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The Papua New Guinea Constitution came into force at midnight on 
16 September 1975 when the country became an independent, sovereign 
State. This thesis is a study of a single aspect of this 
Constitution, namely the legal control of the Executive. The task of 
controlling the Executive is a major aim of the Constitution in that 
it reflects what was perhaps the central concern of the Constitutional 
Planning Committee (CPC) on whose recommendations much of the present 
Constitution is based.
After an account of the factors which gave rise to the concern to 
control the Executive is given, attention is directed to the main part 
of the thesis, viz., the constitutional scheme of control the 
constitution-makers devised for the purpose. The concluding chapter 
provides some assessment of the operation of this scheme in practice, 
focuäing, in particular, on the problems that have been experienced 
since Independence. The chapter goes on to present some suggestions 
as to the reforms that need to be made to the scheme, if the Executive 
is to be adequately and effectively controlled in the future.
iv
PREFACE
Control of the Executive has been one of the important 
constitutional issues that Papua New Guinea faced during its first 
decade of Independence. Through my professional association with the 
implementation of the Constitution since 1975, it has become obvious 
to me that one significant factor which has contributed to these 
constitutional issues has been a lack of a clear understanding among 
Papua New Guineans of their Constitution, particularly of the ways in 
which it is meant to work in practice.
This lack of understanding exists both within the Government and 
outside. A number of factors have contributed to the pervasive nature 
of this problem.
No real attempt has been made by the national government to 
educate the people generally about constitutional matters after the 
Constitution came into force. The only effort that amounted to mass- 
education on a small scale relating to constitutional matters was made 
during the 1972-1974 period when the Constitutional Planning Committee 
organised discussion groups in every Sub-District for the purposes of 
consultation. Even those who appear to be otherwise comparatively 
best informed usually have quite a superficial understanding of the 
basic principles of the Constitution.
There is a further problem of physical accessibility to the 
Constitution. If the Constitution is the basic law of the land and if 
it gives the people of Papua New Guinea their national sovereignty, 
one would think that copies of the Constitution would be made 
available, free of charge, to as many Papua New Guineans as possible. 
This, unfortunately, is not the case.
However, even if the general public had access to the most 
fundamental law of the land, the complexity of the Constitution in 
terms of the subject-matter and the legalistic language render the 
understanding of the Constitution beyond the intellectual grasp of an
Vordinary Papua New Guinean. Nor can it be argued that they have had 
adequate experience of the type required to understand constitutions 
generally, and the Papua New Guinean Gonstitution in particular.
The fact that the Constitution has been in operation for no more 
than a decade has also contributed to this lack of understanding in 
two important respects. First, not all provisions of the Constitution 
have been implemented effectively in that short space of time. 
Secondly, the limited time the Constitution has been in force has not 
allowed its total impact to be fully absorbed into the daily political 
life of Papua New Guineans.
The problem is compounded further by a lack of literature on the 
Constitution generally and on the executive arm of the national 
government in particular. The little literature there is has been the 
work of non-Papua New Guinean lawyers. John Goldring's book The 
Constitution of Papua New Guinea (1978) is the only substantive effort 
so far that attempts to provide some evaluation of the present state 
of the Papua New Guinean constitutional provisions in a single volume.
Since the Constitution is relatively new, I therefore feel that 
the most useful contribution a Papua New Guinean constitutional lawyer 
can make to improving the constitutional system at the moment is to 
help provide a general understanding of how it works, and particularly 
where it fails to work adequately.
The choice of the Executive and control of the Executive as the 
area of focus is deliberate in that 1 want to concentrate on an aspect 
of the Constitution that is important enough to provide some 
perspective on how the overall constitutional system has been working 
since Independence. The theme of control has two advantages. It 
informs the government of what the legal limitations on its powers 
are, and alerts the citizen to the occasions when the government 
exceeds its powers. These are two significant considerations in any 
constitutional system that is based on democracy.
The aim of the work is therefore to expose the general principles 
of the Papua New Guinea constitutional law and practice to enable some 
understanding to be gained of the workings of a new constitution in a 
new but fast-growing society. The law discussed in the work is that 
which was applicable up to 31 December, 1984.
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1INTRODUCTION
SCOPE OF THE THESIS
The control of the Executive is one of the central questions 
addressed by the Papua New Guinea (PNG) Constitution. It is part of 
the general problem of control of government. In its Final Report,'*' 
the Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC) saw it as essential that 
the proposed Independence Constitution should balance two types of 
governmental need, which were equally important for the new State. 
The CPC appreciated that PNG required an effective government which 
would bring about development that Papua New Guineans were calling 
for; and by development it meant the development of the people rather 
than merely the development of the country's economy. Yet, it was 
also convinced that the exercise of governmental powers had to be 
adequately controlled by law.^ This concern arose not only from those 
traditional reasons, such as the prevention of abuse of power, which 
are usually advanced to justify such control, but also from a number 
of factors peculiar to PNG. These factors, discussed fully in Chapter 
1, demonstrate a strong distrust of the Executive on the part ot the 
CPC and others.
Although the CPC was concerned with effectiveness as well as with 
control - and with the need to balance these two objectives - it 
appears to me that the CPC gave the need to control a slightly higher
1. CPC, 1974.
2. Much of the present Constitution is based on the recommendations 
of this Committee. The history and work of the Committee are 
discussed fully in Chapter 1, post.
3. CPC, 1974:1/3, para. 14.
4. The CPC was also aware of other forms of control, such as social 
control through which cohesion had been maintained in the villages in 
PNG. However, it realised that these forms of control would be 
inadequate to deal with problems of modern government: see CPC, 
1974:8/1, para. 1.
2priority.^ This is reflected in the Constitution, which places a 
clear emphasis on control, and says comparatively little on the need 
for effectiveness. For instance, a number of provisions, particularly 
those in Part VIII (Supervision and Control) of the Constitution, are 
concerned specifically with control of power exercised essentially by 
the Executive. But there are no similar provisions relating to the 
need for effective government. This need, however, could be said to 
be implicit in a number of provisions such as those on emergency 
powers and the functions of the National Executive Council. Hence, 
the overall constitutional scheme could suggest that it is, in fact, 
less concerned with the efficiency of government, and with balancing 
effectiveness and control than is actually the case. This continues 
to be a problem because there has so far not been any authoritative 
pronouncement by the courts on this matter. However, this is not the 
concern of this thesis which discusses the ways in which the 
Constitution tries to achieve adequate control of the Executive. 
Nevertheless, it is essential to appreciate that the question of 
control cannot be seen in isolation, but that it must be treated as 
part of a difficult constitutional scheme of balancing effective 
government with controlled government.
Since Independence the need for the control of government, 
particularly for the control of the Executive, has been a significant 
constitutional issue. This is illustrated by a number of important 
Supreme Court decisions, such as Rooney's Case and Bouraga's Case. 
This thesis focuses on control of the executive arm of the National 
Government. ^ My main aim is to explain what the present 
constitutional scheme of the controls is, and to indicate any changes 
that may have been made to that scheme since Independence. These 
changes include the efforts the courts have made in refining and 
clarifying vague provisions of the Constitution. Furthermore, I shall
5. It is interesting to note on this point the comparative 
experience in Africa. There the tendency has been to emphasise 
effective government rather than control of government. See Selassi, 
1974:3; and Nwabueze, 1974:104.
6. See the Preface supra, for the general reasons advanced to 
justify the choice of the topic.
3evaluate how the scheme of controls operates in practice.^
The Essence of the Constitution
Besides providing the framework of government, the PNG 
Constitution also attempts to determine the direction of government
policies and practices by prescribing five National Goals for the
8 9State. The National Goals are not only programmatic, but are the
very essence of the Constitution. They justify the existence of the
State in which the People of PNG vest their power to be exercised for
the purpose of creating the kind of society that could meet their
needs and aspirations.
At the outset, the Goals were intended to determine the
structure, powers and functions of State institutions. There is no 
evidence that the choice of the Westminster model by the CPC for the 
purpose was made on the basis that it was the most suitable system of 
government. Perhaps, the various pressures upon the constitution- 
makers at the time did not afford them adequate opportunity to 
consider whether there were other models which were more suitable.
Nevertheless, the way the Constitution is designed demonstrates 
certain perspectives the constitution-makers had on the relationships 
between the People, the State and the National Goals. The
Constitution declares that all power belongs to the People of PNG. It 
creates the Independent State, defines the Goals of the State 
(i.e. the National Goals), and vests in State institutions the power
7. The thesis is is essentially a study of the PNG constitutional 
law, and to that extent it faces two problems which, as Howard has 
noted (1968 :Preface), are peculiar to any study of constitutional law. 
One is that it is limitless in scope, even within a single theme. The 
other is that governmental and political factors are relevant in this 
area of the law, more so than any other area. I have attempted to 
overcome the first difficulty by focusing on those aspects of legal 
control of the Executive, which have raised significant constitutional 
issues since Independence; and the second by taking account of those 
extra-legal factors only to the extent required by the the particular 
topic under discussion.
8. See the Preamble to the Constitution.
9. It has been said that the Constitution is "in some ways a 
complete expression of all that is noble in the twentieth century": 
see Goldring, 1978:2.
4for the purpose of achieving the Goals. It spells out the criteria by 
which a person may acquire citizenship, and confers on both citizens 
and non-citizens certain Basic Rights which the State in particular is 
required to respect; it also states certain broad principles by which 
government is to be conducted. These include the National Goals, the 
Principles of Natural Justice, the Basic Social Obligations and a 
Leadership Gode.
In this context two points need to be emphsised, since the body 
of this thesis will focus on the control of the Executive and thus on 
a limiting and, in some respects, negative aspect of the Constitution. 
First, the Constitution is a positive document concerned mainly with 
human development, nation-building and creating a Melanesian version 
of a just society. Secondly, the legal limitations on the power 
vested in the State were adopted to ensure that the positive 
objectives of the State embodied in the National Goals are achieved. 
This is not to say that the CPC's concern for control determined the 
actual form of the Constitution, but that it is an important factor 
which must be taken into account and be given special weight in this 
thesis, in order to enable those aspects of the Constitution dealing 
with control to be seen in this proper perspective.
Control of the Executive under the PNC Constitution is not an end 
in itself. Instead, it should be seen as a means of enabling the 
State institutions to exercise the power of the People in accordance 
with the Constitution, and particularly in line with the National 
Goals.
Historical Background
The present Constitution is considerably more detailed than the 
Papua New Guinea Act 1949 (as amended) which was the last colonial 
constitution it replaced. Whereas the current Constitution is both a 
legal as well as a political document,^ the Papua New Guinea Act was 
purely a legal document in the common law tradition in the sense that 
it was concerned with a system of government for adminstering the two 
Territories.
10. That is, it contains a programme to be realised one day. 
Wolf-Phillips classifies such a constitution as 'programmatic': see
Wolf-Phillips , 1972:38-40..
5The framework of government provided by the Papua New Guinea Act
1949 made it natural^ to choose a further development of the
Westminster model of parliamentary government rather than a radical
alternative to it. This system of government had been well
13established by the time of Independence.
Such matters as citizenship and human rights were left to either 
the Australian statutory law or the adopted Common Law, to regulate. 
It was only in 1971 that an Ordinance to protect certain human rights 
was enacted,^ at the initiative of a private member of the House of 
Assembly, after the Territory Administration attempted to override 
these rights in an Ordinance on public order.^
The process of constitution-making which led to the adoption of 
the present Constitution began with the work of three Select 
Committees on Constitutional Development^ that preceded the CPC. The 
first of these was the Gunther Committee appointed in early 1962 by 
the then Legislative Council. It was on the recommendations of this 
Committee that a representative legislature, viz., the First House of 
Assembly, whose members were elected on a universal adult suffrage, 
was established in 1964.
The second Committee was appointed in 1965 by the First House and 
was chaired by John Guise. The introduction of a ministerial system 
in 1968 was the main result of the recommendation of that Committee.
The third Committee - chaired by Paulus Arek - was appointed
11. Particularly by the 1963 amendments and those that followed 
them.
12. de Smith defined this model as comprising four characteristics.
First, the Head of State is not the effective head of government. 
Secondly, the Prime Minister presides over a cabinet of Ministers 
whose appointment and dismissal he has substantial measure of control. 
Thirdly, Ministers are members of Parliament. Fourthly, Ministers are 
collectively and individually responsible to a freely elected and 
representative legislature: see de Smith, 1964:77. The system of
government that had been developed up to 1975 in PNG had all these 
characteristics.
13. For the general development of the Westminster system in PNG, 
see generally Bayne and Colebatch, 1973.
14. Human Rights Ordinance 1971.
15. Public Order Ordinance 1970.
16. These committees are fully discussed in Chapter 1, post.
6during the term of the Second House of Assembly. In contrast to the 
two previous Committees, Arek's Committee made no specific, 
substantive recommendations. Instead it urged that Self-Government 
should be achieved during the 1976-1980 House of Assembly.
Serious preparation for an Independence Constitution began with 
the appointment of CPC in June 1972 by the Third (and last) House of 
Assembly. The Committee was given the mandate:
To make recommendations for a Constitution for full internal 
self-government in a United Papua New Guinea with a view to 
eventual independence.  ^^
The CPC, whose members comprised representatives from the major
groupings in the Third House, began its work in September 1972,
although its appointment was formally announced by the Chief Minister,
earlier on in June. The Committee took almost two years to carry out
its task. It submitted its Final Report to the Chief Minister who in
1 8turn tabled it in the House of Assembly in August 1974. From August 
to December 1974 the House debated the recommendations in the Report. 
Much of the debate was characterised by a conflict between the 
National Coalition Government and the members of the CPC over some of 
the CPC’s recommendations.
Drafting instructions were progressively issued during the debate 
to the First Legislative Counsel to enable him and his staff to 
prepare the Draft Constitution. By May 1975 it was ready for debate. 
Pursuant to the requirement of legal autochthony, the members of the 
House reconstituted themselves into a new body, known as the National 
Constituent Assembly, for the purpose of debating the Draft and of 
adopting it as the Independence Constitution. This new Assembly sat 
intermittently between May and August 1975. When it adopted the
Constitution, it resolved that the Constitution should come into force 
on the Independence Day. It chose 16 September to be the day on which 
PNG would become an independent nation.
17. See CPC, 1974:iv.
18. The work of the Committee and the debate on its Final Report in 
the House of Assembly are discussed in some detail in Chapter 1, post.
7CPC and Its Distrust of the Executive
The constitutional scheme for the control of the Executive can
only be understood if it is seen in the context of the CPC's distrust
of the colonial executive at the time of constitution-making. This
distrust was amply demonstrated by the emphasis CPC placed on the need
for a home-grown constitution. This is not to suggest that the
distrust of the colonial executive was the major factor which
influenced the CPC's determination to have a home-grown constitution;
but it is important to point out that such distrust was a major
19influence in that determination. The CPC wanted to prevent further 
control by the Executive in Canberra over either the content or the 
form the proposed Independence Constitution ought to take.
Furthermore, it distrusted the local Executive in PNG, being led by a 
Papua New Guinean Chief Minister. This distrust led to bitter 
conflict between the National Coalition Government and the CPC. The 
conflict was seen by the Government as ideological. As the Chief
Minister himself later recalled:
The most bitter strife the government has found itself in - 
the confrontation with the Constitutional Planning Committee - 
proves at least, that ideological differences are becoming 
more important in our country than regional interests."
It is not clear what ideological differences Somare meant, as he




The Committee took to heart the national goals of greater 
local control of the economy and self reliance, as well as 
equality and decentralisation, and its consensus appears more 
radical (or certainly nationalistic) than that of the National 
Coalition. ^
Chapter 1 attempts to demonstrate this distrust as the basis for
19. Perhaps because of this and other reasons advanced in Chapter 1, 
post in support of a home-grown constitution, the question (which 
could have been an important one) whether a written constitution was 
needed at all, was never seriously debated (Goldring, 1978:22-23). It 
seems that the necessity for a written constitution was assumed all 
along, and it was perhaps unrealistic under the circumstances to 
expect anyone to seriously question this.
20. Somare, 1975:148.
21. Standish, 1974:96-97. See also John Kaputin's view that the new
constitution must generate change: Post Courier, 12 September 1974.
8the CPC's determination in ensuring that the proposed constitution 
should be home-grown; and that it should contain adequate provisions 
for control of the Executive.
The CPC and the Constitutional Scheme of Control
The CPC recommended the Westminster system of government which, 
as noted above, was almost fully developed in PNG by the time it 
submitted its Final Report. It therefore sought to concentrate on 
improving and adding to the forms of control existing in that system.
A close study of the CPC's Final Report and of the constitutional 
provisions shows that the CPC wanted to strengthen the control of the 
Executive in major respects. It sought to impose both structural and 
substantive forms of control on the Executive. For instance, it 
attempted not only to demarcate power for purposes of control, but 
also to ensure that this was incorporated into the overail 
constitutional scheme by which the total power of the state was 
arranged. As Chapter 2 demonstrates, power is divided and shared as 
well as controlled.
Power is divided generally in two forms. First, it is divided 
through a system of decentralisation between the National Government, 
Provincial Governments and, to a lesser extent, Local-Level 
Governments. Decentralisation is concerned first and foremost with 
the popular notion of participatory government which CPC 
wholeheartedly endorsed, and does not primarily aim at providing 
control. Nevertheless, it involves an element of control in as much 
as decentralisation avoids concentration of power in one particular 
office or at one particular level of government. Power is also 
divided between institutions of the State generally, and between those 
constituting government in particular.
Power thus divided, is then controlled generally through the 
courts and through those the Constitution calls 'Constitutional 
Office-Holders'. Among some of these officials, such as the 
Ombudsman, are given the constitutional responsibility of direct 
supervision and control of the Executive; and are made independent
22. See S. 221 of the Constitution for the list of these officials.
9from the Executive. The Constitutional Office-Holders demonstrate the 
constitutional scheme in which power is divided between various State 
institutions, and the exercise of power thus divided is kept separate 
in some cases by means of constitutionally-guaranteed independence. 
Moreover, the Constitution states specifically that power vested in 
the three principal arms of the National Government (viz., the 
National Parliament, the National Executive and the National Judicial 
System) are, in principle, to be kept separate. But I argue that this 
arrangement should be explained on the basis of the economic principle 
of division of labour rather than in terms of control through the 
traditional doctrine of strict separation of powers which the CPC 
expressly rejected.
Having thus divided the power and provided for its control, the 
CPC went on to recommend that a statement of the need to share out 
that power between the different levels of government and between 
institutions be incorporated into the Constitution. This sharing 
occurs in two forms. One is a vertical sharing in the sense that 
power is shared downwards between different levels of government. 
That is, power vested in the institutions which comprise one level of 
government may be shared by those institutions that make up the other 
levels of government. The other form of sharing is horizontal, in 
that power vested in one institution at one level of government may be 
shared by another institution at the same level. The main legal 
framework tor sharing of power between different levels of government 
is to be found in the Organic Law on Provincial Government. The 
Organic Law divides the whole legislative field into three categories: 
the primarily national subjects; the primarily provincial subjects; 
and the concurrent subjects. The scheme of the Organic Law allows the 
sharing of power between both the National Government and the 
provincial governments in all the three categories. For instance, 
either the National Government or any of the provincial governments 
may legislate in the concurrent field, although it is expected that in 
practice provincial governments would (normally) take the initiative. 
The power over the other two fields can also be shared but on an 
agency basis.
The sharing of power between institutions that operate on one 
level of government is also permitted by the constitutional scheme.
10
It was for this reason that CPC deliberately rejected the notion of a 
strict separation of powers. Thus, under the Constitution as it 
presently stands, the legislative, executive and judicial powers can 
all be shared among institutions. The executive power, for instance, 
can be allocated to institutions outside the Executive, and the same 
principle applies in relation to the other two types of power. The 
significant limitation the Constitution imposes on this sharing is in 
relation to the legislative power: it expressly prohibits the total 
divesting of such power.
The total power of the state is therefore greatly diffused within 
the institutional structure of the State. This diffusion has two 
immediate consequences for the Executive. First, it reduces, in 
structural terms, the size of the Executive, because this wide 
diffusion has the effect of reallocating some of the powers (and thus 
the institutions that exercise them) that were traditionally vested 
it. Chapter 3 attempts to demonstrate the extent of this reduction, 
and indicate the institutions which can be said to constitute the 
Executive proper.
Secondly, as Chapter 4 shows, this diffusion means that even the 
power vested in this reduced Executive is diffused among the 
institutions that comprise the Executive. Thus, the risk of 
concentrating power in one person within the Executive is, in theory 
at least, avoided.
Structurally the CPC wanted to improve the control of the 
Executive by primarily expanding the powers of the National Parliament 
and the courts. In the case of parliamentary control of the 
Executive, the CPC sought to reinforce that form of control through 
the principle of ministerial responsibility to Parliament . It 
recommended that the power over management matters pertaining to 
public service should be vested within the ministry, and that 
personnel matters should be left to an independent Public Services 
Commission. This plan did not succeed, with the result that the 
bureaucracy has enjoyed an unintended hegemony over public service 
matters. The factors which have contributed to this situation are 
explained in Chapter 5.
The CPC's concern to improve the overall effectiveness of
11
parliamentary control over the Executive was reflected by its two 
major recommendations. First, it wanted the Constitution to set up a 
comprehensive system of permanent parliamentary committees. This 
recommendation was not supported by the National Coalition Government, 
which argued that the setting up of such committees should be left to
ordinary statutes: to include them in the Constitution would make the
23constitutional document too long. The result was that this 
particular recommendation was not adopted. It should be noted that 
such committees have not been established subsequently by ordinary 
statute.
Secondly, the CPC recommended that the power to dismiss the 
Executive should be vested in the National Parliamentz to be 
exercised primarily through what it called the procedure of "a 
constructive vote of no confidence" in either the Prime Minister or 
the Ministry collectively. This procedure is intended to achieve two 
objectives simultaneously. It dismisses one Prime Minister and 
replaces him with another. In adopting this procedure, the CPC 
emphasised the need for certainty in government in cases of change of 
government, and thus sought to avoid the uncertainty that occurs in 
the Westminster system of government once there is a successful motion 
of no confidence in the Ministry.
The power of dismissing the Executive given to the Parliament is 
intended to accommodate these two objectives, and Chapter 6 analyses 
the practical and interpretive problems associated with the exercise 
of this power.
The CPC also wanted to strengthen the control over the Executive 
exercised by the courts. Chapter 7 analyses the scope of the modern 
doctrine of judicial review of executive action adopted by the
23. See Government Paper, 1974:18/19.
24. This power is now shared between the Parliament and the Head of 
State in that the effective decision to dismiss is made by the former, 
whilst the formal decision is made by the latter. This illustrates 
the CPC's concept of the sharing of powers, which is fully analysed in 
Chapter 2, post. It should be noted, however, that the CPC saw no 
need for the institution of the Head of State because it argued that 
those functions performed by the Head of State in the Westminster 
system could be carried out by other public officials: see CPC, 
1974:7/1-7/2.
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Constitution, and particularly the emphasis the Constitution places on 
the need for justice.
Besides structural control, the CPC sought to prescribe
substantive limitations on the exercise of power by the Executive, by
incorporating nineteen Basic Rights, and by prescribing procedural
limitations through the adoption of the Principles of Natural Justice.
The Basic Rights provide the broad parameters within which the
Executive was traditionally free to act, while the requirements of
Natural Justice provided procedural restrictions on how the Executive
could exercise power within these parameters. The Principles of
Natural Justice also apply outside the Basic Rights in that any action
of the Executive can be challenged on the basis that it breaches one
of these Principles, even though there may be no substantive right of
25an individual involved.
Concerned with improving the quality of leadership in the
government, the CPC sought to control even the actual conduct (.both
official and personal) of leaders by prescribing a strict Leadership
Code. To administer the Code the CPC recommended the establishment of
9 Aan Ombudsman Commission. This Commission now administers two types
of jurisdictions, viz., the Leadership Code and a general
27maladministration. Significant constitutional issues involving
illegal conduct of leaders (most of whom have been members of the 
Executive) have arisen under the Leadership Code jurisdiction. 
Chapter 8 therefore analyses the nature and scope of this 
jurisdiction, and suggests the reforms that need to be made to 
strengthen it.
25. These principles are essentially those which courts use to 
control the Executive action, and are therefore discussed in the 
context of judicial control in Chapter 7, post. The Basic Rights are 
analysed in the context of the National Goals in Chapter 9, post, 
because it is in that context that Executive action such as a policy 
which aims to promote the Goals, may come into colflict with the Basic 
Rights. Analysis of such conflict would illustrate another way in 
which control could be applied to the Executive through the 
enforcement of these substantive limitations.
26. The composition and function of the Commission are discussed in 
chapter 8, post.
27. Maladministration is a general jurisdiction which applies to all 
public officials including the Leaders who come under the Code.
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Furthermore, the CPC even attempted to prescribe the substance of 
the executive policy by adopting five National Goals and a number of 
Directive Principles for their implementation. Thus, the Constitution 
requires the Executive and other public authorities to take the Goals 
fully into account in formulating policies. They thus serve as 
general constitutional requirements to which executive action has to 
conform, as constitutional yardsticks by which the Executive policy, 
in particular, is to be measured. They prescribe the content of the 
Executive policy by requiring the Executive to adopt a certain course 
of action; and at the same time they control the Executive’s 
discretion by defining the limits to the exercise of that discretion. 
In implementing the Goals, the Executive is likely to come into 
conflict with the Basic Rights. Chapter 9 analyses the question 
whether these Goals and the Directive Principles are constitutionally 
binding on the Executive, and (in cases where an Executive policy 
which aims to implement the goals comes into conflict with the Basic 
Rights) suggests how the Goals can be reconciled with the Basic 
Rights.
In the rest of this thesis I will concentrate mainly on two 
questions: how has the Constitution elaborated the scheme for the 
control of the Executive outlined above, and how successfully has it 
operated in practice during the last ten years?
14
CHAPTER 1
ESTABLISHING A HOME-GROWN CONSTITUTION: 
A DISTRUST OF THE EXECUTIVE
Indigenous leaders in Papua New Guinea in the 1960s looked to 
Self-Government and Independence to provide them with the opportunity 
to end the domination of PNG affairs by the foreign Executive in 
Canberra. The foreign Executive consisted of the Minister for
External Territories of the Commonwealth of Australia and his 
bureaucrats. The feeling of resentment by the PNG leaders against 
tight Canberra control was demonstrated by a number of leading Papua 
New Guineans at the time in their joint submission to the Guise Select 
Committee on Constitutional Development^ in 1965. Maori Kiki, who was 
among them and was one of the founding members of the PANGU Pati, 
recalled that feeling thus:
We pointed out that the present system of administration was 
out of date, autocratic, unrealistic and inflexible, that it 
was merely perpetuating the domination of the Federal 
Government in the affairs of Papua New Guinea to the exclusion 
of our own leaders.^
Evidence of the fact that the real power was exercised by the 
foreign Executive in Canberra was provided by Johnson in the reasons 
he gave when he resigned in 1970 as the Assistant Administrator. 
Johnson stated that he found it difficult to carry out his duties,
[because of] ... the constantly strained relations between 
External Territories and the Administration of Papua New 
Guinea, [due to] ... the Secretary of the Department's attempt 
to control every aspect of Papua New Guinea affairs in the 
name of his Minister. My most difficult experiences were in 
the development and management of Papua New Guinea's works 
programme, where even minor items had to be referred to
1. The work of this Committee and of the other Select Committees on
constitutional development is discussed below: pp.21-30.
2. Kiki, 1968:154.
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Canberra for approval ....
One significant effect of the Canberra domination was observed by 
the Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC) four years later:
Our colonisers have paid little regard to [our] values.
They imposed their "governments", their democracy, their 
institutions and their will with little or no regard to our 
own values and institutions. This way is a blatant denial of 
our humanity. By their practices, they have to some extent 
changed the natural growth of our human development and our 
organizations and forced them into positions of subservience.^
To extract themselves from this position of subservience, Papua New
Guineans needed power. As far as the CPC was concerned, that power
had been unjustly taken away from the people of PNG by the colonial
rulers. Thus, in its Final Report, the CPC called for that power to
be returned to the people.^ Further, the CPC wanted that power to be
permanently vested in the people; so that any assignment of power
thereafter was to be held in trust for the people. By this
arrangement the CPC sought to make it perfectly clear that power did
not belong to any single individual or group in PNG.
During the colonial rule that power was effectively in the hands
of the foreign Executive. It was only in the 1960s as a result of
international pressures, particularly from the United Nations, that 
Papua New Guineans were brought into participating in the process of 
governing their own country. To place this participation in its 
historical context, a brief account of the main stages of the modern 
constitutional development in PNG is pertinent at this point.
That development could be regarded as having gone through three 
general historical phases prior to Independence. The first phase 
which took much of the seventy-seven years of the Australian 
administration involved establishing administrative and legal control 
over the country. This period began with the assumption by Australia
3
3. Johnson, 1983:4.
4. CPC, 1974:2/14, para. 109.
5. Ibid. 101/1, para. 8.
6. There was, of course, an evolution of traditional constitutional 
systems in villages over a long period of time prior to the official 
assumption of the colonial rule in 1884. See CPC, 1974:2/14, para. 
1 1 0 .
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of its responsibility over Papua in 1906, and the mandated Territory 
of New Guinea in 1921; and ended by 1949 when almost all of the 
country was brought under at least some administrative control.^ 
Presumably, this would have been achieved earlier had it not been for 
the devastation brought about by World War II. There was however, 
hardly any consideration given during this period to involving the 
native population in government, except marginally, and even then, 
only for purposes of either establishing or maintaining control. For 
this purpose, 'Luluais', 'Tultuls' and 'Village Constables’ were 
appointed
The second stage began in 1949 with the concern to establish the
constitutional framework for a modern state under the Papua New Guinea
Act 1949. The policy emphases were on health, education and economicqdevelopment. Some consideration was given to the question of 
participation by the native population in the government of the two 
Territories. The two principal forms of this participation were 
through the introduction of a Native Local Government Council system 
and through the Legislative Council. The native population had a 
limited representation in the latter body. The period from roughly 
1950 to 1963 was, in the words of Sir Paul hasluck, the then Minister 
for Territories, 'a time for building' a modern nation.^ In fact, 
Hasluck’s policy on 'building a nation' seems to have emphasised other 
aspects more than constitutional development. For instance, the 
number of native members of the new Legislative Council remained at 
three from 1951 until increased to seven in 1960.^ The official 
historian of the Australian colonial rule explains why political 
development was lacking:
The priorities that Hasluck had established were health, 
education and agriculture. Political development was much 
lower in the order of things and it will be seen from the 
membership composition of the Legislative Council that the 
Council was a vehicle for carrying out government policy 
rather than an immediate means of providing political 
advancement for Papua New Guineans. The means of providing an
7. Rowley, 1967:68.
8. See Wolfers, 1975:19-20; 67-68.
9. See generally, Jinks, 1975.
10. Hasluck, 1976.
11. Griffin, Nelson and Firth, 1979:131.
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introduction for the people to representative government and 
politics was to be local government.^
The third stage of constitutional development, which began in 1962 ana
ended with the final achievement of Independence in the second half of
1975, was the most important period in as much as it was the period in
which Papua New Guineans were trained in the art of parliamentary
democracy. That training was brought about largely through
international pressure, especially through the influential ’Foot
Report of the United Nations' Visiting Mission' (the Foot Report) in
1962. 'We believe', the Report said, 'that the establishment of a
central representative parliament will, more than anything else, give
to the Territory the national sentiment and that sense of political
13unity which has so far been so noticeably lacking.' These words in 
fact echoed the tenor of Resolution 1514 (XV) of the United Nations on 
Declaration of the Granting of Indepencence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples passed by the General Assembly on 14 December, 1960, without a 
dissenting vote.^ The constitutional development that took place 
during this period could be generally taken as having gone through two 
phases: the first related to the work of the Select Committees on
Constitutional Development, on whose recommendations much of the 
development within the first two Houses of Assembly was effected. The 
second stage commenced with the work of the Constitutional Planning 
Committee (.CPC) in 1972. Although the present constitution is basea, 
for the most part, on the recommendations of the CPC, the style and 
the approach the Committee took were influenced by the work of the 
Select Committees on Constitutional Development of the 1964 and 1968 
Houses of Assembly. There was therefore a continuity in at least the 
general approach taken, and this reflected the basic policy accepted 
both in Australia and in PNG that the Constitution for an independent 
PNG was to be determined not only by Papua New Guineans, but by them 
in their own country.
12. Downs, 1980:101.
13. Quoted by Jinks, Biskup and Nelson, 1973:383.
14. Ibid., 405-407.
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1.1 THE SELECT COMMITTEES AND INVOLVEMENT OF PAPUA NEW 
GUINEANS IN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 1962-1972
Select committees on constitutional development became the means 
by which Papua New Guineans were involved in determining the kinds of 
constitutional changes that were needed during the period from 1962 to 
1972. The idea of select committees emerged in the Second Legislative 
Council which first met in April, 1961. There were three such 
committees. In March 1962 the first Select Committee on Political 
Development was appointed.
The members of the Committee comprised two senior Australian 
public servants, two Australian settlers and two Papua New Guineans, 
and were all members of the Legislative Council. The Committee was 
chaired by Dr John Gunther, who was then an Assistant Administrator. 
It consulted widely with the people in the Territory, and held public 
meetings at District headquarters to enable the people to air their 
views and make submissions. In adopting this procedure, the Committee 
appears to have been influenced by the practice of the previous United 
Nations' Visiting Missions which had visited various parts of the 
Territory of New Guinea (which was a U.N. Mandated Territory), to get 
the local people's response to how Australia, as the administering 
authority, had been carrying out its mandate. Thus, a tradition of 
consulting the people on constitutional development had been 
established at an early stage.
The Gunther Committee, as it became known, submitted its report 
to the Legislative Council towards the end of 1962, recommending inter 
alia, a new legislature of 64 members based on adult suffrage. The 
Legislative Council together with the Australian Government accepted 
most of Committee's recommendations. Historians have suggested that 
perhaps the Committee's recommendations would not have been so easily 
accepted had it not been for the compelling influence brought about by 
the report of the United Nations' Visiting Mission under the 
chairmanship of Sir Hugh Foot.^ There was certainly a momentum for 
decolonisation following the UN Declaration on Decolonisation in
15. Griffin, Nelson and Firth, 1979:133.
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The constitutional changes made during the 1963-1974 period were 
brought about through progressive amendments of the Papua New Guinea 
Act 1949. Thus, the recommendations of the Gunther Committee were 
implemented in 1964 through the amendments made to that Act in 1963. 
The most important of these was the establishment of the first House 
of Assembly of 64 members elected through a general election in 1964.
Political development after 1964 was seen generally in terms of 
constitutional development. Hence, whereas the Gunther Select 
Committee was perhaps appropriately called 'Select Committee on 
Political Development', the second Select Committee was in turn, 
appropriately named, 'Select Committee on Constitutional Development'. 
This second Select Committee which became known as 'The Guise 
Committee' after its Chairman, John Guise, was appointed by a 
resolution of the House on 19 May 1965, a little over a year after the 
first general elections ever to have been held in PNC. Again, the 
Committee comprised only members of the House of Assembly, numbering 
fifteen in all. Nine were Papua New Guineans whilst the rest were 
Europeans of whom tour were officials of the Australian 
Administration.
The Committee was asked to consider ways and means ot preparing 
and presenting a set of constitutional proposals to serve as a guide 
for future constitutional development in PNG. For this purpose the 
Committee toured the whole country extensively, conducting public 
meetings to elicit views and opinions on constitutional changes. The 
Committee also visited Canberra to consult with the Australian 
Government on the ultimate political options tor PNG. It was decided 
that the Committee should do this before touring the Districts since 
some of the questions to be put to the people depended very much on 
the Australian position. By this time two options seemed to have 
emerged in relation to the question of ultimate political association 
with Australia. One was that PNG should become the seventh state ot 
the Australian Commonwealth; the other was that it should develop
16. Sir James Piimsoll, Arthur F. Yencken Memorial Lectures, 
September 1983, ANU on 'Australia and The Third World' (personal 
notes).
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towards self-government and eventual independence. In Canberra 
William McMahon, the Federal Treasurer, who headed the Australian 
Government delegation told the Select Committee that the seventh 
statehood option was not open to PNG. Upon returning to PNG, members 
of the Committee were heard muttering, 'orli ino laikim mifela'.^^
The Guise Committee submitted its final report to the House of 
Assembly on the 6 June, 1967. Among the most important of its 
recommendations was that which advocated a system of seven Ministers 
to be appointed among the PNG members of the House. These changes 
were brought into effect in 1968 through amendments to the Papua New 
Guinea Act 1949.
The third Select Committee on Constitutional Development (the 
Arek Committee) was appointed by the Second House of Assembly on 24 
June, 1969, on a motion of Paulus Arek. Fourteen members of the House 
were appointed to the Committee with Arek as its Chairman. Nine were 
Papua New Guineans, three were elected European members whilst two 
were official members. The Terms of Reference were identical with 
those of the previous Guise Committee.
Following the precedent set by previous Select Committees, the
Arek Committee toured the country extensively for purposes of
consultation. The Committee also visited Africa, London, the
South-West Pacific, South-East Asia and Australia. In the words of
Ian Downs, Australian official historian, the Committee ’became by far
the most travelled, best briefed and most expensive group of
1 Hpoliticians in Papua New Guinea up to that time'.
The work of the Arek Committee was, however, overshadowed by the 
new administrative arrangements under which significant authority was 
being transferred from Canberra to the Administrator's Executive 
Council in Konedobu. That is, while the Arek Committee was attempting 
to ascertain what the next constitutional changes ought to be, the 
foreign Executive in Canberra undercut the Committee's efforts by 
transferring certain executive powers to the local Executive in PNG.
17. Meaning in Pidgin,
1980:363.
18. Ibid.:397 .
'They do not like us', quoted by Downs,
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The decision to transfer these powers followed from a visit to PNG by 
the Australian Prime Minister, John Gorton, in 1970. The Arek
Committee submitted its final report to the House of Assembly on 4 
March, 1971. The most significant recommendation of the Committee was 
its call for self-government during the 1972-1976 House of Assembly. 
As the subsequent events showed, the Committee's perception of the 
rate of change in PNG was inaccurate. Self-government came on 1st 
December, 1973.
The Australian Government did not oppose the Select Committees on
Constitutional Development as it saw in them the means of keeping in
touch with the political opinion within the PNG community. It
therefore chose to co-operate, although on one occasion David Hay, the
then Administrator, for instance, had to advise the Secretary for the
Territories in Canberra not to try to dictate 'the course of events'
1 9in the Guise Select Committee.
It seemed to have been generally accepted that there would be a 
written constitution. As Geoffrey Sawer remarked in 1965 when 
examining the possibilities in this regard, '[thej Constitution cannot 
be "unwritten" or unenacted.' but he envisaged that it would either
take the form of "an Act of the Australian Commonwealth Parliament or
„21an annexe to such an Act.
The crucial question was, what should be the content of such a 
constitution? The answer was seen by the two Select Committees as 
related closely to the question of what form of political association 
PNG should have with Australia. This question was left up in the air 
since there was so much ambiguity in the attitude of the Australian 
Government. On this point Australia did not have any policy. All it 
had was a set of guidelines which emphasised maximum flexibility so as
to enable any Australian Government at the time to handle any
22development in this respect. both of the Select Committees of the 
first and second houses of Assembly had to travel to Canberra, for 
instance, to seek an official clarification on this question. But
19. Ibid.
20. Sawer, 1965:29.
21. Ibid. Sawer, however, advanced no reasons for his view.
22. Downs, 1980:370.
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once the choice of seventh statehood was eliminated, the only serious 
option that remained was independence.
One further factor which concerned judges and lawyers in PNG was 
a narrow scope of constitutional change that was taking place during 
this'period. It was clear that the focus of the Select Committees was 
restricted to the mechanics of operating the emerging Westminster 
model of parliamentary government, the framework of which was already 
provided for under the Papua New Guinea Act 1949. It was very much 
the question of replacing the official members of the Administrator's 
Executive Council with elected members of the House of Assembly since 
constitutional development, as Bayne and Colebatch noted, was
generally following the pattern of constitutional development of a
2 Icrown colony. J
In order therefore to widen the scope of constitutional change,
the judges and the lawyers organised (with the support of the
Australian legal fraternities) two seminars in Port Moresby where
other matters such as human rights as well as systems of government
were discussed. The main organiser and financial supporter was the
International Commission of Jurists. The first seminar in 1965
focused on the rule of Law, whilst that of 1970 looked at a number
25of other general constitutional matters. Most members of the Guise 
Committee attended the first seminar, and likewise most members of the 
Arek Committee were participants in the second.
Thus, by 1971, those members of the two Houses of Assembly who 
had served on the two Select Committees were aware of both the kinds 
of matters which a constitution could regulate, and the ways of 
getting a constitution. When the third and the last House of Assembly 
was sworn in, in May, 1972, a procedure for further constitutional 
development had been established. The choice of procedure was also 
influenced by the general experience of constitution-making within the 
Commonwealth of Nations. A brief general account of that experience 
is therefore germane at this point to provide comparative background.
23. See Bayne and Colebatch, 1973: 1; and for the three stages
involved in this pattern of constitutional development: see Wight,
1952:17-34.
24. See generally, International Commission of Jurists, 1965.
25. See generally, Young, 1971.
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The pattern in the Commonwealth was characterised by two distinct
constitutional steps. First, a full internal self-government was
9 Agranted, followed by full independence. ° The difference between 
self-government and independence is explained by de Smith thus:
Internal self-government falls short of independence in so 
far as it implies the absence of full international 
personality and of "Statute of Westminster" legal status. 
Furthermore, the field of self-government will not be 
inviolable unless the British Government has explcitly agreed 
that it would be constitutionally improper to encroach upon 
it. The Crown usually retains full powers of constitutional 
amendment, and sometimes retains unrestricted legislative 
powers, exercisable by Order of Council ....^
The old Dominions of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa
98did not clearly follow this pattern of constitutional development. 
But the former British colonies which became independent after World 
War II did.
Furthermore, in each case of these former British colonies
29Independence was achieved with a written constitution. By the eve
of World War II, the old dominions were also operating under written
constitutions. New Zealand was and still is the exception in this 
30respect. Most of these constitutions have been enacted since World
War II. A computerised study of 142 written constitutions (including
those within the Commonwealth) reveals that 81.7 per cent of these
have been enacted since 1945. Out of these, the majority of the
constitutions (54.9 per cent) belong to the states that had been
either former colonies or had had some form of association with the
Western form of colonial rule. Almost half of this majority (24.6 per
cent) had been ruled either directly by Britain or ruled under the
31British-type of colonial system.
26. These two steps were taken in 1973 and 1975 respectively, in the 
case of PNG.
27. de Smith, 1964:56.
28. For instance, in the case of Australia it is difficult to 
determine the point at which Australia became independent: see 
Barwick C.J., in Bonser v. La Macchia (1969) 43 A.L.J.R. 275 at 278.
29. Here I adopt the ’constitution' to mean either a single document 
or a set of documents.
30. Maarseveen and Tang, 1978:57.
31. Ibid. The study includes the PNG Constitution.
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Although Britain itself has no written constitution, it did not
oppose or prevent any of its former colonies from adopting one. But
this does not mean that Britain had no influence on either the form or
the content of these constitutions. The earlier constitutions, which
were, in the form of Orders-in-Council (such as the Jamaica
(Constitution) Urder-in-Council 1944) , show not only the degree of the
British influence but also their preference for British legislation
rather than a locally enacted constitution as the proper legal form
32for regulating constitutional matters. Allott indicates this
general British influence thus:
The British not only left a British-type constitution, 
they also left a fund of British ideas, assumptions and 
institutions, a political culture ... which might or should, 
have induced changes to conform to the so-called "Westminster" 
tradition.
But the enactment of the constitution in each case did not follow 
one particular form of procedure. By the early 1960s there had 
developed two alternate ways for enacting independence constitutions 
in the Commonwealth: one method largely followed the earlier
experience and was Westminster-made, whilst the other method led to a 
home-grown constitution.
The enactment of a Westminster-made constitution usually involved
the establishment in the colony of a contitutional convention or a
similar body for the purpose of preparing a constitution. This would
then be followed by a round-table conference in London where the final
form and content of the constitution were settled between the
'leaders’ of the colonial people and the British Government. This
settlement was finally embodied in either an Act of the British
Parliament or an Order-in- Council. The constitutions of the ola
Dominions were enacted through this procedure, and so too were those
of some of the former British colonies wich achieved independence in
34recent years, for example the Solomon Islands. Between 15 June,
1959, and 23 June, 1960, the British Colonial Office produced no less
32. McPetrie, 1963:29.
33. Allott, 1968:1.
34. Some of the examples are, The Solomon Islands Independence Act 
1978; The Australian Constitution Act 1900; and the India Independence 
Act 1947.
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o cthan ninety-two constitutional instruments of one kind or another. 
They were all enacted at Westminster. The British insistence that the 
withdrawal of the British sovereignty should be marked by some 
legislative enactment was based on what Roberts-Wray claimed to be 'an 
established constitutional convention that the relinquishment of
O £British title required Parliamentary c o n s e n t . ' T h e r e  is of course 
an important difference, at least notionally, between the
relinquishment of the British sovereignty and the establishment of a 
constitution for a new independent sovereign state. But this 
difference was not regarded as significant in terms of constitutional 
theory relating to the Westminster-made constitutions, largely because 
there was no break in the legal continuity between the two events 
since the power exercised on both occasions was the same power, and 
was derived from the same source, namely Great Britain.
A home-grown constitution was one enacted within the country. In
contrast to the method used in enacting a Westminster-made
constitution, the procedure used in enacting a home-grown constitution
37was 'locally operated' or internalised within the country. The idea 
of a home-grown constitution in the modern history ot constitution­
making began with the enactment of the American Constitution in 17B7. 
In the context of the Commonwealth, the first effort at enacting a 
home-grown constitution was the attempt by the Irish in 1922 to 
establish a constitution of an Irish Free State. Ireland was a 
British dependency. The Irish argued that the power to determine 
their own constitution, and the way of enacting it lay with them and 
not with anyone else. The British Government, on the other hand, 
claimed that that power rested with the British Parliament. The Irish 
won in the end by enacting the Constitution of Lire in 1937 through a 
referendum held in Ireland itself. The Dir&l, the Irish Parliament, 
was not involved in that enactment although the draft of the 
Constitution was submitted to it prior to the referendum for its
Q Uconsideration. The 1937 Constitution ot Eire was thus the first 
home-grown constitution in the Commonwealth. It became the precedent
35. See McPetrie, 1963:29-30.
36. Roberts-Wray, 1963:44.
37. Marshall, 1971:58.
38. See Wheare, 1960:89-94; and see generally Delany, 1957-8:1.
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for the remaining British dependencies that aspired to home-grown 
39constitutions.
The experience of enacting home-grown constitutions in the 
Commonwealth after 1937 reveals two general trends. On the one hand 
there were cases of former colonies which adopted home-grown 
constitutions after they became independent. The reason for a 
home-grown constitution was political rather than legal since what
these countries wanted to secure was stability at Independence.
India, Pakistan, Ghana and Sri Lanka fall into this group. Each
country achieved independence under British legislation,^ but 
subsequently replaced this with a home-grown constitution.^ In each 
of these countries, either a constituent assembly or a constitutional
/ 9convention was used in enacting the constitution. In the case of
Ghana, a referendum was also held.
On the other hand, there were those former dependencies which
became independent in the first instance through a home-grown
constitution. Western Samoa, Nauru and PNG are examples in this
44category. Whilst Nauru used a constitutional convention, Western
45Samoa chose a constitutional convention together with a referendum.
46In the case of PNG, a constituent assembly was used, and the reason 
for this was the argument by the CPC that the members of the National 
Constituent Assembly were sufficiently representative of the people 
(having been elected for purposes of the Third House of Assembly) to
39. See similar development in the founding of the American Republic 
discussed by Wood (1969) where he presents new notions on the American 
republicanism (rather than the notion that it was just as a colonial 
rebellion) to emphasise the home-grown nature of the American 
Constitution.
40. See India Independence Act 1947 which granted independence to 
both India and Pakistan; Ghana (Constitution) Order-in-Council 1957; 
and Ceylon Independence Act 1947.
41. The Constitution of India 1950; The Constitution of Pakistan 
1956; The Constitution of Ghana 1960; and Sri Lanka Constitution 1972.




45. Roberts-Wray, 1966:295-301; 296.
46. Goldring, 1978:27-30; and Ley (1978).
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negate any claim that a referendum was also necessary. ^  The CPC 
attempted to define what it meant by a home-grown constitution.
1.2 THE CPC AMD THE CONCEPT OF A HOME-GROWN CONSTITUTION
The reaction against the foreign Executive in Canberra was 
clearly uemonstrated by the CPC's concept of a home-grown 
constitution. That concept was defined in the Committee's Final 
Report; and it is pertinent to discuss that concept at this juncture 
because the composition of the CPC itself, its method of operation ana 
indeed its recommendations, were all influenced largely by that 
concept.
The CPC realised very early the need for substantive change to be 
made to the existing colonial system. In its Final Report it stated 
that concern:
The Committee believes that at present our country's leaders 
have a unique opportunity to change the existing, foreign- 
imposed system of government, which is widely recognized as 
being inappropriate to our needs. This opportunity must be 
firmly grasped. Now is the historic moment in our search for 
identity and self-fulfilment to take the necessary measures to 
make substantial changes in all of our institutions, to create 
new ones, and to redirect development when things are fluid 
and tractable. But for us to know clearly what measures 
should be taken, our objectives must be clearly established.
The members of the CPC saw the proposed constitution as crucial 
in helping to bring about the changes. But they were also aware that 
this could only be guaranteed if the constitution was drafted and 
enacted by Papua New Guineans themselves. Thus, they did not accept 
the idea that foreigners should determine either the form or the 
content of the proposed constitution. The idea of a home-grown 
constitution seems to have emerged naturally from this type of 
thinking. In its Second Interim Report released in November, 1973, 
the CPC expressed its concept of a home-grown constitution thus:
For a constitution to be truly 'home-grown' the Committee 
believes it should be appropriate to the needs and aspirations 
of the people, and it has done its best to try to ensure that 
its recommendations accord with those needs and aspirations.
47. See CPC, 1974:15/1, para. 6
48. CPC, 1974:2/1, para. 2.
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A second requirement of a 'home-grown* constitution is that it 
should, as far as possible, be based on indigenous systems of 
and ideas about political institutions and procedures. While 
it may not be possible to make direct use of indigenous 
systems of government, due to the small scale of traditional 
Communities and the impact of colonialism on them, the 
Committee believes that it should look to traditional values 
and procedures for inspiration.
The Coalition Government also supported this definition of a 
home-grown constitution. In his speech explaining the motion to 
establish the CPC in June 1972, Chief Minister Somare emphasised that,
(we) must ensure ... therefore that the constitution is suited 
to the needs and circumstances of Papua New Guinea and is not 
imposed from the outside. In short it should be a home-grown 
constitution.^
Although the CPC appreciated that it was perhaps not possible or 
desirable for the proposed constitution to achieve all this, it 
nevertheless believed that the constitution should look to traditional 
values and procedures tor inspiration.^
The concept of a home-grown constitution finally adopted by the
CPC therefore had two elements. First, the CPC wanted the
constitution to be made by Papua New Guineans themselves. Secondly,
it was anxious to see that as much as possible the new constitution
52should reflect appropriate traditional values of the villages. This 
is the meaning of home-grown constitution I have adopted in this work. 
Thus, it can be said that by the early 1970s the feeling for a 
home-grown constitution became an essential component of the 
preparation for Self-Government and Independence.
The preparation began in earnest during the third and the last 
House of Assembly. The inauguration of that house in May 1972 took 
place at the time when there were two major constitutional steps being 
taken towards Self-Government and Independence. There was first the 
general but slow political and constitutional progress towards 
Independence that commenced with the Gunther Committee in 1962. But
49. CPC, 1973(b):2/2, paras. 2.6 and 2.7.
50. See H.A.D., 111:3,279.
51. CPC, 1974:1/2, para. 9.
52. Ibid.
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the real momentum for the drive towards Independence came after the 
Guise Committee returned from Canberra in April 1966, where the 
Committee had been told in no uncertain terms by the Australian 
Government that future association with Australia within the 
Australian federal system was out of question. The result of this 
meeting was that Independence became the only goal to Papua New 
Guineans. As Downs has noted, the effect of this was that,
'Target dates' once only important to foreigners and 
intellectuals, had finally become important to Papua New 
Guineans
The second and specific constitutional step was a gradual 
transfer of powers from Canberra to the Coalition Government in 
Konedobu under the Administrative Arrangements (Vesting of Powers) 
Ordinance 1971-1972. This move was initiated by the Australian 
Prime Minister, John Gorton, after his visit to PNG in July 1970. 
Gorton was in fact forced to make the visit after the Leader of the 
Opposition in the Australian Parliament, Gough Uhitlara, made his third 
visit to PNG in January 1970. Upon his return to Canberra, Uhitlam 
accused the Australian Government of not preparing the people of PNG 
for Self-Government.
These constitutional changes provided opportunities for political 
parties to emerge and operate. Loveuay and Wolfers provide a succinct 
account of the emergence of the major political parties and their aims 
up to 1975 thus:
Throughout the 1960s, constitutional change was a catalyst 
to political change in Papua New Guinea, particularly to the 
formation and activities of political parties. The first 
political party to be formed in Papua New Guinea other than a 
branch of a foreign party was the United Progress party, 
announced in October 1960, shortly before the first election 
of Papua New Guinean members to the legislative council. Some 
of its leaders campaigned on behalf of party candidates in the 
1961 elections, but the party did not survive to play a part 
in the new legislative council. The first party to function 
in the legislature, the PANGU Pati, was launched in June 1967, 
only a few months before an election and the initial steps 
towards ministerial government. And, late in 1970, Gompass 
(which was subsequently renamed the United party), the New 
Guinea National party and the Peoples Progress party were
53. Downs, 1980:375.
54. See generally Bayne and Golebatch, 1973:23.
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formally established following a major transfer of executive 
power from the Australian government to Papua New Guinea 
ministers, and with the 1972 elections in view.’5'1
By the end of the Second House of Assembly in 1971 there was a 
general feeling that Self-Government and Independence were inevitable. 
The important questions were the timing and the remaining necessary 
constitutional steps which had to be taken to reach these two 
constitutional objectives. The most important of these constitutional 
steps was the preparation of a constitution that would effectuate both 
Self-Government and Independence. There was, however, still no debate 
about the advantages and disadvantages of having a written 
constitution. It was probably felt that the need for a written 
constitution was obvious. After all, virtually every modern state, 
especially those that emerged since the end of World War II had a 
written constitution.
As soon as he became the Ghief Minister following the 1972 
General Elections, Michael Somare wanted to set up an all-party 
Committee to investigate into and make recommendations on a permanent 
constitution. But Andrew Peacock, the then Australian Minister for 
External Territories, advised against it, largely because he feared
that such a committee could easily include independent-minded persons
5 6whom Somare might find difficult to control. However, Somare did 
not follow Peacock's advice and went ahead to move formally in June 
1972 in the House of Assembly for the appointment of a Constitutional 
Planning Committee (CPC). The House passed the motion, although 
members of the CPC were not sworn in formally until September 1972. 
In his statement announcing the appointment of the Committee, made on 
the floor of the House on 23 June, 1973, the Chief Minister took the 
need for a written constitution for granted. For the task set for the 
Committee was,
To make recommendations tor a Constitution tor full internal 
self-government in a united Papua New Guinea with a view to
55. Loveday and Wolfers, 1976:1. Since 1972 another major party, 
namely, the Melanesian Alliance has come into existence. It was 
formed in 1979 by John Momis and John Kaputin after they were sacked 
by the Prime Minister Somare from his cabinet for refusing to assume 




The Committee was not asked to inquire into whether a written 
constitution was needed and, if so, whether it should follow a
particular form. Theoretically this question has some importance, 
but, . under the circumstances at the time, it was not a practical 
consideration.
Somare's desire to have an all-party committee meant that 
political factors played a large part in the selection of the members 
of the CPC. The first of these was that all members had to be elected 
representatives of the people through their membership of the House of 
Assembly. This was more or less a repetition of the practice of the 
previous Select Committees. The second criterion was the
representation by the political parties in the House at the time. The 
PANGU Pati had four, the People^s Progress Party had two, the National 
Party and the Mautangan Association had one each; there was one 
Independent, whilst the United Party had six members. The total 
membership was therefore fifteen. The third criterion was that of 
regional representation. There were then as there are still now, four 
main regions in PNG: these were New Guinea Coastal, New Guinea
Islands, New Guinea Highlands and Papua. The composition of the CPC 
reflected regional representation in that it had five members from 
each of the two populous regions, viz., the New Guinea highlands and 
the New Guinea Coastal, and three each from the two remaining 
regions."^
Fourteen of the fifteen had been members of the previous House of 
Assembly, and two had been members of the first House in 1964. Most 
therefore had political experience. In fact the Committee maintained 
some continuity with the previous work of the Select Committees 
through having both John Guise and Paulus Arek as its members.
Except for two members, all the Committee members were fairly
57. CPC, 1975 :iv. The real need was to have one united country. 
Thus, any idea of federation was ignored.
58. See Goldring, 1978:22-23, where he argues that it was an 
important question which was ignored.
59. CPC, 1974:ii.
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well educated, and quite articulate in English.DU All of them could 
either speak Pidgin or Motu, the two linguae francae spoken in PNG. 
The lack of extensive formal education of the two members who could 
not speak English was compensated by their experience in the previous 
House of Assembly and, before that, with local government councils.
The Government was represented by three Ministers, Somare
61himself, his Deputy John Guise and Paulus Arek. When Arek died0 in 
November 1973, Boyamo Sali (another Minister) took his place.
In contrast to the previous Select Committee which were
committees of the House of Assembly, the CPC had the status of a
government-appointed committee. John Ley, who was the legal officer
to the CPC, claims that the Government planned the CPC that way in
order to achieve two objectives. One was to ensure that there was
maximum flexibility in reporting to both the PNG Cabinet and the
Australian Government on proposed recommendations; and the other was
to avoid any serious differences that might have arisen between the
6 9Government and the CPC. In the event, serious differences did arise 
despite the representative composition of the CPC. Although the CPC 
was a government-appointed committee and the Somare Government viewed 
its status as such, the members of the CPC, apart from the Ministerial 
members, regarded the Committee as a Committee of the House.
The matters which the CPC was required under its Terms of 
Reference to investigate and to make recommendations on could be 
grouped under five headings. These were a system of government; 
citizenship; legal control; the mechanism for implementing the
60. A number of them had tertiary education, although without formal 
degrees.
61. The other members who left the Committee was Tei Abal who became 
the Leader of the Opposition after the then Leader of the Opposition, 




constitution;^ and the procedure for amending the constitution.
But the CPC was not strictly bound by the Terms of Reference in that 
it was allowed to take into account any matter it might consider 
relevant to attaining eventual Independence. Most of these matters 
were 'not covered by the existing colonial constitution, namely, the 
Papua New Guinea Act 1949, although some were regulated by other 
statutes such as those relating to human rights^ and emergency 
powers.00
The task before the Committee needed expertise which members 
lacked, especially in the technical sense, and thus professional staff 
were required. But it was made specifically clear in the statement of 
the Chief Minister when he formally moved for the appointment of the 
CPC in June 1972 that in addition to their competence, staff would 
also be appointed on the basis of "their commitment to the concept of 
a Home-Grown Constitution”.^  Also, staff as well as consultants with 
the Third Vvorld experience in constitutional and governmental areas
£ Owere engaged.
In his statement, the Chief Minister also indicated the general 
procedure which the Government intended the CPC should follow. 
Submissions were to be invited from officers of both the Australian 
Commonwealth and those of the Administration and also from all 
interested persons and organisations throughout the country. The 
Committee was to visit every District "to consult fully with district 
representatives, especially on central- regional government relations, 
and on any major changes to the system of government should these be 
recommended". The Chief Minister stated that the Committee might
63. Including the possibility of holding a Constitutional 
Convention. This possibility was, it seems, inadvertently left-out in 
the CPC’s Final Report where its Terms of Reference was restated: 
See, CPC, 1974 :iv cf. The Statement of the Establishment of A 
Constitutional Planning Committee by the Chief Minister, Michael 
Somare, MHA, 3-4.
64. CPC, 1974:iv.
65. See the Human Rights Ordinance 1971.
66. See Emergency Provisions Ordinance 1960.
67. See Woolford, 1976:159.
68. See Goldring, 1978:19-20.
69. The statement on the "Establishment of a Constitutional Planning
Committee by the Chief Minister, Michael Somare, M.H.A." (undated).
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release its proposal in parts in order to allow public response to 
them as well as to encourage public interest in its work. The 
Government envisaged that the Committee would submit its final report 
to the Government which would then table the report in the House and 
be bpund by whatever decisions the House made on the final report. 
Both the Government and the CPC regarded this procedure as essential 
not only for a home-grown constitution but also, and most importantly, 
to establish its legitimacy.^
The CPC generally followed this procedure and took two years to
complete its task. During that period it consulted the general public
very widely, receiving well over 2,000 submissions and conducting
public meetings where an estimated 60,000 people attended. ^  The
72Committee submitted two Interim Reports, and one Final report. The
Final Report released in August 1974 was the most important not only
because it contained the final recommendations of the Committee, but
also because the Constitution itself provides that the Report may be
7 3used as an aid in the interpretation of the Constitution.
By the early months of 1974 the CPC had prepared a tentative 
draft of most of its recommendations and submitted it on a 
confidential basis to the Cabinet and the Leader of the Opposition. 
Some controversial proposals, especially those relating to 
citizenship, were leaked to the press and were published in the Sydney 
Morning Herald. This increased the tension which had built up over 
1973 between the CPC and the Government. The CPC held the Government 
responsible for the leak,^ and it therefore became increasingly 
suspicious of the Executive.
The CPC submitted its Final Report to the Chief Minister in June 
1974. The Chief Minister, in turn, tabled the Report in the 
August-September session of the House of Assembly. The formal process 
of enacting the Independence Constitution had then begun.
70. See Goldring, 1978:28; Narokobi, 1975:19-20.
71. CPC, 1974:1/1.
72. The 1st Interim Report of the Constitutional Planning Committee, 
Port Moresby (September 1973); and 2nd Interim Report of the 
Constitutional Planning Committee (November 1973).
73. See the Constitution, S.24(l).
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1.3 THE FORMAL PROCEDURE FOR ENACTING THE CONSTITUTION
The procedure for enacting the proposed constitution was 
determined largely by the CPC's commitment to have a home-grown 
constitution which would as a matter of law be autochthonous.
The details of the procedure were worked out between the CPC and 
the Coalition Government. These elaborated on the skeleton procedure 
the CPC recommended in its Final Report. The procedure that was 
finally used can be divided into three main stages. The first stage 
began with the debate, and approval, rejection, variation or 
substitution of other proposals by the House of Assembly, of the 
proposals recommended by the CPC in its Final Report. The resolutions 
of the House were the drafting instructions sent to the First 
Legislative Counsel as the basis for preparing the Draft Constitution. 
This first stage occupied the period from mid-August to December, 
1974, although the proposals on provincial government were not 
detailed until February 1975.
The second stage was the actual preparation of the Draft 
Constitution by the First Legislative Counsel and his staff. This 
process had begun in late 1974, and was intensified in the first four 
months of 1975. In early 1975 disagreements arose, especially between 
the members of the staff of the CPC on the one hand, and the Draftsman 
on the other over what the CPC group saw as departures by the 
Draftsman from the instructions set by the House. There were several 
provisional drafts produced in this period.^
The third and final stage was the convening of an entirely new 
body, the National Constituent Assembly, whose function was to debate 
the Draft Constitution and to enact and adopt the Constitution as the 
Independence Constitution of PNG. This body was formed on the basis 
of a resolution of the House of Assembly. It commenced sitting in May 
and sat intermittently till 15 August 1975, when it formally adopted 
the Constitution, and passed a resolution that the Constitution was to 
come into force at midnight on 16 September, 1975. For legal
75. Ibid.
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purposes, the critical feature of the National Constituent Assembly 
was that it was not created pursuant to any legislation applying to 
PNG, whether Australian or Imperial. It was a creation of the PNG 
politicians, even though its members were members of the House of 
Assembly (which was a creature of the Papua New Guinea Act 1949 (as 
amended)). In this respect PNG was following what had by now become a 
recognised procedure for enacting a home-grown constitution in the 
Third World members of the Commonwealth of Nations: India, Pakistan,
Ghana, Sri Lanka and Western Samoa had followed that type of 
procedure.^ it is relevant at this point therefore to consider 
briefly the legal basis of this concept of home-grown constitution, or 
what is known in constitutional law as legal autochthony. That is, 
did the process of enacting a home-grown constitution render the 
Constitution autochthonous?
1.4 THE CONSTITUTION AND LEGAL AUTOCHTHONY
The doctrine of autochthony has a recent origin in comparative
Commonwealth constitutional law. Wheare was the first comparative
constitutional lawyer to introduce the term ’autochthony’ into
constitutional law language within the Commonwealth in the publication
in 1960 of his Constitutional Structure of the Commonwealth.^
Autochthony, according to Wheare, is derived from a Greek word meaning
’sprung from that land itself'. Thus, an autochthonous constitution
79is said to derive its legal force from the native authority”;
whilst an allotochthonous constitution is an imposed one - deriving
80its legal force from elsewhere. Wheare provides a succinct
statement of autochthony:
[F]or some Members of the Commonwealth it is not enough to be 
able to say they enjoy a system of government which is in no 
way subordinate to the government of the United Kingdom. They 
wish to be able to say that their constitution has force of 
law and, if necessary, of supreme law within their territory 
through its own native authority and not because it was
76. Roberts-Wray, 1966:289.
77. Wheare, 1960.
78. Ibid. , 89, fn. 1.
79. Ibid., 89.
80. Maarseveen and Tang, 1978:259-260.
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enacted or authorized by the parliament of the United Kingdom; 
that is, so to speak, 'nome grown’, sprung from their own 
soil, and not imported from the United Kingdom. They assert 
not the principle of autonomy only: they assert also a
principle of something stronger, of self-sufficiency, of 
constitutional autarky or, to use a less familiar but accurate 
word, a principle of constitutional autochthony, of being 
constitutionally rooted in their own native soil.01
Wheare and the other academic lawyers have developed the doctrine of
autochthony through a study of selected cases within the context of
decolonisation in the Commonwealth.
82Decolonisation, according to the Concise Oxford Dictionary, is
a withdrawal of a state from its colony, leaving it independent.
Independence is perhaps more a political rather than a legal term.
But in a broad sense it means autonomy which Wheare defines as "the
capacity to adopt and adapt your own constitution, regulating and
amending the framework of your own government as you think 
• 83necessary.
The old Dominions enjoyed this autonomy and did not place great
importance on the fact that their constitutions were essentially
British legislation, which meant that in theory they were subject to
amendment by the British Parliament. But in the case of the new
states in Africa and Asia, as well as in the Pacific, especially those
which achieved independence after World War II, there was a demand not
84only for autonomy but also tor autochthony. They felt that
autochthony would satisfy their national inspiration, and would give a 
sense of security that the power they acquired at Independence was 
their own and not given to them by someone else. Autochthony is 
therefore a specific legal aspect of independence which was in PNG 
regarded as an essential characteristic of the decolonisation process.
In the rest of this section an attempt will be made first to 
summarise various criteria suggested by academic lawyers for
establishing an autochthonous constitution; secondly, to analyse the 
view of autochthony adopted in PNG, particularly the attitudes of the
81. Wheare, 1960:89.




CPC and the courts; and finally I will try to suggest how to resolve 
ambiguity which still exists because of the different meanings various 
authors have adopted when discussing autochthony.
1.4.1 Criteria for Autochthony
Commonwealth constitutional lawyers have suggested three 
different criteria by which autochthony could be established. Wheare 
maintained that in order for a constitution to be established as a 
truly autochthonous one, there must be a break in the legal continuity 
between the old legal orderOJ and the new one;00 and the factor that 
decides this is whether the procedure used in enacting the
constitution derives its legal basis from the existing legal system or 
from outside it. Thus, Wheare maintained that there was a clear 
break in the legal continuity in 1937 in Ireland when the Irish 
Constitution was enacted by the Irish people at a referendum which was 
not prescribed by any British legislation. Similarly, he argued that 
there was a clear break in India in 1950 when the constitutional bill 
enacted by a Constituent Assembly went into force as the new
Constitution without the Governor-General's assent; because the 
requirement for the Governor-General's assent was not prescribed by 
the India Independence Act 1947, which was a British Act.
But circumstances in other cases were different, for not in every 
case could there be a clear break in legal continuity as was the case 
with the federation of Malaya and the old Dominions. The Malayan 
Independence Constitution was an Qrder-in-Council enacted by the 
British Monarch but with the consent of the traditional Rulers of the
G OMalayan States. In the case of the old Dominions, the constitution 
in each instance was a legislation of the British Parliament.
Wheare did not offer a clear alternative criterion for
85. The old legal order was the colonial legal order which was 
created by the power of a metropolitan country.
86. The new legal order is one replacing the colonial one at 
Independence. It was as it were, the native authority reasserting 
itself.
87. Wheare, 1960:89-113.
88. See Wheare, 1960:106-108.
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establishing autochthony in other cases, except to suggest that the 
people in the countries that fall into this category regarded their 
constitutions as being "rooted in their own soil".
Robinson contended that Wheare’s criterion of a legal break is
too narrow, and that a constitution is autochthonous if it is accepted
by the people themselves. Robinson studied the constitutional steps
taken by Ghana in 1960 to bring about an autochthonous constitution
and came to the conclusion that even though the legal basis of the
procedure used in enacting the constitution was ultimately the British
statute, the people of Ghana accepted the constitution as 
89autochthonous.
Marshall analysed the two arguments and came to the conclusion 
that the whole question is whether the new constitutional order is 
intended to be irreversible. He argued that this related directly to 
the real question raised by autochthony, namely,
whether a legally effective abdication of British legislative 
authority has been made by the sovereign Parliament of the 
United Kingdom.
Here Marshall confronted the provisions of the Statute of Westminster
1931 conferring a charter of independence on the Dominions. And
whilst noting the view expressed in British Coal Corporation v. The 
91King that the British Parliament could as a matter of abstract law
92repeal these provisions of the Statute of Westminster, Marshall 
opted for the general view that the British Parliament could no longer 
repeal either legislation of itself, which has been adopted as 
extending to these members of the Commonwealth, or legislation made by 
the Commonwealth parliaments themselves, pursuant to the enabling 
provisions of the original British statute. He in fact argued that 
the Statute of Westminster imposes "a binding restraint" upon the 
future legislative power of the British Parliament in a particular 
sphere. The total effect of all this is to render the grant of 
independence an irreversible process.
89. Robinson, 1961:41.
90. Marshall, 1977:61.
91. 11935] A.C. 500.
92. Ibid.
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Out of the three academic lawyers, it was perhaps Wheare who has
93been most instructive inasmuch as he suggested three possible ways 
of achieving an autochthonous constitution in the Commonwealth. One 
way, according to Wheare, was to have the legislature of the colony 
operating under legislation of the colonial power adopt the
constitution, but have it brought into operation without the 
Governor-General's assent. This was the situation in India where the 
constitution was adopted by the Constituent Assembly which was 
established by British legislation, viz., the India Independence Act 
1949. But the constitution was brought into force after it was 
certified by the President of the Assembly and verified by the Clerk. 
It did not receive the Governor- General's assent which was necessary 
for any Bill to become law under the India Independence Act 1949. The 
lack of the Governor-General's assent is said to constitute a break in 
the legal continuity.
The second method Wheare suggested is to have an assembly elected 
specifically to draft and enact a constitution but not acting under 
the authority of the foreign legislation. Such an assembly could be 
given the power to draft and enact the constitution without submitting 
it to the Governor-General's assent. Thus, the fact that the assembly 
is not a creature of the foreign legislature constitutes a break in 
the legal continuity in this case. Sri Lanka used this method in 1970 
to enact its 1972 autochthonous constitution. In that case the 
members of the House of Representatives of the Parliament of Ceylon 
met in an old school and constituted themselves into a Constituent 
Assembly which drafted and enacted the constitution. The then 
governing legislation, viz., Ceylon Independence (Commencement) 
Order-in-Counci1 1947 did not make any provision for such an assembly, 
nor for its powers. The legal transformation on that occasion was 
demonstrated by the Prime Minister, Mrs Bandaranaike in her opening 
speech when she emphasised the fact that it was:
A Meeting of the Members of the House of Representatives as 
representatives of the People of Sri Lanka, but not a Meeting 
of the House of Representatives. We have adopted this course 
to underline the fact that both the Constituent Assembly which 
we have met to establish, and the Constitution which the 
Constituent Assembly will draft, enact and establish, will
93. Wheare, 1960:111-112.
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derive their authority from the people of Sri Lanka and not 
from the power and authority assumed and exercised by the 
British Crown and Parliament in establishing the present 
Constitution of LSri Lanka] nor from the Constitution they 
gave us.
•The third means suggested by Wheare is to have the local
legislature draft the constitution but have it referred to the people
to enact it into law through a referendum as was done in Ireland in
1937. There the Irish Parliament merely drafted the constitution and
referred it to the people through a referendum. The approval of the
people of the draft constitution at the referendum constituted the 
95actual enactment.
These precedents on autochthony had an influence on the thinking 
of the constitution-makers in PNG, particularly the CPC.
1.4.2 Autochthony in the PNG Context
The CPC expressed its view thus:
Having done our best to incorporate the views of the 
people in these proposals for the Constitution of our nation 
and to make adequate provision for what we believe are their 
needs and aspirations, and taken due account of their fears, 
we believe the Constitution itself should be legally, as well 
as politically, "home-grown". In legal terms, it should be 
"autochthonous". By this we mean that it should have its 
legal origin in a law of Papua New Guinea, not in an external
source, such as the laws of Australia or of any other 96country.
We believe that this step of breaking our legal link with 
the law of Australia, the administering power, will be 
symbolic of the definite break with the past which we will 
achieve when we bring the Constitution into force and obtain 
our Independence. The Committee believes this should be so 
regardless of any legal theory which might make the validity 
of our consent of the Australian Governor-General, or of the 
High Commissioner, his representative in Papua New Guinea.
To give effect to our political intention that the 
Constitution should be autochthonous, we recommend that the
94. Ceylon Government, 1971:33; and see also Cooray, 1971:122-123.
95. See Wheare, 1960:93-94.
96. CPC, 1974:15/1, para. 3.
97. Ibid., para. 4.
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appropriate steps be taken to ensure that there is no room for 
doubt as to its legal validity. To achieve this objective it 
is essential that the Constitution be established outside the 
authority of the Papua New Guinea Act. Of course, the full 
co-operation of the Australian Government and Parliament will 
be needed if the procedure we propose is to be carried out 
smoothly. However, there seems to be every reason for 
believing that this co-operation will readily be given by 
Australia. 8
How then, did the CPC plan to bring about that "breaking our 
legal link with the law of Australia"? The procedure it recommended 
comprised four steps as follows:
a) The members of the House of Assembly would convene as 
representatives of the people in a new body to be known as 
Constituent Assembly.
b) The Constituent Assembly would debate the Draft 
Constitution and adopt it as the Independence 
Constitution.
c) The Constituent Assembly would then resolve that the 
Constitution would come into force on the Independence 
Day.
d) The members of the Constituent Assembly would then 
reconvene as the third House of Assembly, and fix a date 
for Independence in accordance with its own resolution of 
9th July 1974."
These steps were followed in the actual enactment of the 
Constitution. The basic aim of the procedure was to ensure that there 
was a clear break between the former colonial legal order and the new 
one, so that it would be clear that the validity of the Constitution 
derived from the power of the people of PNG themselves.
Goldring has stated'*'*" that the Draftsman took the view that it 
was possible to achieve autochthony if the Australian Government 
consented to the proposed procedure the CPC had recommended. But this
98. Ibid., para. 5.
99. The resolution stated that the House would fix the date of




apparently was purely the Draftsman's v i e w , a n d  did not reflect
what the CPC wanted. The CPC appreciated that its proposed procedure
would work smoothly only if the Australian Government co-operated.
For this purpose it recommended that Australia repeal the Papua New
Guinea Act 1949-1973; recognise PNG as an Independent Sovereign
Nation, and state specifically that it had no longer any power or
102jurisdiction in relation to PNG. Australia acceded to these
requests through the provisions of the Papua New Guinea Independence 
Act 1975.
But the CPC had never intended that whatever the Australian
Government had to do was to be part of the proposed procedure for
enacting the Constitution. For it was adamant that the validity of
the Constitution should not "depend on the prior consent of the
Australian Governor-General, or of the High Commissioner, his
. 103representative in Papua New Guinea. The Australian Government was
not formally asked to give its consent to the proposed procedure, 
although it co-operated.
The formal establishment of the Constitution on the morning of 16 
September 1975 indicated clearly the intention of all the parties 
involved that the Constitution was autochthonous. The Australian flag 
was pulled down by a PNG Defence Force guard of honour and was handed 
to the first PNG Governor-General, Sir John Guise, who in turn handed 
it to the Australian Governor-General, Sir John Kerr. A copy of the 
Constitution was then presented to the Prince of Wales by Pika 
Kasau, the Regional Member for Manus, representing the members of the 
National Constituent Assembly, the CPC and the P e o p l e . T h e  Prince 
then handed the Constitution to the Prime Minister, Michael Somare,
101. In fact this view seems to contradict the legal advice Lynch 
himself gave to the Government to the effect that "if there is a real 
political desire for autochthony there could be no legal objection to 
it", see Lynch (undated).
102. CPC, 1974:15/2, para. 11.
103. Ibid.
104. Prince Charles, representing the Queen of the United Kingdom, 
who is the Head of State of PNG.
105. He signified the people of PNG in presenting their Constitution 
to the Head of State.
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who represented the PNG Government. The Prime Minister in turn
presented the Constitution to the PNG Governor-General, Sir John 
Guise, who was thenceforth to be the custodian of the Constitution as 
the local representative of the Head of State. PNG thus did all that 
was possible even symbolically to emphasise its great desire for 
autochthony.
On the part of Australia, the Australian Federal Parliament 
enacted the Papua New Guinea Independence Act 1975 which withdrew the 
Australian sovereignty from PNG on the 15 September 1975. The Act
repealed all the Australian legislation that had been in force in PNG 
up to that moment.
Four aspects of these procedures are noteworthy. First, neither
the CPC nor the National Constituent Assembly was created by the Papua
New Guinea Act 1949 (as amended), which was the basic statute under
which administration was carried on during the colonial period after
1949. Secondly, the procedures under which both bodies operated were
not defined by any statute, either Australian or local. Thirdly, the
CPC did not go outside PNG for purposes of consultation on
constitutional matters: all the constitutional processes were
localised, to use Marshall's words. Finally, the Constitution was
signed by Barry Holloway, the Chairman of the National Constituent 
1 08Assembly. There was no argument by the Australian Government that
the Constitution should be signed by the Australian Governor- General 
in order for it to become formally legal, even though there was a 
common view held earlier that the final legal form by which
independence was going to be achieved would be an Australian 
109statute. 7
If there was any doubt about whether the PNG Constitution was 
autochthonous, it was settled by the Supreme Court in 1975 in the case
106. Somare signified the responsibility of the Government to 
implement and protect the Constitution.
107. See S.4.
108. Both Barry Holloway and Tony Elly were officers of the House of
Assembly: Holloway as the Speaker and Elly as the Clerk. But there
was no requirement under the PNG Act that they should sign the Draft 
Constitution.
109. See Goldring, 1978:14-15.
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of the State v. John Wonom^ ^  (Wonom's Case). In that case the 
Supreme Court was faced with the question whether an indictment should 
be brought in the name of the Queen who is the Head of State, or 
whether it should be brought under the title 'The State' which is the 
collective name of the People of PNG. This required the court to 
consider the source from which the prosecutorial power is derived. 
The Court unanimously held that the power like all other types of 
power, was derived from the People, and accordingly indictments should 
be brought in their collective name, 'The State'. Frost, C.J. 
declared that the
Constitution itself is a truly autochthonous Constitution 
established, as the preamble recites, by the will of the 
people, to whom 'all power belongs'. Its authority is thus 
original and in no way derivative from any other source.^^
It is thus quite clear from this analysis of the legal basis of 
autochthony that the PNG Constitution meets all the criteria of an 
autochthonous constitution. If one is to take autochthony in Wheare's 
terms as meaning a legal break brought about by using a procedure not 
defined by the existing legal order, the establishment of both the CPC 
and the National Constituent Assembly support that line of argument. 
If one is take it in Robinson's way as meaning an acceptance by the 
people, especially the courts, then Wonom's Case illustrates that 
support. Or, if one is to take Marshall's concept of irreversibility 
as the criterion for autochthony, the overt acts of both the PNG 
People and the Australian Government in establishing the Constitution 
formally provide evidence of this. The Australian Government clearly 
demonstrated this by repealing all its legislation applying to PNG 
under the Papua New Guinea Independence Act 1975. Section 4 of the 
Act provides specifically that "On the expiration of the day preceding 
Independence Day, Australia ceases to have any sovereignty, sovereign 
rights or rights of administration in respect of or appertaining to 
the whole or any part of Papua New Guinea". This is a withdrawal of 
sovereignty, which in practical terms is irreversible.
110. [1975] P.N.G.L.R. 311. This was the first constitutional law 
case to come before the Supreme Court after Independence, and the only 
important case so far on autochthony.
111. Ibid. , at 314. See Chalmers 1978:672 for the political 
implications of this decision.
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To summarise the position of the doctrine in PNG, it may be 
stated that the application of the doctrine is founded on the fact 
that the power to enact the Constitution was not provided for anywhere 
by either the Papua New Guinea Act 1949 or by any other statute 
applying to and in PNG. On the procedural requirements as suggested 
by various constitutional lawyers, there is clear evidence that these 
were satisfied. There is even a suggestion that a legal break did 
occur in practice in that there was a moment of void between the
expiration of 15 September 1975 and the beginning of 16 September
1121975. In the light of Wonom's Case autochthony means that all 
power comes from the People, which carries a clear implication that no 
one particular group or individual in PNG could claim that the State 
power belongs to them or to him or her.
It is perhaps not too difficult to understand in the PNG context 
the notion that power comes from the People since traditionally no 
single individual or group had been vested with the total power. But 
in the context of other societies where there are bound to be 
different traditional constitutional systems, power may not reside in 
the people themselves. Thus, autochthony in so far as it concerns the 
source of power in these societies, has to be explained on bases other 
than that it resides in the People. This type of analysis is not 
clearly made by the academic lawyers, and this failure creates certain 
problems in understanding autochthony. It seems to me that the source 
of this problem lies in the failure by the academic lawyers both to 
deal adequately with the scope of the doctrine, and to maintain 
consistency in the meaning they attribute to autochthony. Some 
analysis of these two problems is therefore relevant.
1.4.3 Autochthony: The Problem of Scope and Meaning
To deal first with the scope of the doctrine, the basic problem 
is that the general analysis provided by hheare and the others 
indicates a rather restrictive scope. This stems largely from their 
case studies which were not representative of the total colonial 
situation; and the choice of these selective case studies seems to
112. See Goldring, 1978:30; and Kapi, J. in Milan Capek v. the Yacht 
Freja” [1980J P.N.G.L.R. 57 at 60.
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have been the result of a failure by these writers to explain clearly 
Wheare's basic notions of the existing legal order and the new legal 
order.
To take the notion of the existing legal order, does it mean to 
refer to only one legal system or to several? In a colonial context, 
there are two general legal systems. There is, on the one hand, the 
colonial legal system which is predominant and derives its legal force 
from some act of the colonising power, such as conquest, secession or 
pure annexation. There is, on the other hand, the indigenous legal 
system which derives its legal force from the traditional communities. 
This is what is sometimes referred to as the traditional legal system 
which is recognised by the predominant colonial legal system only to 
the extent which served the purposes of the colonial administration. 
But otherwise it is not recognised as a legal system.
It would seem from Wheare's analysis that the legal system he 
referred to as the existing legal system was really the colonial legal 
system. The system did not "spring from the native soil" because in 
Kelsen's terms, its Grundnorm was external in that it derived its 
legal force from the colonising power outside the colony.
But the notion of the existing legal system in a colonial context 
could also mean the traditional or indigenous legal system which was 
kept in abeyance as it were, by the colonial state. This system has 
an internal Grundnorm as explained above. This indigenous legal 
system is in effect formally recognised at Independence. This is the 
legal system that Wheare implicitly referred to as the new legal 
order.
As far as it concerns autochthony, the relevant question is who 
has the power in the indigenous legal system to enact the Independence 
constitution? As the traditional legal system is bound to differ from 
one colonial context to another in terms of its constitutional 
structure, it would be impossible to expect that the power could be 
vested in only one kind of indigenous authority. Thus, in the case of 
PNG as was the case in Ireland, India, Sri Lanka and Ghana, power was 
taken as having by tradition resided in the people of those respective 
countries. But in Western Samoa it was vested in the Matai (the
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traditional chiefs) and in Tonga in the King. ^ ^  In each case 
power was indigenous, deriving its legal force from those in whom 
power was vested by the traditional system. Hence, although power was 
internalised, the institution in which it was vested took a different 
form* in different colonial contexts, ranging from the people 
themselves to groups and even individuals.
In general, the academic lawyers focused on one of these forms, 
namely the people. Their failure to indicate the existence of other 
forms of authorities therefore reduced the scope of their analysis of 
the different forms that can exist of the source of power.
Discovering the source of power is however, only a part of 
creating an autochthonous constitution, because the doctrine assumes 
that the power has to be actually exercised in order to enact the 
constitution, if one is going to have autochthony in a given case. 
This then leads to the question of the exercise of power. The basic 
problem here is to find some way to show that the power employed to 
enact the constitution had not been derived from the existing colonial 
legal system.
This means, according to Wheare, there must be a break in the 
legal continuity between the existing colonial legal system and the 
new one; and the best way to bring about this break is to ensure that 
the procedure used in enacting the constitution was not prescribed in 
any way by the existing legal system. Much of the academic treatment 
of autochthony is concerned with demonstrating that Wheare's emphasis 
on procedure could lead to a rather narrow view of the scope of the 
doctrine. Thus, Robinson emphasised the fact of acceptance of the 
constitution by the people (and here he really meant acceptance of the 
constitution by the courts) as the basis for autochthony in Ghana. 
Marshall employed the notion of irreversibility to explain the 
doctrine in the context of the old Dominions. In both situations it 
was difficult to establish that there had been a break in the legal 
continuity in the sense in which Wheare had argued.
The preceding analysis shows that there can be a number of
113. Powles, 1979; and see also Roberts-Wray, 1966:295-301.
114. See Latukefu, 1975:84.
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criteria by which it could be established that a given constitution is 
autochthonous. Whether a particular criterion applies to the 
exclusion of the others is a question that has to be analysed within 
the context of a given constitutional system. From the above analysis 
it would seem that there are two considerations which determine the 
essence of an autochthonous constitution. First, that autochthony is 
concerned with the source of power with which the constitution is
enacted; and secondly, that the source is internal rather than 
external.
This simple definition of autochthony does not, however, become
so obvious because of different meanings that have been ascribed to it
by various writers. This has created an ambiguity in the use of the
term. Some, for instance, use autochthony to refer to the source of
legislative power with which a constitution is e n a c t e d . O t h e r s
regard autochthony as relating to the content of the constitution.^^
Still others take it to mean both the source of power as well as the
content of the Constitution. Those who have studied PNG
constitutional law, for instance, conceive autochthony as not only
referring to the source of power but also the content of the
Constitution.^^ Thus, a question has been raised whether it is
consistent with autochthony particularly in relation to the promotion
of the National Goals, for judges to have a free hand in resorting to
118foreign precedents in deciding cases.
In order to reduce this ambiguity it would seem useful to
restrict the legal meaning of autochthony to the question of the 
source of legislative power with which a particular constitution is 
enacted. For this is really the legal issue, namely, whether the 
power with which the autochthonous constitution is enacted is original 
or derived from the existing legal order. This basic point could be 
overlooked if too much attention is paid to arguments about whether a 
particular aspect of the content of a constitution is
characteristically local or derivative of other constitutional
115. Roberts-Wray, 1966:289.
116. Maarseveen and Tang, 1978:259.
117. Goldring, 1978:28; Bayne, 1982:223-224; and Narokobi, 1975:19.
118. Bayne, 1982:223.
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p r o v i s i o n s .  U n d o u b t e d l y ,  e v e r y  w r i t t e n  c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  w h e t h e r  
a u t o c h t h o n o u s  o r  n o t ,  i s  d e r i v a t i v e  o f  t h o s e  t h a t  p r e c e d e d  i t  
e l s e w h e r e  i n  some r e s p e c t s .  I t  c a n  be e a s i l y  d e m o n s t r a t e d  t h a t  i n  
m o s t  c a s e s  t h e  d e c i s i o n s  made t o  b o r r o w  c o n c e p t u a l  t o o l s  f rom 
e l s e w h e r e  w e re  c o n s c i o u s l y  m ad e.  The CPC i t s e l f  made t h i s  p o i n t :
[WJe h av e  a ssumed  t h a t  i f  i t  had b e e n  i n t e n d e d  m e r e l y  t o  
f o l l o w  some f i r m  p r e c e d e n t ,  W e s t m i n s t e r  o r  o t h e r w i s e ,  no 
p l a n n i n g  c o m m i t t e e  would  h a v e  b ee n  r e q u i r e d ,  l e a s t  o f  a l l  one 
composed o f  t h e  p e o p l e ' s  e l e c t e d  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e .  A l a w y e r  o r  
two c o u l d  h a v e  made up a  c o n s t i t u t i o n  w i t h  s c i s s o r s  and p a s t e  
i n  much s h o r t e r  t i m e  t h a n  we h a v e  r e q u i r e d .  I t  i s  n o t  t h a t  we 
h a v e  i g n o r e d  p r e c e d e n t s ,  f o r  t h e r e  i s  s u c h  a r i c h  v a r i e t y  
among t h e  w o r l d ' s  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  i f  one  l o o k s  bey ond  t h e  more  
i m m e d i a t e l y  f a m i l i a r .  An e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  o u r  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  
w ou ld  s e n d  a  s p e c i a l i s t  i n  many d i r e c t i o n s  i f  he  was l o o k i n g  
f o r  o r i g i n s ,  and i n  some c a s e s  t h e r e  a r e  no e x t e r n a l  
p r e c e d e n t s  a t  a l l .  What h a s  i n f l u e n c e d  u s  ab o v e  a l l  i n  
s e e k i n g  f o r m u l a t i o n s  and a d a p t i n g  th em ,  h a s  b e e n  t h e  d e s i r e  t o  
m e e t  P apua New G u in ean  n e e d s  and c i r c u m s t a n c e s  . . . .
De S m i t h  a l s o  n o t e d  t h a t  d e l i b e r a t e  a t t e m p t s  a r e  o f t e n  made t o  a d a p t
t h e s e  f o r e i g n  c o n c e p t s  t o  c o n f o r m  t o  l o c a l  c o n d i t i o n s , b o t h  i n  t h e  way
t h e s e  c o n c e p t s  a r e  f o r m u l a t e d  i n  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o v i s i o n s ,  an d  i n
120t h e i r  a p p l i c a t i o n  i n  p r a c t i c e .  T h i s  i s ,  h o w e v e r ,  l a r g e l y  a 
q u e s t i o n  o f  p o l i t i c a l  c h o i c e ,  w h ic h  d o e s  n o t  d i r e c t l y  b e a r  upon t h e  
q u e s t i o n  o f  t h e  s o u r c e  o f  l e g i s l a t i v e  power  w i t h  w h ic h  a c o n s t i t u t i o n  
i s  e n a c t e d .
L e g a l  a u t o c h t h o n y  t h e r e f o r e  r e f e r s  t o  t h e  s o u r c e  of  l e g i s l a t i v e  
power  w i t h  w h ic h  a c o n s t i t u t i o n  i s  e n a c t e d .  T h i s  i s  t h e  c r u x  o f  wh a t  
i s  m ean t  by a u t o c h t h o n y  i n  p u b l i c  l a w .  F o r ,  i t  i s  l a r g e l y  i n  t h i s  
s e n s e  t h a t  t h e  d e c i s i o n s  o f  t h e  PNG c o u r t s  c a n  be  m e a n i n g f u l l y  
e x p l a i n e d  o r  u n d e r s t o o d .
I n  t h e  PNG c o n t e x t  t h a t  s o u r c e  o f  power  i s  t h e  P e o p i e .  D u r i n g  
t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  d e b a t e  t h e  CPC r e g a r d e d  i t s e l f  a s  r e p r e s e n t i n g  t h e  
p e o p l e ,  and i n v o k e d  t h i s  a r g u m e n t  when i t  came i n t o  c o n f l i c t  w i t h  t h e  
l o c a l  E x e c u t i v e .  The l o c a l  E x e c u t i v e  c o n s i s t e d  o f  t h e  i n d i g e n o u s  
M i n i s t e r s  who fo rm ed  t h e  f i r s t  N a t i o n a l  C o a l i t i o n  Go vernmen t  a f t e r  t h e  
1971 G e n e r a l  E l e c t i o n s ,  and t h e  c o l o n i a l  b u r e a u c r a c y  w h ich  i n c l u d e d
1 19 .  CPC, 1 9 7 4 : 1 / 2 ,  p a r a .  9 .
1 20 .  See de  S m i t h ,  1 9 6 2 : 7 8 - 8 1
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the Administrator. The CPC distrusted both the local E x e c u t i v e a n d
the foreign Executive in Canberra. As Hegarty has noted, its Final 
122Report exhibited a suspicion of power and a desire to limit
• 123executive authority .
This suspicion resulted from conflict between the CPC and the 
Coalition Government. It is therefore relevant to examine briefly the 
nature of this conflict.
1.5 THE CPC VERSUS THE COALITION GOVERNMENT DURING THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE: CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE
Besides the CPC, other political groups were distrustful of the 
10 /local Executive. The distrust of the Executive was in a
substantial way related to some of the issues in which the Executive 
view or policy was in conflict with those of the other political 
groups in PNG at the time. For the purpose of this work it is 
convenient to isolate these issues into general and specific issues.
1.5.1 The General Issues of Conflict
Generally there were perhaps five main issue over which the 
demands of the other political groups conflicted quite distinctly with 
those of the Executive. These were, firstly, PANGU's call for early 
Self-Government and Independence; secondly, secession desired by some 
of the well-off districts; thirdly, decentralisation; fourthly, 
opposition by the Coalition Government to proposed reforms; and 
fifthly, the opposition, particularly by the CPC, to transfer of 
certain powers from Canberra to the local Executive in Port Moresby. 
These general issues provided a backdrop to the conflict between the 
CPC and the Government.




124. See Woolford, 1973:51-63. The local Executive shall be 
referred henceforth as the Executive.
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1.5.1.1 Opposition to PANGU's Call for Early 
Self-Government and Independence
The major issue during the 1972-75 period was the timing of
between the PANGU Pati and the United Party. The PANGU Pati had been 
well known throughout PNG as a strong advocate of early 
Self-Government and Independence. This had been one of the platforms
PANGU had support for its cause in the Australian Labor Party 
(ALP). Realising that the question of early Self-Government and
elections in Australia, Whitlam, the then leader of the ALP, sought to 
publicise the issue during his 1970 visit to PNG. Whitlam pursued the 
same policy of early Self-Government and Independence vigorously after 
he became the Prime Minister following the 1972 federal elections in 
Australia. In his first visit to PNG as Prime Minister early in 1973, 
Whitlam stated his Government's policy, thus:
I cannot stress too often that the decision for Independence 
is not only a decision about Papua New Guinea. It is about 
Australia, and Australia's view of her own proper role in the 
world. Australia is no longer willing to be the ruler of a 
colony. And my Government is determined to divest itself of 
that role in the time of the present Australian parliament.
The Leader of the Opposition, Matthias Toliman, responded by
expressing the United Party's fear:
Australia cleared the way for the establishment of this 
Parliament in 1964 with the promise - and the Australian Labor 
Party publicly endorsed that promise - that our own House of 
Assembly should make all the important decisions on the way of 
life and future of our people ... We trust that the good 
sense and good will of the Australian Government will not 
prematurely force us into independence. While this could 
resolve pressures on Australia's Government and meet its short 
term interests, in the long run there could be a very real
the friendship and trust which now exists
When Whitlam arrived in Goroka, he was presented with a
125. Somare, 1970:490.
126. Official Speech, February 1973, quoted by Johnson, 1983:214.
127. Speech at the Official Dinner, quoted by Johnson, Ibid.
Self-Government and Independence. On this there was a conflict
on which PANGU won the 1972 General Elections.
Independence for PNG could be made an issue for the impending federal
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1 O Opetition. Highlanders feared early Self-Government because it 
meant the educationally well-off leaders from the coast would dominate 
the government and the economy to the disadvantage of the Highlanders 
who had few educated men among them. Thus, the Highlanders saw the 
rush towards early Self-Government and Independence by both the 
Australian Labor Government and the Somare Government as amounting to 
a kind of collusion which would ensure a domination by the coastal 
people over the Highlanders in an independent PNG.
The fear that the coastal people might dominate the government 
was not held by the Highlanders alone. Others had a similar fear, and 
did not want to be governed by other regional groups. The demand for 
separate independent statehood thus began to emerge.
1.5.1.2 Separatism
Two regional groups that organised themselves to show that they 
did not want to be governed by an Executive dominated by people from
128. The key message was:
Do not forget, Sir, that education was not started in the 
Highlands until 1953, and the few of our members who are 
educated are our first, not necessarily our best, and their 
views are not necessarily our views. We are not educated, and 
our members are naive in government, but we do not lack common 
sense and we understand that progress to Independence must be 
based on a sound economy. We are afraid that our present 
economy is in jeopardy, and our Ministers do nothing to 
rectify the situation. In fact they seem bent on destroying 
it ... We do not fear the approach of independence as a 
natural follow-through of successful self-government but we do 
object to settling a date for Independence as we do not know 
if our government of the day will be capable of fulfilling the 
responsibilities of Independence by that time.
The freedom of operation the Australian Government has 
allowed our Coalition Government has enabled us to see that 
our Government is not responsible or mature enough to handle a 
happy and beneficial Independence.
We oppose your Government setting a date for Independence 
for the above mentioned reasons. We are vigorously opposed to 
our present Government setting dates for Independence because 
it is their decision, not ours, and we have no confidence in 
their ability to handle Independence (quoted by Johnson, 
ibid., at 212-213).
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other regions, were the Bougainvilleans and the Papuans.
Bougainvilleans had a traditional dislike of the "redskins", the term
they used to refer to the people from the other parts of PNG.
Encouraged by a rich copper mine which had been opened up in the late
1960s. on ther island, Bougainvilleans sought to secede from the rest
129of PNG and form a separate independent state. According to
Johnson, the Administrator at the time, the case of Bougainville was 
the most important problem that the National Coalition Government 
faced.130
The Coalition Government endeavoured to deal with the
Bougainvillean separatist problem partly by bringing two
Bougainvillean Ministers, Donatus Mola and Paul Lapun, into the 
cabinet, and also by appointing Fr Momis, another Bougainvillean, as 
the Deputy Chairman of the CPC.
i 3 1Papuans, too, did not want to be governed by New Guineans. 
Papua was in law an Australian colony. Papuans thought of either a 
statehood within the Australian federal system or independence. The 
Papua cause was boosted in 1972 by the founding of the Papua Besena by 
Josephine Abaijah. This was a loosely-organised political group made
up of largely the people from the Central Province who agitated for an
132independent Papua.
The National Coalition Government was able to control the 
influence of the Papua Besena through the efforts of a number of
leading Papua politicians in the Government. These included Maori 
Kiki, Ebia Olewale, Ruben Taureka and John Guise.
There were other groups which also agitated for separate
independence, although their efforts were not as clearly organised as 
those of both the Bougainvilleans and the Papuans. Apart from the 
Highlanders, the other notable group were the Tolais of the Gazelle
Peninsula in East New Britain. Much of the conflict on the Gazelle
was, however, more concerned with the shortage of land and the
129. See Hannett, 1969:8-14.
130. Johnson, 1983:161.
131. See Woolford, 1976:183-206.
132. See Griffin, Nelson and Firth, 1979:183-184.
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composition of the local government council than with the desire to 
secede from the rest of PNG.
1.5.1.3 Decentralising the Power
One of the central demands of the secessionists and others was
for more power to be given to local authorities. This was a reaction
against centralism of the executive power during the colonial rule
when the people themselves had virtually no power. To the people it
133seemed the Administration had all the power. But the actual power,
as noted above, was exercised by the foreign Executive in Canberra.
The Coalition Government was aware of this situation in that the
initial intention in establishing the CPC was that it would take
1 3 5political initiative away from Canberra. The CPC in turn advocated
a comprehensive system of provincial government by which it sought to 
avoid concentrating power in the National Government through its 
scheme of devolving that power to the provinces. The people 
themselves were also keen to have some form of provincial
I OfLgovernment. °
The CPC itself found that:
Colonial rule has brought peace between once warring 
communities, roads and other forms of material progress. But 
the price of these changes has been the establishment of a 
system of government that has not made adequate provision for 
local initiative.
The system of administration was centralised and dominated by the
bureaucracy. Two specialist consultants whom CPC brought in to advise
it on an appropriate decentralised system of government found that the
bureaucracy was bigger than any that was left by the British in their 
138former colonies. The CPC recommended its solution to the problem:
to return power to the people through a decentralised form of
133. Wolfers, 1976:19.
134. See Johnson, 1983:4.
135. Downs, 1980:493.
136. Goldring, 1978:109.
137. CPC, 1974:10/1, para. 3.
138. Tordoff and Watts, 1974:2/2.
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government.
The Government had certain reservations about the system for
decentralisation recommended by the CPC, largely because it feared
that such a system would neglect local needs by concentrating power in
provincial centres; and it was concerned that, in the light of
experiences with federal systems elsewhere, a sudden introduction of
such a system of government would cause many legal and administrative 
140problems.
One important reason for the CPC's emphasis on decentralisation 
was its concern that without some form of decentralised system of 
government, certain powers being transferred from Canberra to Port 
Moresby, beginning in August 1970, would be concentrated further in 
the central Executive.
139
1.5.1.4 The CPC's Opposition to Transfer of Powers to the Executive
As noted earlier in this Chapter, the then Australian Prime 
Minister, John Gorton, announced in Port Moresby in July 1970, that 
certain powers would be transferred from Canberra to the local 
Executive in Port Moresby.^'*' These powers were transferred between 
1970 and 1973.
The initiative to transfer was taken by the Australian 
Government. z The Coalition Government became a passive recipient of 
these powers. A close adviser and a foundation member of PANGU Pati 
later condemned this attitude of the Government as a blind acceptance 
which showed a lack of priorities within the Coalition's own 
policies.
The CPC saw the endorsement of the programme of transfer by the 
Government as amounting to a breach of the undertaking the Coalition 
had given to it to prepare a Constitution for Self-Government and
139. CPC, 1974:10/1, para. 8.
140. Government Paper, 1974:35.




Independence.^^ This view must have been reinforced when Somare was 
able to get the House of Assembly to endorse, in September, 1973, his 
motion for self-government to be granted on 1st December, 1973 or 
reasonably soon thereafter, irrespective of whether the written 
constitution was ready or not. By the end of 1973 the CPC itself had 
not finalised its recommendations and was in fact behind in its 
schedule. This did not assist Somare, who was under constant pressure 
to move as fast as he could towards early Self-Government and 
Independence, especially after the Labor Government came into power 
following the 1972 General Elections in Australia. All these 
pressures served only to deepen the CPC’s suspicion of the Coalition 
Government.
But the fundamental objection of the CPC over the transfer was
that it pre-empted "possible options that might otherwise be open to
. 146the Committee to recommend . As Johnson observed:
CPC was intent on ensuring that Papua New Guinea's future 
system of government would not be cast in a colonial mould.1
Thus, the CPC sought to have transfer of the powers relating to six
specific subject matters, namely, the Supreme Court, administration of
courts, the Public Solicitor, prosecution, House of Assembly matters
148and electoral policy deferred. Although by November 1973, the CPC
had not formulated its final recommendations on these matters it 
sought the deferral on the basis that:
it seems likely that, in respect of these areas, the 
Constitution will not allow the political executive direct 
control of the kind that would be appropriate in the case of 
defence and foreign relations.^
Thus, by then the CPC had already determined that at least in these 
six subject areas the Executive should be controlled. It also saw the
Coalition's willingness to accept transfer of these powers readily as 
an indication that the Government was not keen to reform the existing 
system of government.
144. Ley, 1978; and Woolford, 1976:165.
145. Ley, 1978.
146. See CPC, 1973a:3, paras. 10-11.
147. Johnson, 1983:152.
148. CPC, 1973b:l/4, para. 1.14.
149. Ibid., para. 1.16.
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1.5.1.5 Opposition by the Government to Proposed Reforms
Hegarty has noted that the Coalition Government was generally 
committed to reforming the colonial system as well as adopting new 
social and economic p o l i c i e s . B u t  the Government failed to achieve 
these, largely because of structural and other problems inherent in 
the colonial system of administration. Moreover, the Government
prevented those reforms it did not support. Its opposition to these 
reforms and its failure to achieve others convinced the CPC and others 
that the Coalition lacked confidence in being able to reform
substantially the existing governmental institutions.
At the outset the Government faced the problem of formulating 
policies. The Coalition partners had no experience in formulating 
joint policies. The Coalition Government was therefore faced with a 
two-fold task. One was to formulate policies which were acceptable to 
all its partners; and the other was to change the existing machinery 
of government in order to ensure that there was an adequate and
appropriate institutional framework within which the new policies 
could be implemented. But before the Coalition could change the
existing machinery of government it had to acquire a control over it, 
and that task was not an easy one.
The Coalition did not lack ideas on social and economic policies.
1 52It was, for instance, willing to adopt the 'Eight Aims' rather than
the 'Programmes for Development - Principles, Policies and Priorities'
1 S3prepared by McCasker's Office of Programming and Co-ordination.
The CPC itself was able to develop these Eight Aims beyond a merely 
economic sphere, into all-embracing National goals that were 
eventually adopted by the Constitution.
150. Hegarty, 1972:455-466.
151. Ibid., 442.
152. The Aims are discussed fully in Chapter 9, post.
153. This Office carried on what its predecessor was doing 
previously. This was the General Financial and Economic Policy 
Division set up within the Department of Treasury in 1969 “to provide 
advice on the use of economic powers as they were released from 
Canberra." See Garnaut, 1981:167-168.
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But the coalition did not show the same degree of enthusiasm in 
changing the existing institutions of government into the forms that 
it considered appropriate for implementing the new policies in a 
fundamental sense. It was able to create only two new bodies: the 
National Planning Office, which replaced the old Office of Programming 
and Co-ordination, and the Budget Priorities Committee. These were 
created "out of sharply perceived needs for specific improvement in 
the machinery for planning and co-ordination". By this time the 
coalition generally, and Somare in particular, came to adopt a view 
that the existing administrative system be preserved.
This non-reformist attitude of the Government was seen by the CPC 
and others as the general factor which explained the Coalition’s 
opposition to some of the CPC's radical recommendations. It is 
relevant therefore to note these specific recommendations briefly 
because the various arguments on each of them during the 
constitutional debate brought out in a distinct way the conflict 
between the CPC and the Coalition.
1.5.2 Specific Issues of Conflict During the Constitutional Debate
The conflict was brought out into the open when the Chief
Minister tabled in the House of Assembly the Government's White Paper
on constitutional p r o p o s a l s o n  the same day on which he tabled the
CPC's Final Report.^'7 The White Paper was a substitute for a
158minority report which Somare and Guise submitted earlier in April,
1974 to the House of Assembly when a draft of the CPC's final report
159was before the House.
In defending the White paper the Chief Minister referred to the 
CPC's Final Report as the Old Testament and the White Paper as the New 
Testament. He went on to elaborate why his Government thought it 
necessary to compile the New Testament:
154. Ballard, 1981:93.
155. See Mortimer, 1979:212; and Hegarty, 1979:198.
156. Government Paper, 1974.
157. Both reports were presented on 16 August, 1974.
158. Both Somare and Guise as discussed above, were two of the three 
Ministers who were members of the CPC.
159. Ley, 1978.
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The Government did not agree with some of the things in the 
Old Testament and so it drew up the New Testament. But there 
are a lot of recommendations in the Constitutional Planning 
Committee report which both sides agreed upon. It is just 
that on a few occasions the Government disagreed with the 
Constitutional Planning Committee report, so we had to suggest 
changes. Changes have to be made to any report tabled in this 
House and the members of this Parliament have the right to 
move amendments to any reports. It is true that the people 
have given us a mandate, but we must guide the people. In 
doing so we must ask ourselves whether all the ideas 
recommended by the people are right to run this country.
Fr. John Momis, the Deputy Chairman of the CPC, but in effect its 
161real chairman, replied that the Government’s White Paper was in
essence a report of those with vested interests which were opposed to
the true interests of the People of Papua New Guinea. The CPC brought
upon itself this opposition because, 'LweJ have questioned the system,
1 69the rights of vested interests ...' Momis asked further,
[ I ] f the two leaders, the Chief Minister and his deputy, 
really believe in democracy why then did they not join us in 
the committee [of which both were members] and make their 
changes there and then? Instead they took the easy way out.
It is a coward's way out. They kept out of the committee 
until the day we were through with our report and then they 
got up and by using the party line, they are now trying to 
disrupt the success of the report on which we have been 
working with the people for so long. ^ 3
The initial argument between the CPC and the Government was one 
relating to how much of the total package of the CPC's recommendations 
should go into the Constitution. The Government took the general view 
that only the basic principles should be incorporated into the 
Constitution, leaving the details to Organic Laws1 and Acts of 
Parliament to regulate. In this way, the Constitution would be kept
160. See House of Assembly Debates, Third House, Vol. Ill, No. 32, 
4139.
161. The Chief Minister was the Ex Officio Chairman.
162. See House of Assembly Debates. Third House, Vol. Ill, No. 32, 
4145.
163. Ibid., 4147.
164. The concept of Organic Law was brought in by the Government to 
solve this controversy, although not completely in the view of the 
CPC. Nevertheless, under the proposed system of constitutional norms, 
the Constitution was to provide the general principles and the Organic 
Laws, the details.
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within a reasonable size. The CPC wanted all the recommendations 
contained in its Final Report to be included in the proposed 
constitution.
The Government appeared to adopt two techniques in rejecting 
those of the CPC’s recommendations that it did not like. Either it 
spelt out in specific terms what it preferred, arguing that the CPC's 
recommendations were vague; or it classified a particular 
recommendation as a matter of detail which should be best left to the 
ordinary legislation to deal with. It opposed particularly the CPC's 
recommendations on provincial government, an investment code, 
citizenship and the head of state.
The Government persuaded the Constituent Assembly to omit from 
the Constitution any reference to a system of provincial government as
I rr
the CPC had recomended, DD but was forced to incorporate it into the 
Constitution two years after Independence^^ as a result of further 
pressure from Bougainvillean politicians. It also succeeded in 
getting the Constituent Assembly to leave out an investment code that 
CPC wanted, arguing that the code was a matter of detail which could 
be best regulated by ordinary legislation.
The effect of the CPC's recommendations on citizenship was to
deny influential Government Ministers who were Australian citizens
(such as Barry Holloway, Bruce Jephcott and Julius Chan) an automatic
right to citizenship on Independence Day, which would have deprived
them of their right to continue to hold high executive offices within
the Government. Not only were the recommendations considered racist
but the Coalition Government was further pressured by these
influential Ministers and by the Australian Government to seek
substantive amendments to the CPC's proposals. The Constituent
Assembly agreed, and the result was that the influential Ministers
1 68continued to remain in office after Independence. DO
165. See Paul Langro's speech: House of Assembly Debates. Third
House, Vol. Ill, No. 34, 4398.
166. Because it was costly. See Gris, 1978:36.
167. See Constitutional Amendment No. 1, 1976.
168. Ley, 1978.
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The CPC rejected the institution of the head of state because it
argued that the functions the head of state performs in the
Westminster system could be also performed by other public officers,
such as the Speaker of the National Parliament or the Chief Justice.
But the Government was able to convince the Constituent Assembly at
169the last minute to adopt the English Monarch as the Head of State, 
and this led to a large public demonstration in Port Moresby to 
protest against the decision.
The CPC saw the main cause of much of the conflict lay in
Somare's use of white advisers, although it is only fair to point
out that the CPC had its own white advisers. But Barnett argues that
the main factor was a break-down in communication between the CPC and
the Government;^“* and Johnson suggests that this was the result of a
1 72failure by Somare to take control of the CPC at the outset.
The areas of disagreement were greatly reduced through the
efforts of an Inter-Party Committee which comprised representatives
l 72from the Government, the CPC and the United Party. The Committee
began work in February 1975, and was able to set down instructions for 
the Draftsman on most issues through meetings it had arranged with 
politicians.
The Drafting Instructions from the House of Assembly did not, 
however, settle some of the questions completely and unequivocally. 
This left some areas open to the Coalition to insert its own views 
into the draft. When the National Constituent Assembly began 
considering the Draft Constitution, members found apparent
discrepancies between the Draft and the Drafting Instructions'*^ of 
the House of Assembly. Former members of the CPC accused the 
Government of deliberately ignoring the Drafting Instructions. Fr.
John Momis who had by then become the leader of the Nationalist
169. Because Somare could not persuade the Highlands block to accept
any other alternatives: Somare, 1981:personal notes. See also
Goldring, 1978:48.
170. See Woolford, 1976:165-166.
171. Barnett, 1981:63-65.
172. Johnson, 1983:152.
173. Bayne, 1982; Ley, 1978.
174. Ley, 1978.
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Pressure Group, moved a motion for the Assembly to adjourn for two 
weeks so that members could study the Draft Constitution and 
particularly the alleged discrepancies.'^'7“’ Others were prepared to 
take the whole Draft to the electorate to get its views. The Leader 
of the Opposition in fact moved a motion to that effect on the third 
day of the A s s e m b l y . A l l  this led to much anti-government feeling 
in the Assembly, and at times to emotional exchanges between the Chief 
Minister and various members of the Nationalist Pressure Group.
The Government saw these moves as nothing more than delaying 
tactics. In his statement the Chief Minister responded:
I think it is high time we should all come together and sit 
round the table and discuss this matter in a spirit of 
compromise. All the time when an issue has been agreed upon 
then parties turn around and start criticising another party 
for mucking around with things ... I am sick and tired of the 
way things are going. We have only three days and if the 
House wishes to adjourn then we may do so but to adjourn the 
House when it is still the middle of the week is not fair.
The impression we convey to the public is that we are only 
here to play around and not to get down to doing our job.^
John Kaputin, the deputy-leader of the Nationalist Pressure
Group, saw the Chief Minister's statement as advocating a perpetual
compromise which to him was a sign of great weakness. The then
Minister for Justice, Ebia Olewale, replied in turn that this may be
so, but surely 'not to be prepared to compromise at all is also a sign
179of great weakness and one which is totally destructive of unity'.
There was in the end some compromise. The Government' s own 
commitment to early Independence did contribute to its willingness, 
perhaps at times reluctantly, to yield to various demands which it 
could probably not have conceded to otherwise.
By early August 1975, the Constitution in its final form was 
ready. On the 15 August, 1975, the National Constituent Assembly 
adopted and enacted it as the fundamental law. On the same day, the






Assembly resolved that the Constitution come into effect at midnight
of the 16th September, 1975. The National Constituent Assembly
adjourned for the last time on 20 August, 1975, after having been told
by the Minister for Justice that the House would expire on 16
September, 1975, when the Constitution came into effect. At midnight
on 16 September, 1975, the Constitution consisting of 54,000 words,
surpassed only by India's of 54,700 words and that of Yugoslavia of 
1 8060,000 words, came into force and took effect.
One significant element of the new Constitution is the notion of
control of power, and central to that notion in the thinking of the
members of the CPC was a concern about who was to exercise power of 
181the State. It is therefore relevant to ascertain how this control
is incorporated into the Constitution, particularly the scheme by 
which the power is arranged, and the consequences such arrangement has 
on the Executive.
180. The three are the longest constitutions in the world: 
Maarseveen and Tang, 1978:85.




DIVISION, CONTROL AND THE SHARING OF POWER: 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL SCHEME
In its Final Report^ 
of power thus:
the CPC stressed its concern for a control
In planning a constitution we are concerned above all else 
with these very questions - who shall have what powers and in 
what manner shall they be exercised.^
Because of the adoption of the Westminster system of parliamentary 
3government, the CPC knew that inevitably the Executive would exercise
much of this power. It therefore sought the best way of controlling 
that power. It considered control of power necessary not only to
protect the rights of the individual, but also to ensure that the kind
of society it had envisioned for PNG was achieved.
The CPC was aware that the traditional method of controlling the 
power of the state was through the doctrine of the separation of 
powers. This doctrine seeks to protect the individual's liberty by
avoiding a concentration of power in one person or institution, 
de Smith has succinctly summed up the doctrine thus:
1. There are three main classes of governmental functions: 
the legislative, the executive and the judicial.
2. There are (or should be) three main organs of government
in a State: the Legislature, the Executive and the
Judiciary.
3. To concentrate more than one class of function in any one 
person or organ of government is a threat to individual 
liberty. For example, the Executive should not be allowed 
to make laws or adjudicate on alleged breaches of the law; 
it should be confined to the executive functions of making
1. CPC, 1974.
2. Ibid., 1/3, para. 11.
3. See Chapter 5, post
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and applying policy and general administration.^
It has been accepted that a strict separation is impractical;^ 
and it has also been acknowledged that there is some separation in 
practice. ^ But whether power can be easily divided into three types'4 5678910 
or whether there is an ideal degree of separation, are questions that 
are not easy to answer. Sawer suggests that what is needed is ’a 
modification of the principle to suit the appropriate kind of
Oclassification1 rather than to reject classification altogether. To 
put the point simply, it is a question of modifying the doctrine to 
serve the purpose which a constitution prescribes in a given case.
Much of the serious debate about the applicability of the 
doctrine relates to the question of whether the doctrine has been 
incorporated into a particular constitutional system. The debate is 
not quite settled. In Britain for instance, there is still a lively 
controversy about whether Britain has a separation of powers doctrine. 
The courts have consistently held that there is a separation of
Qpowers. The academic lawyers however, argue that there is no such 
separation.^ Munro suggests a third view, which takes the middle 
ground by arguing that there is no absolute separation but only 
separation in the relative sense.'*''*' That is, there is some blending 
of powers in practice. Thus, it appears that there are two 
propositions applicable in Britain: that there is no complete 
separation of powers, and that there is some separation at least in
4. de Smith, 1981:31.
5. Vanderbilt, 1963:50; de Smith, 1981:31-32.
6. Sawer, 1961:177.
7. Some writers have argued that it cannot be easily done. Bondy
has for instance, suggested that there is a fourth category, namely, 
administrative powers: quoted by Sawer, 1961:178. de Smith also
agreed that there is a fourth category, but to him this category 
consists of Ministerial powers which he saw as being different from 
executive or administrative powers. He defined ministerial powers as 
those which refer to 'the making of decisions, the issuing of orders 
or the execution of acts in which the element of judgment or 
discretion is either absent or relatively very small': see de Smith,
1980:70-71.
8. Sawer, 1961:177.
9. See Lord Diplock in Hinds v. The Queen (1977) A.C. 195 at 212.
10. Hood Phillips, 1977:11.
11. Munro, 1981:19.
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functional terms. But the separation between the executive and the
legislature both structurally and functionally, is not as clear as the
separation between them, on the one hand, and the judiciary on the
other. This is partly due to the partial fusion of the executive and
the .Legislature, an essential feature of the Westminster model of
12parliamentary Government.
The U.S. Federal Constitution is regarded as having incorporated 
the doctrine in the strict sense. In 1881 the U.S. Supreme Court held 
in Kilbourne v. Thomson that all powers of government are divided 
into legislative, executive and judicial, and ought to be kept 
separate. But Davis argues that all that the Federal Constitution has 
done is to separate the power into three types; and it has not said 
anything about keeping each of these powers separate.^ He argues, 
and the former Chief Justice Warren of the U.S. Supreme Court agrees 
with him, that what actually applies in practice is not separation but 
a system of checks and balances.^
The Australian Federal Constitution follows generally the
American model of separation in as much as power is separated into
legislative power which is vested in the Federal Parliament; the
executive power which is vested in the Queen; ^  and the judicial power
which is vested in the High Court of Australia and other federal
1 8Courts. The drafters of the Constitution had intended to adopt a
19limited separation because a strict separation would be incompatible 
with the Westminster system of parliamentary government that had been 
adopted.
The development of the doctrine in Australia influenced the
12. And since Britain does not have a written constitution, the 
basis of the separation of powers is governed jointly by both 
constitutional conventions and statutes. This arrangement provides 
flexibility which Britons prefer: see Yardley, 1975:197 at 217.
13. 103 U.S. 168, 26 L.Ed. 377 (1881).
14. Davis, 1965:26.





19. See Sawer, 1967:154.
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drafting of the PNG constitutional provisions in this respect through 
legal advisers who were generally either Australians or educated in 
Australia. It is therefore relevant at this point to consider briefly 
the general position of the doctrine under the Australian 
Constitution, because the problems experienced in Australia served to 
explain the view the CPC eventually took on whether or not it would 
adopt the doctrine.
Under the Australian Federal Constitution there is no strict
separation in relation to the legislative and the executive powers
because of the principle of ministerial responsibility to Parliament -
an essential feature of the Westminster system. The High Court has
? 1not insisted on strict separation on this point. However, there is 
a limited separation to the extent that Parliament cannot divest 
itself of its powers by conferring them on the Executive, but again 
this proposition is further qualified by the conferment on the
Executive of the power to make subordinate legislation. This power 
is very wide.
In the Australian context it is in relation to the judicial power
I Tthat the High Coun has insisted on the application of the doctrine.
The High Court made this clear in two leading cases. In USW v.
24Commonwealth it held that the Inter-State Commission could not grant
an injunction to the Commonwealth to restrain NSW from breaching S.92
of the Constitution because it was not a court. The power to grant
injunctions is considered judicial, and S.71 vests that power in the
High Court and other federal courts. Similarly, in R. v. Kirby; ex
parte Boilermakers' Society of Australia (boilermakers' Case) the
9 AHigh Court and the Privy Council"1 held that the Commonwealth Court of 
Conciliation and Arbitration could not fine the boilermakers' Society 
tor contempt because it was not constituted as a court; since the








24. (1915) 20 C.L.R. 54.
25. (1956) 94 C.L.R. 254
26. (1957) 95 C.L.R. 529
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be exercised only by courts within the meaning of S.71. The effect of 
27both cases is that the judicial power cannot be conferred on
? 8non-judicial bodies such as tribunals; and the High Court also made
it clear in Boilermakers * Case that non-judicial powers cannot be also
conferred on courts within the meaning of S.71 of the Federal 
29Constitution.
Insistence on a strict separation of judicial power in Australia
has produced both conceptual as well as practical problems. Two basic
conceptual problems are: what is a court? and what is judicial power
as distinct from non-judicial power? McMillan and others maintain
that it is not difficult to answer the former question presumably
because courts are usually defined by statutes; but they admit that
the latter question causes real difficulty. The problem of finding
a precise definition of judicial power is such that a former judge has
claimed that 'a satisfactory definition of what is judicial power has
11so far eluded the most ingenious judges'.
A strict distinction between judicial and non-judicial powers 
also produces practical problems. It means, for instance, that
separate institutions, with all their attendant costs, had to be 
established to exercise these two separate types of powers as was done 
following the decision in boilermakers' Case). It also means that 
every time a non-judicial body, particularly a tribunal, is set up, 
the draftsman has to take particular care in ensuring that such body 
is not vested with judicial power. The distinction has been
criticised on the basis that it 'leads to excessive subtlety and 
technicality in the operation of the Constitution without ... any
27. See McMillan, Evans and Storey tor a succinct account of the 
cases, 1983:294.
28. Lane, 1977:167.
29. See McMillan, Evans and Storey, 1983:294.
30. Ibid. , 294-293.
31. Sir Richard Eggleston, cited by hambly and Goldring (eds.), 
1976:299. It may be noted that Eggleston was the counsel for the 
union (who won in Boilermakers' Case).
32. See Lane, 1977:168; and McMillan, Evans and Storey, 1983:294.
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"3 Qcompensating benefit'. J But a more substantial criticism of the
doctrine is that it 'inhibits the development of a sound and sensible
system of courts and tribunals'.-^ The common argument on this point
is that the Commonwealth should be free to confer on tribunals both
administrative and adjudicative powers, including powers to enforce
their orders in such areas as broadcasting, trade and commerce where
IScontrol is needed.
Despite these problems, the judges of the High Court still defend
the strict separation of the judicial power on the basis that it
0/1guarantees the protection of the individual's liberty. ° It is 
further defended on the grounds that,
it operates as a fetter on the authority of the Federal 
Parliament to select how and by whom statutory powers may be 
exercised.
Drafters of written constitutions especially in the Western world 
have not supported the concept of strict separation of powers. A 
recent computerised study of 142 written constitutions for instance, 
has found that only 18.3 per cent of these constitutions refer to 
separation or division of powers as such whilst 79.6 per cent do
OO o Qnot. There are references however, to individual types of powers. y
The comparative experience thus suggests that separation of 
powers in the strict sense is too rigid and impracticable. hence, it 
is not found under many of the constitutions that exist today. 
Secondly, what appears to be required in order to enable power to be 
used effectively is either a concentration of power or a flexible 
system of dividing it, so long as adequate control is also at the same 
time provided.
33. Sir Garfield Barwick in Rj_ v. Joske; ex parte Australian 
Building Construction Employees and Builders' Labourers' Federation 
U974) 130 C.L.R. 87, 90.
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The CPC rejected the doctrine in its absolute form and preferred 
instead a scheme which would permit interaction and sharing of power 
between state institutions. It explained that decision thus:
Our constitutional provisions are not based on a theory of 
absolute separation of powers. It is our belief that 
interaction between different state-institutions can be 
beneficial. ®
How then is this scheme reflected in the Constitution? I propose to 
examine this question in the rest of this chapter by first analysing 
the constitutional framework of the scheme; secondly, by evaluating 
the possible judicial view of that scheme; and finally by suggesting 
what I consider to be the true constitutional scheme of the division
of powers.
2.1 THE CONSTITUTIONAL SCHEME OF THE DIVISION OF POWERS
The CPC's concept of shared power is not reflected clearly by the 
constitutional text, largely because the draftsman persisted in using 
the traditional method of tripartite separation of powers as the means 
of dividing at least the governmental power of the State. A brief 
discussion of these two views is relevant at this point.
a) Shared Powers Versus Separation of Powers
The CPC was aware that a modern state has to carry out a variety 
of functions which could be better performed if power was shared by 
the various state institutions to which these functions were 
assigned.^ In emphasising the notion of sharing of power, the CPC in 
effect accepted the two usual arguments made against the separation of 
powers theory, namely, first, that power cannot in the context of a 
modern state be divided easily into only three types; and secondly, 
that a strict separation of powers is not practical. z
The CPC's concept of shared power therefore contrasted sharply 
with the traditional notion of three types of powers which courts used 
in both determining limits to each of the powers, and controlling the 
exercise of each of these powers by applying those limits.
40. CPC, 1974:8/14, para. 138
41. CPC, 1974:1/3, para. 18.
42. See Sawer, 1961:177-178.
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The draftsman, on the other hand, showed in his first Draft of 28 
March, 19744  ^ that he preferred a strict separation of powers theory, 
although he may not have been aware at that point of the CPC’s concept 
of shared power, as a summary of the CPC's final recommendations were 
not circulated to the Government until June, 1974. In its two Interim 
Reports in 1973 the CPC did not deal with the question of division of 
powers, so that there was not very much by which to judge the CPC's 
thoughts on this at that stage of the drafting. In that Draft of 28 
March 1974, all that the draftsman did in terms of the division of 
powers was to adopt the tripartite system as it existed under the 
Papua New Guinea Act 1949 (as amended). Thus, he substituted the 
Administrator's Council with 'the Executive Council',^ the House of 
Assembly with 'the legislature'^ and the Supreme Court with 'the 
National Judicial System'
By early April 1974, the draftsman appeared to have become aware 
of the CPC's concept of shared power, most likely through informal 
communication. For his draft of 18 April 1974^ shows that he 
accepted the concept of shared power to the extent, and only to that 
extent, of allowing both the legislative and the executive powers to 
be vested and delegated outside the executive and the legislature. It 
is worth quoting one of these clauses in full here to illustrate the 
technique of drafting which the draftsman adopted for the first time 
to enable the sharing of power.^ Clause 10 for instance, which dealt 
with the exercise of the executive power, had two subsections which 
were couched in the following terms:
43. This was known or rather suspected as the 'secret Constitution' 
because it was drafted and hidden away before the CPC even made its 
final recommendations. The document itself was titled, 'Secret Draft 
of an Interim Constitution' dated 28 March 1974. Lynch recalled later 
that he was asked by Somare and Holloway to prepare a draft 
constitution using the Papua New Guinea Act 1949 (as amended) as the 
basis for the draft, because it was uncertain at the time whether the 
CPC was going to recommend a constitution in time for Independence. 
Lynch:personal communication. It seems fair to point out that Lynch 
did not prepare the so-called secret constitution by his own volition, 
but on specific request from politicians.
44. Ibid., clause 81.
45. Ibid., clause 24.
46. Ibid., Part IV.
47. This was titled, 'Interim Constitution of 18 April 1974'.
48. The draftsman in fact maintained this technique in the 
subsequent Drafts and also in the Constitution itself.
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1) Subject to this Interim Constitution, the executive power 
of the People of Papua New Guinea is vested in the 
Executive Council, and extends to the execution and 
maintenance of this Constitution, and of the laws of Papua 
New Guinea.
2) Subsection (1) does not prevent -
a) the House of Assembly from conferring by enactment 
powers or functions on authorities other than the 
Executive Council; or
b) the powers and functions of the Executive Council 
being exercised, as determined by it, through a 
Minister or Ministers.
A similar provision was made for the exercise of the legislative 
power.^ But there was no provision made for the judicial power to be 
shared in a similar fashion. Clause 44 which dealt with the exercise 
of judicial power only provided that:
Judicial power is vested in the National Judicial System.
A provision for sharing the judicial power similar to the current 
S.159 of the Constitution appeared for the first time in the Fourth
Draft of 10 May 1975.^ By then there had already been seven Drafts
in which there was no provision for the sharing of the judicial power. 
A brief background to this is therefore relevant.
It seemed to have been accepted by all the parties involved in 
the preparation of the Constitution that because of the fusion between 
the legislative and the executive powers in the Westminster system
which had been adopted, it was impractical to insist on a strict
separation of these two types of powers. But a conflict of view 
occurred on the question of separation of the judicial power.
The draftsman insisted on a strict separation of the judicial 
power, presumably relying on the decision in Boilermakers' Case, 
although he did not seem to have been aware of both conceptual and 
practical problems the decision could create, as indeed it did in the 
Australian context. Conceptually, for instance, if one wishes to 
create control through a system of administrative regulation in the 
form of tribunals, one has to ensure that in terms of drafting the
49. Interim Constitution of 18 April, 1974, clause 23.
50. Fourth Draft of 10 May, 1975 (renumbered and revised), clause 
159.
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legislation, the power conferred on any such tribunal is 
non-judicial.^  But to understand what is non-judicial one must first 
understand what constitutes judicial power, and the development of the 
law on this point in Australia (if that is to be any guide) is far 
from .settled, as noted above.
The difficulties were pointed out to the draftsman by the 
Inter-Party Committee. Some compromise therefore had to be reached 
between the notion of a strict separation of the judicial power, and 
the CPC's general notion of sharing of powers as it applied to the 
judicial power. It was agreed at the end that as a general principle, 
the proposed constitution should allow the judicial power to be 
delegated by statute to non-judicial bodies such as tribunals in order 
to avoid the kinds of problems an adherence to a strict separation of 
the judicial power creates, as it did in the Australian context. But 
in order to avoid any abuse of judicial power it was agreed that any 
exercise of the judicial power should be made subject to the overall 
review power of the National Court.
This compromise arrangement was recommended by the Inter-Party 
Committee to the leaders of the parties involved; and only after the 
leaders accepted the recommendation was there a change. Ilinome Tarua
who represented the Government saw the advantages of the arrangement 
52and supported it. Accordingly, the draftsman included a provision 
to that effect in the Fourth Draft. That provision finally became the 
present S.159 which is discussed in more detail below. Thus, the 
Fourth Draft contained clauses which stipulated that each of the three 
types of powers, viz., the legislative, executive and judicial powers, 
could be shared between various institutions.
The acceptance by the draftsman of the general concept of shared 
power meant that he could not continue to adhere strictly to keeping 
each of the three types of powers separate from each other. He seemed
51. In v . Trade Practices Tribunal; ex parte Tasmanian Breweries 
Pty Ltd ( 1970) 123 C.L.R. 361, the Australian High Court held, for 
instance, that the powers conferred on the Trade Practices Tribunal by 
the Trade Practices Act 1965-1968 to decide on what are examinable 
agreements and whether they are contrary to the public interest, were 
non-judicial: see the Attorney-General, 1980:217.
52. Peter Bayne:personal communication.
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to have become aware of this earlier, in that he decided that such
separation should be kept but only 'as a general principle'. This
53provision appeared for the first time in the Draft of 29 July, 1974, 
and could be regarded as a compromise in that it does envisage 
exceptions that could occur as a consequence of power being shared 
between various institutions. The phrase, 'as a general principle' 
was later replaced in the Draft of 1 March, 1975, by the term 'in 
p r i n c i p l e w h i c h  the Constitution now e m p l o y s . T h e  final position 
the draftsman appeared to have accepted, therefore, was that power 
should be shared between various institutions of the State, provided 
that as a general rule the respective powers of the legislature, the 
executive and the judiciary were kept separate from each other.
The Constitution reflects this position. But this does not 
reflect the total scheme of the division of powers under the 
Constitution. A close study of the constitutional provisions reveals 
that there are other types of powers to which the draftsman's notion 
of separation of powers does not, 'as a general principle', apply.
The Constitution deals with three questions that are basic to a 
proper understanding of the scheme of division of powers under it, 
namely, the source of power, who is to exercise it, and in what manner 
it is to be exercised.
b) The Source of Power
The Preamble to the Constitution declares that all power belongs 
to the People of PNG. This reflects the CPC's recommensdations. In 
its Final Report the CPC stressed that,
[t]he principle that power derives from the people provides
the basis of the Constitution.“^
It saw the Constitution as the means which would return to the People 
their power which was taken away from them by the colonial 
government. It was this power which the People used in enacting the
53. First Preliminary Draft of 29 July, 1974, Clause 111.1.2(2).
54. Third Draft of 1 March 1975, Clause 111.1.1(3).
55. See S.99(3).
56. CPC, 1974:7/1, para. 1.
57. Ibid.
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Constitution. From the perspective of control of the Executive the 
emphasis on the People as the source of power gave rise to another 
important constitutional implication, namely, that neither the 
Executive nor any other institution of the state can claim that it is 
the source of power.
The principle that the People are the source of power has been
58confirmed by the Supreme Court in The State v. John Wonom (Wonom's 
Case). The case is discussed in some detail in the first chapter, 
above, in relation to the question of legal autochthony, and it is 
sufficient here merely to indicate that all three judges in the case 
agreed unanimously that the People were the source of power, even 
though they differed in their views on whether the power of 
prosecution was an executive or judicial power.
Although the source of all power is an important question, from 
the practical perspective the other two questions, namely, who is to 
exercise power and in what manner, are the more important. For these 
are the normal questions on which legal battles are fought in relation 
to any issue about power.
c) The Diffusion of Power
As noted above, the Constitution reflects the CPC's concept of 
shared powers. This means power is diffused among more than three 
state institutions. The starting point in the constitutional text in 
this respect is the Preamble which states that the power of the People 
is to be exercised 'through their duly elected representatives'.^
58. L1975] P.N.G.L.R. 311. This was the first constitutional law 
case that came before the Supreme Court after Independence.
59. Ibid., Frost C.J. at 315; Raine J. at 318; and Williams J. at 
320.
60. This term is rather restrictive in scope, and thus creates an
interpretive problem. For instance, it is difficult to see the judges 
who exercise the judicial authority of the people as is provided by 
S.158(1) of the Constitution, as being 'duly elected' by the people. 
In order to avoid this kind of problem the recent General 
Constitutional Commission recommended in its Final Report that the 
term 'that all power belongs to the people to be exercised in 
accordance with the Constitution' should be adopted to replace the 
present term: See General Constitutional Commission, 1983: Appendix
H, 104.
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Section 99 then vests that power in the National Government. 
This section is the key provision on the constitutional scheme of the 
division of powers and is quoted in full at this point.
S.99. Structure of Government
(1) Subject to and in accordance with this Constitution, the 
power, authority and jurisdiction of the People shall be 
exercised by the National Government.
(2) The National Government consists of three principal 
arms, namely
(a) the National Parliament, which is an elective 
legislature, with, subject to the Constitutional 
Laws, unlimited powers of law-making; and
(b) the National Executive; and
(c) the National Judicial System, consisting of a 
Supreme Court of Justice and a National Court of 
Justice, of unlimited jurisdiction, and other 
courts.
(3) In principle, the respective powers and functions of the 
three arms shall be kept separate from each other.
(4) Subsection (2) is descriptive only and is non- 
j usticiable.
The first point to be noted about S.99 is that it refers to both the 
power and the structure of the National Government, and not only to
/: lthe structure as the heading of the section suggests.
Since power vested in the National Government has to be exercised 
by some institutions, S.99(2) therefore creates the structure of these 
institutions which include, expressly, the three principal arms, and 
implicitly, lesser or ancillary arms. It is also important to note 
(and I discuss this fully in the last section of the chapter) that by 
providing that ’subject to ... this Constitution' the power of the
61. A suitable heading for the section should indicate power as well 
as structure. The draftsman, in fact, had two separate clauses, one 
dealing with power and the other with structure in his Draft of 10 
August, 1974. But presumably because of the need for economy he 
decided to bring both power and structure under one clause in his 
Draft of 1 January, 1975. This is the clause on which the present 
S.99 is based.
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people is to be exercised by the National Government, S.99(1) might 
imply that there are other institutions besides the National 
Government which share the exercise of that power. Thus, the general 
structure of the state institutions as far as it can be discerned from 
S.99 .consists of those that comprise the National Government and those 
that are outside it. Those institutions that constitute the National 
Government are subdivided further into the principal arms and the 
ancillary arms.^
The exercise of that power is diffused within the broad 
structure, and that diffusion occurs at five levels. The first level 
is where the Constitution divides the total power between the National 
Government and the other institutions of the State. As stated above, 
S.99(1) supports this interpretation. For the purposes of this 
analysis the power vested in the National Government may be regarded 
as 'governmental p o w e r s ' w h i l s t  those vested in the other 
institutions of the State may be taken as 'non-governmental powers'.
Leaving the powers vested in the other institutions aside for the 
time being, since S.99 does not deal further with them, it is 
necessary to turn to examine the diffusion of the governmental powers 
because the next four levels of diffusion occur within and beyond the 
institutional structure of the National Government. Thus, the second 
level at which the diffusion of governmental power occurs is between 
the principal arms and the ancillary arms. This division of power is
effected by other individual provisions of the Constitution. For
64instance, in the case of the principal arms, the legislative power 
is vested in the National Parliament by S.100; the executive power in 
the Head of State by S.138, and the judicial authority in the National 
Judicial System by S.158.
The third level at which the diffusion of governmental power 
occurs is between the governmental arms and beyond them, and allows 
for three possible situations. This is due to a wide scope that
62. See Chapter 3, post.
63. That is, power is vested in those institutions that make up the 
government, and this would include provincial and local-level 
governments; although the National Government is structurally separate 
from local-level and provincial governments.
64. The situation of the ancillary arms is discussed below.
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SS. 100(2), 140 and 159 permit for such diffusion. It is again 
pertinent to quote these sections in full here because they are 
crucial to the understanding of the diffusion of powers on this level.
S.100. Exercise of Legislative Power
(1) Subject to this Constitution, the legislative power of 
the People is vested in the National Parliament.
(2) Subsection (1) does not prevent a law from conferring on 
an authority other than the Parliament legislative powers or 
functions (including, if the law so provides, a further power 
or further powers of delegation and subdelegation).
(3) Nothing in any Constitutional Law enables or may enable 
the Parliament to transfer permanently, or divest itself of, 
legislative power.
S.140. Conferring of powers, etc., outside the National 
Executive.
Except where the contrary intention appears nothing in this 
Constitution prevents an Organic Law or a statute from 
conferring or imposing powers, functions, duties or 
responsibilities on a person or authority outside the National 
Executive.
159. Tribunals, etc., outside the National Judicial System.
(1) Subject to Subsection (3), nothing in this Constitution 
prevents an Organic Law or a statute from conferring judicial 
authority on a person or body outside the National Judicial 
System, or the establishment by or in accordance with law, or 
by consent of the parties, of arbitral or conciliatory 
tribunals, whether ad hoc or other, outside the National 
Judicial System.
(2) Nothing in, or done in accordance with, Subsection (1) 
affects the operation of Section 155(4) or (5) (The National 
Judicial System).
(3) No person or body outside the National Judicial System, 
has, or may be given, power to impose a sentence of death or 
imprisonment, or to impose any other penalty as for a criminal 
offence, but nothing in this subsection prevents -
(a) the imposition, in accordance with law, of
65. The Constitution defines the National Judicial System as 
including the Supreme Court, the National Court and all the other 
courts: S.155.
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disciplinary detention or any other disciplinary 
punishment (other than death) by a disciplinary 
authority of a disciplined force on persons subject to 
the disciplinary law of the force; or
(b) the imposition, in accordance with law, of
disciplinary punishments (other than death or
detention) on members of other State or provincial 
services; or
(c) the imposition of reasonable penalties (other than 
death or detention) by an association on its members 
for breaches of its rules.
(4) In Subsection (3)(a), 'disciplined force' has the same 
meaning as in Section 207 (definition of 'disciplined force').
A reading of these provisions shows three general directions in
which the governmental power could be diffused between and beyond the
governmental arms themselves. First, power vested in any of the three
principal arms may be conferred on either or both of the other two,
provided that in the case of legislative power there is no permanent
A Adivesting of that power from the National Parliament. Secondly,
power vested in any of the three principal arms may be conferred on 
the ancillary arms. In this situation diffusion still occurs within 
the governmental structure. Thirdly, power vested in any of the 
principal arms may be conferred on any institution of the State 
outside the governmental structure.
The fourth level at which governmental powers are further
diffused is at the level of provincial government. Here diffusion
occurs between provincial and local-level governments which came into
operation following the enactment of Constitutional Amendment No. 1 in
June, 1976, and the Organic Law on Provincial Government in August in
that year. Under the legal framework created by these two statutes,
provincial institutions are granted a relative autonomy in relation to
policy and other initiatives in both the concurrent and the primarily
A7provincial subject areas. Most government activities are located in 
these two areas. The obvious intention as far as it is reflected in 
the Organic Law is to allow provincial institutions to take the 
initiative in legislation in these two areas. The National Parliament
66. The Constitution, S.100(3).
67. The other subject area is that of primarily national interest.
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retains what may be called a 'reserve power' in the sense that it has 
the ultimate power to act in the last resort to set things in order. 
It could assert this power for a number of purposes, the obvious one 
being the promotion and protection of the national interest. But the 
over-all intention under the decentralised system appears to be to 
allow the National Government to assert this reserve power even in the 
context of national interest only rarely, and only in the last resort. 
And even then it is expected that the National Government would play a 
corrective role rather than a directing one.
The fifth level at which the Constitution diffuses the
governmental power is by isolating specific incidences of that power
for specific treatment. These include the Emergency Powers, ° the
Power of Mercy, ^  and the Power of Indemnity. ^  This arrangement
reflects a concern to ensure that the exercise of each of these powers
is properly controlled. Thus, a declaration of an emergency requires
a close supervision by Parliament of the exercise of the emergency
power.^ When the Executive wishes to exercise the Power of Mercy, it
72needs to receive advice from the Committee on the Power of Mercy.
And when Parliament decides to enact an Indemnity Act, it must first
refer the Act to the Supreme Court for the Court's opinion before the
7 8Speaker certifies the Act.
Although the constitutional text shows the general lines along 
which governmental power is diffused, it does not do this in relation 
to the diffusion of the non-governmental power.^ This thus creates 
some difficulty in any effort to ascertain the diffusion of the State 
power to those institutions which are outside the governmental 
structure proper. However, a close study of the general structure of 
the constitutional text suggests that the non-governmental power is
68. The Constitution, Part X - Emergency Powers.
69. Ibid., S.152.
70. Ibid., S.137.
71. Ibid., see SS.239-243.
72. Ibid., S.152(2).
73. Ibid., S.137(3). The Supreme Court in this instance is involved
in the legislative process: see Bayne, 1981:26.
74. This is the power vested in those institutions which do not form
a part of the government. These institutions are thus
non-governmental.
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diffused in two general directions. First, certain institutions are
given powers which are to be used for supervising and controlling
government especially the Executive.^  These are the Auditor-
General,^ the Public Accounts Committee of the National Parliament,^
78and the Ombudsman Commission. Some of these such as the Public
Prosecutor, exercise power which would normally be exercised by the 
79Executive.
The second set of non-governmental institutions are the
80Constitutional Office-Holders. There are nine of these, and as the 
term ’Constitutional Office-Holder' itself connotes, these officials 
hold offices expressly created by the Constitution. But their 
constitutional significance lies in the fact that the Constitution and 
the Organic Laws guarantee them independence in the exercise of their 
powers
The diffusion of the state power is thus fairly extensive. The 
immediate question that arises from this is whether there are any 
limitations on this diffusion.
d) The Formal Limitations on the Diffusion of Governmental Powers
There are two types of restrictions revealed by the 
constitutional text, one is of a general nature and the other consists 
of specific prohibitions on the extent to which specific powers vested 
in the principal arms of the National Government can be conferred 
outside these arms.
The general prohibition is reflected by S.9 9(3) of the 
Constitution, which provides that 'in principle' the respective powers 
of each of the principal arms are to be kept separate from each other. 
This is a general rule and as explained above, there is no strict 
separation of powers even within the structure of governmental




79. See Chapter 3, post.
80. Ibid., Part IX.
81. See the Constitution, S.223.(2).
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institutions because of the emphasis the Constitution places on the 
sharing of power. The courts have yet to determine what the term 'in 
principle' means or what S.99(3) as a whole means. One can therefore 
only speculate. In my view S.99(3) means that one arm of government 
canno.t be divested of its power. A clue to this result is given by 
S.100(3) which prohibits a total divesture of the legislative power 
from the National Parliament. That is, until S.100(3) is amended to 
provide otherwise, S.100(3) in its present form prevents Parliament
oofrom divesting itself of the legislative power. Although there is
no similar provision in relation to either the executive or the
judicial power, the fact that the diffusion of each of these two types 
8 3of powers is made subject to the Constitution tends to support the 
above interpretation. The reason for the prohibition against a total 
divesting of power in each case is not the same as that which is 
usually advanced in support of the traditional separation of powers 
theory, namely, to prevent abuse of power by not concentrating power 
in one person or body. The reason in this context is different, and 
appears to stem from the draftsman's view that such total divesting of 
power would amount to a constitutional amendment in a manner not 
permitted by the Constitution. That is, it was intended that power 
vested in each of the principal arms of the National Government should 
be easily shared between various institutions without the prior need 
to resort to the usual and rigorous procedure for amending the 
Constitution, which often causes much delay. But it was also realised 
that there must come a point in this process of diffusion where the 
question of divesting the total power arises which would require a 
constitutional amendment in the usual way, if such divesting is to be 
done constitutionally. It is this situation which S.99(3) is intended 
to address, rather than to deal exclusively with the question of the 
separation of powers. In other words, S.99(3) serves the purpose of 
limiting a full diffusion of the governmental power, by preventing the 
divesting of each of the principal powers as presently arranged.
82. It seems the draftsman was influenced on this point by the
Australian cases: see Evatt J. in Victoria Stevedoring and General
Contracting Co. Pty Ltd and Meak.es v. Dignan (1931) 46 C.L.R. 73 at
121.
83. For the executive power, see S.140 and for the judicial power, 
see S.159(1).
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The specific prohibitions against diffusion are directed at both 
the legislative and the judicial powers. The specific prohibition 
against a permanent divesting of the legislative power has already 
been noted above.
Those prohibitions against the diffusion of the judicial power 
are spelt out by S.159(3) of the Constitution quoted above. That 
provision prohibits any conferral of judicial power outside the courts 
where such power enables an imposition of any penalty in the criminal 
law sense, including a sentence of death or imprisonment. The 
constitutional text does not reveal any specific prohibitions against 
the diffusion of the executive power, nor does it prescribe similar 
prohibitions as applying to the non-governmental powers. That is, the 
powers conferred on those State institutions which are outside the 
governmental structure proper do not appear to be made subject to any 
limitations similar to the ones imposed on the governmental power by 
Sections 99(3), 100(3) and 159(3) of the Constitution. The reason for 
this seems to be the concern on the part of the constitution-makers to 
control the exercise of the governmental powers, perhaps more so than 
the non-governmental powers.
To a limited extent, the constitutional text also attempts to 
prescribe the manner in which power vested in each of the principal 
arms of the National Government is to be exercised.
e) The Manner of the Exercise of the Governmental Power
The Constitution only prescribes the manner in which the
executive power is to be exercised. It omits to make similar
provisions in relation to the other types of governmental powers,
84viz., the legislative and the judicial powers. The reason for this 
omission seems to be that historically there have not been significant 
problems arising out of the exercise of these powers to justify 
constitutional regulation. Any such problem as might arise could be 
left to the ordinary law to deal with. Besides, these powers have 
been traditionally used to control the Executive.
84. It also omits to make similar provisions for the exercise of 
non-governmental powers.
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The manner in which the legislative power is exercised by the
8 SParliament is determined internally by the Standing Orders. These 
however, aim not so much at limiting the exercise of that power as to 
enable that power to be exercised efficiently and effectively. If 
there are any questions of non-compliance with the internal procedures 
of Parliament, it is unlikely that the courts would intervene to 
adjudicate
The manner in which the judicial power is exercised is determined
87by those Acts which establish the courts, by the Rules of Court, and
by the rules of the Underlying Law governing court procedures
generally. In one way the Constitution does indicate the manner in
which the Supreme and the National Court may exercise their judicial
powers, and that is through S.155(4) where the courts may make orders
88based on prerogative writs, and under S.158 generally. But
otherwise the Constitution does not deal with the question in specific 
terms.
The Constitution attempts to control executive power by
prescribing certain conditions under which it may be exercised. A
89more detailed analysis of these conditions is made in Chapter 4, and 
it suffices therefore at this point to indicate the general
constitutional requirements.
90The executive power is vested in the Head of State. In
exercising that power she must not only act on the advice of the NEC
or that of any other authority prescribed by law to give such advice,
91but she must also act according to that advice. Thus, she has no 
discretion to act otherwise.
The constitutional text thus shows that the total power of the
85. See the Standing Orders of the National Parliament adopted on 16 
September, 1975.
86. See James Eki Mopio v. Speaker of the National Parliament [1977] 
P.N.G.L.R. 420, and the Constitution, S.115(2).
87. The Constitution, S.184.
88. See the further analysis of this point in Chapter 7, post.
89. See post.
90. The Constitution, S.138.
91. Ibid., S.86(2) which is discussed fully in the next chapter.
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State is diffused between governmental and non-governmental 
institutions of the State. The degree of that diffusion could be said 
to be fairly extensive although the Constitution does prescribe 
certain formal limitations to that diffusion.
2.2 THREE JUDICIAL VIEWS ON THE DIVISION OF STATE POWER
So far the decisions of the Supreme Court have revealed three 
schools of thought among the judges on the constitutional scheme under 
which power is thought to be divided. The first of these may be 
described as the 'traditionalists', who see the division of power as 
being based on the traditional separation of powers theory. The 
second school may be called the 'the multi-governmental arms 
theorists' who view the division of power as not being based on the 
tripartite system of the traditional separation of powers doctrine, 
but rather on the basis of a number of governmental arms which are 
more than three. The third school, which may be labelled as 'the 
non-governmental power theorists', sees some state institutions 
sharing the state power as being outside the framework of government 
and therefore as non-governmental bodies. Each of these theories will 
now be analysed.
a) The 'Traditionalists'
The first sign of the traditional separation of powers theory
92appeared in the case of The State v. John Wonom (Wonom's Case). The 
accused in this case was found guilty and was remanded for sentencing 
three days after Independence on a charge contained in an indictment 
entitled 'the State'. The practice prior to Independence was to title 
indictments in the name of 'the Queen'. When the case was resumed for 
sentencing, the trial judge noted the departure in the practice, 
whereupon Wonom's counsel moved for arrest of judgment under S.649 of 
the Criminal Code on the ground that, because of the change in the 
form, the indictment was a nullity. The trial judge then referred to 
the Supreme Court the question whether the indictment should be titled 
in the name of 'the Queen' or 'the State' or otherwise. In resolving
92. L 1975] P.N.G.L.R. 311.
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this question the Supreme Court had to determine where within the
constitutional scheme of the division of powers the power of
prosecution best fitted. However, without any real discussion of that
scheme, all three members of the Court assumed that the division of
powers was based on the traditional tripartite theory. Frost C.J.
held that the power of prosecution was an executive power vested in
the Head of State to be exercised on the advice of the NEC, and it
therefore was in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution to
title indictments in the name of 'the State', which was the collective
name of the People of PNG. The other two members of the Court,
viz., Raine J. and Williams J. came to the conclusion that the power
of prosecution was a judicial power vested in the National Judicial
System. It was therefore proper that indictments should be titled in
the name of 'the State' which collectively represented the People who
94created the National Judicial System. The two judges reasoned that 
the power of prosecution was a part of the judicial power since it is 
concerned with the dispensation of justice; but because it was 
impracticable for the People to exercise this power themselves, they 
vested the right to exercise it in the courts.
There are two general criticisms that could be made about the
95decision in Wonom's Case at this stage inasmuch as it related to the 
constitutional scheme of division of powers. First, instead of
ascertaining what the total scheme was, the three judges readily 
assumed that the scheme of the division of powers was based on the 
tripartite system of the traditional theory of separation of powers 
incorporated into the Constitution. But, as shown above, the CPC
rejected this theory, and the above analysis of the constitutional 
text does not support the theory. However, having assumed that this 
theory formed the basis of the separation of powers, the judges then 
proceeded to try to fit the power of prosecution within the scheme, 
particularly in either the executive or the judicial categories, as
93. Ibid., 316-317. He further found that the power of prosecution 
was not based on the Royal Prerogative. There is 'no provision for 
any prerogative exercise of executive acts' under Schedule 2.2(2): 
ibid.
94. Ibid., see Raine J. at 318, and Williams J. at 320.
95. A more detailed critique of the 'Traditionalists' is provided 
below.
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that power seemed at least prima facie to fit easily into either of 
these two groups. But even then the judges showed a casual concern at 
analysing the relevant constitutional provisions which diffuse the 
state power.
Secondly, the reasoning which led the judges to adopting two 
different views, one regarding the power of prosecution as an 
executive power and the other as the judicial power, was confusing in 
that it was based on a superficial understanding of the relevant 
constitutional provisions. The judges arrived at their respective 
conclusions without showing how the power of prosecution which is 
vested in the Public Prosecutor by S.177(1) of the Constitution could 
be said to be an executive power or a judicial power. That is, in 
what way could it be said that the textual arrangement of the State 
power suggests that the prosecutorial power is derived from S.138 (the 
vesting of executive power) rather than from S.158 (the vesting of 
judicial power) (or vice versa), especially when the Constitution 
itself does not provide any definition of either the executive power 
or the judicial power?
Frost C.J. seemed to have been influenced by S.176(3)(2) of the 
Constitution in adopting the view that the ultimate power to prosecute 
was vested in the Head of State. Section 176(3)(b) provides that the 
Head of State may, on the advice of the NEC, give direction to the 
Public Prosecutor ’on any matter that might prejudice the security, 
defence or international relations of Papua New Guinea ... ’ . There 
were two steps in Frost C.J.'s reasoning. First, in order to bring
the prosecutorial power into the executive power category, he had to
96regard the prosecutorial power as vested in the Head of State 
because S.138 vests the executive power in the Head of State. The 
second step in his reasoning was then to assume that because the 
prosecutorial power was vested in the Head of State it was therefore 
an executive power. To deal with this second step first, it is not 
difficult to point out that the reasoning is faulty in elementary 
logic in that just because one type of power is vested in the Head of 
State it does not mean that such power is necessarily an executive
96. Despite the express provisions of S.177(1) which vest that power 
in the Public Prosecutor.
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power. Before the prosecutorial power could become a part of the 
executive power, it must first share the same definition that the 
executive power has under S.138 in order to provide the logical 
connection. The Chief Justice did not establish this. But no 
assistance could be derived from S.138 on this point because it does 
not define the executive power.
The fault in the first step in Frost C.J.'s reasoning that 
S.176(3)(b) confers prosecutorial power is that the section does not 
contain either the prosecutorial power or a part of it, because the 
section does not confer any power on the Head of State either to 
prosecute or to order the Public Prosecutor to prosecute. The wording 
of S.176(3)(b) suggests that the power it confers is a negative power 
of veto which the NEC may use to prevent a further prosecution or to 
prevent a further dealing with a matter arising in the course of 
prosecution, where further such action or further prosecution would 
prejudice the security, defence or foreign relations of PNG. Thus, 
even if this veto power conferred by S. 176(3) (b) was regarded as an 
executive power within the meaning of S.138 of the Constitution, it is 
difficult to see how this would attract the prosecutorial power into 
the executive power category when S.176(3)(b) does not vest any 
prosecutorial power or a part of it in the Head of State.
The other two judges who held the prosecutorial power to be a 
judicial power similarly failed to relate S.177(1) to S.158 which 
vests the judicial authority in the courts. Instead, they appear to 
have taken the view that because S.177 occurs in Part VI, Division 5, 
which deals with the Administration of Justice, the prosecutorial 
power conferred by the section was a judicial power. But there is 
nothing in either S.177(1) itself or in S.158 which suggests that the 
prosecutorial power under S.177(1) is derived from S.158, even as a 
result of the sharing of the judicial authority that S.159 of the 
Constitution permits.
In the following year the Supreme Court had another opportunity 
through the case of Rakatani Peter v. South Pacific Brewery^ 
(Rakatani's Case) when it again supported the traditional separation
97. [1976] P.N.G.L.R. 537.
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of powers principle. The question in that case was whether the
98Supreme Court could read down S.131 of the District Courts Act 1963
99to conform to the provisions of S.37(5) of the Constitution. 
Although Kearney J. agreed with Frost C.J. that it could be done 
without being involved in judicial legislation, he warned of the 
danger in unconsciously using the reading down method of statutory 
interpretation thus:
In my opinion, Constitution S.10 must be applied in the light 
of other provisions in the Constitution, in particular
S.99(3); it does not warrant an incursion by the Court upon 
the law-making power of the Parliament, so as to create, by 
reading down, an Act which differs in its substance from that 
passed by Parliament. The Court's function remains one of 
construction, the ascertaining of Parliamentary intention 
however conjectural and not one of legislation.^^
Kearney J. thus supported the strict separation of powers doctrine.
Then in 1982 the case of Supreme Court Reference 1A of 1981; Re 
Motor Traffic Act^ ^  (the Motor Traffic Case) raised again the
relevance of separation of powers doctrine. The issue in the case
involved constitutionality of legislative amendments made to the Motor 
Traffic Act 1950; the District Courts Act 1963;^^ and the Local
Courts Act 1963.^^ The net effect of these amendments was to give 
power to the court designated on the Summons which is issued to a
defendant on a charge for a traffic infringement, to record a plea of 
guilty and sentence accordingly where the defendant failed within 
fourteen days to pay the fine indicated on the Summons. The Public 
Solicitor who referred these amendments to the Supreme Court argued 
that these amendments made by the National Parliament were 
unconstitutional in that they breached S.37(5) of the Constitution. 
This provides that the trial of a person charged with an offence is
98. S.131 permitted summary trial for simple offences, without the 
presence of the defendant. But the section also defined 'simple 
offences' as including those which carry the penalty of imprisonment.
99. S.3 7(5) of the Constitution prohibits any ex parte trial of 
offences that carry the penalty of imprisonment except imprisonment in 
default of payment of a fine.
100. [1976] P.N.G.L.R. 537 at 560.





not to take place in his absence except with his consent or where his 
behaviour renders the holding of the trial impracticable and the court 
orders his removal. The Court held unanimously that these amendments 
were in breach of S.37(5) of the Constitution. But in addition the 
Court went further to hold unanimously that in enacting these 
amendments the National Parliament in effect breached the separation 
of powers theory incorporated in the Constitution in that they 
deprived the court designated in the Summons of any discretion to 
determine the issues raised by the charge, and thereby usurped a 
proper exercise of the judicial power which the Constitution vests in 
the courts. Kearney Dep.C.J., stated the separation of powers 
doctrine on behalf of his brethren thus:
It is clear from its structure that the Constitution 
contemplates a general separation of powers between three 
principal arms of government - the legislature, executive and 
judiciary; see S.99. As a parliamentary system with an 
executive responsible to Parliament, the separation of powers 
between the arms cannot be rigid. But the separation 
principle remains of basic importance in the Constitution and 
prohibits incursions 
functions of another.
J^y one arm of government upon basic
In S.C.R. No. 1 of 1979^ ^  (otherwise known as Premdas' Case) , 
the Government relied on the separation of powers as the basis on 
which the Executive was justified in deporting an alien from the 
country. Premdas was deported by an order issued under the Migration 
Act 1963 by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, without reasons being 
given, although Premdas was known to have meddled in the affairs of 
the Department of Primary Industry through his position as the 
Executive Officer to the Minister of Primary Industry. Premdas' 
appeal to a review committee comprising three senior Ministers in the 
then Somare Coalition Government was unsuccessful. Thereupon Premdas 
applied to the National Court to set aside the implementation of the 
deportation order on the basis that it infringed his Basic Rights 
under the Constitution. The Court ordered a stay in the proceedings 
and referred what it considered a constitutional question to the 
Supreme Court for decision.
105. [1982] P.N.G.L.R. 122 at 134.
106. [1979] P.N.G.L.R. 329.
107. See Saldanha, J.,ibid., at 359
92
The Court upheld the validity of the ministerial decision on the
basis that it did not involve any breach of the Basic Rights. For
purposes of this work the important point was that the Supreme Court
had to decide whether S.61AA of the Migration Act 1963, which was a
privative clause, deprived the National Court of its power of judicial
review conferred on it by S.155(3)(a) and (5) of the Constitution.
The Court took the view that it could not, on constitutional grounds.
But on the facts of the case it held that the ministerial decision did
not involve exercise of judicial power, and therefore there was no
basis for judicial r e v i e w . I t  should be noted that S.159(1) of the
Constitution does provide for judicial power to be conferred on bodies
other than the courts. But in Premdas1 Case S.159 was not an issue.
The Court's view in that case, as well as the nature of the
constitutional provisions relating to judicial review, indicate the
109influence of the separation of powers doctrine.
The decision of the National Court in Premdas' Case^"^ in the 
first instance to stay the deportation order gave rise to a subsequent 
conflict between the Minister of Justice and the judges of the Supreme 
Court in Rooney's Case.^^ As the facts in that case showed, the 
Minister of Justice wrote to the Chief Justice and argued that the
108. Andrew J. put the point succinctly thus:
The enforcement of the Constitution is vested in the 
National Court by SS.22, 57, and 58. These powers are
unlimited. Section 61AA of the Migration Act 1963 excludes 
the Court's jurisdiction in relation to appeals (which are 
statutory matters) and prerogative writ proceedings (which are 
review proceedings). This section however cannot limit the 
National Court's power to enforce any right guaranteed by the 
Constitution.
The jurisdiction of the National Court is also as set out in 
S.155 of the Constitution. Section 155(3) gives the National 
Court an inherent power to review any exercise of judicial 
authority. In my view it is not given inherent power to 
review 'administrative', 'executive' or 'ministerial' bodies, 
that is non-judicial bodies. To this extent, S.61AA of the 
Migration Act 1963 does not conflict with the National Court's 
powers of review: [1979J P.N.G.L.R. 329 at 401.
109. See Bayne, 1980:121 at 131-133.
110. [ 1979J P.N.G.L.R. 329.
111. Public Prosecutor v. Nahau Rooney (No. 2) 11979] P.N.G.L.R.
448.
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question of admission of aliens into PNG and the criteria for 
deporting them was, 'up to the Elected Government and no one else to 
decide'. She went on further to argue implicitly that in taking a 
legalistic interpretation of the Migration Act 1963 to enable a 
deportation order to be suspended, the National Gourt was in breach of 
the separation of powers principle incorporated under the 
Constitution. Further exchanges of letters beween the Minister and 
the Chief Justice led to the former to be charged for contempt of 
court. The Minister was found guilty of contempt in the end.
Section 99(3) cannot be regarded as incorporating absolute 
separation of powers theory because SS.100(2), 140 and 159 of the 
Constitution permit the respective powers of the principal arms to be 
reallocated to other institutions if and when this is required. Hence 
its significance does not lie in the question whether or not it 
thereby incorporates the traditional theory of separation of powers, 
but rather in why it is to be regarded as a separation at all.
Perhaps a stronger basis on which S.99(3) can be explained to fit 
it into the CPC's concept of shared powers depends on the rationale 
used in diffusing power throughout the total institutional structure 
of the State. In this respect it fitted the CPC's aim of achieving 
effective government to diffuse the power not on the basis of 
separation of powers which it rejected, but on the basis of the 
economic principle of division of labour. This principle is 
explicit in the CPC's notion of shared powers. The CPC realised that 
the multifarious functions the modern State of PNG had to perform 
required not few but many institutions to adequately carry them out. 
This could be achieved if the State power was shared between these 
institutions. The three principal arms of government were retained 
because they fitted into this diffused institutional structure.
The CPC saw the principal arms as constituting the core 
institutions of the National Government, and in order to protect the 
economic principle of division of labour on which their respective
112. Ibid., at 453.
113. It is sometimes argued that separation of governmental powers 
is not based on the need to prevent abuse but on the need to divide 
labour: see Sawer, 1961:177 at 177.
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powers are allocated, there was the need to provide at least in 
principle that their powers should be kept separate. For this would 
ensure that the important arms of government retain at all times at 
least some power not only to guarantee that government retains its 
effectiveness and continuity, but also to enable it to perform its 
constitutional duties.
Separation of these powers in principle means that there must be 
some limit to that sharing if the economic principle of division of 
labour is to be maintained. It is however, difficult to determine 
precisely what this limit is. I have suggested above that as far as 
the constitutional text provides any indication, it means that no 
total divesting of any powers conferred on the principal arms is 
permitted. This is expressly prohibited by the Constitution in the 
case of the legislative p o w e r s . I n  the case of the judicial power, 
this appears to mean, as the Supreme Court demonstrated in the Motor 
Traffic Case,^^ that courts cannot be deprived of their judicial 
discretion. In that case the Supreme Court viewed an attempt by the 
National Parliament in taking away the discretion in the court named 
in a Summons to hear a traffic infringement charge as amounting to a 
breach of this separation of powers. It is also not clear whether 
non-judicial powers could be vested in the courts. The question of 
the limit, or the minimum requirement of this limit, however, still 
remains open since the Supreme Court did not discuss the separation of 
powers doctrine in those terms.
The above analysis shows that the CPC rejected the traditional 
theory. One of the reasons for which it did this was its awareness 
that it is usually these types of traditional doctrines that provide 
courts elsewhere the opportunity to use legalistic arguments as a 
justification for non-co-operation with other arms of government. It 
hinted at this when it expressed its concern that:
the courts could introduce unnecessary rigidities or that 
their procedures would not permit acceptable compromises, and 
[we] have accordingly sought alternative devices and 
methods.
114. The Constitution, S.100(3)
115. [1982] P.N.G.L.R. 122.
116. CPC, 1974:8/15, para. 145.
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PNG could not afford that type of judicial attitude which a strict 
separation of powers theory could easily engender.
b) The Multi-Governmental Arms Theory
*The proponents of the multi-governmental arms theory were 
Pritchard and Wilson JJ. in the Constitutional Reference No. 1 of 
1978^ ^  (Public Solicitor's Case). In that case, after referring to 
two Victorian cases where the traditional separation of powers 
doctrine was accepted by the Victorian Supreme Court, Pritchard 
J. stated that:
... there is no such tradition in Papua New Guinea. Except to 
the extent that the principles and rules of common law and 
equity in England are adopted under Sch.2.2 to our
Constitution, in Papua New Guinea we do not call on traditions 
of government from anywhere in the world at all; we look to 
our own constitutional laws and them alone. The Constitution 
and the Organic Law are the Supreme Law of Papua New Guinea 
and their provisions are self-executing to their fullest 
extent^ their respective natures and subject matters permit 
• • • •
Pritchard J. regarded the National Government as consisting of six 
arms which include the National Parliament, the National Executive, 
the National Judicial System, the Office of the Public Prosecutor, the 
office of the Public Solicitor and the Judicial and Legal Services 
Commission. He then stated that,
... [i]n my view these six bodies are thus the arms of the 
National Government, the first three mentioned being clearly 
spelt out as the 'principal arms' in S.99, the other three 
being, for lack of a better word, 'lesser' or 'ancillary' 
arms.
Hence, under the National Parliament, Pritchard J. would include the 
Offices of the Speaker and his Deputy, the Electoral Commission, the 
Parliamentary Salaries Tribunal and the Parliamentary Service. He 
would bring the office of the Prime Minister and other Ministers, the 
NEC, the Office of the Secretary of the NEC and the Advisory Committee 
on the Power of Mercy under the National Executive. And he would 
regard as coming under the National Judicial System all the courts,
117. [ 1978J P.N.G.L.R. 345. 
H8. Ibid. , at 377 .
119. Ibid. , at 369.
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the Office of the Chief Justice and other justices, the Magisterial 
Service and the Office of the Chief Magistrate. But here Pritchard 
J. seems to be introducing an additional category of institutions, 
namely, those which could be regarded as the ’essential organs' or 
component parts of the principal arms of the National Government. To 
illustrate two examples, the office of the Speaker is an 'essential
organ' of the National Parliament just as the office of the Chief
Justice is an essential component of the National Judicial System. 
Thus Pritchard J. sees the principal arms as comprising, in each case, 
a certain number of essential organs; lying beyond them are the lesser 
arms. He considers this classification as exhaustive, although it 
should be noted that he failed to take into account the position of 
some of the present State institutions such as the Police Force, the 
Defence Force, the Corrective Institutions Service and the Statutory 
Authorities .
There is however, one variation to the theory and this is to be
found in the reasoning of Wilson J. in the case. Whereas Pritchard
J. regards lesser arms as comprising the Public Prosecutor, the Public
Solicitor and the Judicial and Legal Services Commission, Wilson
J. would include this category in the other organs that Pritchard
J. includes as essential organs under each of the principal arms.
Thus Wilson J. regards the Parliamentary Salaries Tribunal as a lesser
1 90arm rather than as an essential organ of the National Parliament, 
and the basis on which he does this seems to be the fact that the 
Tribunal is independent of Parliament. In other words, Wilson
J. introduces independence as the criterion for determining whether a 
given governmental institution is a lesser arm or an essential organ 
of a principal arms.
Wilson J. however, does not regard either the Public Prosecutor 
or the Public Solicitor as coming within the meaning of governmental 
body in any sense. Thus to the extent that arms of government are not 
necessarily organised into the traditional tripartite system, but that 
there are more than three arms of the National Government, Wilson 
J. agrees with Pritchard J. But he seems to disagree at least 
implicitly that all organs of State could be categorised as arms of
120. Ibid., at 369
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121government. This disagreement was largely due to a failure by the
judges to indicate clearly the criterion or criteria they were using
in classifying the various governmental institutions that exist
outside those that constitute the principal arms. This failure
confused even the judges themselves. Wilson J. regarded the ancillary
arms as being 'within the principal arms', which could mean either
they are component parts of the principal arms in every respect or
they could be instruments of the principal arms in only some respects.
Pritchard J., however, considered these ancillary arms as being
separate from the principal arms which, as he noted, had their own
121'component parts'.
The position of the principal arms is clear because they are 
designated as such by S.99 of the Constitution. But it is not clear 
how one determines the allocation of the rest of governmental bodies 
into those which are ancillary arms, and those that are in Pritchard 
J.'s words, 'the component parts' of either the principal arms or the 
ancillary arms. It seems to me that the Supreme Court in Public 
Solicitor's Case was implicitly using two criteria to distinguish the 
ancillary arms from the principal arms and their components parts.
The first criterion is independence conferred by law. Almost all 
those governmental bodies regarded by the Supreme Court in the Public 
Solicitor's Case as ancillary arms have this characteristic. The 
notable exceptions to this are the Defence Force, the National Public 
Service and possibly the Parliamentary Service. These exceptions 
illustrate the second criterion that the Supreme Court was using, 
namely, the separation in the text of the Constitution of the 
provisions governing the principal arms from those dealing with the 
ancillary arms. Wilson J. in particular seemed to emphasise this in 
Public Solicitor's Case where he placed great weight on the fact that 
the State Services are separated from the executive arm by their 
inclusion in Part VII in the text of the Constitution.^^ According 
to this view, a governmental body is an ancillary arm, if the text of
121. Ibid., at 361.
122. Ibid.
123. Ibid., at 369.
124. Ibid., at 361.
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the Constitution clearly shows this by separating it from the 
provisions governing the principal arms, irrespective of whether it 
has been conferred with independence by law.
The second criterion causes confusion. The first criterion best 
aistinguishes ancillary arms from their instruments. Thus if a 
particular body is independent in law, then it is an ancillary arm. 
Otherwise it is merely an instrument, which means it is a part of the 
total administrative and institutional establishment of that 
particular principal or ancillary arm. For instance, the Office of 
the Secretary to the NEC is a component of the NEC. Even though it is 
created by the Constitution its Secretary does not have any
independence conferred by him either by the Constitution or by any 
other law.
The colonial experience supports the argument advanced by
Pritchard J. that 'there is no such tradition [of separation of
1 9 Apowers] in Papua New Guinea'. The colonial rule was characterised
by the predominance of the executive arm of government. In legal
matters Rasluck's memoirs indicate that he was keen to retain, for
127instance, the control of legal policy from Canberra.
The relative insignificance of the legislature and the judiciary
'in the field' was seen as justitied on the basis of administrative
expediency as there was only one man, viz., the kiap, to do the 
1 98work. Lynch maintains that David Fenbury, the then Director of
Native Affairs, did not support the idea of separation as he showed in
1 29his article, 'Kot bilong mipela' published in New Guinea in 1965.
As Bayne showed there was very little separation between the judicial 
and the executive powers since the district administration officers 
who manned the courts for Native Affairs 'regarded their judicial work 
as ancillary to their executive functions, and performed their 
judicial work with an executive mind'. It was not therefore
125. The Constitution, S.151(1).
126. [ 1978J P.N.G.L.R. 345 at 377.
127. Bayne, 1981:134.
128. Lynch, 1969:58-61; and Nash, 1967:3.
129. Fenbury, 1965; 1967; and 1978.
130. Bayne, 1975:14.
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surprising that earlier on Professor Derham found that magistrates 
could be controlled in such a way that,
they could be fairly effectively restricted in the exercise of 
magisterial functions in a way that would be virtually 
impossible in the exercise of similar functions in summary 
jurisdiction courts in the various states of Australia.
Fitzpatrick sees this lack of relative significance of the legislature
and the judiciary during the colonial rule, despite the recognition of
the separation of powers doctrine in Australia, as a tool for
112promoting and protecting the interests of the colonisers.
There was another respect in which a close affinity between the 
executive and the judiciary existed, and that was in relation to the 
personnel of the courts. At the early stages, the Governor was also 
chief judicial officer. Even when separate judicial personnel were 
appointed at a later stage, the appointment was still made by the 
executive as a matter of legal right. There was, however, some 
feeling that the superior courts should be kept separate from the 
Administration. This was reflected in the policy adopted some time in 
the early 1950s to recruit barristers from the Australian state bars
i q  /as j u d g e s . T h e  development of the Magisterial Service into an 
independent service ultmately was also generated by the same concern. 
Mr Justice Pritchard, who was a former Chief Magistrate, recalled how 
magistrates initially found it difficult to maintain their judicial 
independence when employed as public servants by the Department of 
Law. Thus the Magisterial Service was created out of this concern 
to ensure that magistrates were independent from public service 
direction or control when discharging their judicial duties. For this 
purpose magistrates were considered as being on permanent leave from 
the public service.
There is some basis for the multi-governmental arms theory 
insofar as the powers of government are concerned. For both the




135. [1978] P.N.G.L.R. 345 at 369-370.
136. Ibid.
100
intention of the constitution-makers and the constitutional text show 
that there are more than just three sets of institutions sharing the 
governmental powers of the State. Thus, if there is any separation of 
powers at all, it exists to separate powers not only between three 
arms but between a number of arms some of which may be principal 
whilst others are of a lesser kind.
The multi-governmental arms theory, however, appears to be based 
on the premise that the total State power is to be classified as only 
governmental power which is then distributed among a number of arms 
some of which are principal whilst others are ancillary. This so much 
is evident in the respective judgments of Pritchard and Wilson JJ. in 
the Public Solicitor's Case.33  ^ This is the premise that Prentice 
C.J. refutes in the same case as he could not see the functions of the 
Public Solicitor, the Public Prosecutor, the Committee of Power of 
Mercy and that of the Public Accounts Committee as governmental 
functions . He stated his view thus:
Insofar as such bodies are created independent of direction 
and control, they would seem to be exercising the power of the 
people given to them as a direct grant by the CONSTITUTION and 
Organic Laws and their exercise of powers could not I think be 
said to be an exercise of power ’by the National Government’ 
in such a sense as would by itself constitute any of them ’an 
arm' of the National Government, or department or agency or 
instrumentality thereof within the meaning of S.219 and 
Sch.1.2 of the CONSTITUTION.138
Hence, the multi-governmental arms theory is useful insofar as it 
explains the constitutional arrangements of the governmental power. 
But it is an inadequate theory for explaining the total constitutional 
scheme in which the State power is arranged. For it does not take 
into account the non-governmental powers. The same thing of course, 
could be said about the traditional theory of separation of powers.
c) The Non-Governmental Power Theory
The theory that some of the State power is allocated to state 
institutions which are not part of the governmental structure, is to 
be found in the judgment of Prentice C.J., and to some extent in the
137. [1978J P.N.G.L.R. 345.
138. Ibid., at 350.
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judgment of Wilson J. (as noted above), in the Public Solicitor's 
Case. It is necessary to quote the part of Prentice C.J.'s judgment 
that is relevant in some detail here in order to see the conceptual 
basis on which he finds the theory. After stating that he could not 
see how the Public Solicitor could be said to be a governmental body, 
the Chief Justice stated that:
In endeavouring to find the conceptual basis of the powers 
of the Public Solicitor, one refers to S.99 of the 
CONSTITUTION which asserts the 'power, authority and 
jurisdiction' of the people is to be 'exercised by the 
National Government'. But this is 'subject to and in 
accordance with the Constitution. The CONSTITUTION and 
Organic Laws have created and vested powers and 
responsibilities in certain organisations and offices such as 
Public Prosecutor, Public Solicitor, Committee of Mercy and 
Public Accounts Committee.
Insofar as such bodies are created independent of direction 
and control, they would seem to be exercising the power of the 
people given to them as a direct grant by the CONSTITUTION and 
Organic Law and their exercise of powers could not I think be 
said to be an exercise of power 'by the National Government' 
in such a sense as would by itself constitute any of them 'an 
arm' of the National Government, or department or agency or 
instrumentality thereof within the meaning of S.219 and 
Sch.1.2 of the CONSTITUTION.
That the Public Solicitor is not 'an arm of government' 
appears I consider, in the Constitutional provisions 
establishing the office. Section 176(1) establishes the 
office, that is, he is a creature of the people not of 
Parliament. His appointment (S.176(2)) is by the Judicial and 
Legal Services Commission, itself also a creature of the 
people (S.183) and not of the Parliament. And S.176(5) enacts 
that 'Subject to Section 177(2) (functions of the Public 
Prosecutor and the Public Solicitor), in the performance of 
his functions under this Constitution, the Public Solicitor is 
not subject to direction or control by any person or 
authority.
Wilson J. appeared to support this theory in that he also did not 
consider the office of the Public Solicitor as being part of the 
National Government in the sense of it being either a 'governmental 
body' as defined by Schedule 1.1, or a 'State Service' as defined by 
S.188 of the Constitution.
139. [1978] P.N.G.L.R. 345 at 369
102
The non-governmental power theory thus conceives the total state 
power as being divided into two general categories, namely, into 
governmental and non-governmental powers. Following from this general 
division, power is then diffused within each of these categories. The 
theory of governmental and non-governmental powers thus repudiates the 
notions that there is a tripartite separation of powers or that all 
powers could be classified as governmental.
The premise implicit in this theory seems to be based on a 
concern that in order to prevent abuse of power by governments, the 
power to control government should not be vested in the government 
itself. That is, government is better controlled when the power to 
control members of government and their activities is entrusted to 
institutions which do not form part of government.
The theory illustrates a basic problem many of the present-day 
constitutions have created, viz., that they require governments to 
perform two tasks which are antithetical: first, governments are 
expected to govern effectively; and secondly, in the process of so 
doing they are required to control themselves effectively.
Much abuse of power by governments can be explained on the basis 
of a fundamental failure by constitution-makers to separate the two 
distinct functions which a democratic state has to perform if it is to 
survive as such. In a developing country such as PNG both of these 
functions are considered crucial, and the CPC appreciated these at the 
outset. It is opportune then to consider which of the theories 
analysed above best explains the PNG constitution scheme of division 
of powers. It my view the theory that does this combines the 
multi-governmental arms theory and the non-governmental powers theory, 
which could be called 'the governmental and non-governmental powers 
theory'. A further analysis of this theory is therefore necessary.
2.3 THE GOVERNMENTAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL POWERS THEORY 
AS THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR THE GENERAL DIVISION,
CONTROL AND SHARING OF THE STATE POWER
In the Public Solicitor's Case, Prentice C.J. advanced the 
non-governmental powers theory in order to counter-balance the theory 
of multi-governmental arms that was being advanced by the other two
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members of the Court. In drawing the distinction between governmental 
and non-governmental powers this theory of governmental and 
non-governmental powers provides a useful perspective for 
understanding the constitutional scheme according to which power is 
arranged. The distinction reflects the two essential but distinct 
tasks the CPC saw as bound to be faced by the new State. On the one 
hand, there was the need for an effective government to ensure that 
the country continued to develop to attain the National Goals within a 
stable democracy. On the other hand, the CPC was equally concerned to 
ensure that there was effective control of the exercise of power by 
those who were to govern the country, in order to prevent abuse of 
power, to protect the rights of the individual, and to ensure that the 
National Goals were followed.
The task of governing the country was considered as rightly 
belonging to the government. Thus, the power for this purpose was 
vested in those institutions that comprised the government. But the 
task of ensuring effective control of government was not considered as 
appropriate for government to perform because it is inherently 
antithetical to the former task. That is, the government could not be 
expected to both govern effectively and at the same time to control 
itself. Both tasks are equally essential and both require an exercise 
of power to achieve them.
But to which one of these two tasks should the proposed 
Constitution give some emphasis in the context of PNG, where popular 
demands were for development? Would development be achieved by an 
emphasis on control of government, or would it be achieved on an 
emphasis on effective government? On this question, the CPC’s choice 
was candid. It wanted the Constitution to 'act as accelerator in the 
process of development, not as a b r a k e p a r t i c u l a r l y  in relation 
to 'the executive government's legitimate efforts in trying to promote 
development'.^^ In order to enable both the function of control and 
effective government to be performed the CPC adopted the approach of 
allowing the government to govern, and leaving the task of controlling 
government to other State institutions outside the government.
140. CPC, 1974:2/1, para. 2.
141. Ibid., 8/1, para. 10.
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The Constitution reflects this general distinction between 
government and control of government by vesting certain powers in the 
principal arms which comprise the National Government, and by vesting 
certain other powers in institutions outside the government. Within 
each of these two general categories, power is allowed to be shared. 
Governmental powers have been covered in the analysis of the 
constitutional text above. It is convenient now to consider further 
the nature of non-governmental powers.
As the constitutional text demonstrates, the non-governmental 
powers are those vested in institutions which are outside the National 
Government. These, institutions fall into two groups. One group, 
which Part VIII covers, are concerned with supervision and control 
particularly but not exclusively, of public monies; and the other 
group dealt with by Part IX are the Constitutional Office-Holders.
I / OThe first group consists of the Office of Auditor-General, the 
Public Accounts Committee, and the Ombudsman Commission.'*'4  ^ In the 
second group there are nine Constitutional Office-Holders as defined 
by Part IX of the Constitution, and these include the Auditor-General 
as well as each member of the Ombudsman Commission. The Ombudsman 
Commission fits into both groups because its functions are fairly 
wide, particularly in relation to maladministration. The others 
include the judges, the Public Prosecutor, the Public Solicitor, the 
Chief Magistrate, each member of the Electoral Commission, the Clerk 
of the National Parliament and each member of the Public Services 
Commission.
When these institutions, especially those in the second group, 
are examined closely, two particular features emerge in relation to 
the nature of the power conferred on them.
First, the institutions which deal directly with the supervision 
and control of public finance and the conduct of public officials are 
separated from the government, and are made independent from it. The 
Ombudsman Commission and the Auditor-General come under this category.





Secondly, those institutions which are not directly concerned 
with supervision and control in the above sense (although there is 
always the possibility that they could be) are also made independent 
from the government. The basis for this seems to be the realisation 
that in the performance of their constitutional duties these 
institutions are likely to face interference by either the Executive 
or by any other State institution. The rest of the Constitutional 
Office-Holders fall into this category. Three of these, viz., a 
judge, the Chief Magistrate and the Clerk of the National Parliament 
are organs of the principal arms of the National Government. They 
provide an interface between governmental and non-governmental 
institutions, and the office of a judge illustrates the interface 
well. In exercising the judicial authority a judge is of course 
exercising a governmental power; but a judge is also a Constitutional 
Office-Holder within the meaning of Part IX of the Constitution, and 
therefore has certain control (or non-governmental) powers to protect 
his independence from the Executive when the need arises. This again 
provides another perspective on the flexible system of sharing powers 
under the Constitution, namely, that non-governmental power may be 
conferred for specific purposes on governmental bodies; and likewise 
governmental powers may be conferred on non-governmental bodies.
What is meant by non-governmental power according to Parts VIII 
and IX of the Constitution therefore depends, it would seem, on two 
criteria. First, whether such power relates directly to supervision 
and control within the meaning of Part VIII. Secondly, and even if 
such power is not related directly to supervision and control, whether 
it requires independence for its exercise within the meaning of Part 
IX. Have the courts applied these criteria? Most of what the judges 
have said on separation of powers have been by way of obiter dicta 
which are discussed above. Only in two cases where the issues before 
the Supreme Court involved direct consideration of the constitutional 
scheme relating to the arrangement of State power. These were the 
Public Solicitor's Case and the Motor Traffic Case. Both cases are 
discussed in some detail above.
In the Public Solicitor's Case, Prentice C.J. appeared to have 
regarded the independence conferred by the Constitution on the Public 
Solicitor as the decisive factor in enabling him to conclude that the
106
Public Solicitor was not a governmental body, both generally as well 
as within the meaning of ’governmental body’ as defined by Schedule 
1.1 of the Constitution. The other two members of the Court saw that 
independence as being a decisive factor which influenced them in 
regarding the Public Solicitor as an ancillary arm rather than a 
'governmental body' . The Court was thus able to exclude the Public 
Solicitor from the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman Commission on the 
basis that he was not a 'governmental body' within the meaning of 
S.219^^1 of the Constitution.
In the Motor Traffic Case the effect of the legislative 
amendments involved in that case was to deprive the courts of the 
judicial discretion in determining the appropriate penalty involved in 
motor traffic offences in summary jurisdictions. In holding the 
amendments to be unconstitutional, the Supreme Court unanimously took 
the view that, inter alia, the amendments denied the courts of summary 
jurisdiction the independence guaranteed to them as well (as to other 
courts) by S.157 of the Constitution. That is, each member of a court 
within the meaning of S.157 of the Constitution is independent from 
any direction or control even from the Parliament in the exercise of 
the judicial authority. Thus, a judge who is a member of the Supreme 
Court or the National Court is guaranteed that independence which is 
further protected by Part IX, S.223(3) of the Constitution, dealing 
with Constitutional Office-Holders.
Hence, the criterion of independence has received some judicial 
recognition insofar as it enables the courts to determine whether a 
particular State institution is non-governmental or not. But the same 
cannot be said about the criterion of supervision and control that 
Part VIII of the Constitution adopts, largely because there have as 
yet been no cases which have required the courts to consider the 
application of this criterion. On this point it may he noted in 
passing that in the Public Solicitor's Case, Pritchard J. referred to 
the supervisory and control function of the Ombudsman Commission in 
reaching his view that the Public Solicitor, as a Constitutional 
Office-Holder was subject to the Leadership Code.
146. S.219 identifies in broad terms the institutions of the State 
that come under the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman Commission.
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In both the Public Solicitor’s Case and the Motor Traffic Case 
the Supreme Court avoided any discussion of the distinction between 
governmental and non-governmental powers beyond the framework provided 
by the Constitution, presumably because it would have been regarded by 
the judges as purely hypothetical. But it is also fair to point out 
that the judges failed in both cases to deal adequately with the total 
constitutional scheme in which the power of the State is permitted to 
be shared by and between various State institutions.
2.4 CONCLUSION
The above analysis demonstrates that the Constitution divides the 
total power into two broad categories by vesting certain powers in the 
governmental institutions and the rest in institutions outside them. 
The CPC wanted power to be divided this way in order to deal with what 
it saw as two distinct tasks that PNG was going to face. One was the 
need to have an effective government which would bring about 
development; and the other was the need to have control over 
government in order to prevent abuse of power and to protect the 
rights of the individual.
The CPC chose to emphasise effective government by adopting a 
policy which requires the State power to be shared as much as possible 
not only between governmental institutions, but also between them and 
the non-governmental ones. This has the inevitable consequence of 
permitting extensive diffusion of the State power, particularly the 
governmental power. Thus, governmental powers may be shared not only 
between principal arms and ancillary arms of government but also 
beyond them.
The CPC's emphasis on the need for effective government does not 
mean, of course, that it attached less significance to the need for 
control of government. As the above analysis of the constitutional 
scheme shows, the CPC appreciated the fact that government cannot be 
expected to control itself if it is given the primary duty to develop 
the country. Thus, the function of controlling government had to be 
given to institutions outside the government to carry out. 
Accordingly, certain institutions outside the government are vested 
with powers which are generally for purposes of supervision and
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control of public finances and conduct of public officials. But as 
shown above, not in every case is a non-governmental power directly 
related to the control of government.
The governmental and non-governmental powers theory therefore 
best explains the constitutional scheme of the sharing of the State 
power. As far as the other judicial theories go, it is clear that the 
CPC rejected the traditional theory of a strict separation of powers 
and to that extent the Supreme Court has been wrong in following 
it.l^ The multi-governmental arms theory, insofar as it explains the 
scheme of the diffusion of governmental powers, is acceptable, but it 
is incorrect to the. extent that it conceives the total State power as 
being only governmental.
The State power is therefore quite diffused between governmental 
and non-governmental institutions. One significant effect of this 
diffusion is that it has reduced the size of the Executive. This is 





As a consequence of the high degree of diffusion of State power 
the Executive has lost to other State institutions some of the powers 
it traditionally exercises in a Westminster system. The reduction 
occurs in two ways- within the State structure. In the first place, 
some traditional executive powers are vested in non-governmental 
institutions. For instance, the power to prosecute is vested in the 
Public Prosecutor who is outside the Government. In the second place 
the reduction occurs at the level of governmental institutions. In 
this case some executive power is vested in ancillary arms which are 
outside the Executive. For example, the power to appoint judges is 
executive power, but it is vested in the Judicial and Legal Services 
Commission which is an ancillary arm. The effect of these reductions 
is to render the Executive smaller in size with fewer powers to 
exercise, and therefore at least in theory, easier to control.
It is important then to know what organs of government constitute 
the Executive if the various acts of the members of these organs of 
the Executive are to be controlled effectively. For this purpose, 
this Chapter will attempt firstly, to identify the two reductions 
referred to above; and secondly, to ascertain the balance of the 
institutions which constitute the Executive.
3.1 THE EXECUTIVE WITHIN THE STATE STRUCTURE
The State institutions are divided into governmental and 
non-governmental institutions. Governmental institutions are further 
divided into the principal arms and the ancillary arms.'*'
The principal arms are those that are identified by S.99 of the
1. See Appendix A, and Chapter 2, supra.
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Constitution. Each of these arras has what Pritchard J. called in the
oPublic Solicitor’s Case, its own "components”. For instance, the 
component parts of the National Parliament (a principal arm) would 
include its various Committees, and the Offices of the Speaker and 
Deputy Speaker. In the Public Solicitor’s Case, Prentice C.J.
referred to each of these component parts as an ’instrument', on the 
basis that it was not independent of its particular principal arm.
The term 'instrument' is adopted here since it succinctly describes 
these component parts of a principal arm.
The ancillary arms of Government may be subdivided into three 
groups. The first group are those which in law are independent from
the three principal arms, but are otherwise related to them.^ For
instance, the Parliamentary Salaries Tribunal and the Office of the 
Clerk of the National Parliament would come under the subdivision 
relating to the National Parliament.
The second group would include the institutions which the 
ConstitutionState Services'. It specifies four of them: the
National Public Service, the Police Force, the Defence Force and the 
Parliamentary Service.^ They can be more conveniently brought under 
four slightly different headings, namely, the National Parliamentary 
Service, the National Public Service, the National Defence and 
Security Services and the National Law Enforcement Services. The 
National Defence and Security Services would include not only the 
Defence Force with its maritime, land and air elements, but also 
possibly the National Security and Intelligence Organisation which is 
established by separate legislation.^1 Similarly, the National Law 
Enforcement Services include not only the Police Force but also the 
Corrective Institutions Service which is created by a separate Act of 
Parliament.^
2. L1978] P.N.G.L.R. 345.
3. See Prentice C.J., ibid., at 350 and Wilson J. at 360.
4. See Appendix B.
5. See the Constitution, S.188.
6. See National Intelligence Organization Act 1984.
7. Corrective Institutions Act 1957 (as amended)
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The third group of ancillary arms are the Statutory Authorities.^ 
Although structurally outside the Executive, they exercise executive 
power as permitted by the general diffusion principle contained in 
S.140 of the Constitution. These Authorities in turn can be 
classified according to the essence of their respective functions. 
For instance, those that are essentially commercial can come under the 
Government Commercial Authorities, those with the function of 
regulating activities in specific fields may come under the 
Governmental Regulatory Authorities, and those with specific welfare 
functions could come under the Governmental Welfare Authorities.^
From the above it can be seen that the NE is only one element 
within a diffused governmental structure. What then are the organs 
that comprise the NE?^ Consideration of this question must begin 
with a discussion of the reallocation from the NE, certain powers and 
institutions that had been hitherto part of the colonial executive.
3.2 THE VESTING OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN NON-GOVERNMENTAL BODIES
During the pre-Independence period some of the functions now 
performed by Constitutional Office-Holders were performed by the 
colonial executive, which included not only the Administrator and his 
officers but also the Minister for Territories and his Department in 
Canberra.^ For instance, the public service matters relating to both 
management and personnel were administered by a Public Service
8. These are discussed in Chapter 4, post.
9. See Appendix B.
10. The Executive under the Westminster model consists of three 
component parts. These may be regarded as the political element, the 
public service element and the semi-public service element. The 
essential characteristic of the political element is the fact that 
those who occupy this echelon within the executive structure are 
chosen through the normal democratic process, and are members of 
Parliament. Those who occupy positions in the other two areas of the 
Executive are appointed in principle on merit. The usual criterion 
which determines the difference between the latter two elements is 
some relative independence conferred on the semi-public service 
authorities by their respective constituent Acts.
11. See Beattie, 1971:1-2.
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1 2Board.  ^ Prosecution was conducted by the Prosecution Section within 
the Department of Law. Legal aid was the responsibility of the Public 
Solicitor who was also a part of the Department of Law. Auditing was 
performed by the Valuer-General whose office came under the Chief 
Minister's Department.
As shown in the last chapter, these functions have been taken 
away from the NE by the Constitution, and are now conferred on 
Constitutional Office-Holders who are outside the governmental 
structure. Hence, subject to a few qualifications, the power over 
public service matters in relation to both management as well as 
personnel, is vested in the Public Services Commission. The
prosecutorial power is vested in the Public Prosecutor,^ and the 
power to grant legal aid is vested in the Public Solicitor.^ 
Auditing is the constitutional responsibility of the Auditor- 
General.^ Under the Westminster model, these functions are performed 
by the Executive on the basis that they are governmental functions, or 
at least on the basis that traditionally, they have been performed by 
the Executive. In PNG, however, a different view has been taken on 
this point, as explained in the last chapter. This view was 
demonstrated clearly by Prentice C.J. in the Public Solicitor's 
Case,^  when he said:
For myself I cannot see how as a matter of fact, the Public 
Solicitor in carrying out his duties to advise and represent 
clients can be envisaged as carrying out work on behalf of or 
for the government.
This suggests that these functions are in their essence
non-governmental. Certainly the text of the Constitution itself
1 9points to this conclusion, as Prentice C.J. also noted; but the 
crucial criterion which characterises the essence of these functions
12. Public Services (Interim Arrangements) Act 1973, S.9, and
generally, see Parker, 1966:243; and 187.




17. [1978] P.N.G.L.R. 345.
18. Ibid., at 350.
19. Ibid
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is the independence which is conferred on these Constitutional Office- 
Holders. The essence of this independence requires the Constitutional 
Office-Holders to be free from any control by the Executive or by 
others in the performance of their constitutional functions.
The independence of Constitutional Office-Holders is guaranteed 
by the Constitution, and in each case is expressed in terms of 
freedom from ’direction and control'. This independence is also 
extended to the employees of each of these Constitutional
Office-Holders, but is not absolute, since the Constitution makes it
22subject to a number of very important qualifications, described 
below.
First, such independence does not oust the jurisdiction of the
23courts, the Parliament, the Ombudsman Commission, the Auditor- 
General or the Public Accounts Committee. Secondly, it does not 
constitute an authority either to expend funds, or to appropriate 
them. These are general qualifications. In addition, there are also 
specific qualifications which apply in some individual cases, i.e. the 
Head of State may, on advice, direct the Public Services Commission on
0  / ia personnel matter, or the Public Prosecutor on a matter that "might
prejudice the security, defence or international relations of Papua 
23New Guinea ...". The Public Solicitor may also be directed by the 
Supreme Court or the National Court to provide legal aid in a case
9 Awhere an application for such direction is successful. That is, any 
person who is refused legal aid by the Public Solicitor is given a
right to appeal either to the Supreme Court or the National Court for 
27such direction.
20. The Constitution, see S.192 (Public Services Commission); 
S.176(3)(a) (The Public Prosecutor); S.176(5) (The Public Solicitor) 
and S.213)(3) (The Auditor-General).
21. The Organic Law on the Guarantee of the Rights and Independence 
of Constitutional Office-Holders, S.13.
22. See the Constitution, Sch.1.19.
23. This applies to the Leadership Code jurisdiction, ibid.
24. The Constitution, S.192(a).
25. Ibid., S.176(b).
26. Ibid., S.177(2)(b).
27. Ibid., S.177(3): see Evertz v. The State [1979] P.N.G.L.R. 174
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These qualifications reflect in one important sense the concern 
of the CPC to ensure that the National Government should be an
O Oeffective government as well as being adequately controlled. Thus,
it was realised that independence needed to be controlled in order to
ensure that the various organs of the State co-operate constructively
in the task of governing the country. This power of controlling the
independence granted to the Constitutional Office-Holders is in turn
guarded against possible abuse. This task is left to the Parliament.
For instance, in a case where the NEC has given a direction through
the Head of State to the Public Prosecutor under S. 176(4) of the
Constitution, the Prime Minister is required to table such direction
at the next session of Parliament, unless after consultation with the
Leader of the Opposition, he considers that such tabling is likely to
29prejudice the security, defence or international relations of PNG.
3.3 THE REDUCTION OF THE EXECUTIVE ARM WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT
The reduction of the power of the NE also takes place within the 
government itself by virtue of the fact that some powers are vested in 
the ancillary arms. These ancillary arms are independent from the 
Executive either in law or in fact. A close examination of the powers 
exercised by these arms shows that they exercise some of the powers 
that hitherto had been executive powers exercised by the colonial 
executive.
Two such specific powers are the power of judicial appointments,
and the power of pardon or as the Constitution calls it, 'the power of
30mercy'. Except for the power of appointing a Chief Justice, the
power of making judicial appointments is now vested in the Judicial
31and Legal Services Commission. It includes the power to appoint the 
Chief Magistrate.^
28. See CPC, 1974:6/1 at para. 1.
29. See the Constitution, S.176(4).
30. The Chief Justice is appointed by the Head of State on the 





In making appointments the Judicial and Legal Services Commission 
is not subject to direction or control by any person or authority.
In the Public Solicitor’s Case, Pritchard J. and Wilson J. regarded 
the Commission as an ancillary arm of government. The CPC itself 
explained in the following terms why it chose to have a different body 
to make judicial appointments:
We have therefore recommended that judges (including the 
Deputy Chief Justice) should be selected by a body composed of 
people who are likely to take into account all of these 
factors. We do not believe that judges should be chosen 
simply by the Government of the day in consultation with the 
judiciary though of course the act of appointing a judge is, 
in fact, an executive one, and in most countries, including 
Australia and Britain, the appointment of judges of the higher 
courts is made by the executive alone. As well as the views 
of the executive and the judiciary, opinions expressed from 
the standpoint of people with a variety of backgrounds, 
experience and values should, we believe, be brought to bear 
on the choice of those who are to become judges.^
It seems to follow from the CPC’s view that the power of judicial
appointment is essentially an executive power which is allocated to an
independent ancillary arm of government by the Constitution.
The Judicial and Legal Services Commission consists of the 
Minister of Justice or his nominee as the Chairman, the Chief Justice, 
the Deputy Chief Justice, the Chief Ombudsman and a Member of
O QParliament appointed by Parliament. This composition is increased 
by an additional member, viz., the Chief Magistrate, when a matter
Q £before the Commission relates to the Magisterial Service. °
The Magisterial Service is an instrument of the Judicial and
Legal Services Commission, since the Chief Magistrate who is in charge
of the Service is made responsible to the Commission for the operation 
37of the Service. The Chief Magistrate is in fact required to carry
O Oout any direction or instruction given to him by the Commission. 
These, however, must relate to the administration of the Service,
33. Ibid., S.183(4).
34. CPC, 1974:8/5, para. 43.
35. Ibid., S.183(2).
36. Ibid., S.183(3).
37. Ibid., S.173(3) and Magisterial Service Act 1975, S.2(a).
38. The Constitution, S.175(4).
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since any exercise of judicial power by the Chief Magistrate is not
19subject to any direction or control. In the Public Solicitor's
Case^ Pritchard J. regarded the Magisterial Service as a separate arm 
of the Judicial and Legal Services Commission:^ that is, as an
ancillary arm. This view, however, must be regarded as incorrect, 
since the Magisterial Service does not have that independence which 
distinguishes ancillary arms from instruments of principal arms. The 
Magisterial Service is in effect an administrative body which 
administers the welfare of the magistrates (which do not include
/ OVillage Court magistrates). The Service is thus an instrument of
the Commission, in this administrative sense. The magistrates
themselves exercise the judicial power and are a part of the National 
Judicial System within the meaning of S.155 of the Constitution. 
Prior to Independence, the Magisterial Service was a part of the 
Department of Law, and magistrates were in fact public servants on
/ 'Xleave from the Public Service in order to serve as magistrates. Now 
they must be considered as employees of the Judicial and Legal 
Services Commission.
The executive power of mercy is vested in the Executive, namely, 
in the Head of State acting on the advice of the NEC.^ But this is a
formality. In practice the outcome depends largely on the
recommendation of the Advisory Committee on the Power of Mercy which 
is required by the Constitution to report to the NEC before the NEC 
advises the Head of State.^ The Committee itself is established by
ZifSthe Organic Law on the Advisory Committee on the Power of Mercy. °
The CPC was concerned "to ensure that the power of mercy is 
exercised only in an appropriate case and in a just manner".^ For 
this purpose it recommended that the Committee on the Power of Mercy
39. Ibid., S.157.
40. 11978] P.N.G.L.R. 345.
41. Ibid., at 369.
42. See the Constitution, S.174(1).
43. See Pritchard J. in the Public Solicitor's Case at 369.
44. The Constitution, S.151.
45. Ibid., S.152(2).
46. Ibid., S.l(l).
47. See CPC, 1974:8/13.
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be "an advisory committee ... to investigate and make recommendations 
in cases where the Executive is giving consideration to exercising 
this power .
Although the CPC envisaged the role of the Committee as being 
purely advisory, the Committee has in fact gone beyond its advisory 
function. Although, as stated above, the NEC cannot advise the Head 
of State until it receives a report from the Committee, the NEC does 
not regard itself as bound by the Committee's recommendations. Yet, 
as a former executive officer to the Committee has noted, the 
recommendations of the Committee were invariably accepted by the 
NEC.49
The Committee has also been viewed increasingly as a court of 
appeal. This is reflected in an increasing number of applications 
that have been lodged with the Committee. As Sakora has noted, the 
Committee at one stage considered as many as sixteen applications 
during one meeting. Furthermore, he noted that counsel representing 
each applicant presented the same arguments as were previously 
presented on appeal in the courts.^ Some applicants even sought to 
circumvent the judicial process by applying directly after conviction 
to the Committee, presumably because they felt they had no prospect of 
succeeding on appeal.
The Committee as defined by the Organic Law on the Advisory 
Committee on the Power of Mercy, comprises the following:
(a) a lawyer;
(b) a medical practitioner with experience in psychiatry;
(c) a member of the National Parliament;
(d) a Minister of religion; and
(e) a person with experience in community work,
appointed by the Head of State, acting with, and in accordance 







published in the National Gazette.
There is a further provision that at least one of the members must be 
54a woman.
Since all the other members are generally non-legal persons, the 
position of the lawyer member of the Committee is crucial and also 
contains a potential danger. Although neither the Constitution nor 
the Organic Law has stipulated that the lawyer should be the Secretary 
for Justice, this is, in effect, the interpretation which successive 
governments have adopted. Thus, if one assumes that it is more than 
likely that the Secretary's opinion would influence the views of the 
other members of the Committee, such opinion, in the normal course of 
events, is assured of acceptance by the NEC. This is more than 
likely, because the Secretary for Justice is not only the legal 
adviser to the Minister for Justice, to whom the Committee submits its 
report for presentation to the NEC, but he is also the Principal Legal 
Adviser to the NEC itself under a separate legislation.^ If the
Secretary for Justice wants for some reason to over-rule the decisions 
of the superior courts, then a real threat is posed to the
effectiveness of the judicial process. In the last analysis it would 
be a conflict between the legal opinion of the most senior national 
lawyer in the Government and that of the most senior national lawyer 
in the Supreme Court. If the Secretary for Justice had his way, it 
would be a case of substantial influence by the bureaucracy, an 
eventuality not envisaged by the CPC.
The increasing importance of the Committee was recognised by the
SSupreme Court in the Public Solicitor's Case, where Prentice C.J.
appeared to regard it as being outside the governmental structure. 
But it can be argued that strictly this is incorrect, since the role 
of the Committee as provided for by the Constitution is purely 
advisory, and it is within the government. It is worth noting,
53
53. Organic Law on the Advisory Committee on the Power of Mercy, 
S.1(2)“
54. Ibid., S.l(l) and (3).
55. See Principal Legal Adviser Act 1975.
56. L1978] P.N.G.L.R. 345.
57. Ibid., at 350, but Wilson J. regarded the Committee as an 
ancillary arm of government: ibid., at 361.
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however, that the Committee has provided a restraining influence on 
the Executive to an extent not envisaged by the CPC.
Even the four bodies which the Constitution designates as State 
Services and which were previously part of the colonial executive, are 
no longer part of the Executive Arm. In the Public Solicitor's Case,
Wilson J. regarded them as ancillary arms of the National Government
S8not directly related to the Executive. They are the National Public 
Service, the Police Force, the Defence Force and the Parliamentary 
Service.
During the pre-Independence period the precursors of these bodies
were part of the colonial executive through the various statutory
provisions that were made for them respectively. The Public Service
was created specifically by the Papua New Guinea Act 1949 (as amended)
59as part of the colonial executive. The Police Force was regulated 
by the Royal Papua and New Guinea Constabulary Ordinance 1965 which 
was replaced in 1973 by the Police Force (Interim Arrangements) Act of 
that year. The Defence Force came into existence in 1975, after the 
Defence Act 1974 came into force. Previously the Defence Force owed 
its existence to the defence statutes of the Commonwealth of 
Australia. The precursor to the Parliamentary Service was in fact a 
department, viz., the Department of the House of Assembly, which was 
specifically created by the Public Services (Interim Arrangements) Act
1973.6°
The Constitution separates these bodies from the Executive by 
including them textually within a separate Part, namely, Part VIII. 
This seems to be the basis on which Wilson J. was prepared in the 
Public Solicitor’s Case to regard these State Services as constituting 
ancillary arms of the National Government.
But if one takes independence in law as the criterion for
58. Ibid.
59. See S.30. These provisions were supplemented by the Public 
Service Ordinance 1949 which was replaced by the Public Service (Papua 
and New Guinea) Ordinance 1963. The 1963 Ordinance in turn was 
replaced by the current Public Service (Interim Arrangements) Act 
1973.
60. See Sections 28-29.
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distinguishing ancillary arms of government from the principal arms, 
the position of the State Services as ancillary arms creates 
difficulties, because the status of these Services, as regards 
independence in law, ranges from no independence at all to the status 
of limited independence. Thus, if one takes the relevance of 
independence in an ascending order of importance, there is at the 
bottom the Defence Force and the National Public Service, both of 
which do not have any independence expressly conferred on them by the
f i 1law. On the next rung of that ladder is the Parliamentary Service
which does not have independence as such but which is required to
h 9perform its functions 'impartially'. Finally at the top of the
ladder comes the Police Force which has independence, but that
ft ^independence is limited to the power of arrest and prosecution. J
The Judicial and Legal Services Commission, on the other hand, is 
not an instrument of the National Judicial System (a principal arm), 
but an ancillary arm because it does have independence conferred on it 
by the Constitution itself.*^ Independence conferred by law is
therefore crucial in maintaining not only a distinction between 
ancillary arms and components of these arms, but also between 
ancillary arms and the principal arms.
3.4 THE ORGANS CONSTITUTING THE EXECUTIVE
The foregoing reductions may be better illustrated if they are 
seen as occurring within the general framework of the traditional 
executive under the Westminster model. Under that model the executive 
consists of three elements: the political, the public service and the
statutory authorities. The political element comprises essentially
the Head of State and the Ministry. The public service element 
consists of the public service proper.
As the above analysis shows, there have been no reductions within
61. The independence in relation to personnel matters and management 
matters is given to the Public Services Commission which is outside 
the government as stated above.
62. The Constitution, S.132(3).
63. See Chapter 6, post.
64. Ibid., S.183(4).
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the political element. What the draftsman has done to this element 
has been to bring its two components, namely, the Head of State and 
the NEC, under one structure which he has termed the National 
Executive. The NE has then become one of three principal arms of the 
National Government.
The reductions that have occurred have been in the other two 
elements of the Executive. In fact, as indicated earlier in this 
chapter, the Statutory Authorities have been removed completely from 
the Executive because they are outside it, even though the power they 
exercise is executive power. They are, however, permitted to exercise 
such power by virtue of the provisions of S.140 of the Constitution. 
This does not mean that Statutory Authorities are not subject to 
control by the NEC. In fact, the NEC exercises a great deal of 
control over them.
In terms of the principal arms/ancillary arms classification, the 
constitutional position of Statutory Authorities presents something of 
an anomaly, since they do not fit neatly into either of the two 
groups. This is due largely to the general problem legislation has 
created by not drawing a clear line between the independence which 
these Authorities need, and the extent to which Ministerial
£ Cresponsibility is applied to their activities.
Within the public service proper, the reductions have been quite 
substantial. Most Constitutional Office-Holders now comprising the 
non-governmental structure, are outside the public service proper. In 
addition, the Police Force is, as it was in the early colonial days, 
outside the Executive Arm. The attempt made by the National 
Government to create a Department of Police in order to bring it 
within the Executive was held by the Supreme Court in Bouraga's Case00 
to be unconstitutional.^ Among the other State Services, the 
Parliamentary Service may be taken as either a component of the 
National Parliament or an ancillary arm of the National Government, 
depending on whether one regards its ’impartiality’ as conferring on
65. This problem is discussed in Chapter 4, post.
66. L 1982] P.N.G.L.R. 178. The case is discussed in detail in 
Chapter 5, post.
67. See especially Kapi J., ibid., at 192.
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it a certain amount of independence. Semantically there is a 
difference between 'impartiality' and 'independence', in that the 
former requires one to be fair whilst the latter connotes freedom from 
control or direction. The practice seems to suggest that the 
Parliamentary Service tries to be impartial in the service it renders 
to members of Parliament, especially to independent members. Thus, it 
is really a component of the National Parliament rather than an 
ancillary arm of government.
After all the reductions are taken into account, the Executive 
consists of the political element and a reduced public service 
element. The political element comprises the National Executive with 
its two components, viz., the Head of State and the National Executive 
Council. The Head of State acts through her representative in PNG, 
namely, the Governor-General. The National Executive Council acts on 
its own, under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister. But where it 
has delegated exercise of its powers, the NEC acts through either the 
Prime Minister or the individual Ministers, depending on the 
particular case.
The essential characteristic of the political element lies in the 
fact that persons who occupy this echelon are either chosen directly 
by the people of Papua New Guinea themselves or indirectly through 
their representatives. Thus the Queen of England consented to accept 
the position of the Head of the State in her capacity as the English 
monarch, for Papua New Guinea only upon request by the people of Papua 
New G u i n e a . F o r  all practical purposes, the representative of the 
Head of State, viz., the Governor-General, is chosen by the people's 
representatives in the Parliament, and the Head of State makes the 
formal appointment after receiving the Parliament's nomination through 
the NEC.^ The NEC comprises the Prime Minister and the other 
Ministers who are members of the Parliament by virtue of successfully 
contesting a parliamentary election.^
Lynch has stated that the phrase 'National Executive' was chosen 
as an umbrella-expression to conveniently describe the Executive in




parity with similar expressions adopted to describe the other two arms
of the National Government.^ In fact similar expressions are used by
7 2the draftsman elsewhere in the Constitution, for this purpose. The
Constitution does not expressly give the National Executive, as such,
73any function or power. These are vested in its constituent parts, 
viz., the Head of State and the NEC. Thus, it could be argued that 
the National Executive performs through its constituent parts. The 
NEC in turn acts either on its own through the Prime Minister or the 
other Ministers, or through the bureaucracy. The constitutional basis 
of each of these bodies is discussed more conveniently in the next 
chapter where their respective powers are analysed.
Although it is easy to define the political element of the 
Executive, it is not so easy to ascertain the components of the public 
service element. This is largely due to the reductions that have 
occurred in this element. The consequence of these reductions is that 
the public service proper comprises the Departmental Head and his 
officers employed either within the department or within a component 
of a department, such as an office. Besides the department, all the 
other components of the public service are as a general rule, those 
institutions that are not independent from the Executive.
The Constitution does not provide any concept comprehensive
enough to embrace all the institutions that are not independent of the
Executive. The closest it has come to adopting such a concept, was
the use it has made of the term 'State Service'. But the definition
of that term shows that it is being used in a restricted sense to
include for the time being, only four institutions of the state,
namely, the National Public Service, the Defence Force, the Police
74Force and the Parliamentary Service.
As argued above, only the National Public Service could be 
regarded as coming within the public service proper. But in practical
71. C.J. Lynch:personal communication.
72. See for instance, the expression 'The National Justice 
Administration' under S.154 of the Constitution. The expression 
covers the courts, the Minister responsible for the administration of 
justice and the Law Officers.
73. The Constitution, S.139. The section merely creates the body.
74. The Constitution, S.188.
124
terms, the National Public Service (NPS) does not have much meaning as 
it is merely a body of employees. Its constitutional significance 
lies in its relationships with the Public Services Commission on the 
one hand, and the NEC on the other. That relationship hinges on which 
authority is the employer of the public servants under the 
Constitution. During the pre-Independence period, public servants 
were regarded as employees of the Administration rather than of the 
Public Service Board.
It does not appear to be the case under the Constitution however,
that public servants are employees of the National Government. Two
factors explain why this is so. First, the National Public Service is
the constitutional responsibility of the Public Services Commission
(PSC).^“* Secondly, the PSC is outside the governmental structure as
argued above. It follows from this that public servants or members of
the NPS are employees of the PSC. The most important of the employees
7 his the Departmental Head.0 
CONCLUSION
The above analysis thus shows that the Executive consists of the 
members of the National Executive and the Departmental Head and his 
officers. This is the result of an extensive diffusion of powers 
which have been traditionally exercised by the Executive. Thus 
compared with the executive under the normal Westminster model, the 
Executive under the PNG Constitution has been greatly reduced both in 
terms of its size as well as its powers. The powers vested in it are 
further diffused among its instruments as the next chapter will 
attempt to demonstrate.
75. Ibid., S.191.
76. His position is discussed in Chapter 5, post
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CHAPTER 4
DIFFUSION AND EXERCISE OF THE EXECUTIVE POWER
It was demonstrated in the last chapter that a high degree of 
diffusion has divested the Executive of certain of its traditional 
powers. Instead, they have been allocated to institutions outside the 
Executive and the government. This form of diffusion may be regarded 
as an outward diffusion, since power is taken away from the 
Executive.'*" But power is also diffused within the Executive itself. 
This may be regarded as an inward diffusion inasmuch as the power is 
dispersed internally among the various organs that comprise the 
Executive.
This inward diffusion takes place within the framework of the 
Westminster system of government which the National Constituent 
Assembly adopted. The essential features of the system are that:
(a) Parliament is supreme in its legislative power;
(b) the Executive is responsible to Parliament for the 
exercise of the executive power on behalf of the Head of 
State;
(c) the Head of State is a Divided Head of State in that the 
Queen is the symbolic Head of State while the effective 
Head of State is the Prime Minister; and
(d) the responsibility of the Executive to Parliament is 
essentially determined by constitutional conventions.^
The executive in the Westminster model consists of the titular Head of 
State, the Prime Minister and his Ministry, and a public service. As 
shown in the last chapter, the Executive under the PNG Constitution
1. In this case power is vested in both ancillary arms and in 
non-governmental institutions as analysed in the last chapter.
2. Deklin, 1975:12. The PNG Constitution has adopted those aspects 
outlined in (b) and (c) above, and has also enacted the conventional 
rules governing the relationship between the Head of State, the 
Ministry and the Parliament.
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consists of the English Monarch as the titular Head of State, the NEC 
and the Departmental Heads and their officers. The executive power in 
the Executive is diffused among these institutions. Some of the 
executive power is also vested in the ancillary arms of the 
Government, outside the Executive.
The diffusion of the executive power is important from the
perspective of control of the State power since it prevents the
concentration of the executive power in the hands of a single person 
4or authority. It therefore becomes necessary to ascertain not only 
the constitutional scheme of the diffusion, but also to explain the 
nature of the executive power vested in each instrument of the 
Executive. It is equally essential to establish the manner prescribed 
by the Constitution for the exercise of that power. For this purpose, 
some definition of power needs to be made at this point.
4.1 THE MEANING OF EXECUTIVE POWER
The task of defining executive power involves two basic 
considerations. First, what meaning has the Constitution adopted? 
Secondly, how does this approach relate to the established theories 
which attempt to explain executive power?
4.1.1 The Difficulty of Defining Executive Power
The PNG Constitution uses the term ’executive power'^ without 
defining it.^ It is difficult to state with certainty whether this 
omission is attributable to an assumption by the constitution-makers 
that executive power as a concept was so well known at the time that 
it did not need to be spelled out or whether they thought that it 
would be impossible to define precisely what constitutes executive
3. Who is represented in PNG by a Governor-General.
4. Nwabueze, 1973:56.
5. See the Constitution, S.138.
6. Goldring, 1981:116.
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power in contrast to legislative and judicial powers. 7
Most constitutions attempt to define the executive power. 
According to the Australian Federal Constitution, for instance, it 
consists of
the execution and maintenance of this Constitution and of the
Olaws of the Commonwealth.
This reflects the traditional perception of executive power as one
that relates to the execution of the law, but, as constitutional
lawyers readily admit, the scope of the executive power in modern
societies goes far beyond the need to implement the laws made by the
legislature. Thus, it has been said of S.61 of the Australian Federal
Constitution that it "is clearly not an exhaustive delimitation of the
9scope of the executive power .
Under the Westminster system the executive power involves the 
initiation and formulation of laws, as well as the specific function 
of implementing them. It also involves the general running of the 
government. Thus Wynes defines executive power as
the authority within the state which administers the 
carries on the business of government and maintains 
within, and security from without the state.
law,
order
The CPC appears to have adopted this modern definition by
referring to the executive power as "the power to administer the
country in accordance with ... laws".*'*' The reference by the
12Constitution to 'executive government' supports this interpretation. 
Goldring considers the scope of this power in PNG as involving three 
basic tasks which are:
7. Keith, 1977:1-2; and also see Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd
ed.), Vol. 7, at 192. This difficulty also arises from two different 
senses in which the executive power is used. In one sense it is used 
to describe that power as defined by law. In another, it is used to 
refer to the policy-making function which is a political 
consideration: see Bayne and Colebatch, 1973:6-7.
8. Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900, S.61.
9. Campbell, 1977:88-89.
10. Wynes, 1976:385.
11. CPC, 1974:7/1, para. 3.
12. The Constitution, S.149(3)(a).
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- the carrying out of laws made by, or under the authority of 
the National Parliament (including pre-Independence laws 
continued in force); and the doing of 'incidental' acts which 
must be done in order to carry out the laws even though the 
laws themselves make no express provision;
- the making of policy, which either becomes embodied in 
legislation, or is observed by the executive in carrying into 
operation the Constitutional Laws and Acts of the Parliament; 
and
- the general operation of the machinery of government
including the provision of those services which are essential
• 13if society is to continue to operate in a normal way.
The PNG courts are yet to define the meaning of executive
power, ^  although in a number of cases both the Supreme Court and the
National Court have held particular actions to fall within or outside
its scope. In the State v. John Mogo Wonom, ^  for instance, Frost
C.J. regarded the prosecutorial power as an executive power, whereas
the other two members of the Supreme Court, Raine and Williams JJ.
took it to be a judicial power. However, none of the judges attempted
to define what constituted either executive power, or, for that
matter, judicial power. In Schuiling v. Krau^ the National Court
held that a deportation was an exercise of executive power; ^  and in 
1 8Re Rooney No. 2 the Supreme Court regarded the decision by the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that of the Committee of Review 
which confirmed the Minister's decision to revoke an entry permit, as 
exercise of executive power. In Premdas v. Independent State of
O QP.N.G., Andrew J. regarded the decision of the Foreign Affairs 
Minister to deport Dr Premdas as involving the performance of an
13. Goldring, 1981:117-118.
14. It has been claimed that even in Australia there has been as yet
no case arisen which requires a definition of the power: see
Richardson, 1977:55.
15. [1975] P.N.G.L.R. 311.
16. [1977] P.N.G.L.R. 176 at 181.
17. Ibid., at 181.
18. [1979] P.N.G.L.R. 448.
19. Ibid., see Kearney J. at 486.
20. [1979] P.N.G.L.R. 319
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• • •• M . . . .  . 91administrative , ministerial or executive function. Andrew 
J. therefore appeared to treat these three terms as meaning the same 
thing, viz., executive power. However, in none of these cases had 
there been any need and, therefore, any attempt by any of the judges 
to define what constitutes executive power under the Constitution.
For the purpose of this work I have adopted the modern definition 
of executive power, which two British authors state to be:
the general and detailed carrying on of government, according 
to law, including the framing of policy and the choice of the 
manner in which the law may be made to render that policy 
possible.^
This definition reflects the scope of "executive government", 
conferred on the NEC by S.149(3)(a) of the Constitution.
4.1.2 Relevance of the Established Theories 
of Executive Power in the PNG Context
Any discussion of the meaning of executive power would be 
incomplete if it did not take into account the major theories in this 
field. Having seen the meaning of executive power under the 
Constitution, it is perhaps opportune to consider whether it supports 
a particular theory of executive power.
a) The Three Traditional Theories
The general question that is often posed in relation to the scope 
of executive power is: does the executive power include all those
functions that are neither legislative nor judicial? If it does, as 
is generally assumed, then does this mean that executive power can be 
exercised independently of the law, whatever that law may be? There 
are three traditional theories on this question, and Nwabueze sets
O Qthem out fully in his book, Presidentialism in Commonwealth Africa.
It is, therefore, sufficient for my purposes to give a brief summary. 
The first is the Residual Power Theory according to which executive 
power embraces every power which by its nature is neither legislative 
nor judicial. Gledhill puts the theory in its most succinct form:
21. Ibid. , at 398.
22. Hood-Phillips and Jackson, 1978:13.
23. Nwabueze, 1974:1-15.
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Executive power is what remains of the functions of government 
after the legislative and judicial powers have been taken 
away. It is not limited to execution of the laws; provided it 
is not forbidden by law, action by government need not wait 
upon legislation expressly empowering government to do it.
The formulation of policy and the preliminary steps necessary 
to implement it by legislation come within the executive 
power.
This theory necessarily implies that executive power involves more 
than the implementation of laws. It extends as far as the formulation 
and implementation of policies. But Nwabueze argues that much of what 
the executive government does, including the details of 
administration, is a result of convenience, efficiency and logic and 
does not really explain what constitutes the essence of executive 
power. 2“*
The second, closely related theory is the Inherent Power Theory. 
Nwabueze states the theory thus:
According to this theory, executive power confers an inherent 
authority to exercise any function which is inherently 
executive in nature. It presupposes, therefore, that the 
function in fact partakes of the nature of execution. This 
would exclude functions that are not inherently of that 
nature, such as policy and administration of law.
According to Nwabueze the third theory regards executive power
as :
simply power to execute the laws, to carry into effect the 
provisions of the law, either by enforcement against persons 
contravening them or by doing work or taking some other action 
required thereunder. Accordingly, executive power presupposes 
some law which is to be executed. There must be in existence 
a law in execution of which the action of the executive is 
done.27
It is to be noted that this theory reflects the traditional meaning of 
executive power, viz., one of implementing the law. Nwabueze does not 
give a specific name to this theory as he does to the other two, but 
it would seem appropriate to call it the "Law Executing Theory" 
because it is concerned with the execution of the law.
24. Gledhill, 1967:42.
25. Nwabueze, 1974:2.
26. Ibid., at 4.
27. See Nwabueze, 1974:10.
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In considering whether any of these theories is applicable in the 
PNG context two general points need to be made. First, such 
consideration has to begin with the provisions of the Constitution, 
especially those governing the arrangement of the State power 
generally, and the executive power in particular. Secondly, the 
exercise of the power may have two possible outcomes as far as it 
affects the individual. In the one case, the exercise of such power 
may not affect the individual at all in terms of his Basic Rights. An 
example of this would be in the case where the Executive adopts a 
policy to persuade the people to grow cash crops. Such policy would 
not violate anybody's Basic Rights. The Executive's power to 
formulate and implement such policy is inherent in the responsibility 
the Constitution confers on it under S.149(3)(a) for the executive 
government of PNG.
On the other hand, there are situations where the exercise of 
executive power does affect the Basic Rights of an individual, and 
cases on this are discussed in Chapter 9 below. Much of the law on 
the limits to the executive power is concerned with this type of 
situation, and this is the focus I also take in this work.
The constitutional scheme as analysed in Chapter 2 seems to 
depart from all the three theories under consideration. The residual 
power theory, for instance, by assuming that all state power could be 
divided into different forms of governmental power, is inconsistent 
with the basic constitutional scheme of dividing State power into 
governmental and non-governmental powers. In addition, the theory 
perpetuates the traditional distinction (which courts have not held to 
be valid for all purposes) between executive, legislative and judicial 
powers. Certainly, to the extent that the theory purports to 
incorporate the notion of strict separation of powers, it is 
inapplicable because the CPC expressly rejected that notion.
Similarly, it would be difficult to sustain the argument 
underlying the inherent power theory that there is a constitutional 
basis on which the executive power could be exercised independently of 
the law. All executive power is derived from the Constitution and its 
exercise is regulated by it. Thus, if the Executive, for example, 
wishes to qualify any of the Qualified Rights, it must conform to the 
procedure designed for the purpose under S.38 of the Constitution.
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There are additional reasons for which the inherent power theory 
could be rejected. First, the Constitution declares that all power
O Obelongs to the People of PNG, and provides that it is to be 
exercised by those to whom it is assigned. There is no authority with 
inherent power. Secondly, executive power is delegated to the Head of 
State and to the other Executive institutions. Its exercise is not 
only subject to the Constitution, but also to the principles of the
Underlying Law governing the limits to delegated powers, such as the
29rule of delegatus non potest delegare. Thirdly, the Executive power 
under the PNG Constitution is a statutory power which means its scope 
is restricted to the limits defined within the Constitution and other 
statutory laws.
It is also difficult to argue that the third theory, viz., the
law executing power theory is being applied when one takes into
account the fact that the governments on the three levels (National,
provincial and local) are doing more than just carrying out laws.
Certainly the term ’executive government’, which the Constitution uses
30to define the responsibility of the NEC, is too wide to be read as 
being restricted to only the implementation of laws.
The situation that obtains in Papua New Guinea is that executive 
power involves more than merely implementing laws. This includes not
only formulation and implementation of policies but also the task of
31general administration. Although the precise boundaries of the
32power may be difficult to delineate as is generally agreed, there is 
no doubt that every executive act, including formulation of policies, 
must have a foundation in law. This is the basic principle of the 
Constitution that all the judges supported in both Premdas' Case and
28. See The State v. Wonom, [ 1975] P.N.G.L.R. 311, esp. Frost C.J. 
at 315.
29. See Secretary for Law v. Tenalom, [1965-66] P.N.G.L.R. 414; and 
the discussion of this case in Chapter 7, post.
30. See the Constitution, S.149(3)(a).
31. As Goldring has pointed out it covers a wide range of 
activities. See Goldring, 1981:118.
32. Keith, 1977:1-2.
33. [1979] P.N.G.L.R. 329.
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O /in the two Rooney Cases. ^
4.2 THE EXTENT OF THE DIFFUSION 
Section 138 provides that:
subject to this Constitution, the executive power of the 
People is vested in the Head of State to be exercised in 
accordance with the Division _V. 2 ....
This means that the exercise of that executive power by the Head of 
35State is dependent on the advice of the Prime Minister, of the NEC, 
and of any other person or body authorised by law to give such 
advice. To that extent the Constitution has therefore re-enacted 
the traditional Westminster legal fiction by which the executive power 
is formally vested in the Head of State, viz., the Monarch, but its 
exercise is made dependent on the advice of the Prime Minister and his 
cabinet.
It therefore becomes important to ascertain the nature of this
power as well as the extent to which it is shared between the Head of
State and various other constituents of the Executive. The two key
constitutional provisions which permit this diffusion are the
provisions of S.138 and those of S.140. Section 138 is quoted above
37and S.140 is quoted in full in Chapter 2 (supra). An understanding 
of the correlation between these two sections is important if one is 
to comprehend the general scheme of the diffusion, for although S.138 
states that the executive power is vested in the Head of State, S.140 
also makes it clear that it can be vested elsewhere.
4.2.1 The General Principles of Diffusion
When S.138 and S.140 are read together, two propositions become
34. Re Rooney (No. 1) 1 1979] P.N.G.L.R. 403; and Re Rooney (No. 2)
[1979] P.N.G.L.R. 448.
35. The CPC wanted the executive power to be vested in the NEC which
is the collective body, but this was changed when the Constituent 
Assembly decided to adopt the institution of the Head of State: See,
CPC, 1974:7/1, para. 3.
36. See the Constitution, S.86.
37. See p.79 above.
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evident. First, the executive power vested in the Head of State is 
not the total executive power of the People because S.140 states that 
some of the executive power can be vested outside the NE. It would 
also seem to be explicit in S.138 that even the portion of executive 
power presently vested in the Head of State can be divided and vested 
in some authority outside the NE. Section 140 was adopted 
deliberately because the draftsman and his advisors wanted to avoid a 
situation where everything had to be sent to the National Executive
O OCouncil for approval.
Secondly, the exercise of executive power in each case must 
conform with the .manner prescribed by law. This proposition is 
explicit in S.138. The implication here is that the manner of 
exercising executive power in each case is prescribed by law. In 
relation to the executive power vested in the Head of State, the 
manner of its exercise is explicitly stated by S.138, but in other 
cases it is a question of ascertaining the constitutional and legal 
provisions governing their respective exercise.
The net effect of the joint operation of S.138 and S.140 is that 
the Constitution disperses the total executive power in two general 
directions: it vests some in the Head of State but only formally, 
since the effective exercise of that portion of power lies with the 
NEC and its instruments because of the constitutional requirement that 
that power can be exercised only on, and in accordance with, advice. 
The Constitution then vests the balance of executive power in various 
other bodies both within and outside the government.
4.2.2 The Diffusion within the Political Element of the Executive
The important bodies within the political element of the 
Executive proper are the Head of State and the NEC and its 
instruments, namely, the Prime Minister and the other Ministers. 
Although the position of the Head of State in this respect is not of 
practical importance, it nevertheless needs to be examined not only 
because the executive power is vested formally in her, but also 
because of the significance of the Royal Prerogatives that appear to
38. C.J. Lynch:personal communication
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have been adopted by the Constitution. Besides these, the institution 
of the Head of State was a controversial issue at the time of 
constitution-making. My analysis of her constitutional position is 
therefore provided in Appendix C to this thesis.
4.2.2.1 The NEC and Its Instruments
The fact that in exercising executive power the Head of State is 
required by the Constitution to act on advice on every occasion, 
points to the constitutional significance of those institutions that 
are prescribed to give that advice. An examination of the
Constitution, the Organic Law and the relevant Acts of Parliament 
shows that the authority normally prescribed to render this advice is 
the NEC. However, on a number of occasions the Prime Minister is also 
authorised to give such advice; and on occasions Ministers are 
individually authorised.
The NEC is often referred to as the "cabinet" in PNG. It is
39expressly created by the Constitution, and comprises the Prime
Minister (as Chairman) and all the Ministers.^ The term 'cabinet' is
not used in either the Constitution or any other legislation, although
the CPC referred to it in its Final Report.Structurally, though
the NEC is the core governmental organ, as a typical cabinet is in the
Westminster model, it is different from the traditional cabinet in two
fundamental respects: first, unlike cabinets in other Commonwealth
countries, all the Ministers are members of the NEC. This is a
reflection of one of the basic principles of government the CPC
recommended, viz., that decisions are to be made collectively as had
been practised in village communities throughout PNG for 
/ 0generations. Secondly, and accordingly, all Ministers are required 
to support any decision of the NEC even though a particular Minister 
was not present when the decision was taken. This is a constitutional
/ Qconvention elsewhere, but in the PNG context it may be argued that




43. See Jennings, 1969:277.
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the rule is implicit in a collective responsibility of the Minister 
under Section 141 of the Constitution.
Undoubtedly, the NEC is the most important constitutional organ 
within the executive arm of the National Government . It should be 
noted that the Constitution confers the general responsibility of the 
executive government of Papua New Guinea on the NEC, and not on either 
the Prime Minister or other Ministers individually. Section 149(3) of 
the Constitution, which provides for this, states that:
The functions of the Council are -
(a) to be responsible, in accordance with this Constitution, 
for the executive government of Papua New Guinea; and
(b) for such other functions as are allocated to it by this 
Constitution or any other law.
Two points may be noted in relation to this general responsibility. 
First, it is couched in the broadest possible terms and would appear 
to embrace the whole executive field. Secondly, there may be other 
functions not necessarily related to the executive government that may 
be conferred on the NEC by other laws - i.e. apart from the 
Constitution.
It is noted that S.149(3) expresses the NEC's responsibility in 
terms of "functions" rather than "powers" for the reason that the 
executive power is vested in the Head of State under S.138(2) of the 
Constitution. The distinction between power and function seems to be 
clearly drawn here, but it is rather fictitious in that the effective 
exercise of executive power is carried out by the NEC, because of the 
requirement that the Head of State acts on advice. This distinction 
is really a distinction without a difference. In effect, it is a 
legal fiction adopted to provide a bridge between the effective 
exercise of the executive power and the formal vesting of that power 
as a result of the decision by the Constituent Assembly to adopt the 
institution of the Head of State. The CPC wanted the executive power 
to be formally vested in the NEC but with various specific executive 
functions to be shared between various institutions.^ However, its 
recommendation had to be modified when the decision to adopt the Head
44. CPC, 1974:7/2, para. 15.
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of State was made. The constitutional significance of the distinction 
lies in the fact that, at least in theory, power is exercised by the 
head of State and function is performed by the NEC. The practical 
effect of this is that any document containing advice must be signed 
by the Head of State before it can be legally acted upon. In other 
words, the NEC cannot both advise and formally approve that advice: 
the former is its proper constitutional function; the latter is not.
Although S.149(3) of the Constitution refers to the nature of the 
role of the NEC as one of performing functions rather than exercising 
powers, S.149(4) does allude to the "power" of the NEC, thereby 
implying that the NEC does have powers of some sort in the formal 
sense. It is clear that the NEC does have power under sub-s.5 of the 
same section to determine its own procedures and proceedings, and 
under S.150(2) to determine the responsibilities of its Secretary. It 
would seem that the formal powers of the NEC are confined to those two 
areas since to extend the definitions of its powers beyond these 
limits would be to contradict the formal language of S.138 of the 
Constitution.
The CPC intended that the NEC should be the body that makes 
policy. "We wish to emphasise ..." the Committee stated, "that it 
would be contrary to the spirit of [ourj proposals it the role of the 
National Executive Council was to become purely formal so that the 
Council did not in fact make policy".^ It can be reasonably inferred 
from the generality of the language of S.149(3)(a) of the Constitution 
that making of policy falls within the definition of "executive 
government" occurring therein.
Policy, according to the Concise Oxford Dictionary is a general 
plan of action and has three fundamental aspects. Apart from the 
process of formal adoption of a policy, there is the question of 
formulating as well as of implementing that policy. Again, it is a 
recognised fact that whereas the choice of a policy legally and 
constitutionally belongs to the NEC and its agents, the formulation 
and implementation is carried out by the Department that is concerned 
with a particular area over which a policy is to be prepared.
45. Ibid., 7/3, para. 20.
138
The NEC has its own Secretary who heads the Office of the NEC 
which provides the supportive services. ° In order to facilitate and 
enable the NEC to perform its functions efficiently and effectively, 
the NEC has three sub-committees. The first is the National Planning 
Committee; the second, the Social Justice and Welfare Committee, and 
the third, the Management Committee. These Committees always meet a 
few days in advance of the actual NEC meeting.
The National Planning Committee (NPC) is the most important of 
the three. It determines the respective agenda of the meetings of the 
other two committees. The NPC is a procedural inner NEC, in that it 
also determines which submissions from other bodies are to go to the 
NEC for consideration, and which of these policy submissions that have 
been approved for consideration are to be allocated to either of the 
two sub-committees. The composition of the NPC has been restricted to 
the Party leaders and their deputies in the coalition.
The two other sub-committees make their recommendations to the 
NEC which then either approves or rejects them. Ministers can 
re-submit a matter that has been rejected by either of the two 
sub-committees to the NEC for reconsideration, but from personal 
experience it is unlikely that Ministers who opposed the matter 
previously would change their minds, unless fresh and convincing 
evidence in support of the case is tendered. But invariably it is 
only with the Prime Minister's prior approval that such a matter can 
be re-submitted for consideration by the NEC
Besides these structural arrangements within the NEC itself and 
its secretariat, there are corresponding structural arrangements 
within each Department as well as within the National Parliament for 
the purpose of processing policy.
It is obvious that the NEC is not concerned solely with matters 
of policy, although these comprise the bulk of its work load. The 
other matters it deals with may be categorised into four general 
types: supervision of the general administratiion, review and 
co-ordination of policies, appointments, and crisis-management. These 
are essential functions of the executive government.
46. See the Constitution, S.150
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The NEC may delegate its power or authority to perform further 
acts in relation to any matter that it has considered to either the 
Prime Minister or any other Minister. This power of delegation is 
derived from S.149(4) of the Constitution, which states that
except where the contrary intention appears, nothing in this 
Constitution prevents the power, functions, duties or 
responsibilities of the Council from being exercised, as 
determined by it, through a Minister.
In order to control the exercise of power delegated to a Minister 
under this section, the NEC has adopted the following guidelines:
1) When a Minister exercises a delegated power or function he
must submit an information paper to the NEC at its next
meeting after the exercise of the powers or function;
2) the information paper must contain a reference to:
a) the decision of the NEC delegating him the power;
b) the particular power he is to exercise;
c) the subject matter upon which he has exercised the 
powers; and
d) the grounds for exercising the power.
3) The Minister’s advice to the Head of State must include:
a) recitation of the decision and the date when the NEC 
delegated its power to him. When the power is first 
exercised by the Minister, it must include the actual 
NEC decision as documented in the yellow paper [the 
yellow paper is the colour of the paper on which the 
NEC's decisions are recorded],
b) in signing the document the signature of the Minister 
must indicate that the advice is given on behalf of 
the National Executive Council.
In practice the tendency has been that if a matter concerns no 
particular portfolio, the authority is given to the Prime Minister to 
act alone, but in the light of the understanding reached in the NEC at 
the time on the particular matter (although the Prime Minister is 
given some discretion). If a particular matter is one that relates to 
a specific department, then authority for further action is given to 
the Minister in charge of the portfolio with a proviso that he 
consults the Prime Minister before taking the required action.
47. See Submissions Handbook for National Executive Council and 
National Parliament (August, 1981:5-6).
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a) The Functions and Powers of the Prime Minister
A Prime Minister holds an office expressly created by the 
48Constitution. He is appointed by the Head of State acting on the
49advice of the National Parliament. In effect, the Prime Minister is 
chosen on the floor of the Parliament.
After the Speaker is chosen following a general election, 
Standing Order 6(3)"^ provides that Parliament will proceed to elect a 
Prime Minister. The procedure for election under Standing Order 8(1) 
requires a motion, duly moved and seconded without notice. The
question of formal procedural requirements was raised for the first 
time in June 1977 during the election of the Prime Minister, with
Somare and Guise as nominees at the time. It was questioned whether a 
motion moved and seconded verbally and subsequently supported by 
majority by a show of hands was all that was required under the
Standing Order 8. The Somare-Chan Coalition partners, who had the
majority, took the view that the motion should be in writing with the 
name of the nominee and should be supported by a simple majority.
This view prevailed, and accordingly Somare defeated Guise under that
procedure.
It would seem that this procedure would be available for electing 
the Prime Minister in two other cases: where the incumbent
voluntarily resigns, or where he is dismissed from office either on
medical grounds or as a result of conviction under the provisions of 
the Leadership Code. But where the Prime Minister is dismissed from 
office following a successful vote of no confidence in him or his 
Ministry on the floor of the Parliament, the procedure for election of 
the succeeding Prime Minister is different."^
The Prime Minister is required to be a member of the National 
Parliament as all the Ministers have to be under S. 141(a) of the 
Constitution. The provision states, in fact, that the ministry is a 
"Parliamentary Executive".
48. The Constitution, S.142(2).
49. Ibid., S.142(2).
50. See National Parliament Standing Orders 16 September 1975.
51. See Chapter 6, post, for the discussion of this procedure.
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However, what the Constitution does not make clear is whether, in 
the light of two types of members in the Parliament (elected members 
and nominated members), a nominated member is eligible for the 
position of Prime Minister. So far the practice has supported the 
view that the member of Parliament who is eligible for the office of 
the Prime Minister should be an elected member, since he has an 
electorate base. The better view, however, would be that the 
nominated members have equal eligibility to the office. That 
reasoning is based on three grounds. First, the Constitution does not 
discriminate between the two types of members, apart from directing 
that one group is to be elected and the other to be nominated. 
Secondly, the nominated members are not debarred expressly anywhere in 
the Constitution from seeking the office of the Prime Minister, or of 
other ministries. Thirdly, in the PNG context where talent and 
political expertise at that level may not be prevalent among elected 
members, the nation's leadership may have to come from nominated 
members. If so, there should be a convention requiring such a person 
to be acceptable to all political parties represented in the 
Parliament before he is nominated, since there is currently no
constitutional provision on this point. Normally the competition 
would be between two elected members, and there has already developed 
a tendency among elected members invariably to refer to their 
electorates as the legitimate authority on which they speak or act.
In such situations a nominated member faces great difficulties unless
he is accepted by most of the members.
As yet there have been no nominated members despite the
provision. Both Somare and Chan have been elected members of
Parliament. But if there had been a nominated member of the calibre
of these two leaders it would be theoretically interesting, though a
matter of conjecture, whether such a member would have been given
access to the office. It may be a moot point considering the
existence of a strong feeling that nominated membership of the
51National Parliament should be dropped.
The Prime Minister may resign by giving a written notice to the
52. See the Constitution, S.101(1).
53. See General Constitutional Commission, 1980:31
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Head of State. He may also be suspended from office and then
dismissed if he is found guilty of the offence of misconduct in office 
under the Leadership Code.-^ If two medical practitioners certify 
that he is unfit to continue as the Prime Minister, the Head of State 
is required to remove him from office after she receives advice from 
the Parliament.^
Whether the Prime Minister resigns, is removed or dismissed, in
law he remains in the position until the next Prime Minister is
appointed.“^  Again this reflects the CPC's recommendation that there
58should be continuity in government at all times.
The Constitution does not assign a general function to the Prime 
Minister. Whatever functions he now performs (just as those performed 
by his Ministers) are derived from the general responsibility for the 
executive government of PNG conferred on the NEC and any other 
function a law may confer on that body under S.149(3)(a) and (b) of 
the Constitution respectively.
The Constitution however, requires the Prime Minister to perform 
certain specific tasks, such as the nomination of Ministers and the 
allocation of portfolios to them. The Prime Minister is given
specific powers to carry out these functions.
i) Appointment of Ministers
One of the most important functions of the Prime Minister is to 
nominate other Ministers to the Head of State for formal
appointment. Although in theory the discretion is solely that of 
the Prime Minister, his choice is very much circumscribed by a number 
of factors. First and foremost, the maximum number and the minimum 
number of Ministers are fixed by the Constitution.^ The actual
54. The Constitution, S.146(1).
55. Ibid., S.142(6) and 146(5)(b).
56. Ibid., S.142(5).
57. Ibid., S.147(1) and 147(2).
58. The CPC, 1974:7/5, para. 35.
59. The Constitution, S. 144(1).
60. There were eighteen Ministers at Independence in 1975. See: 
Organic Law on the Number of Ministers, S.l(2).
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numbers at both ends depend on the total number of seats in the
National Parliament and these in turn depend on the total number of 
electorates at the time of a given general election. Secondly, the
choice of a particular person depends on the political factors, such
as the standing the individual has in his party, and the need for
regional representation.
Associated with the Prime Minister’s power of nominating other
Ministers is his power to allocate portfolios to Ministers,^ and to
9determine titles for them. Again, political factors play a crucial
part in limiting the choice the Prime Minister has in this respect.
Normally the major party in the coalition takes the Prime Ministership
and other important portfolios such as Foreign Affairs, Finance and
Justice. However, there can be problems. Somare's decision after the
1972 elections to give Julius Chan the Finance portfolio allowed the
PPP to dominate economic policy-making within the government and the
nation to such an extent that Pangu was already concerned by the time
of Independence, and, in fact, pressured Somare to retrieve the
portfolio for Pangu. This Somare did after the 1977 elections when
the Finance portfolio was given to Barry Holloway, a PANGU member.
Unlike Sir Julius Chan later, Somare had an upper hand in determining
the allocation of portfolios in 1972. Of course, Sir Julius was in
1980 in the rather unenviable position of having to accommodate five
coalition members of his government when allocating ministries. Sir
Julius did not oppose demands of the Coalition partners for certain 
f) 9portfolios. J In fact, these demands were one set of preconditions 
which underlay the formation of the coalition.
The Constitution allocates the chairmanship of the NEC to the
Prime Minister, but there is an implication that this chairmanship
64relates only to the meetings of the NEC. Nonetheless, in practice, 
the Prime Minister is in a powerful position in that he determines 
what items are to go on to the agenda of the meetings of the NEC. The 
Secretary to the NEC in his brief sets out the matters that are urgent
61. The Constitution, S.148(2).
62. Ibid., subsect. (1).
63. Fr. Momis:personal communication.
64. See the Constitution, S.149(2).
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and those that are not, and it is then up to the Prime Minister to 
make the final decision on each of the matters that have been 
submitted.
During NEC meetings, the Prime Minister has a decisive influence 
on decisions that are reached. Because of his personality and 
character Somare has tended to listen to all points of view, and this 
has protracted the debates and deliberations unnecessarily at times. 
But on crucial issues he has never hesitated to make his stand clear.
The other power the Prime Minister has is a delegated power 
discussed above. This occurs when the NEC by its decision delegates 
power to the Prime Minister to carry out certain functions at a later 
date.
ii) Control Over the National Public Service
One area where Somare in particular preferred to retain a close 
personal control was the National Public Service, which, until after 
the 1982 General Elections, he was reluctant to allocate to a 
Minister.
There is nothing in either the Constitution or the Public Service 
(Interim Arrangements) Act 1973 which gives the Prime Minister an 
exclusive power to be responsible for the affairs of the National 
Public Service, nor is he prohibited from holding that responsibility. 
All through the period from 1972 till March 1980 Somare held on to the 
Department of the National Public Service because he attached some 
significance to that area. He was aware of the potential problems 
that were likely to arise in the public service more than perhaps 
elsewhere within the government , and this made him reluctant to hand 
over the portfolio to another Minister. Sir Julius Chan did not view 
the public service in the same manner. In fact, Chan appeared to be 
more concerned with solving problems in the service. Since he was so 
busy himself he designated Mr Aparima, a member of his own party, PPP, 
as a Minister of State assisting the Prime Minister in matters of the 
National Public Service to be responsible for the area. But Chan also 
did not give away the portfolio completely. Aparima was merely 
assisting Chan. To that extent Aparima's portfolio was an auxiliary 
one and not a full one in the sense, for instance, that that of
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Finance is. Since the 1982 General Elections Somare has emulated Chan 
by allocating the public service matters to a special Minister of 
State.
It would seem that the power of the Prime Minister to keep public 
service matters to himself is derived from S.148(2) of the 
Constitution which vests in him the power to allocate portfolios to 
other Ministers and to keep others for himself if he so chooses. 
Besides this, the Prime Minister has the general responsibility as a 
supervisor of the entire governmental operation. This is a function 
implicit in the practice of cabinet government under the Westminster 
system, and particularly in the general responsibility for the 
executive government of PNG conferred on the NEC of which the Prime 
Minister is the Chairman.
b) Functions of the Other Ministers
Other Ministers are chosen by the Prime Minister and are formally 
appointed by the Head of State.^ This is an enactment of what is a 
constitutional convention in the United Kingdom and Australia. The 
Constitution leaves the choice to the Prime Minister. However, in 
relation to numbers, the Prime Minister's hands are tied, in that the 
number should not be fewer than six nor more than one-quarter of the 
number of members from time to time, as determined by or under an 
Organic Law. The relevant Organic Law is the Organic Law on National 
Elections which vests the power to determine the total number of 
electorates in the country in the Boundaries Commission.00 Thus with 
the total number of members of the current Parliament at 109, the 
Prime Minister can appoint no more than 27 as the maximum under the 
formula, not including himself. Sir Julius Chan had the full 
Ministry. Somare had only twenty Ministers at the beginning of 1976 
but increased the numbers to twenty-four by the time he was dismissed 
from office in March, 1980. The formula was in fact recommended by 
the CPC which was concerned that the Ministry should not be so large 
as to dominate the legislature.7
65. The Constitution, S.144(2).
66. See SS.24 and 25.
67. See The CPC Final Report 1974 Part 1, 7/3, para. 21.
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Although the decision as to who should be given a ministry is 
left to the Prime Minister, the CPC did recommend four general 
criteria which the Prime Minister is expected to use in making 
ministerial appointments. These include ability, integrity, political 
party affiliation and the need for the Ministry to be broadly 
representative of the various areas of the country.^ It would appear 
that party affiliation has had a dominating influence in the choice so 
far, although the other criteria seemed to have been respected more by 
Somare than by Chan. In fact, under the Chan Government the New 
Guinea Coastal region had only one minister in the NEC until the 
appointment of Mr Agmai Bilas (Madang Open) and Mr Iwoksim (Telefomin 
Open). On the basis of Province, Manus was the only Province that had 
no representation in the NEC under the Chan Government. But then Chan 
had more political accommodation to make with five coalition partners 
than Somare had with only two.
Ministers hold their ministerial positions and portfolios at the 
pleasure of the Prime Minister and the Parliament. In the former case 
the Head of State has no discretion but to dismiss a Minister once he 
receives advice from the Prime Minister to that effect^ or when a 
Minister is found guilty of breaching the Leadership Code.^ 
Parliament may move a motion of no confidence against a Minister and 
if successful the Head of State again has no discretion but to dismiss 
him.
The Constitution seems to draw a distinction between appointment 
of a person to the Ministry and appointment of that person to a 
portfolio. The latter chronologically follows the former. When 
Ministers are appointed, including the Prime Minister, they are 
appointed to the Ministry which is another word for the NEC. The 
Prime Minister then determines under S.148(1) of the Constitution the 
allocation of portfolios and other ministerial responsibilities. This 
distinction was used in practice under the first Somare Government, 
but not under Chan. When Mr Moses Sasakila, the Minister for Culture,
68. Ibid., 7/9-7/10.
69. Z. Zurecnuoc (Finchhafen Open).
70. The Constitution, S.144(4)(b)(i).
71. The Constitution, S.144(4)(b)(ii).
147
Recreation and Youth Development under Somare was found guilty of
misconduct in office pursuant to the Leadership Code, Somare stripped
him of the portfolio, but kept him as a Minister with no portfolio.
Sasakila was not sworn in again by the Governor-General as a new
72Minister without a portfolio. Somare did the same thing with Mr
John Kaputin in 1974 even though this was before Independence, when
73Kaputin was the Minister of Justice.
During the period of the Chan Coalition, three Ministers were 
involved in court cases early in 1981: Mr Gabriel Bakani, the
Minister for Energy, was charged with having assaulted police in Kimbe 
and resigned in the course of prosecution, even though he was 
acquitted at the end. Mr Ibne Kor, the Minister for Environment and 
Conservation was charged with rape and was forced to resign, even 
though, at the end, he too was acquitted. John Jaminan, the Minister 
for Health was convicted by the Wewak District Court for driving under 
the influence and was fined K100. Chan urged him to resign but he 
refused. Chan then sacked him by advising the Governor-General to 
dismiss Jaminan, which was done. In all three cases, Chan did not 
make any attempt to retain any of them as a Minister without 
portfolio .
The present relatively fluid situation of party affiliation 
within the Parliament is to some extent attributable to the tremendous 
attraction ministerial positions have for politicians. This leads to 
the so-called ’numbers-game' when it comes to voting in Parliament and 
the attendant uncertainty that often has caused great anxiety to the 
Prime Minister.^
Although a Minister is politically responsible for the particular 
portfolio assigned to him by the Prime Minister this does not confer 
on him any general power of direction or control unless he can point 
to a statutory provision conferring on him the power he claims he has. 
This is the result of the decision of the Supreme Court in the
72. See Ombudsman Commission, 1977:94-96.
73. See Third House of Assembly Debates, Vol. Ill, No. 32, 3127
74. Chan, 1982:2.
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Bouraga's Case^  which involved the interpretation of S.148 of the 
Constitution
There appear to be two sources from which a Minister derives his
powers, either over his particular portfolio or in relation to
executive government generally. The first source is statutory. For
instance, under the Organic Law on Provincial Government the Minister
for Decentralisation is given certain specific powers. He has, for
example, the power to revoke any previous notice he gave in which he
recognised a particular group or body within a province as
constituting a constituent assembly.^ Other Ministers also have
specific powers conferred on them by legislations pertaining to their
respective portfolios. The second source of power is by way of
delegation from the NEC. Under the Ministers (Delegation) Act 1975 a
Minister may delegate any of his powers and even sub-delegate them,
provided he does this by an instrument and there is an enabling
78Regulation made under that Act for this purpose. The 1978 amendment 
79to the Act, however, seems to suggest that this power of delegation
can be conferred on a Minister only if the power the Minister
80delegates is statutory. Thus, the provisions do not cover any
delegation of non-statutory powers made by the NEC to a Minister. 
This is covered instead by the general power of delegation afforded by 
S.149(4) of the Constitution. The 1978 amendment to the Ministers 
(Delegation) Act 1975 also empowers a Minister to delegate and
sub-delegate his non-statutory functions to others by means of an 
81instrument. These provisions also cover the powers of the Prime
Minister.
The precise scope of Ministerial power is difficult to determine, 
largely because, as Greville-Smith J. has noted, there
75. [1982] P.N.G.L.R. 178. See chapter 5, post, for a full analysis 
of the case.
76. A more detailed analysis of the nature and scope of a Minister's 
powers is made in Chapter 5, post.
77. See: Organic Law on Provincial Government, S.5(l).
78. See Ministers (Delegation Act) 1975, SS.2 and 5.




is virtually no case law from the courts in PNG dealing with 
the subject matter of limitations on the power of a
Minister. ^
In some cases the Supreme Court has indicated specific limits. In
O OPremdas' Case it expressed the view that any exercise of executive
power which breaches the Constitution would be subject to judicial
84review, and in Fallscheer's Case it held that the exercise of
executive power involved in that case must comply with the rules of
85natural justice. In BouragaTs Case much of the Supreme Court's
attention focused on the limits of ministerial power over their 
departments, rather than on the question of general limits to 
ministerial powers.
4.2.3 The Diffusion of Executive Power 
Within the Public Service Element
a) The Powers of a Departmental Head
The most important person with whom power is shared within a 
Department is the Head of that Department. The basis of his powers is 
statutory, and this is analysed, for the sake of convenience, in the 
next chapter. It is opportune, however, at this point to turn to 
consider those ancillary arms of Government in which the Constitution 
vests the "right" to exercise some of the executive power, outside the 
Executive proper but within the government.
b) The Exercise of Executive Power by the Ancillary Arms of Government
The important ancillary arms are the Public Services Commission 
(PSC), the Police Commissioner and the Boards of Statutory
Authorities. Again, for the sake of convenience, the PSC is discussed 
in the next chapter. Here the respective powers of the Police
Commissioner00 and the Statutory Authorities are discussed.
82. Greville-Smith J. in Fallscheer v. lambakey Okuk [1981] 
P.N.G.L.R. 101 at 103.
83. [1979] P.N.G.L.R. 329.
84. [1981] P.N.G.L.R. 101.
85. [1982] P.N.G.L.R. 178.
86. The position of the Police Commissioner is also considered 
further in chapter 5, post.
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c) The Powers of the Police Commissioner
The Constitution confers on the Police Commissioner the
responsibility for the superintendence, efficient organisation and
control of the Police Force in accordance with an Act of the 
87Parliament. That Act is the Police Force (Interim Arrangements) Act 
1973 (the Police Interim Act). That Act also confers the 
responsibility for the superintendence of the Force on the 
Commissioner. But there is some ambivalence with regard to the
extent to which that superintendence is subject to political control, 
because the statutory provisions do not address this question clearly.
The Police Interim Act stated specifically in its original form
that the superintendence of the Force by the Police Commissioner was
89subject to any direction by the Administrator who was the commandant 
90of the Force. Although the Constitution confers the responsibility
91for the superintendence of the Force on the Police Commissioner and 
states that the Force is subject to the control of the NEC through a 
Minister, it does not expressly state that the Commissioner's 
responsibilities in that respect are subject to the general power of 
control by the NEC. But the wide ambit of S. 196(1) does suggest that 
the Commissioner's powers are subject to this general power of control 
by the NEC, except in two cases where exceptions are spelt out. The 
first of these is that the Minister for Police has no power of command 
within the Force, ^  and the second is that the performance by the 
Police of their function of prosecuting and withdrawing charges is not 
subject to any direction or control from outside. This last
exception is in fact a restatement of the position of the police at 
common law, which was incorporated under the Police Interim Act by 
reference to the police powers as those of a constable at common
87. S.198.
88. See the Police Interim Act, S.9.
89. Ibid.
90. See the Police Interim Act, S.8.




94law. Thus, apart from the two exceptions, the power over police
matters is shared between the NEC and the Police Commissioner. It is
not clear, however, whether the NEC has to act through the Minister
for Police on every occasion. From the implications of the Bouraga's 
9 5Case^  the Minister certainly has no power to discipline the 
Commissioner, as this power lies with the NEC.^
d) The Exercise of Executive Power by Statutory Authorities
Statutory Authorities have become an essential component of the 
National Government. They perform much of the executive function of 
providing substantive services ranging from social services to 
industrial and commercial undertakings.
The term Statutory Authority is used in PNG to include a variety 
of bodies: these include Authorities, Boards, Commissions,
Corporations, Offices, Services, Tribunals, Trusts and Institutes of 
Learning. It is worth noting that neither statutes nor judicial 
decisions use the term in a technical sense. The term has emerged 
from an administrative and political usage which has taken the 
statutory basis of these bodies as the criterion that distinguishes 
them from Departments. But this criterion is misleading and serves no 
legal purpose, for there are a number of bodies that are set up by 
statute but do not have any of the legal attributes which the 
Statutory Authorities possess. For instance, the Land Transport 
Control Board created under the Land Transport Control Board (Change 
of Name) Act 1976, is merely an extension of the Department of 
Transport and Civil Aviation, even though it is created by statute.
Statutory Authorities may be divided into six groupings according 
to the activity each is assigned to perform. They include:
a) marketing Boards for primary produce; for instance, the Copra
94. See the Police Interim Act 1973, S.154; and the position of 
policemen as independent public officers at Common Law: see de Smith, 
1981:384.
95. [1982] P.N.G.L.R. 178.
96. See: Chapter 5, post, for further consideration of the 
constitutional relationship between the Minister for Police and the 
Commissioner of Police.
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Marketing Board, Cocoa Industry Board, Coffee Marketing Board, and 
Rubber Board.
b) industrial and commercial undertakings; within this area there are 
authorities such as the National Airlines Commission, the 
Electricity Commission, and the Post and Telecommunication 
Commission.
c) credit and financial agencies; those that fall under this category 
include the Bank of Papua New Guinea, the Papua New Guinea Banking 
Corporation, the Development Bank and the Investment Corporation.
d) regulatory and planning agencies; included in this group are, the 
Harbours Board, the Building Board, Trade Licensing Board, and 
Land Board.
e) research and academic bodies; these include the two universities - 
the University of Papua New Guinea and the University of 
Technology, as well as the National Library.
f) social service agencies; within this category the most important 
statutory authority is the National Housing Commission, but among 
others there are the Sports Council, Stadium Trust, and Recreation 
Reserve Trust.
g) miscellaneous bodies; the most important body in this group would 
be the National Broadcasting Commission.
It was not until in the early 1960s that Statutory Authorities 
began to appear in Papua New Guinea with the establishment of the 
Electricity Commission in 1961 under the Electricity Commission Act 
1961. This was followed by the enactment of the Harbours Board Act 
1963 which set up the present Harbours Board. Under the Housing 
Commision Act 1967 the present National Housing Commission was 
established. All these Statutory Authorities were set up during the 
colonial period when the decisions on effective policy were still made 
by the Australian colonial administration. In fact, to a large extent 
the structure of the respective constituent Acts of each of the 
Authorities resembles that of their counterparts in Australia.^
Neither the Australian colonial government nor the PNG government
97. For public corporations in Australia generally: see Sawer, 
1954; and for those operating on the federal level in Australia, see 
Zines, 1970.
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has stated its policy on the use that has been increasingly made of
the device of a Statutory Authority. The Kilage Committee noted this
and also the fact that the practice appeared to have followed the
98Australian system. Goldring and Wettenhall note that ”[t]he
Australian Statutory Authority was born of a desire that some public
corporations, of both a trading and a regulatory type, should be free
99from day-to-day political pressures.” Yet, the two authors argue,
because statutory authorities are essentially public, there is 
a demand that they should be accountable and responsible to 
the public, or to its representatives in Parliament, for their 
activities. There is also a recognition that the policies and 
activities of most statutory authorities are, in a real sense, 
p o l i t i c a l •
The Australian statutory authorities are patterned on the concept of
responsibility to Parliament. Here Goldring and Wettenhall note that 
the Australian statutory authorities tend to follow either the N.S.W.
model or the Victorian one. The N.S.W. model emphasises ministerial
responsibility as the means by which Parliament maintains control. 
The Victorian model advocates direct control by Parliament through the 
requirement that a statutory authority is directly responsible to 
Parliament for its operations.^ ^  The scheme in the PNG legislation 
dealing with Statutory Authorities shows that the NSW model has been 
adopted in PNG in that emphasis is placed on Ministerial control.
All these Authorities are created by statute. The important 
constitutional question is: does the Constitution authorise 
Parliament to create Statutory Authorities? The answer is 
affirmative, and is to be found in S.140. It may be recalled that 
S.140 permits Parliament to confer the executive power on persons or 
authorities outside the National Executive. Since the powers 
Statutory Authorities exercise are essentially executive in nature, 
the power they use in this respect must be assumed to be executive and 
is conferred on them by Parliament under S.140.
The boards of these bodies are vested with substantial powers and
98. Report of an Interdepartmental Committee on Public Services 
Structure Review, December 1974, 6.




management by their respective constituent Acts, but these Acts do not
confer on them full independence from ministerial control. But in
some areas such as finance, contracts and policy, the trend in the
legislation has been to give either the NEC or the Minister concerned,
the ultimate power of making the decision. The Electricity
Commission, for instance, cannot sign any contract that is worth
K40,000 or more, unless it has obtained a prior approval from the 
103NEC. Equally, the Commission needs to have the NEC's approval for
any over-drafts that it decides to commit itself to.^^ The Statutory 
Authorities thus exercise executive power, but structurally they are 
not part of the Executive proper.
4.3 CONTROL OF EXECUTIVE POWER THROUGH THE 
PRINCIPLE OF MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY
General control of the executive power vested in both the 
Executive Arm and outside it is exercised primarily through the 
principle of ministerial responsibility. The Constitution stresses 
this principle by requiring the Head of State to act, when exercising 
the executive power, in accordance with advice tendered either by the 
ministry or by any other authority prescribed by law to give advice.
Under S.141, the Constitution enacts three specific rules that 
constitute the general principle of ministerial responsibility (which 
elsewhere is a matter of constitutional convention). First, 
ministerial responsibility is a responsibility to the National 
Parliament and this entails that only members of Parliament may hold 
Ministries. The only exception to this, allowed for reasons of 
continuity in government, is in relation to a Minister who is defeated 
at the polls. In such a situation, he remains a Minister until a new 
Prime Minister is appointed. Secondly, the Ministry is
102. Only in the case of the Statutory Authorities operating in 
financial areas is some relative autonomy given, but again on the 
basis that they are run on the general business principles: see the 
Investment Corporation Act 1971, S.9. But this relative autonomy does 
not amount to legal independence.
103. See Papua New Guinea Electricity Commission Act 1961, S.25.
104. Ibid., S.20.
105. The Constitution, S.141(1).
106. Ibid., S.147(1).
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collectively answerable to the People through the Parliament for the
proper carrying out of the executive government of PNG and for all
matters done either by or under the name of the NEC.^^ Thirdly, the
Ministry may be dismissed collectively or individually by the Head of
1 08State in accordance with the Constitution.
The CPC saw the principle of collective ministerial
responsibility reflecting the traditional collective decision-making
process of the village communities in PNG. This explains its emphasis
on the need to have collective leadership not only in relation to the
1 09ministerial responsibility but also generally. J Since all Ministers 
are members of the NEC, collective responsibility requires an effort 
to reach unanimous decisions, if this is possible.
It was to achieve this goal of collective decision-making that 
the CPC took some pains in setting down procedural guidelines that the 
NEC should follow in the conduct of its business. For instance, the 
CPC strongly recommended that any matter for the NEC must be submitted 
in written form at least fourteen days before it is considered, and 
circulated to all Ministers, and the Secretary of the NEC must 
circulate the minutes of the NEC's decisions to all Ministers and to 
maintain a follow-up to ensure that the decisions are implemented.^1“*
The bare recognition which the Constitution gives to the position 
of the individual Minister is also attributable to the emphasis given 
to the principle of collective ministerial responsibility. Whereas 
the collective responsibility is stated with some force under S.141(b) 
by the Constitution, individual ministerial responsibility is couched 
much more cautiously in S.148(2); although, in stating that Ministers 
may be dismissed individually, S.141(d) shows that there is some 
connection between the dismissal of a Minister and the individual 
political responsibility conferred on him under S.148(2).
Some Ministers have tended perhaps to over-emphasise their 
political responsibility. This in turn has tended to put them in a
107. Ibid., S.141(b).
108. Ibid., S.141(c).
109. See CPC, 1974:7/2, para. 12.
110. Ibid., 7/8, paras. 10 and 12.
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defensive stance from which they are prepared to go to all lengths to 
assert their own views of the departmental policies even against a 
collective decision of the NEC. It requires a strong Prime Minister 
to be able to keep such Ministers under control. This is essential, 
for individual responsibility operates within and under the over-all 
principle of collective responsibility, and there must be limits to 
which the principle of individual responsibility can be asserted, 
beyond which the NEC cannot expect to enjoy cohesion and
confidentiality.
Since the executive power has to be exercised on advice, it 
raises a number of important constitutional questions which need to be 
analysed. Much of the analysis will involve S.86 of the Constitution, 
which therefore needs to be quoted in full here because it prescribes 
the conditions on which that power may be exercised.
S.86. Functions, etc.
(1) The privileges, powers, functions, duties and 
responsibilities of the Head of State are as prescribed by 
or under the Constitutional Laws and Acts of Parliament.
(2) Except as provided by Section 96(2) (terms and conditions
of employment) in the exercise and performance of his 
privileges, powers, functions, duties and responsibilities 
the Head of State shall act only with and in accordance 
with the advice of the National Executive Council or of 
some other body or authority prescribed by a
Constitutional Law or an Act of Parliament for a
particular purpose as the body or authority in accordance 
with whose advice the Head of State is obliged, in a 
particular case, to act.
(3) Any instrument made by or in the name of the Head of State 
shall recite that it is made with, and in accordance with, 
the advice of the National Executive Council or of any 
other body or authority in accordance with whose advice 
the Head of State is obliged, in the particular case, to 
act, but failure to comply with this subsection does not 
affect the validity of an instrument.
(4) The question, what (if any) advice was given to the Head 
of State, or by whom, is non-justiciable.
4.3.1 Acting on and in Accordance with Advice: An Analysis of S.86
Section 86(2) and (3) state that the Head of State is required to
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act on advice, but also to act in accordance with advice tendered to 
her; and that any instrument made by or in her name must recite the 
authority on whose advice she purports to act in a given case. But 
the full force and effect of this general principle is reduced 
somewhat by the subsequent provisions of S.86 itself: first, by the 
last part of sub-s.3 which preserves the validity of an instrument in 
a case where the instrument does not comply with the requirements 
stated in the first part of the subsection itself; and secondly, by 
the provision of non-justiciability in sub-s.4 which renders it 
difficult for the courts to exert any control. The general effect of 
these provisions creates some ambiguity about the meaning of the 
general principle laid down in sub-s.2 of S.86. Some understanding of 
this general principle and particularly its implications may be 
derived from analysing four specific questions that emerge from a 
close reading of S.86 itself. These are: who can give advice? What 
does the Constitution mean by advice? What is the prescribed form in 
which advice is to be given? And what are the implications of the 
non-justiciability provision?
4.3.2 Who Can Give Advice?
The NEC is the authority generally empowered to give advice, but
on a number of occasions individual Ministers are permitted by statute
Ue-ÄoA. err 5^ 0C4C-
to give advice directly to the MrG*. This depends very much on the 
terms of each enabling statute. Normally, the power to bring into 
force and effect either a whole statute or a part thereof is exercised 
by the Head of State who acts on the advice of the particular Minister
whose Department was responsible for the formulation and the
subsequent carriage of the Bill for the Act through to the
Parliament.^  ^
Where any decision of either the NEC or the Parliament is
required by law to be conveyed to the Head of State, the Constitution
112requires the Prime Minister to convey such decisions. In the case
of the Head of State, any decision she makes is deemed in law to take
111. See, for instance, the Preamble to the Dumping of Wastes at Sea 
Act 1979.
112. The Constitution, S.97.
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1 1 8effect once it is notified to either the Prime Minister or the NEC.
Because of the requirement that the Head of State acts on advice 
of the Executive, a former Governor-General, Sir Tore Lokoloko, was 
reluctant to surround himself with advisors and research officers or 
even'to go outside the Justice Department if he wanted a legal opinion 
on any matter. On the other hand, his predecessor was known to
have asked for a legal officer and an economist to be on his staff, 
but he was told that he was required to act on advice tendered to him, 
and, therefore, did not require the staff that he s o u g h t . H e n c e  it 
appears obvious that Sir John Guise was not as concerned with the 
principle of acting on advice as was Sir Tore Lokoloko.
In this connection, it is interesting to note that both Sir John
Guise and Sir Tore Lokoloko has asserted on more than one occasion
that even though they were required to act on advice, it was their
right to be informed, to be consulted, and to warn,^^ But such an
assertion is based on a fundamental misconception of the powers of the
Head of State under the Gonstitution. The right to be informed, to be
consulted and to warn is a personal prerogative of the English Monarch
in the context of the United Kingdom. In Australia it was
1 1 8generally agreed that the Governor-General had this prerogative. 
This prerogative however, does not apply in PNG on the basis of the 
general argument advanced in Appendix C to this thesis. But, in
particular, its application is inconsistent with the general principle 
of acting on and in accordance with advice tendered by the executive 
government. In fact the opposite seems to be the rule: that the Head
of State, and here it means really the Governor-General, must remain 
constantly aware that any act on his part without consulting the 
Executive or acting without advice could precipitate the application 
of constitutional sanctions against him.
113. Ibid., S.98.
114. Sir Tore Lokoloko:personal communication.
115. Wolfers, 1977:8.
116. Ibid., 87-88.
117. Even in the United Kingdom, the existence of personal
prerogatives is doubtful: See Jennings, 1969:394.
118. See McMillan Evans and Storey, 1983:188.
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4.3.3 What Does the Constitution Mean by ’Advice'?
The Constitution uses the term 'advice'. It would appear
119however, that advice is different from an act or a decision.
Advice in this context cannot mean an opinion or information, which is
the usual meaning that standard dictionaries give to the word 
i on'advice'. Here, advice must mean a course of action already agreed
to by the executive body which has the effective power to make the 
decision which is submitted to the Head of State to receive the 
formality of her signature. She has no discretion to reject advice. 
Thus, to put the meaning of advice in other ways, such as a 
recommendation, is to suggest that the Head of State has some type of 
reserve power which will enable her to over-ride the recommendation.
The meaning of 'advice' adopted here is supported by the original
context in which the word advice was adopted. It was initially
proposed that the word 'instruction' should be used instead of the
word 'advice' as the former word implies clearly that there is no
discretion involved. The word 'advice' however, was adopted at the
end after protest was received from Buckingham Palace that
'instruction' was not the proper language for describing Her Majesty's
i 2 iconstitutional obligations.
Does advice include illegal or unconstitutional advice? The 
draftsman did pose the question relating to the need for some 
provision to cover the situation where advice given to the Head of 
State was illegal or unconstitutional, but was told by the members of
the CPC not to do anything about it as this would not happen,
122according to the Melanesian way. This therefore raises the
question: what if advice that is given to the Head of State is
unconstitutional or even illegal? Is the Head of State
constitutionally required to act on such advice? The Constitution
does not provide an answer to this question.
It could be argued that the Governor-General is constitutionally
119. See the Constitution, S.97.
120. See The Concise Oxford Dictionary (New Edition) 16.
121. C.J. Lynch:personal communication
122. Ibid.
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obliged to act on such advice on the assumption that such advice is
constitutional. It is not his constitutional responsibility, nor does
he have a discretion to question whether such advice is
constitutional, because to do so would be to claim a discretion which
is not conferred by the Constitution. From the perspective of the
whole constitutional system, it is better for the Prime Minister and
his Ministry to take the responsibility for any advice that may
eventually turn out to be unconstitutional or illegal. In this way,
the Governor-General is protected against the constitutional 
123sanctions which would otherwise be imposed on him. This view is 
preferable because it avoids a possibility of a chaotic constitutional 
situation.
The second conflict situation where the Constitution is silent is 
in relation to a deadlock between the Executive and the Parliament, 
resulting in the Executive being unable to govern, and the People not 
getting the opportunity to change the Executive. The common situation 
often depicted by lawyers is where the Parliament refuses to pass the 
Appropriation Bill, but at the same time is not prepared to pass a 
vote of no confidence in either the Prime Minister or the Ministry 
collectively under S.145 to enable a change of government in mid-term; 
or alternatively, to vote to go to a general election under 
S.105(l)(c). Thus, in such a situation where the Prime Minister can 
neither govern nor go to the electorate to break the dead-lock, does 
the Head of State have any power to break the dead-lock? In the 
United Kingdom the Prime Minister would advise dissolution of the 
Parliament. In Australia, the Governor-General most likely would use 
the so-called ’reserve powers' to dismiss the government and 
commission a caretaker government if the government refuses to advise 
the dissolution of both Houses of Parliament. In PNG neither the Head 
of State nor the Governor-General has the power to prorogue the 
Parliament and call for a general election. But in such situations in 
order to break the dead-lock, can the Head of State rely on her 
constitutional position as the custodian of the Constitution? It 
would seem that she cannot.
A previous Governor-General has expressed an unwillingness to act
123. See the Constitution S.90(2)(a)
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alone in either of these situations due to a lack of guidance by the 
Constitution. Instead he would rather see that the decision on such 
occasion to be made jointly between himself, the Speaker and the Chief 
J u s t i c e . T h e r e  is certainly a great merit in Sir Tore's 
suggestion, although there must be naturally some reservation in 
involving the Chief Justice in a political situation which may be 
potentially dangerous for the courts; but, by the same token, there is 
no reason that a retired Chief Justice may not be involved in such 
situations that obviously require wisdom, experience and tact, if the 
constitutional order is to be retained.
4.3.4 The Form of Advice
Nowhere does the Constitution nor any other statute require that 
advice to be given to the Head of State should be in a particular 
form: for instance, whether it is to be in a written form or whether 
advice in oral form is also permissible. This makes it difficult to 
ascertain whether advice has been given at all and by whom, especially 
where there is no written record.
It seems to me that both SS.97 and 98 of the Constitution provide 
adequate scope for the proposition that such advice needs to be in a 
written form. For only in this way will there be any certainty that 
there is decision of the NEC or of the Parliament, whichever the case 
may be. Whether what is being conveyed to the Head of State is what 
the NEC has decided is, of course, a different point.
4.3.5 The Implications of Non-Justiciability
The problem created by the failure to make any provisions to 
govern the form in which advice is to be given is exacerbated by the 
provision in S.86(4) of the Constitution, which renders any question 
about what advice had been given, and by whom, non-justiciable. 
Goldring considers this provision as ill-advised as it
may undermine the theoretical position by denying a means of 
ensuring that the Head of State does always act in accordance
124. Sir Tore Lokoloko:personal communication.
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with advice.
He therefore predicts that despite the language of the section, courts 
would enquire into the question of whether advice in fact has been 
given. On the other hand, the Supreme Court in Sasakila's CaseiZ/ 
held that by Sch.1.7 of the Constitution, courts cannot inquire into 
the question of whether advice to the Head of State had in fact been 
given. Thus in that case the Court took Sasakila's dismissal as valid 
because it was based on the Prime Minister's advice which is 
non-j usticiable. But in the same case the Court did not regard the 
recommendation by the Independent Tribunal to dismiss Sasakila as 
"advice” and therefore non-justiciable.
The Constitution attempts to provide some balance between the 
need for the Executive to be relatively free to formulate policies for 
the country, and the need to allow courts to check on the Executive 
process. Thus S.86(4) makes advice given to the Head of State 
non-justiciable, and S.153(2) makes any question on the NEC's 
procedure also non-justiciable. But then S.153(1) subjects S.153(2) 
to amendment either by a Constitutional Law or an Act of the 
Parliament; and S.153(5) states specifically that the privative clause 
does not apply to the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman Commission under 
the Leadership Code. In Premdas' Case the Supreme Court indicated 
that where the action in question amounts to a breach of the 
Constitution, it would read down the privative clause in order to 
enforce the Constitution in such a case. The law in this area remains 
to be developed by the courts.
The requirement that the Head of State acts on advice is a
standard formula that has been adopted in constitution-making in the 
128Commonwealth. The PNG Constitution has improved this general 
formula by adding the further requirement that the Head of State must 
act in accordance with that advice.
125. Goldring, John: 'The Executive Power. "Responsibilitity,
Accountability and Answerability of the Executive: To Whom and for
What?"'. A paper presented at the constitutional workshop in Waigani, 
February 8-14, 1981. A revised version of the paper was later
published (see Goldring, 1981) but this point was omitted.
126. Goldring, 1978:50.
127. 1 1976J P.N.G.L.R. 491.
128. See Roberts-Wray, 1966:335, but the practice is not universal: 
see de Smith, 1964:93-96.
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4.3.6 Consultation and Consensus
To the CPC, ”[t]rue participation in our societies requires
1 29consultation and consensus'. The Constitution reflects this 
concern by providing that ”[i]n principle, where a law provides for 
consultation between persons or bodies, the consultation must be 
meaningful and allow for a genuine interchange and considerations of 
views". But, in one sense this provision does not reflect what the 
CPC was alluding to; that is, that consultation and consensus should 
be the general principle of co-operation that everybody is obliged to 
follow, irrespective of whether there is a special legal requirement 
or not.
In fact, Chan's main accusation against Somare when the PPP 
pulled out of the Somare-Chan Coalition in 1978 was the failure by 
Somare to observe the basic constitutional principle of consultation 
in the general sense in which the CPC intended it to apply. 
Certainly, Chan had a point, in that there was no systematic method of 
consultation even between Ministers. In the meantime it smacks of 
irony that Chan, after he became Prime Minister, not only had failed 
to take initiatives in this regard, but, from personal knowledge, he 
really did not believe in it. It was known, for instance, that the 
decision to send troops to Vanuatu to quell the rebellion on Santo in 
July, 1980 was Chan's decision and his alone, made without 
consultation - not even with Gerega Pepena, the Defence Minister, who 
happened to pick up the news via the media whilst he was in Australia.
The problem of achieving consensus on a unanimous basis is, of 
course, a practical problem even for the NEC. The CPC recognised 
these difficulties and recommended that normally one third of 
Ministers should be present, before the NEC could properly meet, and 
for urgent occasions, at least five Ministers must be present 
including the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister. It 
appears that much of what the CPC recommended has been accepted and 
put into practice, although not all aspects have been adhered to.
129. CPC, 1974:1/4, para. 18.
130. The Constitution, S.255.
131. See CPC, 1974:7/8, para. 8
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It has been a regular occurrence especially since the Chan 
Coaltion came to power for individual Ministers to air their views
publicly when they differed from their colleagues, even over NEC
132decisions which they were collectively required to defend. Somare
used to demand that the principle of collective responsibility be
respected by all his Ministers and was prepared to sack Ministers if
there were blatant breaches of the principle, as he did with both
Momis and Kaputin in 1979. Chan appeared to allow more flexibility
and would only sack Minister were they have been found guilty of
offences by the court, as in John Jaminan's case early in 1981.
133However Chan's position was a difficult one, since there was very
little cohesion within the government, because the five disparate 
political parties did not seem to have much in common except their 
desire to stay in power.
4.4 CONCLUSION
Although the Constitution does not define executive power, the 
CPC's Final Report leaves no doubt that executive power involves more 
than merely carrying out the law. It includes a wide range of 
activities which can only be performed if the executive power is 
diffused. The Constitution therefore permits the executive power to 
be diffused along two general directions. First, it disperses the 
power among those institutions that constitute the Executive itself. 
Secondly, it permits the executive power to be diffused outside the 
Executive proper by allowing it to be conferred on some of the 
ancillary arms of Government as well as on non-governmental 
institutions.
The executive power, however, belongs to the people, and the 
Constitution states unequivocally that its exercise must be made in 
accordance with the Constitution. The basis of the power is therefore 
law, and this rejects any theories of executive power which seek to 
establish the validity of executive power outside the law.
132. See Post Courier, 5 June, 1981.




The sharing of the executive power between ministers and public 
servants'*- was of particular concern to the members of the CPC because 
they were aware of conflicts that had often arisen in the past between 
these two groups.- The main aim was to control the powerful 
bureaucracy. To achieve this, the CPC emphasised the primacy of 
political control over public servants, and it saw the principle of 
ministerial responsibility as the means by which that control could be 
maintained. They reasoned that if policies of any government were to
be implemented with maximum efficiency and economy, then politicians
2must have control over the management of the public service.
But there was also another explanation behind this 
recommendation, and this related at the time to the relationship 
between public servants and the emerging indigenous politicians. The 
members of the CPC themselves had known, if not experienced, the 
tremendous power wielded by both the senior Australian public servants 
and the indigenous administrators in the first Somare-Chan Coalition 
Government formed after the 1972 General Elections. As Ballard has 
noted, the essence of colonial rule 'in its pure form was a public 
service edifice', and this was also reflected in the legal 
provisions.^ Even the much-improved provisions of the Public Service 
(Interim Arrangements) Act 1973 (the Public Service Interim Act) did 
not make any reference to the office of a Minister.
Senior expatriate public servants were replaced by Papua New 
Guineans during the 1972-1974 period under the Government's
1. The two groups that comprise the Executive: see the composition
of the Executive discussed in Chapter 3, supra.
2. CPC, 1974:12/1.
3. Ballard, 1982:240; see also Parker, 1966:207-208.
4. The Papua New Guinea Act 1949; The Public Service Ordinance 1949.
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localisation policy. It was thought that this would remove the 
friction between senior public servants and their Ministers. But this 
did not happen. Instead, the contrary occurred. Mr Simon Kaumi, for 
instance, who was appointed the Director of the Department of Social 
Development and Home Affairs in July, 1973,^ was sacked by Chief
* C
Minister SomareD in the second half of 1974 for publicly attacking his 
Minister for interfering in the running of the Corrective Institutions 
Service.^
The problem of political control of the administration seems to 
be universal, largely because bureaucracies
may possess such long-term vested interests 
capacity for survival that politicians, with 
interests and skills, cannot possibly control them
and such a 
short-term8
It has been claimed that in Australia the adopted Westminster theory
of ministerial responsibility with its underpinnings of public service
neutrality and anonymity serves to conceal this conflict and the 
essentially political role of the public service.^ Public servants in 
fact make or take part in making policy decisions,^ which is largely
a political function.
The conventional rule of political neutrality under the 
Westminster model adopted in Africa at Independence was discarded when 
a number of the African countries adopted one party systems of 
government replacing the multi-party systems that they began with at 
Independence. For instance, it has been claimed that in Zambia the 
reverse situation, where public servants direct policy, seems to be 
emerging as a result of senior public servants being able to be 
seconded to senior positions in the party executive which in effect 
directs the cabinet.^
5. Kaumi’s appointment by then had brought the number of indigenous
department heads up to eight: see Hegarty, 1973:195.
6. The Chief Minister was himself responsible for public service 
matters at that time.




11. See International Commission of Jurists, 1978:97.
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In multi-party systems such as that of PNG, the question becomes 
one of finding an appropriate balance between the power of the public 
servants and that of the elected representatives. In the context of 
the Westminster system, the issue is one of determining the proper 
limits of ministerial power over the affairs of each public service 
department. Although the CPC emphasised the primacy of political 
control over the public service, Bouraga's Case has revealed that as 
a matter of constitutional law this is not the case. That case 
provided the Supreme Court its first opportunity to pronounce on what 
the law is in relation to the conflict between politicians and public 
servants regarding the power over public service matters. In order to 
see this conflict fully from a legal perspective, some analysis of 
S.148 of the Constitution, as well as what the Supreme Court decided 
on the questions referred to it in the case, is relevant at this 
point.
5.1 SECTION 148 AND BOURAGA'S CASE
It is worth quoting S.148 in full at the outset for purposes of 
the analysis that is to follow:
S.148. Functions etc., of Ministers.
(1) Ministers (including the Prime Minister) have such 
titles, portfolios and responsibilities as are determined from 
time to time by the Prime Minister.
(2) Except as provided by a Constitutional Law or an Act of 
the Parliament, all departments, sections, branches and 
functions of government must be the political responsibility 
of a Minister, and the Prime Minister is politically 
responsible for any of them that are not specifically 
allocated under this section.
(3) Subsection (2) does not confer on a Minister any power 
of direction or control.
5.1.1 The Issue Under S.148
The argument about whether the PNG Government is run by 
politicians or by public servants revolves around the various 
interpretations that have been put on S.148(3). As can be seen above,
12. SCR No. 1 of 1982 [1982] P.N.G.L.R. 178.
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sub-s.3 provides that the conferment on a Minister of a political 
responsibility over a Department under sub-s.2 of S.148 does not 
thereby vest in him any power of direction or control.
Public servants have taken this to mean that Ministers do not 
have any power under the Constitution to direct or control their 
respective Departments or Offices. Ministers have argued conversely 
that that could not have been intended by either the CPC or the 
Constituent Assembly in adopting the Westminster model of 
parliamentary democracy with the basic principle of ministerial 
responsibility. The argument by the politicians is essentially that 
the constitution-makers could not have intended to give Ministers 
responsibilities without the power necessary to carry them out.
It is perhaps opportune at this juncture to discuss briefly these 
two basic literal interpretations that have been put on S. 148(2) and 
(3) in order to narrow the arguments down to specific constitutional 
issues under S.148.
The two interpretations may be taken as the public service 
interpretation and the politicians' interpretation of S.148. Both 
essentially oppose each other. The public service interpretation is 
that S.148(3) literally means what it says. That is, that a Minister 
has no power of direction or control over his Department and to the 
extent that either a Constitutional Law or an Act purports to provide 
otherwise, as appears to be permitted by sub-s.2, sub-s.3 overrides 
sub-s.2 in rendering such provision void and of no effect. This 
interpretation therefore renders sub-s.2 subject to sub-s.3 and 
certainly has the effect of giving public servants a hegemony over the 
governmental process within the Departments.
The politicians' interpretation tries to reconcile the two 
subsections (which appear to contradict each other). According to 
that interpretation, what sub-s.3 is saying is that the mere fact that 
sub-s.2 confers on a Minister the political responsibility over a 
Department does not at the same time vest in the Minister a general 
power of direction or control over his Department. One has to look 
elsewhere to find such power and this is explicit in the exception 
contained in the phrase, 'except as provided by a Constitutional Law 
or an Act of the Parliament' that occurs at the beginning of sub-s.2
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of S.148. This interpretation reconciles the principle of the
ministerial responsibility with the principle of the public servants' 
neutrality in a reasonable way, in that a Minister can carry out his 
ministerial responsibility if he can point to a specific power that 
enables him to do so, but he cannot otherwise claim to have a general 
power to order his Department when he so feels.
The public service interpretation leaves little room for further 
inquiry. But the politicians' interpretation of S.148(2) and (3) 
opens up the whole question of what are the actual and specific powers 
each individual Minister has and under what legislation. The Minister 
responsible for public service matters, for instance, needs to 
establish that he has specific powers either under other provisions of 
the Constitution, or under other statutes such as the Interim Act, in 
order to legitimise his claim as an exception to the general principle 
that he has no power of direction or control over his Department or 
Public Service Commission under S. 148(3). The same principle applies 
to all the other Ministers. The Defence Minister tor example, must 
establish that he has powers under the Defence Act to control or
direct the Defence Department in order to bring himself within the 
exception.
What then are the matters for which the Minister for public 
service has power of direction or control within the meaning of
S.148(2)? This requires some examination of the relevant
constitutional and other statutory provisions dealing with public 
service matters. The key constitutional provisions are SS.191 and 
192. They need to be quoted here in full to assist the understanding 
of an analysis that is to follow:
S.191. Functions of the Commission.
(1) Subject to this Constitution, the Public Services
Commission shall be responsible, in accordance with an Act of
the Parliament, for -
(a) the efficient management and control of the National
Public Service; and
(b) all personnel matters connected with the National Public 
Service; and
(c) such other matters in relation to other State Services and 
the services of other government bodies as are prescribed 
by Constitutional Law or Acts of the Parliament.
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(2) It is a function of the Commission to keep under 
continuous review the State Services (other than the Defence 
Force) and the services of other governmental bodies, and to 
advise, either on its own initiative or on request, the 
National Executive and any authority responsible for any of 
those services on organizational matters and the co-ordination 
of effort, and in particular on conditions of employment, with 
a special view to avoiding wasteful duplication of effort and 
competition.
(3) Nothing in subsection (2) gives the Commission any power 
of direction or control.
S.192. Independence of the Commission.
The Public Services Commission is responsible to the 
National Executive Council, but subject to Section 193 
(appointments to certain offices), in personnel matters -
(a) it shall comply with any general directions as to policy 
from the Head of State, acting with, and in accordance 
with, the advice of the National Executive Council; and
(b) it is otherwise not subject to direction or control by any 
person or authority.
An examination of the S.191 shows that public service matters are 
classified into two general groups, viz. personnel matters and 
management matters; and S.192 confers independence on the PSC in 
relation to both types of matters subject to the qualification 
concerning personnel matters specified in clause (a) of the section. 
Much of the conflict between politicians and public servants relates 
to ambiguities arising from the distinction between ’personnel 
matters' and 'management matters', and from the question of who has 
the power over which of these matters.
a) The Statutory Distinction between 'Personnel 
Matters' and 'Management Matters'
The Constitution defines what constitutes 'personnel matters' but 
not 'management matters'. Section 194 defines 'personnel matters' to 
be:
decisions and other service matters concerning an individual 
whether in relation to his appointment, promotion, demotion, 
transfer, suspension, disciplining or cessation or termination 
of employment ... or otherwise.
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Although the Constitution does not define what is meant by 
'management matters', it is clear from its Final Report that the CPC
had in mind those matters that concern 'groups of public servants, or
13about the public service as a whole' and these would include:
- size and organization of government departments, including 
classification of positions;
- efficiency and economy of departments;
- conditions of service ... (and)
- recruitment, training and localisation of staff.^




Service Interim Act. ^
The PSC is independent from control by any other body and this is 
guaranteed by S.192(b) of the Constitution. The exception is that it 
must comply with any general direction as to policy on personnel 
matters that the Head of State may issue on the advice of the NEC 
under S.192(1)(a) of the Constitution. The Interim Act however, 
provides differently. Under S.18 of the Act the PSC -
15. Section 17 of. the Act expresses these matters in terms of duties 
of the [PSC] as follows:
1. In addition to such other duties as are in this [Act] 
imposed on the [PSC] the PSC has the following duties
(1) to devise means for effecting economies and promoting 
efficiency in the management and working of Departments 
by -
(a) improved organization and procedures; and
(b) closer supervision; and
(c) the simplification of the work of each Department and 
abolition of unnecessary work; and
(d) the co-ordination of the work of Departments; and
(e) the limitation of the staffs of Departments and to 
actual requirements, and the utilization of those 
staffs to the best advantage; and
(f) the improvement and training of officers; and
(g) the avoidance of unnecessary expenditure; and
(2) to examine the business of each Department and ascertain 
whether any inefficiency or lack of economy exists; and
(3) to exercise a critical oversight of the activities, and 
the methods of conducting the business, of each 
Department; and
(4) to maintain a comprehensive and continuous system of 
measuring and checking the economical and efficient 
working of each Department and to institute standard 
practices and uniform instructions for carrying out 
recurring work; and
(5) to determine courses of study for which recognition may be 
granted; and
(6) to make adequate arrangements for training of officers and 
for their advancement, ensuring as far as possible a 
uniform approach to the problem of standards; and
(7) such other duties in relation to the Public Service as are 
prescribed.
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shall furnish the [NEC] reports or recommendations on all 
matters required to be dealt with by the [NEC] under this 
[Act] or referred to the [PSC] by the [NEC].
Hence, there is another inconsistency between the two provisions in
that S.18 of the Interim Act refers to all matters which would include
both personnel as well as management matters.
b) The Historical Background of S.148(3)
1 6The Constitution and the Public Service Interim Actlu assume that 
there is a distinction between, on the one hand, personnel matters 
and, on the other, management matters. Moreover, both the 
Constitution and the Interim Act appear to vest the power over both 
matters on the PSC. There is no direct reference in either of the 
legal provisions to individual Ministerial power over either the 
personnel or the management aspects of the National Public Service. 
How this situation came about may be explained by the debates in the 
immediate pre-Independence period about who should direct control of 
the public service with regard to both kinds of matters, particularly 
the debate about the power of individual Ministers.
Up to 1972, it was public servants who made decisions about both 
matters. The Public Service Board was the chief instrument for the 
exercise of these Powers.^ Mr Israel Idoni, a former Chairman of the 
Public Services Commission, recalled a number of gatherings among 
senior Papua New Guinean public servants at the Nine-Mile Horse-Track
1 Ojust outside Port Moresby where they brooded over the question. Mark 
Lynch who was closely involved with the operation of the cabinet at 
the time notes that
Departmental heads had to adjust to a number of new realities 
as some matters passed from their control to that of the 
ministerial member, and other matters no longer had to be 
referred to Canberra.^
Tos Barnett who served as personal legal advisor to Somare 
recalled at a workshop organised by the General Constitutional
16. The Interim Act is authorized by S.191 of the Constitution.
17. See generally, Parker, 1966.
18. Israel Idoni:personal communication.
19. Lynch, 1981:23.
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Commission in Port Moresby in March 1981 that the term ’direction and
control' was being thrown around at the time in relation to the
internal matters within a Department. The feeling was that a Minister
should not have power to control internal matters, although he could
have a legitimate claim to power on matters of policy. The
20controversy was not settled.
During a workshop organised by the Law Department of the 
Australian National University on Constitutional Law and Development 
in the Pacific in April, 1982 C.J. Lynch was asked to explain how 
sub-s.3 of S.148 came to be where it is today. His reply was that the 
decision to give Ministers no power of direction or control was taken 
at a later stage as indicated by the absence of sub-s.3 in the first 
two Drafts of the Constitution. According to him the Police Minister 
at the time was threatening to order the police to arrest people on 
suspicion. This conduct together with the general behaviour of 
Ministers at the time in regarding themselves as having the power to 
order people to do things, compelled a decision to be taken not to 
give them any general power of direction or control. It was felt that 
what was required to be done by public servants in a Department was 
adequately covered by the Duty Statement of each position that a 
public servant holds. It may be noted that the decision applied to 
all Minister rather than only to a particular Minister.
The CPC provided a different basis on which no power of direction 
or control was to be given to the Minister responsible for public 
service matters, and this related to the distinction the Committee 
drew between personnel matters and management matters within the 
public service. The CPC saw three principles as basic to the 
government in its task for providing service to the people. First, 
there was a need for a permanent body of loyal and impartial officers 
appointed on the basis of merit. Secondly, the government needed to 
maintain control over the management of the public service in order to 
ensure implementation of its policies with maximum efficiency and 
economy. Thirdly, in order to implement the first two principles
20. Personal notes.
21. Who drafted the Constitution
22. Personal notes.
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fully and effectively, co-ordination was needed among Departments and 
Statutory Authorities in relation to both personnel matters and 
government policies on conditions of service and establishments.
The CPC wanted two different bodies to implement the two above 
principles. A Public Services Commission responsible for personnel 
matters was needed to ensure that the principle of appointments on the 
basis of impartiality and merit was implemented fully; and a 
Department responsible for management matters in the public service, 
to ensure the implementation of the principle of governmental control 
over the management of the public service. Its final recommendations
r) jwere made to that effect. 4
The Somare Government expressed reservations on the CPC's 
recommendations in the following terms:
5. The CPC Report insists that a separate department dealing 
with establishment matters must be set up and made subject to 
ordinary Ministerial direction. This may be desirable but 
another approach would be to leave this to ordinary
legislation and not put it in the Constitution. As long as 
the Commission is not subject to strict government detailed 
control in questions of promotions, dismissals, appeals, etc., 
it would be possible (and more economical) for it to continue 
also to handle establishment matters (subject to Ministerial 
control) as the PSB does now - unless the Parliament later 
decides to enact a separate law setting up a new
Establishments Department. (This approach was previously 
agreed to by Cabinet on the recommendations of the Public 
Service Board and senior national officers.)z
Thus, the Government wanted to see the Public Services Commission 
responsible for both personnel as well as management matters on the 
basis of economy and efficiency, although it was amenable to other 
suggestions. The Drafting Instructions issued by the House of
Assembly after the House debated the CPC's report and adopted it in 
principle showed that the CPC's recommendations on the above point
9 Awere amended by the Government Paper. °
But the Draft Constitution submitted to the National Constituent
23. CPC, 1984:12/1.
24. Ibid., 12/8-12/9.
25. Government Paper, 1974:43.
26. The Fourth Draft of 10th May 1974.
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Assembly in May 1975 contained a Clause 204 which purported to divest
control over management from the PSC and confer it on a Department,
following more or less the CPC's original recommendations. It was
Martin Tovadek (the Member for Gazelle) who, in the course of the
debate in the Constituent Assembly, moved successfully for the
elimination of Clause 204 of the Draft. In support of his motion
Martin Tovadek argued that up to then both the personnel and
management matters had been handled by the Public Service Board fairly
well, and he saw no reason for the Public Services Commission not to 
27do likewise. This resulted in the amalgamation of the two functions 
in the Public Services Commission as it is now under S. 191(1) of the 
Constitution. In fact this arrangement has been favoured by all the 
various Committees that had been set up in the past to examine and 
report on the public service in PNG as the Kilage Committee noted in 
its Report.
From the foregoing it would appear that the term, 'no power of 
direction or control' as used in S.148(3) was intended to protect the 
internal workings of Departments from arbitrary rule by Ministers. 
This is Lynch's view. The distinction between 'personnel' and 
'management' matters was drawn originally to protect the public 
servants from ministerial control over personnel matters, reflecting 
in this way one of the traditional principles on which public service 
according to the British model is patterned.
On a literal reading, the relevant constitutional provisions 
reflect the general fear of arbitrary rule by Ministers by denying 
them any general power of directing or controlling their respective 
Department on either matters of personnel or management. But then the 
Constitution creates what seems to be a dilemma in introducing notions 
of both collective and individual ministerial responsibility without 
really reconciling either of these principles with the hands-off 
principle that is contained in S.148(3). How have the Courts 
responded to this situation? Here it is pertinent to consider in some
27. The National Constituent Assembly Debates 5th July 1975, 
6/6/2-7/5/1.
28. Report of an Interdepartmental Committee (on) Public Services 
Structure Review, December 1974:10.
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29detail Bouraga's Case for it is the only case so far where the
Supreme Court was confronted with the task of deciding the extent to 
which a Minister could claim power to direct or control his given 
Department.
5.1.2 Ministerial Responsibility and Bouraga's Case
Phillip Bouraga was appointed to the positions of both the 
Commissioner of Police and the Secretary of the Department of Police 
on 26 April 1979 pursuant to the provisions of S.193 of the 
Constitution. Section 193 covers appointment to both positions. The 
office of the Commissioner of Police is expressly created by the 
Constitution under S.198. The power of setting up Departments and 
defining their functions is given to the Head of State by SS.22 and 23 
of the Public Service Interim Act respectively. Acting under that 
power the Head of State on the advice of the NEC established the 
Department of Police and determined its functions on 13 February 
1976.31
Bouraga's appointment as Police Commissioner was made by the Head 
of State on the advice of the NEC after consultation with the PSC and 
the Parliamentary Committee on Senior Appointments as required by 
S.193(l)(e) and (2) of the Constitution. His appointment as the 
Secretary for the Department of Police was made again by the Head of 
State on the advice of the NEC after consultation with the PSC 
pursuant to S.193(l)(a) and (2) of the Constitution.
On four occasions in 1981 Bouraga refused to inform the Police 
Minister on a number of matters relating to the Police operation. The 
PSC brought four charges against Bouraga under S.76 of the Public 
Service Interim Act for wilfully disobeying lawful orders. Section 
76(l)(c) reads:
An officer who wilfully disobeys or disregards a lawful order 
made or given by any person having authority to make or give 
it is guilty of a disciplinary offence and is liable to be 
dealt with and punished under this Part.
29. [1982] P.N.G.L.R. 178.
30. National Gazette No. G26 of 26 April 1979.
31. Ibid., No. G15 of 13 February 1976.
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The PSC set up a Board of Inquiry to investigate the truth of 
these charges pursuant to the Public Service Interim Act. During the 
course of its inquiry certain questions relating to the constitutional 
provisions governing the appointment and removal of Bouraga as 
Commissioner and Secretary arose. Before completing its hearing of 
evidence and before submitting its report to the PSC the Board 
referred three questions to the Supreme Court for that Court's 
opinion. These were -
(1) whether the PSC has the power under the Public Service 
Interim Act to charge the Commissioner of Police and/or 
Secretary for Police pursuant to SS.76 and 83 of the Act;
(2) whether the Minister for Police has the power of 
direction or control under S.148 to enable him to make orders 
the refusal of which formed the bases for the charges; and
(3) whether the Minister for Police has power of direction 
or control under S.196 of the Constitution to give orders to 
the Police Commissioner and/or Secretary.
The Supreme Court that heard the arguments on these questions 
consisted of ex-public servants: two Papua New Guineans (Kidu C.J. 
and Kapi J.) and an Australian (Pratt J.). Kidu C.J. was a former 
Secretary for Justice and was the Secretary for the Department of the 
Prime Minister when his appointment as the new Chief Justice was 
announced by the Prime Minister, Sir Julius Chan, in mid-1980. Kapi 
J. was the Public Solicitor before his appointment to the Bench in 
November 1979, and Pratt J. was a former Acting Public Solicitor under 
whom Kapi J. had practised prior to his appointment. This brief 
background of the three judges is relevant to indicate, first, that 
all the three judges have had extensive experience of the public 
service system in PNG; and secondly, that they had no doubt developed 
their own understanding and attitude towards the relationship between 
the politician and public servant.
The implications of the first two questions referred to the 
Supreme Court are fairly wide and in order to deal with them 
adequately, it is perhaps best to begin with the recording of what 
each of the judges actually held on each of the two questions.
32. S.196 of the Constitution confers the responsibility over the 
Police Force on the NEC, and states that a Minister has no power of 
command unless provided otherwise by an Act.
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a) The First Question: The PSC's Power Under the
Constitution and the Public Service Interim Act to 
Charge the Commissioner and/or Secretary for Police
The question was whether the PSC had power under either the 
Constitution or the Public Service Interim Act to discipline Phillip 
Bouraga in two different legal capacities: as the Commissioner of
Police and as the Secretary of the Department of Police.
(i) Bouraga as Police Commissioner
All the three judges held that there was no provision either in 
the Constitution or in the Public Service Interim Act that empowered 
the PSC to discipline Phillip Bouraga in his capacity as the Police 
Commissioner. As Kidu C.J. pointed out, since the Police Commissioner 
is appointed by the Head of State on the advice of the NEC the same 
procedure is to be used to discipline the Commissioner. This is the 
result of Sch.1.10(A) of the Constitution since there is no statutory 
provision specifically covering the point. The relevant provisions of 
Schedule 1.10 are as follows:
(4) Subject to Subsection (5), where a Constitutional Law 
confers a power to make an appointment, the power includes 
power to remove or suspend a person so appointed, and to 
appoint another person temporarily in the place of a person so 
removed or suspended or, where the appointee is for any reason 
unable or unavailable to perform his duties, to appoint 
another person temporarily in his place.
(5) The power provided for by Subsection (4) is exercisable 
only subject to any conditions to which the exercise of the 
original power or appointment was subject.
The judges noted that the Police Interim Act did not give any power to
the PSC or anybody else to discipline the Commissioner. The only
involvement of the PSC is in the appointment of the Commissioner since
pursuant to S. 193(2) of the Constitution the PSC is one of the two
bodies that are required to be consulted before the appointment.
(ii) Bouraga as the Secretary of the Department of Police
Again, all three judges were prepared to hold that the PSC had no 
power to discipline Bouraga as the Head of the Department of Police, 
although the judges differed slightly in their reasons. Both Kapi and
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Pratt JJ. considered it unconstitutional (Kapi J. expressly; and Pratt 
J. implicitly) to transfer to the Public Services Commission through 
the creation of the Department of Police, the functions that the 
Constitution vests exclusively in the Commissioner of Police under 
S.198. To that extent the office of the Secretary for Police had no 
legal or constitutional status and that settled the issue.
Kidu C.J. was not prepared to go so far apparently due to 
inadequate argument on that point. Instead, the Chief Justice held 
that the provisions of the Constitution overrode SS.76 and 83 of the 
Public Service Interim Act in a way that deprived the PSC of the 
disciplinary power even though both SS.76 and 83 of the Act deal with 
the question of discipline. It is important to note the steps in the 
Chief Justice's reasoning:
O /- a discipline question in the NPSJ is essentially a personnel 
matter within the meaning of S.194 of the Constitution;
- personnel matters are expressly stated by S.191(l)(b) of the 
Constitution to be the responsibility of the PSC;
- S.191(1) authorises the PSC to carry out the responsibility in 
accordance with an Act which is the Public Service Interim Act 
which, in turn, makes provisions under S.76 and S.83 relating to 
disciplinary matters, generally and for Departmental Heads in 
particular;
- S.191(1) makes all that, however, subject to the Constitution;
- schedule 1.10(4) provides that the power of appointment includes 
power to suspend and remove; and
- SS.76 and 83 are inconsistent with Schedule 1.10(4) and to that 
extent are of no effect.
33. S.83 which deals with disciplinary offences by Departmental 
Heads provides as follows:
(1) Where the Board has reason to believe that a 
Departmental Head has committed a disciplinary offence, the 
Board may charge, and, if it sees fit, suspend the officer and 
shall forthwith report the charge and the suspension, if any, 
to the [NECJ.
(2) If the officer does not, in writing, admit the truth of 
the charge, the [PSC] shall appoint a Board of Inquiry.
34. National Public Service.
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The Chief Justice did not state unequivocally the bases on which 
SS.76 and 83 of the Public Service Interim Act are inconsistent with 
both S.193(l)(a) and (2) and Sch.1.10(4) of the Constitution. 
Presumably, this could be explained on the basis that to the extent 
that both SS.76 and 83 purported to confer the disciplinary power over 
Departmental Heads on the PSC they were inconsistent with Sch.1.10(4) 
which confers that power on the body that makes the appointment. That 
body in the case of Departmental Heads is the Head of State acting on 
the advice of the NEC after consultation with the PSC as required 
under S.193(l)(a) and (2) of the Constitution. This reasoning by the 
Chief Justice was also supported by Kapi J.
b) The Second Question: Whether the Minister for
Police has Power under S.148 of the Constitution 
of Direction or Control over the Commissioner of 
Police and/or the Secretary for Police
(i) Bouraga as the Commissioner of Police
The question here was whether the Minister for Police had any 
power to direct or control Phillip Bouraga as the Commissioner of the 
Police either under the Constitution or under the Police Interim Act. 
All the three judges held that the Minister did not have any power 
under either source.
(ii) Bouraga as the Secretary for Police
The issue that was of a direct relevance to the relationship 
between the public servants and politicians was whether the Minister 
for Police had any power under the Constitution or the Police Interim 
Act to direct or control Bouraga in his capacity as the Secretary of 
the Department of Police. This involved some examination of the 
provisions of S.148 of the Constitution and all three judges spelled 
out their respective interpretations of that key section.
Again, all the judges were unanimous in holding that S.148(3)
does not give any power of direction or control over the Secretary as
the Departmental Head. Nor did the Police Interim Act, which S.198 of
3 5the Constitution authorises. To the three judges all that S.148(2)
35. Their reasoning is explained fully below.
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does is to give the Minister the right to have information on the 
activities of his Department upon request. The judges thereby implied 
that there is a distinction between that right and a power of 
direction or control. But there was no real attempt made to bring out 
this distinction. The judges were unable to find under the Police 
Interim Act any provision conferring power on the Minister to direct 
or control the Police Commissioner either in his capacity as the 
Departmental Head or as both the Commissioner and the Departmental 
Head.
It may be noted that the question of direction or control raised 
in the Second Question is fairly wide, and would obviously cover the 
question of disciplinary power contained in Question One under the 
Reference. This point was not argued in the case, but in terms of the 
final decision of the Court in denying the Minister any power of 
direction or control, it shows therein that it includes any 
disciplinary power. If, then, neither the PSC nor the Minister for 
Police have power to discipline Phillip Bouraga in his capacity as a 
Departmental Head, who has?
The Court's reply was that the NEC has this power under 
Sch.1.10(4) of the Constitution. But this is not strictly correct, 
since the appointment of a Departmental Head is actually made by the 
Head of State under S.193 on the advice of the NEC after consultation 
with the PSC. The intention of Sch. 1.10(4) is to require the same 
procedure for suspension or removal of an appointee as was used in the 
appointee's appointment. It follows that in the case of a 
Departmental Head the prescribed procedure would be for the Head of 
State to remove on the advice of the NEC after consultation with the 
PSC.
In the end, the Supreme Court answered all the three questions 
under the Reference in the negative. In terms of the first two 
questions, the Court found that neither the PSC nor the Minister for 
Police had any power under the relevant statutes to discipline Phillip 
Bouraga as the Departmental Head. That power resides in the Head of 
State acting on the advice of the NEC.
If any future government is to have any power over the operations 
of Departments, it is crucial to know what the limitations of that
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power are. The Supreme Court's treatment of this question was not as 
clear as it should have been.
5.2 THE LIMITS OF MINISTERIAL POWER
The question of the limits of the power of an individual Minister 
is best seen in the context of his power over his Department. The 
decision of the Supreme Court in Bouraga's Case on this point is that 
the mere fact of the conferment of a political responsibility on a 
Minister over a department under S.148(2) of the Constitution does not 
thereby confer on that Minister a general power of direction or 
control over his Department. It is necessary to examine the statutory 
provisions governing or relating to the portfolio in question to see 
whether the Minister concerned does have specific powers to direct or 
control his Department with regard to any aspect of the departmental 
activities. This was indicated by the judges in their examination of 
the Police Interim Act. Pratt J. alluded to this point thus:
I do not believe it was the intention of the framers of the 
Constitution to prevent Parliament from passing Acts which in 
fact have the effect either implicitly or explicitly of giving 
such power of direction or control to a Minister. Indeed a 
number of Acts do this very thing ... The system of using an 
Act of Parliament to define and direct ministerial control 
over specific areas has the great advantage of letting 
everyone know exactly what powers are conferred in what areas, 
with the approval of the parliamentary members. b
It may be added that this proposition is subject to the Constitution,
especially S.191(1), where public service matters are concerned.
There are therefore two propositions deducible from Bouraga's Case in
relation to the power of a Minister over activities of his department.
First, a Minister has power when he establishes that a specific 
statute vests that power in him. He does not have a general power. 
Secondly, the NEC has a general power under Schedule 1.10(4) to 
discipline Departmental Heads, which Ministers can use to elicit 
information from unco-operative Departmental Heads. This second 
proposition is perhaps wider in its scope than stated here. Both 
propositions nonetheless constitute the legal and constitutional basis 
of Ministerial power.
36. [1982] P.N.G.L.R. 176 at 206.
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It is implicit in Bouraga's Case that all the three judges 
considered internal activities of Departments as outside the 
legitimate concern of a Minister unless a specific power is granted to 
him by the law. The Chief Justice went as far as supporting the 
conventional distinction between policy and administration that Sir 
Ivor Jennings adopts in his book The Cabinet Government. Jennings 
says the former is the legitimate concern for a Minister; the latter 
is not his area but the public servant’s. Kidu C.J. endorsed these 
statements. These observations, however, could only be regarded as 
obiter dicta since the Court had already decided that a Minister has 
no general power of direction or control over his Department.
The power of removing a Departmental Head, which was the issue in 
Bouraga’s Case, is in essence a disciplinary power. Disciplinary 
power is a part of the general power that governs personnel matters; 
and the power over personnel matters is vested in the PSC subject to 
the qualifications discussed above. Although the Supreme Court held 
that the power of removing a Departmental Head is vested in the NEC, 
it failed to deal with the whole question of disciplinary power 
adequately. It has, for instance, left unanswered such questions as: 
does the NEC also have power to mete out other lesser forms of 
disciplinary measures? It would seem that it could.
But why does the law, as it now stands, deprive a Minister of any 
power of discipline over a Departmental Head? Three reasons may be 
suggested. First, there was a general view held, although mistakenly 
as it eventually turned out, that discipline is a personnel matter 
which has been allocated to the independent PSC. Only Kidu C.J. 
addressed this problem in Bouraga's Case. This view is based on the 
original recommendation of the CPC and the distinction the CPC drew 
between ’personnel’ and 'management' matters. Secondly, it cannot be 
denied that to some extent the structuring of the constitutional 
system was determined by the prevailing views people had of the 
personalities of the leaders at the time: whether, for instance, they 
were likely to abuse any power that would be given to them. Lynch 
suggested that the decision not to give a Minister a general power of 
direction or control arose out of fear of the conduct of the Police 
Minister at the time, namely, Mr Peter Lus. There had been a few 
"exchanges" on the floor of the Parliament involving Peter Lus. John
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Guise was another leader who generated some fear that if too much 
power was given to Ministers, they would abuse it. General Diro, the 
former Defence Force Commander, told the General Constitutional 
Commission in July 1981 that it was because of this fear of John Guise 
(who was going to become the First Governor-General at Independence)
that the concept of the Head of State as the commander-in-chief of the
37armed forces was dropped. Thirdly, there could have been a fairly 
strong feeling that discipline is a sensitive matter, especially as it 
related to Departmental Heads, and that should be dealt with 
collectively through the NEC rather than through the individual 
responsibility of a Minister, in particular the Minister responsible 
for public service matters. It is implicit in S.193 and Sch.1.10(4) 
of the Constitution that since the appointment of a Departmental Head 
is determined collectively, so should his discipline.
The question of limits of the Ministerial power also depends on 
the view the Court took of what S.148(2) means by political 
responsibility. The Court's definitions of political responsibility, 
as well as its understanding of the practical meaning of that
O Oresponsibility, however, lack depth and clarity. °
All the judges acknowledged the fact that the principle of 
political responsibility is not defined by the Constitution. The 
Chief Justice took the view that whatever this principle was, it 
certainly required co-operation between public servants and 
politicians as well as some clear understanding of the conventional 
rules governing the relationship between them. He quoted Sir Ivor 
Jennings' Cabinet Government to some extent in support of his view, 
and went as far as to urge both groups to read the book.
The other two judges attempted to define what is meant by 
political responsibility. According to Kapi J.:
This responsibility is more in the nature of doing the 
groundwork for the National Executive Council for purposes of 
executive decisions under Section 149(3) of the Constitution 
and simply informing the public through Parliament or news
37. Personal communication.
38. This is so, despite the fact that all the three judges had been 
experienced senior public servants prior to their respective 
appointments to the Bench.
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media the workings of the Executive arm of the Government or 
the particular branch or department of government. That is as 
far as the political responsibility of a Minister can go.
Pratt J. was prepared to put political responsibility in more general
terms:
Political responsibility may be defined as a responsibility in 
the Minister as a member of the Government for what the 
department has done in the past is doing in the present and 
must do or should do in the future.
These two definitions are unsatisfactory because the one given by 
Pratt J. is too vague to really indicate what is entailed in the 
political responsibility of a Minister, just as that of Kapi J. is too 
simplistic for an adequate description of what actually happens in 
practice.
There is another respect in which the treatment of political 
responsibility in the three judgements was superficial, and that was 
in the way the judges appeared to have understood the provisions 
governing that responsibility.
Although for instance, the Constitution does not define the 
principle expressly SS.141, 148 and 149 leave little doubt as to what 
it involves. The judges did not appear to have been fully aware of 
this. Section 141 puts it beyond doubt that the Ministry is a 
Parliamentary Executive, and because of that there are three basic 
principles that govern its constitutional relationship with the 
National Parliament. First, that a Minister must be a member of the 
Parliament. Secondly, the Ministry is collectively responsible to the 
People, through the Parliament, for the executive government for which 
the responsibility is specifically conferred on the NEC by S.149(3) of 
the Constitution. Thirdly, the Ministry is liable to be dismissed 
either collectively or individually by the Parliament. Political 
responsibility is therefore essentially a responsibility owed by the 
Executive to the representatives of the People in the Parliament. It 
characterises the constitutional relationship between the legislature 
and the executive in the parliamentary form of government. That 
general responsibility rests on two supporting and specific 
principles: the collective responsibility of the Ministry as a whole 
to the People in the Parliament , and the individual responsibility of 
the Minister to the Parliament for the affairs of his Department. 
Since these are basic principles of constitutional arrangement under
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the Westminster model, the PNG Constitution, in enacting them, is not 
really saying anything new.
The Supreme Court in Bouraga's Case had great difficulty in 
finding a criterion by which to delineate the extent of a Minister's 
powers over his Department. For instance, the judges resorted to a 
notion of "right" as the criterion for limiting such powers by taking 
the view that a Minister has "the right" to ask for and be given 
information on the activities of his Department. It appears that the 
judges used the concept of "right" in this context to refer to the 
right accrued to the Minister by virtue of the public office he holds. 
But using the notion of "right" in this sense only causes confusion, 
because the sense in which the Constitution uses "right" under the 
Basic Rights provisions refers to the rights of an individual as a 
person. It seems the judges resorted to this notion of right as a way 
of getting out of a dilemma. On the one hand, the Court was faced 
with the need to give some meaning to the general principle of 
political responsibility. For instance, the Ministry should at least 
have all the necessary information regarding Departmental activities 
in order to inform the Parliament about the affairs of government. On 
the other hand, it was faced with the interpretation that it had 
adopted under S.148 that Ministers have no general power of direction 
or control. The Court decided to avoid the dilemma by giving 
Ministers the "right" to request information as being all that S.148 
entails, and no general power of direction or control.
Another point on which the Supreme Court appeared to have been 
confused was in relation to the authority to which the Minister is 
required under the Constitution to be responsible. All three judges 
stated that the Ministry is responsible collectively to the People 
through the Parliament. But they were not explicit to the same extent 
in relation to individual ministerial responsibility. In fact, Kidu 
C.J. regarded individual ministerial responsibility as owed to the 
NEC. Although this is the practical, and may be regarded as the 
conventional aspect of the individual ministerial responsibility 
principle, there is another perhaps more important aspect. It is that 
each Minister is responsible to the People through Parliament for the 
portfolio that is assigned to him by the Prime Minister. Although the 
nomination of each Minister depends on the Prime Minister, once
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Ministers are appointed they are not in the Westminster model 
responsible to the Prime Minister or the cabinet. That responsibility 
both in the collective and the individual senses is owed to the 
Parliament. By contrast, in PNG that responsibility is owed to the 
People rather than to the Parliament, to reflect the autochthonous 
nature of the Constitution.
5.3 THE LIMITS OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE POWER
The two most important bodies that exercise power over public 
service matters are the PSC and the Departmental Head. The powers of 
the PSC are conferred on it by the Constitution; and those of the 
Departmental Head by the Public Service Interim Act 1973. To what 
extent then are they restricted in the exercise of their respective 
powers?
5.3.1 The Public Services Commission
Although the Constitution confers the power over both management
39and personnel matters on the PSC, that power in so far as it relates 
to personnel matters is restricted by the power conferred on the Head 
of State to issue an advice and policy direction with which the PSC is 
required to comply.^ This direction can be given administratively 
since there is no indication by the Constitution that it must be given 
in any particular form. But, curiously, this power is restricted only 
to personnel matters, which leaves the implication that the NEC has no 
power to direct the PSC on management matters. This is probably 
because it had always been assumed that the NEC has the power to 
direct the PSC on management matters. The situation is, however,
clarified somewhat by the decision in Bouraga's Case, if the case is 
read liberally, that the NEC can direct the PSC on a matter of policy 
on any aspect of either personnel or management matter, so long as 
this is done through an Act of Parliament and done in accordance with 
the Constitution. It may be noted that, to that extent, the decision 
ignores the provision of S.192(a) which requires the Head of State to 
direct the PSC as a matter of policy only on personnel matters.
39. See the Constitution, S.191(1).
40. Ibid., S.192(h).
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In Bouraga's Case the judges, especially the Chief Justice, 
referred to the traditional distinction between policy and 
administration, and expressed the view that the former is the 
legitimate concern of the politician whilst the latter properly 
belongs to the public servant. It was unfortunate that the Court drew 
this distinction because it complicates the situation all the more, 
since there was no attempt made by any of the judges to explain what 
is meant by either 'policy’ or 'administration'. Furthermore, none of 
the judges endeavoured to indicate how the distinction between 
'policy' and 'administration' relates to the distinction the 
Constitution draws between 'personnel' and 'management'. Does 
'policy' cover the area the Constitution designated as 'management' 
whilst 'administration' covers that of 'personnel' category? The 
Supreme Court left the question unanswered. But at least Bouraga'js 
Case has left a clear implication that Ministers have no power over 
the day-to-day running of their respective Department unless they can 
point to specific statutory provisions which vest that power. This 
consequently means a lot of power is in effect left with the PSC or 
with the individual Departmental Head. But the NEC can direct the PSC 
on matters of general policy. This is a conventional rule which the 
Constitution does not address.
5.3.2 The Departmental Head
The responsibilities of the PSC for a Department are carried out 
by the Departmental Head who is also the PSC's representative. He is 
therefore the most important public servant. But neither the 
Constitution nor the Public Service Interim Act vest any power in the 
formal sense in the Departmental Head. The provisions that deal with 
his responsibilities are those of the Interim Act, but these do not 
contain any reference to the question of powers. These 
responsibilities are couched in general terms. Section 24(3) for 
instance, in its original form provided that '[t]he Departmental Head 
is reponsible for the general working and the efficient conduct of the 
business of his Department'. That section was amended in 1981, but 
the wording has not changed in this respect, and is contained in a new 
subsection of S.24.^ Besides this general responsibility, the
41. See the Interim Act, S.24(2).
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Departmental Head has a particular responsibility under S.26(l) to 
report to the PSC when the need arises -
(a) any alterations which are, in his opinion, necessary or 
expedient for the more economical, efficient or convenient 
working of the Department or any other branch of it;
(b) any alterations which are, in his opinion, necessary in 
the salaries or allowances of any of the officers under his 
control.
Under S.26(2) of the Interim Act a Departmental Head has a further 
responsibility to:
... bring to the attention of the [PSC] any matter, whether in 
relation to an officer or to the work of a branch or section 
of the Department, with which he thinks it is desirable for 
the [PSC] to be acquainted.
In addition each Departmental Head is required under S.20 to submit a 
report covering the preceding year. The functions of a Department are 
determined by the NEC after it has considered a report from the PSC.^
Hence, to the extent that a Departmental Head is responsible to 
anybody, S.26 of the Interim Act implies that it is to the Public 
Services Commission. But there is an inconsistency here between the 
Interim Act and the Constitution in that S.193(l)(a) of the 
Constitution assumes that the Departmental Head is responsible 
directly either to the NEC or to the Minister responsible for public 
service matters. In the light of Bouraga's Case the Departmental Head 
is responsible to the NEC on disciplinary matters involving him. But 
it is not clear as a matter of law whether it is also directly 
responsible to the NEC or to his Minister for both management and 
personnel matters because of S.191(1) of the Constitution which vests 
the power over both matters in the PSC.
If the Departmental Head has any power at all, it must be assumed 
to exist in association with the responsibilities conferred on him by 
the Interim Act. This is confirmed by the provision in the Interim 
Act that he may delegate his powers. J




Head under the Interim Act.44 At one stage the PSC delegated many its 
powers over both personnel as well as management matters to 
Departmental Heads. But because some of the Departmental Heads abused 
these powers, most of these powers have now been taken back by the 
PSC.4 1^ Under the Interim Act the PSC can revoke its delegaton at 
will.46
The practical effect of the exercise of power by Departmental 
Heads depends on the authority to which they are responsible in law. 
Previously, under the Public Service Interim Act, that authority was 
the PSC. But now, in the light of Bouraga's Case that authority is 
undoubtedly the NEC. This creates further problems. It reduces for 
instance, the effective control by the PSC over the Departmental Heads 
and because of that, over the running of Departments, despite the 
provisions of S.191(1) of the Constitution. Furthermore, the 
Departmental Head now has to cultivate loyalty even in a personal 
sense to the politicians in power, if he wishes to retain his 
position. This has thus introduced political control into the public 
service in its most important area, and thereby has created the 
attendant problem of insecurity within the service. The traditional 
principle of public service neutrality is therefore threatened.
Ballard notes that the public service in Papua New Guinea was 
designed to meet the needs and the aspirations of the Australian 
public servant, and this was largely due to the influence of the 
Public Service Association which wanted to ensure parity in conditions 
with the Australian public service.4  ^ In particular, Ballard points 
out that:
The Papua New Guinean public servants ... were fully imbued 
with an Australian public servant’s distrust of politicians 
and were watchful for any evidence of political interference 
in the very broad a^ea considered to be the rightful domain of 
the public service.
The early Somare Government saw this tendency in the public
44. S.16.





service and employed a number of devices in an attempt to make the
public service more responsive to the political will. These included
the appointment of ministerial private staff, the adoption of
political criteria for appointment to senior positions with the
government, and encouragement given to public servants to engage in
political activities, at least at the senior level. But Ballard notes
that the Somare Ministry was only able to achieve the response from
the public service after the Budget Priority Committee was 
49established. Even then the problem had not been completely solved 
as Bouraga's Case has clearly illustrated.
5.4 THE NEED FOR SOME BALANCE BETWEEN POLITICAL CONTROL 
AND CONTINUED PUBLIC SERVANTS' EXPERTISE
Although the CPC emphasised the primacy of political control over 
the public service, it also recognised the need for a continued 
availability of expertise from public servants to enable governments 
to formulate and implement their policies. The Committee stated in 
its Final Report that one of the principles which guided it in its 
recommendations on the public service was :
the need to ensure that any government of the day has a 
permanent body of officers who will serve it loyally and 
impartially, and who have been appointed to their positions on 
the basis of merit. ^
In order to implement this principle the CPC envisaged that an 
independent Public Services Commission was required 'to determine 
matters which vitally affects these officers as individuals'.^ The 
need to balance this requirement with the need for any government to 
have control over the public service led the CPC to draw a distinction 
between personnel matters and management matters. But as explained 
above, this distinction was dropped by the National Constituent 
Assembly, with the result that the power over both matters is now 
vested in the PSC, subject to a policy direction from the NEC. That 
direction is restricted, however, to only personnel matters if one 






The net effect of this appears to give the PSC a more powerful
position, at least in law, than the CPC had recommended. That is the
52status quo which, it has been claimed, Bouraga's Case maintains.
But this bureaucratic hegemony is more apparent than real when the 
decision in Bouraga's Case is properly understood. For ^this decision 
has attempted to restore some balance between the need for ministerial 
control and the need for independence of the public service over 
personnel matters.
The view of the Supreme Court that S. 148(2), in the light of 
S.148(3), confers no general power of direction or control on a 
Minister unless there is a specific legal provision to the contrary 
gives some independence to the PSC and the Departmental Head. In 
relation to public service matters, S.191(1) vests the power over both 
the personnel and management matters in the PSC, and guarantees 
independence to the PSC under S.192 over personnel matters. There are 
two qualifications the Constitution makes in this respect. The first 
is that the appointment of Departmental Heads, which is a personnel 
matter within the meaning of S.194 of the Constitution, falls into the 
control of the NEC under S.193(l)(a) and S. 193(3) of the Constitution. 
Schedule 1.10(4) of the Constitution merely augments the list in S.194 
by including as personnel matters, both removal as well as suspension. 
Thus, to the extent that Bouraga's Case held that power of removing a 
Departmental Head lies with the NEC, it is merely applying the 
Constitution provisions; and to that extent the Constitutional 
provisions repeal by necessary implication the provisions of the 
Public Service Interim Act dealing with those matters. Two questions 
remain unclear, however. First, whether in the light of Bouraga's 
Case the power over all disciplinary matters affecting Departmental 
Heads now lies with the NEC since both removal and suspension are 
essentially disciplinary measures; and secondly, whether the NEC now 
has the full power over all personnel matters within the meaning of 
S.194 of the Constitution relating to Departmental Heads and other 
offices designed under S.193(2) of the Constitution. On a purposive 
interpretation of the Constitution, I take the view that the NEC does 
have the full power in relation to both questions.
52. See Ghai and Hegarty, 1982:255.
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The second qualification the Constitution makes to the general 
principle under S.191(1) is to be found under S.192(a) which confers 
on the head of State acting on the advice of the NEC the power to 
issue policy directions relating to personnel matters. This power can 
be exercised at any time and remains potentially an effective weapon 
in the hands of a party or parties in a government which finds an 
unco-operative public service.
The net result of the inter-relationship between the 
constitutional provisions in the light of Bouraga's Case is that the 
power over all personnel matters relating to Departmental Heads and 
positions of similar constitutional status lies effectively with the 
NEC, but the power over personnel matters affecting other public 
servants lies with the PSC as provided by S. 191(1) of the 
Constitution. This is apart from the power the NEC effectively has in 
issuing through the office of the Head of State any policy directions 
to the PSC relating to any aspect of personnel matters, including 
those affecting Departmental Heads.
A more troublesome question is the one that relates to management 
matters. As stated above, the power over these is conferred on the 
PSC by both the Constitution and the Public Service Interim Act. A 
lack of any qualification by the Constitution on this arrangement 
seems to leave a clear implication that only the PSC has the power 
here. This is contrary to what the CPC intended. The judges in 
Bouraga's Case had attempted to alleviate this extreme position in two 
respects. First, by the decision that a Minister has power if there 
is a legal provision conferring such power. The problem with that 
view is that, since the Constitution does not qualify the present 
vesting of the power over management matters, any attempt by any other 
legislation to do this would be tantamount to a breach of the 
Constitution. Secondly, the Supreme Court drew a distinction between 
'administration' and 'policy' and by expressing the opinion that the 
former was the concern of the public servant and the latter belonged 
to politicians. This opinion specifically of Kidu C.J., was obiter 
dicta, but it seems that the Supreme Court equated 'policy' with 
'management' on this occasion without expressly stating it. 
Therefore, it would seem from the general view of the judges, that the 
PSC has a hegemony over management matters in law. The practice also 
appears to support this position.
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The model that has thus emerged is not the British decolonisation
53model in its pure form, where a distinction is drawn between 
personnel and management matters in terms of the structural 
arrangement, nor is it the Australian-New Zealand model where such 
distinction is not drawn.^ What has emerged is an attempt to merge 
the two models into one, where the Constitution draws a distinction 
between personnel and management matters for purposes of allowing 
political control over some aspects of personnel matters exclusively, 
and all aspects of personnel matters generally. But otherwise, the 
power over both areas is vested in only one controlling body, viz., 
the PSC.
Both Ghai and Hegarty have found this arrangement to be 
unsatisfactory, and have suggested a number of options by which the 
primacy of political control through Ministerial power could be 
restored. They prefer an amendment to the Public Service Interim Act 
to give a Minister a general power of direction or control over his 
given Department. In addition, they have suggested that S.148(3) of 
the Constitution should be deleted and S.192 should be amended to 
clarify the distinction between policy and 'operation matters'. The 
two authors have argued further that a Minister should have not power 
over 'operational matters', whereas he should in relation to policy 
m a t t e r s . T h i s  position is somewhat the reverse of the present one 
where a Minister is deprived of the power of direction or control.
But reversing the present position is in fact creating the other 
extreme situation, and this leads to similar interpretative problems 
that now beset constitutional provisions. What is required is to 
amend the constitutional provisions and the provisions of the Public 
Service Interim Act to provide some balance between political control 
and independence of the PSC's control over personnel matters. The 
best solution is to return to the recommendations of the CPC by 
adopting the distinction between personnel matters and management 
matters, and by clearly providing that a Minister has power in 
relation to the latter but not the former, except that the Head of
53. Which is what the CPC wanted.
54. Ballard, 1982:242.
55. Ghai and Hegarty, 1982:254-255.
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State may issue on advice, policy directions relating to the former as 
presently provided by S.192 of the Constitution. When such directions 
are issued, they should be tabled in the Parliament as soon as 
practicable, as recommended by the CPC. In this way, there is 
clearly a primacy of political control, in that a Minister has power 
over management matters, and this power is as general as it can be 
reasonably interpreted to be. In addition, he could use the general 
power of the NEC to get policy directions to the PSC on personnel 
matters under the conditions on which such power may be exercised.
There is, at the same time, some balance, in that a Minister 
cannot interfere with personnel matters of the public service except 
under the clearly defined limits as determined by Parliament through 
statutes. Beyond this the PSC must be independent from any direction 
or control over personnel matters, if the continued availability of 
public service expertise is to be maintained. The important exception 
is the question of personnel matters affecting the Departmental Heads, 
and in the light of the decision in Bouraga's Case it is most unlikely 
that any PNG government would want to return the control over these 
matters to the PSC. Thus, in making these changes, this exception has 
to be clearly stated in order to avoid the kind of confusion that 
confronted both the Public Service Appeals Tribunal and the Supreme 
Court in Bouraga’s Case.
5.5 CONCLUSION
Although the CPC emphasised the primacy of political control over 
the public service, it recommended this to be balanced with the need 
for a continued availability of public service expertise. For this 
purpose it recommended that a distinction be drawn between personnel 
matters and management matters, and that the power over the former be 
vested in an independent Public Services Commission, whilst that 
relating to the latter be vested in the Ministry.
But at the end, a policy decision was made not to give each 
Minister a general power of direction or control and this is now 
reflected in S.148(3) of the Constitution. The determining factor for
56. CPC, 1974:12/2.
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the adoption of this policy was a concern at the arbitrary behaviour 
of Ministers at the time, although the possibility of the influence of 
some vested interests of public servants, as Goldring suggests,^'7 
(especially those of expatriate public servants as Ghai and Hegarty
C Oclaim) cannot be ruled out. But there was no question of drafting
59error, as Ballard has claimed.
The vesting of power over both the personnel and the management 
matters in the PSC despite the contrary recommendation of the CPC, 
seems to be a further consequence of this policy. However, it should 
be noted that the reasons Martin Tovadek gave in making this change in 
the National Constituent Assembly did not suggest that concern over 
Ministerial behaviour at the time was a contributing factor to the 
change.
In Bouraga’s Case the Supreme Court endeavoured to restore some 
balance to a situation where a Minister had no power over his given 
Department, and the public service appeared to have all the power. 
The Court did this by qualifying the hitherto unrestricted scope of 
S. 148(3) by laying down that a Minister does have power if this is 
specifically provided for by statute, but he does not have a general 
power as S.148(3) states. In applying this to public service matters 
the Court held that the power over certain aspects of personnel 
matters, viz., appointment and discipline relating to Departmental 
Heads is vested in the NEC. When all this is read together with the 
provisions of S.192 of the Constitution, there seems to be some 
balance restored at least between collective ministerial power and 
public service control.
But Bouraga's Case raised more questions than it was able to 
answer. In particular, the failure by the Court to qualify what 
appears to be an extreme position the Constitution has created with 
regard to management matters has left that area as the one in which 
the bureaucracy still enjoys an unintended hegemony.
57. Goldring, 1978:4.




MOTIONS OF NO CONFIDENCE AND 
PARLIAMENTARY DISMISSAL OF THE EXECUTIVE
In its Final Report, the CPC stated that one of its major
recommendations was that Ministers were to be both individually and
collectively responsible to the Parliament 'for their executive
actions and policies, including the work of their Departments'.^ This
meeans that, ultimately, Parliament must be able to dismiss the 
2Executive. Apart from this last resort, Parliament can control the 
Executive on a day to day basis through its internal procedures 
(especially through the device of Question Time) which gives the 
Opposition a special role in this respect. Legislation is, of course, 
the main means by which Parliament can direct and thus control 
Executive action. However, it should be noted that because the 
Executive commands the majority in Parliament only those Bills that 
are acceptable to the Executive would be enacted into legislation.
The way of dismissing the Executive under the Westminster system
is a motion of no confidence. In the United Kingdom, for instance, it
is acknowledged constitutional convention that if a government loses
its majority in the House of Commons on a vote of no-confidence in it,
3it is deemed defeated and a new government is required to be formed. 
That is, since the House of Commons is a representative assembly, a 
loss of majority constitutes a loss of support by the majority of 
electorates, and withdraws the legitimate and constitutional base on 
which the government had been recognised hitherto. The practice was 
begun with Sir Robert Walpole, the first Prime Minister, in 1742. In 
that year he resigned because he lost a vote of no confidence in the
1. CPC, 1974:7/6.
2. Ibid.
3. Jennings, 1964:184; Dicey, 1965:70; Phillips, 1973:114. In fact,
the government must advise a general election or resign: see
Winterton, 1983:2.
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House of Commons 4
The practical problem with the procedure of motions of no 
confidence, in the Westminster system is that it creates the problem 
of continuity of government where there has been a successful motion 
against the Ministry. In such a situation there is an uncertainty 
about the person who is to be the next Prime Minister."’ The CPC was 
aware of this problem. It therefore recommended what it called a 
'constructive vote of no confidence' to be moved in Parliament against
either the Prime Minister or the Ministry as a whole which had to
£
nominate an alternative Prime Minister. Although the CPC did not 
indicate this in its Final Report, its proposals closely resemble the 
provisions of Article 67 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of 
Germany. Under that Article the Bundestag (the German Parliament) may 
dismiss the Federal Chancellor from office by a vote of no confidence 
in him but only by electing a successor with the majority of its own 
members. This vote is described as a 'constructive vote' and Ziller 
explains its meaning thus:
This vote of no-confidence is described as "constructive" 
because it ensures that the Bundestag cannot take a 
no-confidence vote against the Chancellor without there being 
another person whom the majority of the Bundestag deputies 
support and consider capable of immediately assuming 
government responsibility. In other words, a mere "negative 
majority" is not sufficient to topple the Chancellor (and 
hence his Ministers as well).
The aim of this procedure is to achieve a more stable form of 
government.®
A study of the CPC's Final Report shows that the CPC recommended 
two types of motions of no confidence. The first is the 'constructive 
vote' of no confidence which can be moved against either the Prime 
Minister or the Ministry collectively, provided an alternative Prime 
Minister is nominated in the motion. The second type of no confidence 
motion may be moved against an individual Minister (but not the Prime







Minister). It is not a ’constructive vote* and does not need to 
satisfy specific procedural requirements the former has to satisfy. I 
will call this an ordinary motion of no confidence.
In its Final Report the CPC spelled out its concept of the
constructive motion of no confidence. First, such a vote could be
moved only during the first three years of the ordinary life of a 
9Parliament. Secondly, before such a motion was actually moved in 
Parliament, notice of at least one week had to be given. Thirdly, 
this notice had to be signed by one tenth of the members of 
Parliament. Fourthly, it had to nominate the alternative Prime 
Minister. Finally, if such a motion was to succeed, it had to be 
passed by an absolute majority of the members of Parliament.^
Thus, the CPC wanted to ensure that if such a motion was 
successful it not only revoked the appointment of the defeated Prime 
Minister but also appointed at the same time his named successor who 
was then free to choose his own ministry.^
The CPC saw four main advantages in this procedure. First, it 
would reduce the element of uncertainty that might follow the 
dismissal of a government by enabling one Prime Minister to give way 
to another without unnecessary procedural complexities. Secondly, it 
would avoid giving any discretion to the Speaker to appoint someone to 
succeed the outgoing Prime Minister. Thirdly, it gave to the
Parliament the power to determine who would become the next Prime
Minister. Moreover, it would force the members of Parliament to treat
1 3any motion of no confidence seriously.
Since the CPC's recommendations were supported by both the Somare
9. The CPC recommended a four-year term for Parliament, but the 




12. The CPC recommended that there should be no Head of State and 
that the functions of the Head of State should be shared between the 
Speaker and various other leaders: ibid., 7/1—7/2.
13. Ibid., 7/6. The CPC also indicated that Parliament could move a 
vote of censure against the Executive at any time to show its 
dissatisfaction with any government policy or action. Such motion 
however, would fall short of one of no confidence: ibid.
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Government and the Opposition United Party, they were not debated by 
either the House of Assembly or by the National Constituent Assembly. 
The provisions of the Fourth Draft^ became the provisions of the 
Constitution when it was enacted.^
Since Independence, constructive motions of no confidence have 
become a source of some instability in both governmental and political 
processes, by diverting the attention of the political leaders from 
the normal requirements of government. Sir Julius Chan, a former 
Prime Minister, described the effect which motions of no confidence 
have on the working of the parliamentary system thus:
[A]t almost every sitting of Parliament the air is thick with 
rumours that the government is about to fall. And for at 
least the first week of the session, nobody can think of 
anything else and very little work gets done.
The very fact that the Constitution allows such motions to be 
moved leads to the ridiculous result that on almost every 
occasion where it is legally possible to move a motion of no 
confidence, the public has come to expect that it is going to 
happen. The end result is that a very great deal of what 
ought to be the valuable time for this Parliament is 
completely wasted.^
In this Chapter an attempt will be made, first, to describe the 
constitutional scheme, secondly, to identify the constitutional 
problems which have arisen; and thirdly, to offer some suggestions as 
to how these problems can be resolved.
6.1 THE CONSTITUTIONAL SCHEME
The key section for motions of no confidence is S.145, which 
needs to be quoted in full here to provide the basis for the analysis 
that is to follow.
S.145. Motions of no confidence
(1) For the purposes of Sections 142 (the Prime 
Minister) and 144 (the Ministers) , a motion of no 
confidence is a motion -
14. See Clause 146 of the Fourth Draft.
15. The Constitution, S.145.
16. Chan, 1982:2.
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(a) that is expressed to be a motion of no confidence in 
the Prime Minister, the Ministry or a Minister, as the 
case may be; and
(b) of which not les than one week's notice, signed by a 
number of members of the Parliament being not less 
than one-tenth of the total number of seats in the 
Parliament, has been given in accordance with the 
Standing Orders of the Parliament.
(2) A motion of no confidence in the Prime Minister or 
the Ministry -
(a) moved during the first four years of the life of the 
Parliament shall not be allowed unless it nominates 
the next Prime Minister; and
(b) moved within 12 months before the fifth anniversary of 
the date fixed for the return of the writs at the 
previous general election shall not be allowed if it 
nominates the next Prime Minister.
(3) A motion of no confidence in the Prime Minister or 
the Ministry moved in accordance with Subsection (2)(a) 
may not be amended in respect of the name of the person 
nominated as the next Prime Minister except by 
substituting the name of some other person.
(4) A motion of no confidence in the Prime Minister or 
in the Ministry may not be moved during the period of six 
months commencing on the date of the appointment of the 
Prime Minister.
The section deals with the constructive motion of no confidence 
as well as the ordinary motion of no confidence, without elaborating 
on the distinction between them. To avoid confusion, it is necessary 
to deal with each type of motion separately, focusing particularly on 
their constitutional bases and consequences.
6.1.1 The Constructive Motion of No Confidence
Under S.145(4) a constructive motion of no confidence in either 
the Prime Minister or the Ministry collectively cannot be moved within 
six months from the date of appointment of the Prime Minister. After 
this period of grace, the Prime Minister and the Ministry 
collectively, are both liable to dismissal if a constructive motion of 
no confidence in either case is successful.^
17. Ibid., SS.142(5) and 144(4).
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The consequence of a successful constructive motion of no 
confidence in either the Prime Minister or the Ministry collectively 
differ, depending on the period in which the motion is moved. If it 
is moved before the fifth year of a Parliament, the consequence is the 
dismissal of the Prime Minister or the ministry collectively by the 
Head of State and the new Prime Minister is appointed without a 
General Election. If, on the other hand, a constructive motion of no 
confidence is successfully moved during the fifth year, the 
consequence is a General Election. But such a motion must not
nominate the alternative Prime Minister. Otherwise it would be 
invalid. This is, however, strictly not a constructive motion because 
it does not nominate the alternative Prime Minister. It can be best 
regarded as a special motion of no confidence. Thus, there are three 
types of motions of no confidence: the constructive motion; the
special motion; and the ordinary motion.
The CPC thought the six months period of grace was a reasonable
1 ftminimum period the Prime Minister needed to settle his Ministry. 
But with a turn-over of members of Parliament in excess of fifty per 
cent at a General Election, a new Minister might need more time to 
learn what is entailed in his Ministry, as well as in the whole 
governmental system.
There are two possible situations in which a Ministry can be
dismissed from office through a constructive vote of no confidence in
its Prime Minister. The Constitution contemplates without stating it
expressly, only, one of these situations, namely where such a motion
is moved successfully by a party not in government. In such a
situation, it is clear under S3.143 and 142(5) that the Prime Minister
1 9must take his ministry with him as Somare did in March 1980.
But there is another possibility which the Constitution does not 
cover, namely that a constructive motion of no confidence can also be 
moved against a Prime Minister by a faction within his own party. 
When this does occur such a motion (if successful) cannot be dealt 
with any differently from the one moved from outside the governing
18. CPC, 1974:7/10, para. 20.
19. Somare's dismissal is discussed below
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parties, as far as the consequence of such a motion is concerned. 
Thus, even though the alternative Prime Minister nominated by the 
motion moved within a government is in all probabilities a government 
man, he is in the same general constitutional position as a nominee in 
the case where a motion is moved from outside the government.
Where a motion of no confidence in the Ministry as a whole is 
successful, the Ministry must go with its Prime Minister, if the 
motion is moved prior to the fifth year of a Parliament. The Head
O 1of State is under an obligation to dismiss it.
The Ministry collectively as pointed out above, enjoys a
six-month period of immunity from motions of no confidence. But each
individual Minister, except the Prime Minister, does not enjoy that
immunity. This raises a rather interesting question about the extent
to which Parliament may go in removing Ministers individually without
breaching the collective immunity that the Ministry as a whole enjoys
during the first six months. It would seem that a dismissal of more
than half a Ministry would breach that immunity rule. This rule
however, did not apply to the First Parliament as was held by the
o oSupreme Court in Constitutional Reference No. 2 of 1976. There
Frost C.J. noted that because the six-months period of grace did not 
apply to the Ministry, Parliament could, if it so desired, remove all 
the Ministers, one by one until only the Prime Minister remained, at 
which point he would then be forced to resign. He would not have 
the maximum number of six Ministers the Constitution permits in order
r\ /
to form the Ministry. The power of Parliament of dismissing either 
the Prime Minister or the Ministry collectively through constructive 
motions of no confidence therefore remains a potent weapon with which 
to control the Executive. This was demonstrated on 11 March 1980, 
when Michael Somare was dismissed from the Office of Prime Minister 
following a successful constructive motion of no confidence in him. A 
brief account of this case is relevant, to illustrate the interpretive
20. Ibid., SS.142(5) and 145(1)(a).
21. Ibid., S.142(5).
22. 11976] P.N.G.L.R. 228.
23. Ibid., at 236.
24. See the Constitution, S.144(1).
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problems involved, since this was the first time the procedure of 
constructive motion of no confidence was actually applied in practice.
a) Somare's Dismissal
O RThe defeat of Somare was the culminating point in a series of
political events which began with the withdrawal of the Chan People's
Progress Party from the Somare Government on 7 November, 1978 over
9 f-\amendments to the Leadership Code. This situation was exacerbated
by a reshuffle of the cabinet at the same time in which Somare
27increased the voting strength of his PANGU Pati.
Then, during the following year, 1979, the 'Rooney Affair' caused
a great turmoil within the Government when the Government was openly
confronted by the Supreme Court. As a result of this, five of the
9 ftSupreme Court Judges resigned, ° and this could have done nothing but 
caused a greater disenchantment with the Somare Government.
On the 4th March, 1980, the then Leader of the Opposition, 
Iambakey Okuk gave a notice in Parliament of a motion of no confidence 
in Michael Somare as the Prime Minister, and named in that notice 
Julius Chan as the alternative Prime Minister within the meaning of 
S.145(2)(a) of the Constitution. When the motion was about to be 
debated in Parliament on 11 March, 1980, there was a conflicting legal 
advice given to the Government on whether the notice of the motion was 
in order. The Justice Department took the view that it was, but the
legal officers of the Prime Minister's Department took the view that 
29it was not. The latter opinion was based on a strict construction 
of S.145(2)(a) of the Constitution, which states that a notice of
25. There have been seven attempts, each against Somare, to remove
him from the office of the Prime Minister. One was successful, viz., 
that of 11 March, 1980. The most recent unsuccessful attempt was 
during the March Parliamentary session in 1985 when Somare defeated 
Pius Wingti, his former Deputy, by 68 votes to 19: see Post Courier,
26 March, 1985. But it was the successful motion of 11 March 1980 
that provides interesting perspectives on the practical application of 
the procedure and the difficulties of interpretation involved.
26. See Post Courier, 7 November, 1978.
27. Ibid.
28. See Weisbrot and Paliwala, 1982:8.
29. Personal notes.
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motion of no confidence must be given in accordance with the Standing 
Orders.
There were three grounds on which the legal officers from the 
Prime Minister's Department argued that the notice of 4th March, 1980 
was defective. First, as Okuk's notice of a motion was that of a 
Private Member, it should have been referred to the Private Business 
Committee as required by the Standing Order No. 141. As this was not 
none, the notice was defective. Secondly, a notice of a motion 
becomes effective only when it appeared in the Notice Paper. This was 
the requirement any notice of motion had to comply with under the 
Standing Order No. 149. Although Okuk's Notice was dated 4th March, 
1980, it did not appear on the Notice Paper until 6th March, 1980. 
Section 145(l)(b) required one week's Notice to be given. Thus, it 
was in order for the motion to be moved on 13 March because the 
effective date of Notice for this motion was 6 March. Thirdly, the 
legal officers argued that the Notice of 4th March, 1980, was 
defective in that it stated the name, Julius Chan, as the alternative 
Prime Minister and was therefore inconsistent with S.145(2) of the 
Constitution, which required the actual motion to do this.
The opinion of the legal officers from the Prime Minister's 
Department was accepted by the Government. This opinion was presented 
to the Speaker in Chambers in the presence of his legal adviser and 
the Clerk. But subsequent events in Parliament showed that the 
opinion was not accepted, presumably because it was regarded as 
constituting a delay tactic.
When the debate on the motion itself began in Parliament on 11 
March, 1980, Neville Bourne, the member fo Menyamya, argued for the 
Government by bringing a point of order that the Notice of the motion 
was not in order on the grounds stated above. The Speaker however, 
ruled that the Standing Orders did not cover motions of no confidence, 
and that in the past notices of such motion were not given to the 
Chairman, of the Private Business Committee but to the Clerk instead, 
who then formally tabled them in Parliament. The Prime Minister, Mr 
Somare then moved a motion of dissent against the Speaker's ruling. 
Julius Chan in turn, supported that ruling. A division was called by 
the Opposition and after the bells, the vote was taken on the motion 
of dissent. The Government lost by 48 votes to 37.
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Thereafter, the Prime Minister himself brought up a further point 
of order on the basis that since the question of defective notice of 
the motion had been referred to the Supreme Court for its advice, 
Parliament should refrain from considering the matter until the 
Supreme Court handed down its decision. In support of his argument 
the Prime Minister relied on the precedent set down in Rooney’s Case 
the year before, where Parliament refrained from further debate on the 
issues involved in that case because the case was pending before the 
Supreme Court. The Speaker then announced that the new point of order 
raised technical questions of law on which he needed advice. He 
therefore adjourned the Parliament till the ringing of the bells.
The bells rang at 4.25 p.m. The Speaker then handed down his 
ruling that according to the normal practice of the Parliament, any 
matter that is formally before a court must be adjourned until the 
court in question has given its decision. This might mean, the 
Speaker said, a suspension of Parliament until the court's decision is 
given. This ruling raised the Government's hope of temporarily 
staving off the debate, only to be dashed by the Opposition's motion 
of dissent against the Speaker's ruling, moved by Joseph Aoae, the 
Member for Kairuku-Hiri.
The Opposition knew that they had the numbers to pass their 
motion of dissent against the Speaker's ruling, which they did by 57 
votes to 47. But it realised that it needed time to have the actual 
motion of no confidence in Somare passed, as by then time was 
approaching 5 o'clock at which time Parliament is required under the 
Standing Order Mo. 48 to be adjourned. Accordingly, the Leader of the 
Opposition, Iambakey Okuk moved a motion to suspend the Standing Order 
No. 48 in order to allow the debate on the motion of no confidence to 
be brought to finality. The motion was carried.
Immediately following this, the Leader of the Opposition formally 
moved that the National Parliament had no confidence in Michael Thomas 
Somare as the Prime Minister, and that therefore Julius Chan be
30. When the Government realised that the motion could be held off 
for a while on the basis of a defective notice, it referred the case 
to the Supreme Court as a constitutional matter under S.18 of the 
Constitution.
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nominated the Prime Minister. Okuk went on to make his speech in 
support of the motion. The Prime Minister then made his speech in 
reply, refuting the allegations against his Government made by the 
Leader of the Opposition in his speech.
As soon as the Prime Minister finished his speech, the Member for 
Jimi, Thomas Kavali who was a former Minister for Lands in the Somare 
Government but who had joined the Opposition, gagged the debate by 
moving a motion that the question be put to the vote. The Opposition 
defeated the Government easily on this motion by 57 votes to 47.
The Speaker then read out the motion that Parliament had no 
confidence in Michael Thomas Somare as the Prime Minister. For the 
purpose of voting on the motion the Speaker then directed that those 
Members who supported Somare to move to the Speaker's right and those 
who supported Chan to move to the Speaker's left. After this was 
done, the members stood while the Clerk counted those on the right and 
his Deputy counted those on the left. After the Clerk finished
counting those on the right he went up to his desk and recorded the 
result, and then proceeded to the left hand side of the chamber and 
counted those supporting Chan. He then went up to his desk and 
recorded the result. The Deputy Clerk did the same. Whilst the Clerk 
and his Deputy cross-checked their counting results, the Speaker 
directed all Members to resume their respective seats.
The Clerk then handed the results to the Speaker who announced 
that 57 Members supported the motion whilst 47 were against. The 
Speaker then declared Julius Chan as elected by Parliament to be the 
Prime Minister, and adjourned Parliament for 15 minutes to allow the 
Prime Minister-elect to prepare his statement.
When Parliament resumed, Julius Chan made his statement on what
his new Government hoped to achieve. Michael Somare, in turn,
congratulated the Prime Minister-elect. The Speaker then adjourned
11the Parliament for two days.
During that evening, the Governor-General signed an Instrument of
31. See Minutes of Proceedings of the National Parliament, No. 120, 
11 March, 1980.
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Dismissal, dismissing Michael Somare as the Prime Minister, and an 
Instrument of Appointment, appointing Julius Chan as the new Prime 
Minister. Following this, Julius Chan was sworn in by the 
Governor-General into the office of the Prime Minister together with a 
care-taker cabinet of three Ministers. A full Ministry was appointed 
and sworn in during the following week.
There was however, some uncertainty among lawyers about the 
correct procedure for the appointment of Julius Chan as the new Prime 
Minister. One view was that the normal procedure for appointing a 
Prime Minister under S.142(2) of the Constitution and the Standing 
Order No. 8 should be followed after the motion was successfully 
passed. The other was that this would amount to a procedural 
duplication and it was precisely for this reason that the CPC invented 
the special procedure of a constructive vote of no confidence in which 
one Prime Minister constructively gives way to another without 
Parliament having to vote for the same person the second time. The
oolatter view ultimately prevailed, but in order to see the problems 
of interpretation of various provisions governing each of these 
procedures, a brief analysis of them is necessary.
i) The Normal Procedure for Appointing a Prime Minister
The procedure for the formal nomination of prime ministerial 
candidates by the Parliament as required under S. 142(2) of the 
Constitution is provided for by the Standing Orders. But the rules 
governing the actual choice of a person as a candidate are not legal 
but conventional.
Section 142(2) of the Constitution provides that -
The Prime Minister shall be appointed, at the first meeting of 
the Parliament after a general election and otherwise from 
time to time as the occasion for the appointment of a Prime 
Minister arises, by the Head of State, acting in accordance 
with a decision of the Parliament.
This procedure by which Parliament makes that decision is provided for 
by the Standing Order No. 8(1) which states that:
The Prime Minister shall be elected by motion, duly moved and 
seconded, without notice.
32. Personal notes taken whilst in the Prime Minister's Office.
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The procedure under the Standing Order No. 8(1) is the procedure for 
electing a Prime Minister in four situations: first, after a general 
election; secondly, where a Prime Minister dies in office; thirdly, 
where he is dismissed from office other than as a result of a 
successful constructive motion of no confidence against him; and 
fourthly, where a Prime Minister resigns from office.
This procedure was used to appoint Michael Somare as Prime 
Minister on two occasions, namely, following the General Elections of 
1977 and those of 1982. After the Speaker is chosen during the first 
meeting of a Parliament following a General Election, Standing Order 
No. 6(3) and S.142(4) of the Constitution require Parliament to
proceed to elect a Prime Minister, and this can be done at any time.
3 3Parliament did not have to leave it to the following day. The 
procedure under Standing Order No. 8(1) appears to be a simple 
procedure in that it requires a motion duly moved and seconded without 
notice. However, an ambiguity in the interpretation of the Standing 
Order emerged during the election of the Prime Minister in August 1977 
when Michael Somare and John Guise were the nominees. The question 
was whether a motion moved and seconded verbally and subsequently 
supported a majority of show-hands was all that was required within 
the meaning of the Standing Order. The Somare-Chan Coalition accepted 
the legal advice that the Standing Order requires the motion to be in 
writing with the name of the nominee and that of the motion to be
q J
supported by a simple majority. This interpretation ultimately 
prevailed and Somare defeated Guise when the written motion was put to 
the vote. This interpretation was also adopted in the election of the 
Prime Minister after the 1982 General Elections.
ii) The Special Procedure under the
Constructive Vote of No Confidence
As stated above, in devising the procedure of a constructive vote 
of no confidence, the CPC wanted to achieve two results 
simultaneously, namely, the removing of one Prime Minister and the 
installing of another. Hence, it intended that a motion of no




confidence in a Prime Minister and which nominates an alternative 
Prime Minister should be an adequate election by the Parliament of the 
alternative Prime Minister, if the motion is successful.
It seems that S.143(2)(a) of the Constitution attempts to 
incorporate this procedure, but leaves ambiguities because of poor 
drafting. That section provides that:
(2) Where a Prime Minister is dismissed under section 
142(5) (a.) (the Prime Minister) the person nominated under 
Section 145(2)(a_) (motion of no confidence) ...
(a) becomes the Acting Prime Minister until he is appointed 
a Prime Minister in accordince with Section 142(2) (the Prime 
Minister); and
If one leaves out the phrase, ’in accordance with S.142(2)(a) ...’ in 
the last part of paragraph (a), the section does appear to incorporate 
this special procedure by providing that the person nominated as the 
alternative Prime Minister in a constructive motion under S.145(2)(a) 
of the Constitution becomes automatically the Acting Prime Minister 
until he is appointed a Prime Minister. But when that part of the 
paragraph is included, it creates an element of ambiguity in that it 
then raises the question whether the normal procedure under S.142(2) 
of the Constitution and the Standing Order No. 8(1) should be applied 
in this situation of a successful motion of no confidence in a Prime 
Minister.
However, as shown above, this ambiguity is now settled, at least 
in practice by the precedent of Julius Chan’s election as the Prime 
Minister. After the successful motion of no confidence against 
Michael Somare as the Prime Minister, Julius Chan became instantly the 
Prime Minister-Elect until he was formally appointed and sworn as the 
Prime Minister within the meaning of S.143(2)(a) of the Constitution. 
Thus the rationale of the procedure is now established: that 
Parliament should not vote twice for the same person, once such person 
is shown to be clearly the alternative Prime Minister in a successful 
motion of no confidence. What remains to be done then is the 
completion of the formalities in relation to the formal appointment by 
the Head of State as required under S.142(2) of the Constitution.
Any dispute over a motion of no confidence involves essentially 
the question of Parliamentary procedure, and S.134 of the Constitution
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renders such matters non-judiciable. Moreover, the Supreme Court
O £has indicated that it would be reluctant to intervene in such cases.0
6.1.2 The Ordinary Motion of No Confidence
From the moment of his appointment a Minister (but not the Prime 
Minister) is subject to dismissal through ordinary motions of no 
confidence. If a motion of no confidence moved against a Minister is 
successful, he is dismissed by the Head of State. This seems to be 
the automatic effect of S.144(4)(a) of the Constitution. Thus, the 
Prime Minister cannot advise the Governor-General to act against the 
decision of Parliament, and there does not appear to be any need for 
the Prime Minister to advise the Governor-General to dismiss the 
defeated Minister. The proper procedure would be for the Speaker to 
notify the Head of State of the Parliament's decision, and then for 
the Head of State to dismiss the Minister. This would constitute the 
practical operation of the automatic effect of S.144(4)(a) of the 
Constitution.
One significant effect of a successful motion of no confidence 
against a Minister is that he is dismissed as a Minister from all the 
portfolios he may be holding at the time either on a permanent or on 
an acting basis. This may depend on the actual wording of the motion, 
although this would or should not prevent a complete dismissal of a 
Minister.
It should be noted however, that a vote of no confidence in an 
individual Minister (other than the Prime Minister) is not a 
constructive motion of no confidence because the motion requiring such 
vote is not required to nominate an alternative Minister. To make 
such motion a constructive one would be to defeat the purpose of the 
power the Constitution vests in a Prime Minister to choose his own 
Ministry. ^
35. Thus enacting the traditional principle developed through Common
Law cases: see, Bradlaugh v. Bossett (1884) 12 Q.B.. 271, and Dingle
v. Associated Newspapers Ltd. & Qrs [1960] 2 Q.B. 405.




However, it seems the CPC realised that there could be occasions 
on which the Prime Minister may be unable to dismiss a Minister. In 
such cases it wanted the Parliament to do the work on his behalf, and 
this could be done adequately if Parliament was given a general power 
to move an ordinary motion of no confidence in each individual 
Minister.
There have been five unsuccessful attempts at removing individual 
Ministers by means of motions of no confidence. Three of these were 
moved during the period from August 1977 to March 1980 when the
O OSomare-Chan Coalition was in office; and two were moved during the 
period when Chan's Coalition Government was in office from March 1980 
to August 1982."^
Because none of the ordinary motions of no confidence has been 
successful, the technical questions still remain to be settled.
6.2 PROBLEMS CREATED BY CONSTRUCTIVE MOTIONS OF NO CONFIDENCE
Parliament must control the Executive's performance and dismiss 
the Executive which is incompetent and lacks a sense of 
responsibility. It must do this expeditiously and with minimum cost 
to the electorate.
But if the executive government is changed too often, it will 
create instability within the political system: governmental 
programmes will be interrupted and the mandates promised during 
elections will not be easily implemented. There is also the question 
of financial cost. In other words, Parliament must enable the 
Executive to govern and to deliver the social goods it promised the 
electorate. The Executive can govern only if there is some stability.
The common complaint is that there have been too many 
constructive motions of no confidence to allow the Constitution to
38. The motions were moved against Pato Karkaya, the Minister for 
Works and Supply; Delba Biri, the Minister for Justice and Bruce 
Jephcott, the Minister for Transport and Civil Aviation.
39. These two motions were moved against Roy Evara, the Minister for 
Primary Industry and Warren Dutton, the Minister for Police.
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work effectively.^ When Somare won the last constructive motion of 
no confidence in him as the Prime Minister in March 1985, he had by 
then faced seven such motions. He won all except one.^
An Editorial in the Post Courier on 25 March, 1985, argued that 
such a motion does not change anything. All it does is to demonstrate
"the contempt politicians have for their voters and the quite
/ 0sickening displays of moral outrage from all parties." Three
negative consequences of such a motion can be identified. First, it 
unsettles the Executive and makes it difficult for it to formulate and 
implement its policies. Secondly, such a motion causes delay in the 
amount of work Parliament is required to process in each session. 
Thirdly, it frustrates the work of public servants (especially the 
senior officers) in that they are hesitant to work actively for fear 
of being seen as supporting the outgoing government should the motion 
succeed.
These problems were brought to the attention of the General 
Constitutional Commission which was set up in 1979 to review the 
Constitution.*^ The Commission submitted its Final Report with its 
recommendations to the National Parliament in early March, 1983. At 
the time of writing the Parliament had not completed the debate on the 
Report.
In its Final Report the General Constitutional Commission has
recommended three changes to the present provisions governing
constructive motions of no confidence. First, it has recommended that
the present period of six months grace in which a motion of no
confidence could not be moved against the Prime Minister or the
Ministry collectively, be extended to twelve months, and that this
45immunity be extended to individual Ministers as well. It was felt
40. See the complaint by the Public Employees Association: Niugini
Nius, 22 March, 1985:13.
41. See Post Courier, 19 March, 1985:4.
42. Ibid., 25 March, 1985:4.
43. Chan, 1982:2.
44. See General Constitutional Commission Act 1978.
45. At present a Minister is not covered: see the Constitution
S.145(4); and see General Constitutional Commission 1983:138-39.
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that a motion of no confidence in a Minister does have some unsettling 
effect on the Government as a whole and thus, each Minister should 
also enjoy this immunity in order to enable not only his ministry but 
also the whole Government to settle down. But the major consideration 
was the need for a newly-elected government to settle-down well as 
early as possible so that it could carry out its programme. The 
Commission considered this to be very important in the light of its 
recommendation to reduce the current life of Parliament from five 
years to four. D There was also an element of concern in the thinking 
of the Commissioners that this extension of the period of grace was 
necessary to reduce the possibility of what may be regarded as 
unnecessary motions of no confidence being brought against a new 
government.
The Commission received a number of submissions complaining about 
what appeared to be unnecessary motions of no confidence brought 
against the Government. In order to try to resolve this problem, the 
Commission's second recommendation calls for any notice of a motion of 
no confidence to be signed by one-quarter of the total membership of 
the Parliament instead of one-tenth as at present.^ This would, the 
Commission hoped, create some sense of seriousness among the Members 
of Parliament so that only genuine motions could be brought. Also, it 
would prevent interruptions of the government's business in 
Parliament, which had been inevitable consequences of such motions in 
the past.
The General Constitutional Commission's third recommendation is 
that if there is a second motion of no confidence moved in either the 
Prime Minister, the Ministry as a whole or even in an individual 
Minister during the fourth and final year of the life of a Parliament, 
there should be a General Election. Two considerations influenced the 
Commission's thinking on this recommendation. First, it felt that a 
second motion against a Government in the final year may indicate an 
unstable Government which the electorate should be asked to replace 
through a General Election. Secondly, if on the other hand, the
46. Personal notes taken whilst I was serving as both the Secretary 
to the Commission and as a Commissioner.
47. See General Constitutional Commission, 1983:138-139.
216
problem is one of a fight for power, then the best way to stop this is
48to ask the electorate to resolve it through a General Election.
Otherwise, the Commission has recommended that the present 
procedure be retained.
6.3 A PROPOSAL TO REMEDY THE PROBLEMS
It seems to me that there are two basic factors which combine to 
create the monotonous regularity of constructive motions of no 
confidence. First, the Constitution does not provide any guidance on 
the possible grounds on which such motions could be brought forth in 
Parliament. Secondly, the Constitution equally fails to provide any 
further control on when such motions could be brought, apart from 
allowing for a six months period of grace. If the problems created by 
frequent constructive motions of no confidence are to be remedied, 
these two basic factors have to be removed or, at least, controlled. 
Some analysis of each of these factors is therefore relevant.
6.3.1 Possible Grounds for Constructive Motions of No Confidence
As a result of a failure by the Constitution to define the
grounds for constructive motions of no confidence, all kinds of
reasons, some of which could only be regarded as trivialities, have
49been put forward in the past. ^
The procedure of motions of no confidence in the Westminster 
system as it is practised elsewhere relates very much to a case where 
an issue is of such significance that the Prime Minister has declared 
it as a matter of confidence prior to voting. Section 105(1)(b)(ii) 
of the Constitution embodies this procedure. The CPC itself viewed
the procedure of constructive motions of no confidence to be used in
48. Ibid.
49. A good example of this was the allegation by Sir Tei Abal that 
Pato Karkaya, the Minister for Home Affairs in the first Somare 
Government, had tried to act like a Prime Minister. Sir Tei Abal used 
this as one of the reasons for his motion of no confidence against 
Pato Karkaya as a Minister in August, 1978: Personal notes.
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cases where issues are of great significance to the nation.
It is known that generally motions of no confidence moved so far 
have been the result of personal ambition for power and perhaps of 
office, rather than as a result of genuine complaints that the 
Government had not acted properly or competently. It seems to have 
been assumed by the constitution-makers that laying down grounds on 
which a motion of no confidence may be moved would be to remove the 
flexibility that political process requires. But this has created an 
open-gate situation in which, at least theoretically, all the sittings 
of Parliament after the six months of period of grace, could be spent 
debating motions of no confidence against the Government. It would 
seem that the Constitution could and should provide some general 
requirements in this respect without reducing unduly the flexibility 
of the political process. For instance, it could be provided that any 
of the following reasons could constitute the basis on which a motion 
of no confidence may be moved: that the electorate no longer has any 
confidence in the Executive in carrying out its mandate; that the 
Executive for one reason or another, for instance through wide-spread 
corruption, cannot govern; that the Executive has made a policy 
decision that has seriously violated the provisions of the 
Constitution; or that the Executive has made a wrong decision on a 
matter of serious nature, which throws the confidence of Parliament in 
it into serious doubt. Such provision would indicate the seriousness 
of the sorts of issues with which the procedure of motions of no 
confidence should be concerned as intended by the CPC.
6.3.2 The Need for Some Control on the Timing 
of Constructive Motions of No Confidence
Not only is the question of grounds for motions of no confidence 
left to political expediency, but so is the question of when such a 
motion is to be brought. The six months period of grace is the only 
restriction in this regard. The net effect of this is that the four 
annual sittings of Parliament in a given year could be tied up with 
matters of motion of no confidence as was almost the case in 1978 when
50. See CPC, 1974:7/6, para. 45.
218
three of the four sittings in that year had to deal with separate 
motions of no confidence in Ministers in the first Somare Government.
There is therefore a real need to have some control on the period 
in which motions of no confidence may be brought. This could be done 
by working out a time-table which balances the objective of providing 
some stability to enable the Executive to implement its programme and 
the objective of removing at the earliest opportunity an Executive 
that cannot govern effectively and competently. The best way to do 
this is to set the life of a Parliament at four years as recommended 
by the General Constitutional Commission; and to make allowance for 
each of these objectives to be achieved in each alternate year, after 
the period of grace. The main means for achieving the objectives are 
the Parliamentary sittings in each year. The Constitution requires at 
least three sittings in every twelve months."^ But the practice has 
been four sittings in each year. Thus, for a Parliament of four 
years, there would be a total of sixteen sittings spread over a total 
period of forty-eight months for purposes of allowing an Executive 
either to govern or of dismissing it if it cannot.
A new Government that comes into existence after a General 
Election needs adequate time to settle down. Under the peculiar 
circumstances of PNG the current six months of grace period has proved 
to be inadequate, and so the General Constitutional Commission 
recommended that this period be extended to twelve months. This 
should prove adequate. The focus of the Constitution during the first 
year should therefore be one of allowing a new government to settle 
down and implement its policies.
If it fails to do this then the main focus during the second year 
should therefore be to enable Parliament to remove such an Executive. 
This could be done by allowing two of the four annual sittings to be 
used for removing the Executive through constructive motions of no 
confidence. Thus, if Parliament cannot remove the Executive on a 
motion of no confidence on the first occasion, then it can do so on 
the second occasion. But if Parliament fails on the second occasion 
to change the Executive through a successful motion of no confidence,
51. See the Constitution, S.124(1)
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then the message is clear: that Parliament is unable to resolve the 
problem. At this point the electorate should be allowed to do it. 
The way to achieving that is to allow a third motion of no confidence 
to be brought which leads to a General Election irrespective of the 
outcome. This would force Members of Parliament into two options in 
the second year: either they change the Executive if they sincerely 
believe that it is not a good government, by treating the second 
motion of no confidence in that year seriously, or they all face the 
electorate on the third motion, even if it is successful.
The remaining two normal sittings are then kept for the normal 
business of Parliament. With that, the Executive should get the 
opportunity to carry on with its programme.
The second year is the mid-point in the four-year period of a 
normal Parliament, and is therefore important in terms of how much a 
new Executive can achieve within the balance of that period. If, for 
instance, Parliament is to remove a Ministry through a vote of no 
confidence during the first sitting in the second year, the new 
Executive would have about thirty-three months to implement its 
policies. That period is reduced to thirty months if such a motion is 
passed during the second sitting, and to twenty-seven and twenty-five 
respectively if it is passed in the third or the fourth sitting.
During the third year, the aim should be to allow the Executive 
to carry out its programme. In the case where there has been a change 
in the Executive during the second year, any possible interference by 
Parliament through a motion of no confidence is avoided by the fact 
that much of the third year would be a period of immunity against such 
motions. But where there had been no change in the Executive during 
the second year, some provision had to be made to remove it during the 
third year if the need arises. It is suggested that this could be 
done by allowing any two of the four sittings in that year to deal 
with motions of no confidence. But because the focus this time is to 
enable the Executive to carry out its programme, Parliament should be 
forced to get rid of the Executive during the first occasion, if it 
really believes the Executive cannot perform. But if it does not 
achieve this, then it should be given the chance on the second 
occasion to do it. If the motion is not successful, the Executive 
should be allowed to serve its term since it would have then become 
clear that it still had the confidence of Parliament.
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But where a motion of no confidence is successful on the second
occasion in the third year, the result should be a General Election.
The reason is that any Executive that comes into office at this point
is only a care-taker Government since at the most it would have less
than eighteen months in which to carry out its programmes and less
52than ten months at the least.
The fourth year is the year for the electorate to exercise their
democratic right to return their representatives. Thus, if there is
any doubt about the competency of the Executive by this stage, it
should be resolved by the electorate. Thus, the present provisions
require a General Election to be held if there is a successful motion
of no confidence in either the Prime Minister or the Ministry during 
55the final year. But this would still have an unsettling effect, in
that it would not be fair to an Executive which has survived up to
this point. It should be allowed to complete its programme.
In order to achieve this, Parliament should be given one 
opportunity to turn the Executive over to the electorate through a 
successful motion of no confidence as presently provided. But to
restrict this choice to only one occasion, the Constitution needs to 
be amended to provide that a second motion of no confidence in the 
final year will result in a General Election irrespective of whether 
it succeeds or not, as recommended by the General Constitutional 
Commission.
What seems to be required under S.105(l)(c) is a simple 
resolution passed by an absolute majority that there should be a
General Election. This power resembles that which a Prime Minister 
has under the Westminster system elsewhere to be able to call a 
General Election at any time. So far the provision has not been used, 
and accordingly, it is difficult to indicate either the nature of this 
power or its precise scope.
52. If the motion which brings it into office is passed during the 
first sitting or during the last sitting, respectively.
53. The Constitution, S.105(l)(b)(i).
54. It should be noted that S.105(l)(c) confers on Parliament the 
power to resolve to go to a General Election at any time. This is a 
safety-valve provision which is really a reserve power in the hands of 
Parliament.
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6.3.3 The Rationale of the Proposal
The proposal suggested above aims to achieve some balance between 
the jieed for both the Parliament and the electorate to allow the 
Executive to formulate and implement its policies; and the need to 
change an Executive that cannot govern. The first need can be 
satisfied by allowing the first twelve months as the settling-down 
period in which formulation of policies is vital. Thereafter, 
sufficient time is allowed for implementation of these policies.
The second need could be met by concentrating at the earliest 
opportunity which is the second year, in removing an Executive that 
has failed to formulate policies or for some reason has been unable to 
govern effectively. If this cannot be done during the second year, 
then provision is made to enable such Executive to be removed during 
the third year. After the second year however, emphasis is shifted 
slightly towards the need for the Government to complete its 
programme, because an Executive which has survived up to then would 
have proved its acceptability and ought to be given the opportunity to 
implement its mandate. Equally, a new Executive, if there had been a 
change in the second or third year, should be given a chance to show 
something of its policies and programme.
The reserve power of the Parliament under S.105(1) of the 
Constitution in the meantime, plays a complementary role by permitting 
the electorate to resolve at any time any conflict arising between the 
Executive and the Parliament that Parliament cannot resolve by itself. 
In this way, a Government that can govern is given the chance to 
govern, but the one that cannot is expeditiously removed with little 
risk to continuity and stability of the whole governmental system.
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CHAPTER 7
CONTROLLING THE EXECUTIVE THROUGH THE COURTS
The Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC) knew that conflict
would inevitably arise not only between individuals, but also between
individuals and government; and even between different levels of
government.'*' It wanted such conflicts to be resolved according to 
„ 2law and justice', although as will be shown later in this chapter, 
the constitution-makers in the end regarded "justice" as the more
important of the two. Yet, they also wanted to see PNG governed by
, 3law and not by whims of powerful individuals or groups . This was
the main purpose of having a constitution at all.^ Hence, the CPC 
emphasised that
those who legislate and those who exercise executive power 
should not also be responsible for dispensing justice in our 
new nation.
It therefore sought to strengthen the role courts had been 
traditionally playing in controlling the Executive. This is reflected 
by the constitutional provisions which incorporate both the public law 
and private law remedies, particularly SS.155(4), 59, 60, 41 and the
Schedule 2. Section 155(4) provides a wide power for the superior
£courts to make orders in the nature of the prerogative writs. 
Sections 59 and 60 appear to incorporate the principles of natural 
justice. Furthermore, Schedule 2 also incorporates these principles 
through its adoption of the Common Law of England as part of the 
Underlying Law. Section 41 proscribes certain acts, including 
executive acts, under otherwise valid laws, and is, in the comparative
1. See CPC, 1974:8/1, para. 1.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., 8/1, para. 3.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., 8/1, para. 4.
6. The writs are defined in detail by the 1983 Rules of the National 
Court.
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context, a unique provision. In this chapter I will attempt to 
analyse both the nature and scope of these provisions which permit 
citizens to challenge any action of the Executive.
7.1 THE FORM AND SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF 
EXECUTIVE ACTION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
7.1.1 The Forms of Judicial Review
The common law has developed both procedural remedies and 
substantive law doctrines for purposes of controlling the Executive 
action.
The procedural remedies are divided into two categories. The 
first comprises those remedies which are usually referred to as the 
'Prerogative Writs' since their origin lay with the Royal 
Prerogatives. These are Prohibition, Certiorari, Mandamus, Quo 
Warranto, Habeas Corpus and Ne Exeat Regno Procedendo. The second 
category of procedural remedies are the Private Law remedies or what 
are sometimes referred to as the non-prerogative remedies which 
developed from private legal suits between individuals. There are 
four of these, viz. Injunction, Declaration, Realtor Action (i.e. 
public interest suits)'7 and Actions for Damages.
The substantive law doctrines which courts developed to control 
abuse of power also are of two kinds. The first is the doctrine of 
ultra vires which may be applied on such grounds as want or excess of 
jurisdiction, defects in procedure, improper purpose, extraneous 
considerations, unreasonableness, sub-delegation of powers, and 
surrender of discretion. The second is what is collectively termed 
the Principles of Natural Justice. The doctrine is closely related to 
the first one. The two important principles are the rule against bias 
and the right to be heard.
7.1.2 The Constitutional Basis of the Judicial Remedies
Orders in the nature of prerogative writs are expressly permitted
7. These are initiated by the Attorney-General or with his consent.
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by S155(4), and Orders 16 and 17 of the Rules of National Court have 
incorporated the writs themselves. But it is not certain whether this 
incorporation includes all the non-prerogative remedies. Section 
155(4) provides that:
Both the Supreme Court and the National Court have an 
inherent power to make, in such circumstances as seem to them 
proper, orders in the nature of prerogative writs and such 
other orders as are necessary to do justice in the 
circumstances of a particular case.
The National Court Rules of 1983 made by the National Court judges 
under the authority of S.184 of the Constitution, spell out neatly the 
procedural remedies against Executive action. The Rules are based on
Othe United Kingdom model, and provide for most of the procedural
Qremedies stated above. Order 16 does away with the traditional 
distinction between the prerogative and the non-prerogative remedies 
by combining both.^ It even allows for joint application for two or 
more of these remedies at the same time^ - a course of action not 
possible at Common Law.
The two traditional remedies Order 16 omits are the old Writ of
Ne Exeat Regno Procedendo, and the Realtor Actions. The Writ of
1 2Habeas Corpus is dealt with separately by Order 17. Any application
for judicial review must first secure leave to apply from the National 
1 3Court; and no leave will be granted unless the applicant has a 
sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates".^ 
The introduction of the application for judicial review means that for 
the first time both the public law and private law remedies become 
available in conjunction with one another. This raises the question
8. England introduced a single procedure for judicial review in
1977 : See The Rules of the Supreme Court (Amendment No. 3) of 1977 .
This new procedure was legislated in 1981 as Section 31 of the Supreme 
Court Act 1975. See the analysis of this procedure by Wade, 1983:166.
9. Order 16 is entitled "Application for Judicial Review" and 
contains twelve Rules.
10. Order 16, Rule 1.
11. Ibid.
12. An application for a writ of habeas corpus must be made by way
of originating summons and may be made ex parte: Order 17, Rules 1
and 2.
13. Order 16, Rule 3(1).
14. Order 16, Rule 3(5).
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whether there is now only one single test for locus standi, namely 
that of sufficient interest or whether there are still several tests, 
which take into account the different contexts in which the various 
remedies have developed.
•The courts are yet to develop the law on this new doctrine of 
judicial review. In Augustine Olei v. The Provincial Land Court at 
Port Moresby and Others,^ the National Court granted leave to a 
person seeking judicial review under Order 16 on the basis that he, as 
a "person aggrieved" within the meaning of S.55(1) of the Land 
Disputes Settlement Act 1975, was a person who had sufficient interest 
for purposes of Order 16 even though he was not a party to the 
proceedings in the lower court.^
The two substantive law doctrines stated above are also 
incorporated into the Constitution. On the Principles of Natural 
Justice, S.59 of the Constitution provides specifically that,
(1) Subject to this Constitution and to any statute, the 
principles of natural justice are the rules of the underlying 
law known by that name developed for control of judicial and 
administrative proceedings.
(2) The minimum requirement of natural justice is the duty 
to act fairly, and, in principle, to be seen to act fairly.
The doctrine of ultra vires (as well as the Principles of Natural 
Justice) are also adopted as part of the Common Law under Schedule 
2.2(1).
There are, in addition, a number of specific instances where the 
Constitution provides power to the National Court to grant remedies. 
These are discussed in detail by Bayne. ^  Sections 22 and 23 are 
particularly significant. The former provides that where 
constitutional provisions lack machinery for enforcement the National 
Court is required to supply it; and the latter provides that where an 
action breaches a constitutional provision which prohibits or 
restricts a certain act or imposes a duty, the National Court may 
impose a sentence of imprisonment not exceeding 10 years or impose a
15. Unreported Judgment N.461(M) of May, 1984
16. This was the Provincial Land Court.
17. See Bayne, 1981:51-57.
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fine not exceeding K10,000, or make any other order it deems proper, 
where neither the Constitution nor any other law provides for 
enforcement of such breach. Both sections are silent on who can bring 
an action in such cases, and this was the question the Supreme Court 
faced in relation to S.23 in the case of the Supreme Court Reference 
No. 4 of 1981 (The Vanuatu Case).^ In that case the Leader of the 
Opposition, Michael Somare, filed a petition seeking a delaration from 
the Supreme Court that both a Resolution and the Defence Force 
(Presence Abroad) Act 1980 passed by the National Parliament in July, 
1980, which committed the Defence Force for peaceful operation in
Vanuatu, were unconstitutional because they breached the restrictions
19imposed by S.205 of the Constitution. The majority was prepared to
grant Somare locus standi on the basis that he had a sufficient
interest in the matter both as a member of Parliament and as a 
20citizen. Although the Supreme Court allowed Somare locus standi for
purposes of getting the S.23 remedy, it saw a limitation to the
application of S.23 inasmuch as it stated that the section was not
applicable to Parliament. As Kidu C.J. pointed out, S.23 does not
21give any power to the courts to penalise Parliament.
The Constitution also in some specific cases creates duties, the 
breach of which attracts judicial review. Section 225 for instance, 
imposes a duty on the Government to provide facilities to
Constitutional Office-Holders in order to enable them to perform their 
functions. A breach of this type of provision attracts certain kinds 
of remedies such as Mandamus to enable duties to be performed. 
Admittedly, the actual enforcement of such provision depends on 
whether funds have been appropriated by Parliament for the purpose. 
Where there is such an appropriation it should be relatively easy to
18. [1981] P.N.G.L.R. 265.
19. S.205(2)(b) permits the Defence Force to be committed to an 
international peace-keeping or relief operation but only with a prior 
approval from Parliament. Somare argued, however, that such approval 
can only be given if there is an international agreement between 
Vanuatu and PNG as required by S.202(b) of the Constitution, and that 
there was no such agreement.
20. The minority viewed the petition as involving a constitutional 
reference and since the Leader of the Opposition is precluded by S.19 
of the Constitution as a proper authority to make such reference, 
Somare lacked the necessary standing.
21. [1981] P.N.G.L.R. 265 at 267.
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enforce the provision. The general principle governing this type of
22remedy at Common Law was stated by Lord Tenterden in Doe v. Bridges 
thus:
Where an Act creates an obligation and enforces the 
performance in a specific manner, we take it to be a general 
tule that performance cannot be enforced in any other 
manner.^
This decision was followed later in the House of Lords in Passmore v. 
Oswaldtwistle Urban District Council.^
7.2 THE SCOPE OF THE POWER OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF EXECUTIVE ACTION
7.2.1 The Scope of S.155(4)
2 5It is now established that S.155(4) is a grant of power. There
is still, however, some uncertainty about the scope of this power. In
The State v. Independent Tribunal; ex parte Sasakila^0 (Sasakila's
Case) where Certiorari was sought to remove an Order of a Leadership
Code Tribunal into the Supreme Court, Kearney J. observed that
9 7 9ftS.155(4) together with S.60 and Schedule 2.4 has extended the 
scope of Certiorari beyond what is permitted at Common Law, and has 
removed the technical complexities involved in this area of judicial 
review. As Bayne shows, S.155(4) has been applied in criminal cases 
also by Narokobi A.J., who has taken a broad interpretation of the
22. 1831 1 B & Ad. 847.
23. Ibid., at 859.
24. [1898] A.C. 387.
25. Premdas v. Independent State of Papua New Guinea (Premdas' Case) 
[1979] P.N.G.L.R. 329 at 337 , and Andrew J. at 401; and Kearney 
Dep.C.J. in Avia Aihi v. The State (No. 1) (Aihi's Case). [1981] 
P.N.G.L.R. 80 at 91.
26. [1976] P.N.G.L.R. 491.
27. S.60 of the Constitution empowers the Courts to develop a system 
of principles of natural justice and of administration specifically 
designed for the needs of PNG.
28. Schedule 2.4 empowers the courts specifically to develop the 
Underlying Law.
29. [1976] P.N.G.L.R. 491 at 505.
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on O 1section in two cases. In The State v. Kapua Ungi Narokobi A.J.
relied on both SS.154(4) and 155(3)(a) to recall a sentence he had
given earlier in terms of the defendant as a first offender and to
pass a fresh sentence before the circuit ended, when evidence was
32produced which showed that the defendant had a criminal record. In
The State v. Kuli Wapulae and Four Others, Narokobi A.J. again
relied on S.155(4) to order a customary punishment. Although the case
went on appeal, the S.155(4) argument was not raised by counsel and
therefore was not considered by the Supreme Court. 4 However, in the
35later Aihi * s Case, Kapi J. took the view that Narokobi was wrong in
O K.relying on S.155(4) to make the order. °
In order to determine the scope of S.155(4) it is important to
see the section as comprising two limbs. The first limb governs
"orders in the nature of prerogative writs"; and second limb covers
"such other orders as are necessary to do justice in the circumstances
of a particular case". When these two limbs are taken together, the
scope of the S. 155(4) powers is fairly wide. As Kapi Dep.C.J. noted
37in the Supreme Court Reference No. 2 of 1981 (the Criminal Code 
Case). In that case he stated that the section gives
very wide powers to grant orders beyond the circumstances 
permitted by the principles of common law or equity. These 
wide powers are given to the court by the words - "in such 
circumstances as seem to them proper" in the first limb and 
"as are necessary to do justice in tl\e^  circumstances of a 
particular case" in the second limb ....
The question referred to the Supreme Court relating to S.155(4) was
30. See Bayne, 1981:48.
31. N.252 of 14 August 1980 (Unreported Judgement of the National 
Court).
32. See Narokobi's philosophical views on the role courts ought to 
play in Narokobi, 1984.
33. N.233 of 4 June 1980 (Unreported Judgment of National Court).
34. Acting Public Solicitor v. Uname Aumane and Others [1980] 
P.N.G.L.R. 510.
35. [1981] P.N.G.L.R. 81.
36. Ibid., at 107-108. There have also been cases where S.155(4)
was relied on in a way not resembling the prerogative writs: see
Bayne, 1981:48.
37. 11982] P.N.G.R.L.R. 150.
38. Ibid., at 171.
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whether by relying on the section the trial judge was correct in law 
in discharging an accused person once the charge was proved, without 
proceeding to conviction. The Supreme Court was unanimous in holding 
that the trial judge was wrong, although the reasons given varied. 
This is the most recent case in which the judges have given some 
consideration to the scope of the two limbs of S.155(4), particularly 
the second limb, and it is therefore relevant to examine briefly what 
the Court said about each of these limbs.
a) The First Limb: 'Orders in the Nature of Preprogative Writs'
Courts have been readily applying the first limb of S.155(4) by 
making orders based on the prerogative writs in both civil and 
criminal cases. But they are yet to discuss the full scope of the 
first limb. The difficulty the judges have found in determining the 
scope of S. 155(4) relates to the second limb, and much of this 
involves ascertaining what the second limb means by the term "such 
other orders as are necessary to do justice in the circumstances of a 
particular case".
b) The Second Limb: "such other orders as are necessary
to do justice in the circumstances of a particular case"
The first difficulty is whether the words "other orders" as Bayne 
puts it, must "be of the same general character as the prerogative 
writs ... or ... these words of section 155(4) be the basis for any 
kind of remedy in any kind of legal action. This latter broader 
interpretation of S.155(4) has been accepted by a number of 
non-constitutional cases covered by Bayne.^ The second difficulty is 
whether these words were meant to include the non-prerogative 
remedies, since the prerogative remedies are already expresssly 
referred to by the first limb of the section. In the Criminal Code 
Case4 which was concerned with the second limb, Greville Smith 
J. took the view that the inherent power vested by S. 155(4) is wide
39. See McDermott J. in Re Douglas Rush, O.S. No. 2 of 1984 
(unreported judgment of the National Court).
40. See Bayne, 1981:47.
41. Ibid., 47-50.
42. 11982] P.N.G.L.R. 150.
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enough to cover both the prerogative and non-prerogative remedies.^ 
Pratt J. took the same view and saw the distinction between the two 
types of remedies as relevant in their actual application.^^ Kapi 
J. did not recognise that there was a distinction, and saw the scope 
of the "other orders" that may be made as being limited only by the 
words "in such circumstances as seem proper to them" occurring in the 
first limb of S. 155(4). Thus the Supreme Court appears to have 
accepted the view that both the prerogative and the non-prerogative 
remedies are incorporated by S.155(4) despite the fact that S.155(4) 
refers expressly only to the prerogative remedies. But even if it is 
argued that S.155(4) does not incorporate the non-prerogative 
remedies, one can still, in my view, rely on Schedule 2 of the 
Constitution as the source of these remedies.
The Orders 16 and 17 of the National Court Rules now permit both 
the prerogative and the non-prerogative remedies by way of an 
application for judicial review. The Rules therefore complement the 
provisions of both limbs of S.155(4).
When do these remedies become available? In the Criminal Code 
Case Kapi J. took the view that orders on prerogative writs are 
available only where there is a legal right.^ Similar reasoning was 
adopted by Saldanha and Andrew JJ. in Premdas1 Case‘S  in denying 
Premdas the right of judicial review of the Ministerial deportation 
order, because as a non-citizen he did not have any right to stay in 
the country once his visa was cancelled.
An applicant who is seeking the right of judicial review under 
the 1983 National Court Rules must now show, as stated above, that he 
has "a sufficient interest in the matter" before he can succeed. This 
is laid down by Order 16 Rule 5. This appears to be wider than the 
narrow view Greville Smith and Kapi JJ. took in the Criminal Code 
Case, that before orders on the prerogative writs are made, an 
applicant must show that he has a legal right which he is seeking to
43. Ibid., at 166-167.
44. Ibid ., at 174.
45. Ibid., 171.
46. [1979] P.N.G.L.R. 329
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protect in the proceedings. Whether the scope of Order 16 Rule 6 will 
be cut down to this remains to be seen.
There are at least two important limitations the Supreme Court 
has accepted on the scope of the second limb of S. 155(4). The first 
is that in Aihi's Case it held that the scope of the power vested by 
that section does not extend to creating a new, substantive legal 
right. The appellant in this case had been convicted and sentenced to 
life imprisonment by the National Court. Under S.27(1) of the Supreme 
Court Act 1975 a convicted person must lodge his notice of appeal 
against conviction or sentence within 40 days from the date of 
conviction, or if he wishes to seek an extension of time within which 
to appeal, then under S.2(2) of the same Act he is required to apply 
within the same 40 days. The appellant lodged her notice of appeal 
more than twelve months after her conviction and sentence.
But her right to seek review by a higher court or tribunal 
according to law is guaranteed by S.37(15) of the Constitution. She 
therefore sought to overcome the 40 days restriction under the Supreme 
Court Act by urging the Supreme Court to protect her S. 37(15) right 
through the exercise of the jurisdiction vested in it by the 
Constitution. The appellant’s argument on the second limb of S.155(4) 
was that the Supreme Court should exercise its discretion under that 
section to waive the appellant's failure to comply with S.27 of the 
Supreme Court Act and grant her application. Only Kidu C.J. and 
Kearney Dep.C.J. alluded to this argument, and they rejected it: Kidu
C.J. did so on the basis that it was not applicable to such a 
situation (as in that case), where there were specific constitutional 
provisions under S.57(3) for enforcing such rights.^ By a similar 
reasoning, Kearney Dep.C.J. took the view that S.155(4) is not
intended to recreate primary rights (such as the right to review under
48S.37(15) in this case) which have been extinguished. But he agreed
49that S.155(4) is a grant of power, following the same interpretation 
which both Prentice C.J. and Andrew J. adopted in Premdas v. The
47. [1981] P.N.G.L.R. 81 at 86.
48. Ibid., at 91.
49. Ibid
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Independent State of Papua New Guinea^  in 1979. But there is still 
some uncertainty relating to the full scope of that grant of power 
under the second limb of S.135(4), although from the reasoning of Kidu 
C.J. it does not apply to the enforcement of those rights which have 
specific constitutional (and semble other statutory) provisions for 
their enforcement. According to the reasoning of Kearney Dep.C.J., 
that power cannot be used to recreate a primary right that has been 
taken away by a person's failure to exercise it as prescribed by law. 
It would also seem to follow from Kearney Dep.C.J.'s reasoning that 
S.155(4) power is not available to create primary rights in other 
situations, presumably as this would be tantamount to judicial 
legislation of an obvious kind which the Constitution does not in 
principle permit under S.99(3).
The second substantive limitation on the scope of the second limb
of S. 155(4) is that it does not empower either the National Court or
the Supreme Court to create a new law outside S.9 of the Constitution.
This was the decision of the Supreme Court in the Criminal Code
Case. As described above, the trial judge in that case found that a
charge of forgery and uttering was proved, but he felt that it did not
warrant a recording of a conviction. Relying on the second limb of
S.155(4), the trial judge discharged the accused without recording a
conviction. There is no statutory provision either under the Criminal
Code or under any other statute which empowers a judge of the National
52Court to take such a course of action. The Supreme Court was
unanimous in holding that the trial judge had acted wrongly by
creating a new law which did not fall under the definition of the laws
53of PNG in S.9 of the Constitution; and to that extent it was in 
breach of the separation of powers principle of the Constitution.^
Beyond these two substantive limitations, there appear to be a 
narrow and a broad view held by the Supreme Court judges on the scope 
of the second limb of S.155(4).
50. [1979] P.N.G.L.R. 329 at 337 and 401 respectively.
51. [1982] P.N.G.L.R. 150.
52. Such provision exists only under the Local Court Act 1963, S.20.
53. See Greville Smith J. in [1982] P.N.G.L.R. 150 at 166.
54. See Kearney Dep.C.J., ibid., at 159; and Kapi J. at 173.
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Those who take the narrow view would apply the ejusdem generis 
rule in their interpretation of the words "such other orders as 
necessary" to mean that such orders must be of the type enumerated in 
the first limb, viz., prerogative w r i t s . I n  the words of Kapi J., 
they must be related to a substantive legal right which is "the 
characterisation" of the prerogative w r i t s . T h a t  is, a person who 
is seeking such an order must show that he has a substantive legal 
right to protect.
Moreover, those judges who favour this narrow interpretation 
would also construe "justice" occurring in the second limb as "justice 
according to law" as defined by S.9 of the Constitution.^'7
Those judges who favour a broad view of the second limb of
S.155(4) regard the term "justice" as providing the proper basis on
which the decision whether or not such "other orders" should be made,
must rest; and they reject the narrow view that "justice" here means
justice according to law as defined by S.9 of the Constitution, since
to take such a view would be to restrict the initiative that the
Constitution exhorts the courts to use in developing not only the
underlying law within the meaning of Schedule 2 to the Constitution,
but also a suitable system of administrative law for PNG as stipulated
by S.60. Thus, in Mauga Logging Company Pty. Ltd, v. South Pacific
Oil Palm Development Pty. Ltd. (the Mauga Case), Frost C.J. found
that in order to do justice between the parties in the case which, as
a non-constitutional case, involved damages for a breach of contract,
he could make an order based on an interlocutory injunction which was
not available at Common Law or in Equity, and which was not
59specifically referred to by S.155(4). In Dent v. Thomas Kavali, 
Bredmeyer J. (sitting as the National Court) relied on the second limb 
of S.155(4)° to grant an application for a declaratory order in a 
land case where the applicant sought to have the forfeiture of his 
lease declared null and void even though the application was made
55. See Greville Smith J., ibid., at 167; and Kapi J. at 171.
56. Ibid.
57. See Greville Smith J., ibid., at 116; and Kapi J. at 171.
58. [1977] P.N.G.L.R. 80.
59. [1981] P.N.G.L.R. 488.
60. Ibid., at 490.
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outside the period of limitation laid down in the Land Act 1962. The 
Court also indicated that it had power to make an order in the nature 
of certiorari under the second limb, although such an order had not 
been sought by the appellant.
•The judges who favour a broad view of the second limb of S.155(4)
would not apply the ejusdem generis rule to establish what kind of
orders are permitted by that limb of the section. As Kearney Dep.C.J.
stated in the Criminal Code Case, ' ... there is no reason why the term
"other orders" referred to in S.155(4), should be construed ejusdem
f) 1generis with "orders in the nature of prerogative w r i t s " . T h e
reason is that, as Pratt J. put it in the same case, the words are
f) 9simple enough and should be given a fair and liberal meaning. Both 
judges relied on the similar view adopted by Frost C.J. in the Mauga 
Case. J The scope of the second limb of S. 155(4) on this view is 
therefore left quite wide.
7.2.2 The Scope of the Substantive Law Doctrines
Both the doctrine of ultra vires and the Principles of Natural 
Justice are incorporated into the Constitution through the adoption of 
the Common Law and equity by Schedule 2.2. The scope of each of these 
needs to be analysed.
a) The Doctrine of Ultra Vires
The essence of the doctrine of ultra vires is simply that a
(S4public authority may not act outside its powers. Wade calls this 
doctrine the central principle of English administrative law because 
much of its development has been due to efforts by the English courts 
to extend and refine the doctrine to cover all possible cases of abuse
61. [1982J P.N.G.L.R. 150 at 158.
62. Ibid., at 174.
63. [1977] P.N.G.L.R. 80, especially at 85.
64. For the development of this doctrine into its modern form, see 
de Smith, 1980:94-96.
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of power by public authorities.65 The task of challenging the vires 
of administrative action involves the basic problem of statutory 
interpretation by the courts. Courts in PNG, before and after 
Independence, were prepared to apply the doctrine in order to check 
certain Executive action. Thus, in Secretary for Law v. Tenalom66 the 
Supreme Court held Regulation 34 of the Motor Traffic Regulations 
invalid on the grounds that it was ultra vires the power given by S.33 
of the Motor Traffic Ordinance 1950-1965. Section 33 of the Ordinance 
vested in the Administrator in Council the power to make Regulations, 
spelling out such requirements as weights of the load and the number 
of passengers which may be carried in different kinds of motor 
vehicles. Regulation 34 did not do this, but instead it delegated 
this power to the Superintendent of Motor Traffic to lay down these 
requirements in a licence which he was given the power to issue. The 
Supreme Court saw this as granting a legislative power to the 
Superintendent, which was not authorised by S.33 of the Ordinance. 
Two important cases on ultra vires after Independence are the cases of 
Mairi v. Alkan Tololo6  ^ and Mileng v. Alkan Tololo66 (otherwise known 
as the school fee cases). The two cases illustrate both an attempt by 
the Executive to rely on a questionable legal basis in order to raise 
revenue, and the traditional alertness of courts to construe financial 
legislation strictly in order to control the Executive action relating 
to public monies. In both cases the Supreme Court relied on the 
doctrine of ultra vires to restrain the Executive. A brief resume of 
the background to the cases is necessary at this point in order to 
enable one to understand the decisions in so far as they touched on 
the doctrine of ultra vires.
The problem the Executive faced in these cases was that it was 
defeated in Parliament when it proposed a Bill to authorise the
65. Wade, 1982:38. Wade points out that this judicial development 
also has created confusion over the extent to which the doctrine can 
be applied, and much of this confusion stems from an interchangeable 
use courts have made of the terms 'jurisdiction’ and 'power'. He 
argues that it would assist clarity if only the latter word is used: 
ibid., 39-43.
66. [1965-66J P.N.G.L.R. 414.
67. 11976] P.N.G.L.R. 125.
68. [1976J P.N.G.L.R. 447.
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Minister for Education to charge what was known as the ’economic fee* 
on all multi-racial international schools in PNG in order to meet the 
rising costs of running these schools. The fee was to be paid by 
children of PNG citizens attending these schools. This left the
Executive no alternative but to resort to the Education Act 1970 as 
the legal basis on which to charge the 'economic fee’. Section 96 of 
the Act empowered the governing boards of all schools to raise funds 
and expend them for the benefit of their respective schools; and S.19 
vested in the National Education Board the power to determine limits 
within which, and the conditions subject to which, fees may be 
charged. Purporting to act under this provision the National 
Education Board decided to levy the 'economic fee' and directed the 
governing boards of multi-racial international schools to use one or 
the other of two methods of collecting fees. One was for the 
governing board to collect it and pay the fee into a National Trust 
Account set up for the purpose. The other method was that the
arrangement and disbursement of the fees were to be determined by each 
of the governing boards.
The Supreme Gourt had to construe these provisions in the light 
of S.209(1) of the Constitution which provides that:
Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, the raising and 
expenditure of finance by the National Government, including 
the imposition of taxation and the raising of loans, is 
subject to authorization and control by the Parliament, and 
shall be regulated by an Act of the Parliament.
Schedule 1.2 defines "the raising and expenditure of finance by the
National Government including the imposition of taxation" as including
rates, charges and fees and imposts of any kind.
The legality of the first optional method of collecting the 
economic fee was challenged in Mairi's Case and the Supreme Court was 
unanimous in holding that the imposition and collection of the 
economic fee at the direction of the National Education Board was 
beyond the power (ultra vires) of school boards, vested by SS.96 and 
19 of the Education Act. The legality of the second method of 
collecting and disbursing the 'economic fee' was challenged in 
Mileng's Case, and again the Supreme Court unanimously held it to be 
illegal on the same basis as in Mairi's Case.
The common feature of the two cases was that they dealt with
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financial statutes which courts have traditionally construed 
69strictly. But this does not suggest that PNG courts will not apply
the doctrine in other cases. In fact, since Independence both the 
Supreme and the National Courts have not hesitated in applying the 
doctrine to invalidate executive action in such areas as the Basic 
Rights, the Leadership Code and Provincial Government.^  Thus, in the 
Supreme Court Reference No. 1 of 1984 (unreported) the Supreme Court 
unanimously held as unconstitutional the decision by the Prime 
Minister to appoint as the head of the public service in the Morobe 
Province a person who was not recommended by the Morobe Provincial 
Government. Under S.50 of the Organic Law on Provincial Government, 
the Prime Minister cannot act outside the recommendation. The cases 
involving the ultra vires doctrine under the Basic Right are analysed 
in Chapter 9 post, and those under the Leadership Code in the next 
chapter.
b) The Principles of Natural Justice
The Constitution states the minimum requirement of the Principles
of Natural Justice. This requirement consists of two rules. One is
the duty to act fairly, and the other is to be seen, in principle, to
act fairly.^ These rules reflect the notion of fairness of
procedure, which is the essence of natural justice in the English 
7 2public law: that a man may not be a judge in his own cause, and
73furthermore a man's defence must always be fairly heard.
The principles of natural justice are subject to the general 
power conferred on the courts to develop the Underlying Law,^ and 
also to any changes that may be brought about by statute.^
One important issue that emerges from this is whether any dispute
69. Frost C.J. in the Mairi Case [1976] P.N.G.L.R. 125 at 130.
70. Bayne (forthcoming).
71. See the Constitution, S.59(2).
72. Wade, 1982:414; and de Smith, 1980:156.
73. Ibid.
74. The Constitution, S.60.
75. These are two general limiations on the principles of natural 
justice.
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involving the principles of natural justice raises a constitutional
question. The consequence of regarding such dispute as raising a
constitutional question is that it would automatically remove such a
question to either the National Court or the Supreme Court. This, in
turn, would create the problem of delay in proceedings before the
courts below. In Premdas' Case/D the Supreme Court did not deal with
this question, although the judges made it clear that the content of
these principles are to be ascertained by reference to the Underlying
Law. Ideally, as Bayne has pointed out, an issue involving principles
of natural justice should not raise constitutional questions. This,
he says, would be largely a superficial exercise, since these
principles are subject to both statute as well as the judicial
development of the Underlying Law.^ Nevertheless, the fact that
Schedule 2.3 imposes on the courts a duty to develop the Underlying
Law, including the principles of natural justice within the meaning of
S.60, permits constitutional questions to be raised. Bayne suggests
that, to prevent this, there should be a provision stating that SS.59
and 60 do not raise constitutional issues for purposes of S. 18(1) of
the Constitution relating to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
7 8Court over constitutional issues. Perhaps the position could be
made clearer by such provision if it is indicated therein that SS.39 
and 60 by themselves should not be the basis for the Court to assume 
jurisdiction under S.18(l). This would leave out those cases where
principles of natural justice may be inextricably involved with other 
constitutional issues.
So far courts have not tended to regard the issues involving the
principles of natural justice as raising constitutional questions
79directly. In Re Fisherman Island, Wilson J. referred to S.59 of the 
Constitution in holding that the failure by an Acting Land Titles 
Commissioner in not subscribing to the transcript of the evidence of a 
key witness in a land case breached the rule against bias, in that it 
could raise suspicion in right-minded people that the Acting
76. [1979] P.N.G.L.R. 329.
77. Bayne, 1981:35.
78. Ibid.
79. [1979] P.N.G.L.R. 202.
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80Commissioner had been biased. The judge did not consider this as a 
constitutional question. In Sausau v. Police Commissioner and the
O 1State, the Supreme Court also referred to S.39 in holding that a
Police Tribunal constituted under the Police Force (Interim
Arrangements) Act 1973 was required to observe the principles of
natural justice although it did not need to give reasons for its
decision. Bredmeyer J. specifically stated this to be the situation
with regard to the principles of natural justice incorporated through
82the adoption of the Common Law by Schedule 2.2 of the Constitution.
Again the Court did not appear to consider that the principles of
natural justice raised constitutional questions. In Balus Tara v.
83Rachel Gugu where an appeal against a decision of a District Court
84Magistrate in awarding cash and strings of tambu, on a complaint of 
adultery by his court clerk, the National Court (Bredmeyer J.) stated 
that it was the duty of all courts to observe the principles of 
natural justice. It is significant to note that in all these cases
arguments on the constitutionality of the various acts were not
raised.
One important question that needs to be considered is whether the 
principles of natural justice apply to all or only some of the public 
bodies. Another way of making the same point is to ask whether these 
principles are applicable to the exercise of all types of power or to 
only some.
The trend in the judicial development of the law on this point 
has been a division between those judges who support the proposition 
that the principles do not apply to purely administrative powers, and 
those judges who argue that they do. This has created some confusion 
and, unfortunately, the PNG Supreme Court has perpetuated this 
confusion by also being divided on the question. In Premdas v. 
Independent State of Papua New Guinea J the judges held the view that
80. Ibid., at 233-234.
81. [1982] P.N.G.L.R. 327.
82. Ibid., at 330.
83. N.374(M) (an unreported judgment of the National Court of 19 
March, 1982).
84. The local shell money used for local transactions.
85. [1979] P.N.G.L.R. 329.
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the principles of natural justice do not apply to administrative
O 2:
powers, but in Iambakey Okuk v. Fallscheer.00 they held the opposite 
view.
In Premdas' Case a non-citizen had his visa revoked and was 
ordered to leave the country by the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
acting pursuant to the provision of the Migration Act 1963. The 
Minister's decision was upheld by a Ministerial Review Committee which 
did not give Premdas an opportunity to present his case. He therefore 
sought, inter alia, a declaration from the National Court on the basis 
that he was denied natural justice guaranteed to him by the 
Constitution. The National Court considered this claim together with 
others to raise constitutional questions and referred the case to the 
Supreme Court.
The majority of the Supreme Court by four to one were content to 
follow the foreign decisions, especially the English decisions, which 
treated the Executive's decisions on immigration matters involving 
aliens as an exercise of purely administrative powers to which the 
principles of natural justice did not apply. They did not consider in 
depth either the distinction that is usually drawn between 
administrative and judicial powers, nor the basis on which that 
distinction is maintained. That basis is that administrative powers 
involve expediency rather than rights, whereas judicial powers are 
concerned with the latter. The majority considered that Premdas as an 
alien had no right in this area of the law, and therefore could not be 
protected by the principles of natural justice.
Only Saldanha J. discussed in some detail the decision of the 
English Court of Appeal in Schmidt v. Secretary of State for Home 
Affairs relating to the bases on which the principles of natural 
justice could be applied. He referred in particular to Lord Denning's
O Ojudgment which took the landmark case of Ridge v. Baldwin as 
establishing the proposition that the principles of natural justice 
apply if a person can show that he has a right, an interest or a 
legitimate expectation to protect in the proceedings. But, in the 
end, Saldanha J. dismissed Lord Denning's view as an obiter.
86. [1980] P.N.G.L.R. 275.
87. [1969] 2 Ch. 149.
88. [1964] A.C. 40.
241
It was on this point of whether Premdas had a legitimate 
expectation that the minority judge (Wilson J.) disagreed with the 
majority. He thought that, since Premdas' visa was revoked before its 
expiry date, he (Premdas) had a legitimate expectation to be given the 
reasons for the revocation and the opportunity to present his case. 
For Wilson J. this provided sufficient legal basis for the application 
of the principles of natural justice.
Although the majority in Premdas' Case were content to maintain 
the distinction between administrative powers and judicial powers, 
Prentice C.J. did allude to Lord Denning's judgment in Schmidt's Case 
as suggesting that the distinction was no longer adequate. In
Fallscheer's Case the Supreme Court rejected it and followed the 
modern judicial trend to extend the application of the principles of 
natural justice to the exercise of administrative as well as judicial 
powers. The Court distinguished the Premdas' Case. In Fallscheer's 
Case the Minister for Transport and Civil Aviation acting under 
S.23(2) of the National Airline Commission Act 1972 terminated the 
respondent's employment as the General Manager of Air Niugini on the 
grounds of inefficiency. The termination was made without giving the 
General Manager an opportunity to be heard in his defence. Section 
23(2) of the Act vested in the Minister a power to terminate the
appointment of the General Manager at any time for inability,
inefficiency, incapacity or misbehaviour. It did not, nor did any 
other section of the Act, refer to the application of the principles 
of natural justice. The issue before the court was whether the 
exercise of power of dismissal by the Minister under S.23(2) of the 
Act was subject to the principles of natural justice, even though the
Act made no reference to them. The Court was unanimous in holding
that it was. In coming to this decision the Court stated that the
principles of natural justice have been incorporated under Schedule 
2.2 of the Constitution. In particular, the Court relied on the House 
of Lord's decision in Ridge v. Baldwin, specifically the judgment of 
Lord Reid which identified three categories of cases where the
principles of natural justice apply, namely, cases involving dismissal 
for the a cause; property rights; or exercise of authority with civil 
consequences to the person being affected. The Court saw
89. [1980] P.N.G.L.R. 274 at 288.
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Fallscheer's Case as falling within the last category, because there
were specific civil consequences of the Minister's act, namely, that
Fallscheer would risk his reputation and lose the balance of his term 
90of employment. He should therefore have been given the chance to
present his case. Thus in Fallscheer's Case the Supreme Court has
given its support to the application of the principles of natural
justice to the traditional categories of cases where a right or an
interest in terms of Lord Reid's criteria in Ridge v. Baldwin, is
involved. But the judges were silent on the question whether they
would be prepared to extend the principles to cases which Lord Denning
classified as "legitimate expectation" cases in Schmidt's Case. Only
Miles J. expressed some doubts in this respect. The Court, however,
has left the possibility open by stating that no general rule could be
laid about the application of the principles of natural justice, and
92that each case must be determined on its own facts.
The Supreme Court had to consider the principles of natural 
justice after Fallscheer's Case, again in Tindiwi v. Nilkare and the
Q QIndependent State of Papua New Guinea7  ^ (Tindiwi's Case). The 
Plaintiff was the former Premier of the Enga Provincial Government 
which was suspended by the NEC on a recommendation from the Minister 
for Decentralization pursuant to the provisions of the Organic Law on 
Provincial Government. Under S.90 the Minister is given discretion to 
call the Premier in to explain the grounds on which the Minister is of 
the opinion that the provincial government should be suspended. Under 
S.91 the NEC is given a similar discretion once it receives a report 
from the Minister. Neither the NEC nor the Minister called in the 
Plaintiff before the NEC suspended the Provincial Government. The 
Plaintiff challenged the decision on the basis that, inter alia, it 
breached the principle of audi alteram partem. The crux of the case 
was whether discretion conferred by statute excludes the principles of 
natural justice. The majority (Bredmeyer and Amet JJ.) held that it 
did, whilst Kaputin J. dissented. The majority distinguished 
Fallscheer's Case on three bases. First, that there was no express or
90. See Andrew J., ibid., at 106.
91. Ibid., at 296.
92. See Andrew J., ibid., at 277; and Kapi J. at 286.
93. Unreported Judgment of 27 July, 1984 (S.C. 275).
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implied provision in the National Airline Commission Act excluding the 
Principles of Natural Justice in Fallscheer's Case, whereas there was 
an implied exclusion of the Premier's right to be heard under SS.90 
and 91 of the Organic Law; secondly, the Plaintiff did not lose a 
livelihood as Fallscheer did; and thirdly, that the Plaintiff had 
access to political remedy whereas Pallscheer had only legal remedy 
available.
It is clear from Tindiwi's Case that statutes can exclude the 
principles of natural justice either expressly or impliedly. 
Moreover, the majority in that case introduced a new criterion, viz., 
availability of remedies, as a basis on which the question of whether 
the principles of natural justice apply in a given case could be 
determined.
7.3 BASIC RIGHTS AND PROSCRIBED ACTS 
a) The Basic Rights Jurisdiction
94The Basic Rights "limit the powers (whether legislative,
executive/administrative, or judicial) of all persons and bodies in 
. 95Papua New Guinea . Together with the demarcation of powers in the 
Organic Law on Provincial Government, the Basic Rights provisions of 
the Constitution constitute the two major sources of limitations on
the exercise of power by the Executive and by the National Government
96as well as the provincial governments.
Section 57 provides the machinery for enforcing the Basic Rights. 
That section not only confers standing on the person whose right has 
been infringed, but, as Bayne has indicated, it goes beyond this by 
giving both the Supreme Court and the National Court wide scope to 
intervene in the proceedings. It does this by vesting in the Courts
-T'— t- p o
themselves^either to intervene on their own accord, or through other 
persons who have either an interest in the breach of the right
94. See the Constitution, SS.32-38, and the discussion of the 
categories of these Rights in Chapter 9, post.
95. See Bayne, 1981:20.
96. Ibid. Because of the limited scope of this work the position of 
provincial government is not covered here.
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(irrespective of whether such an interest is personal or not) and on
whom standing is conferred to bring proceedings. The section even
deems that certain officials should have an interest in seeking
redress for such a breach. This does create a possible danger that
courts may assume jurisdiction too readily in cases where issues have
not been clearly and properly defined either by the courts below or by
97the parties themselves.
Under S.57(6) of the Constitution, it is envisaged that the two 
superior courts may be vested with further jurisdiction with regard to 
the Basic Rights either elsewhere in the Constitution or in some other 
law, and the powers vested by the section are not to be read as in 
derogation of, but as in addition to, those powers. This is an
additional jurisidiction. Insofar as other constitutional provisions
Q Oare relevant to this, S.39(2) would come close to it. °
There have been a number of cases in which the superior courts 
have enforced Basic Rights, although most of them dealt with the Right 
to Protection of the Law guaranteed by S.37 and with the Right to 
Personal Liberty protected by S.42. In most of these cases the Rights 
were enforced against the Executive. A sample of these cases is worth 
looking at to demonstrate the range of situations which have occurred.
99Thus in Re Heni Pouta and Kenneth Susuve the National Court 
held that serious assaults on two prisoners by unknown warders 
amounted to both a cruel punishment prohibited by S.36(1) and 
deprivation of liberty prohibited by S.37(17) of the Constitution. In 
Constitutional Reference No. 3 of 1978^ ^  the constitutionality of the 
Inter-Group Fighting Act 1977 was challenged before the Supreme Court. 
The purpose of the Act was to control the problem of tribal fighting 
in the Highlands. What the Act sought to do by S.11(3) was to require 
each accused person to prove that he was not taking part in the actual 
fighting. This exceptional provision was justified by reference to 
S.37(4)(a) according to which a person charged with an offence is 
presumed innocent till proven guilty, unless a law places upon him the
97. Bayne, 1981:21.
98. Ibid., see esp. at 26.
99. [1982] P.N.G.L.R. 7.
100. [1978] P.N.G.L.R. 421.
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burden of proving particular facts which are, or would with the 
exercise of reasonable care be, peculiarly within his knowledge.
The Supreme Court by a majority of two to one held that 
S.37(4)(a) was intended to refer to specific facts within the peculiar 
knowledge of an individual. Section 11(3) of the Act did not come 
under the authority of S.37(4)(a) because it could not be regarded as 
referring to an individual, since the fact of taking part in the 
actual fighting could not be said to be peculiarly within the 
knowledge of an individual, as everybody, either taking part or merely 
watching, would have also known it. The Act was thus 
unconstitutional. Similarly, in Supreme Court Reference No. 1A of 
1 9 8 1 the Supreme Court refused to recognise the constitutionality 
of a number of legislative amendments the Executive had effected 
for the purpose of solving motor traffic problems. The combined 
effect of these amendments was to give a court of summary jurisdiction 
mentioned in the traffic summons the power to enter a plea of guilty 
and to determine sentence in cases where the accused failed both to 
pay the fine within 14 days and to appear at the hearing. The Public 
Solicitor who challenged the constitutionality of these amendments 
argued that they aimed to have the court mentioned in the summons to 
destroy the accused's innocence and to assume that he had committed 
the offence contrary to S.37(4)(a). He argued further that the 
amendments also breached S.37(5) of the Constitution inasmuch as they 
deprived an accused of his right under that section to be present at 
his trial in cases where he did not give consent for trial to proceed 
in his absence. The Supreme Court unanimously upheld these 
submissions, and accordingly held the amendments to be 
unconstitutional.
There is some difficulty in determining the scope of the Basic 
Rights jurisdiction because of the interpretive problems posed by 
SS.59 and 41 of the Constitution. Section 59 has already been 
discussed above and the important question here is whether it 
incorporates the principles of natural justice. Here I agree with
101. L1982] P.N.G.L.R. 122.
102. Amendments were made to the Local Courts Act 1963, the District 
Courts Act 1963 and the Motor Traffic Act 1950.
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Bayne that it does not, because to read the section thus would 
unnecessarily allow many administrative law questions arising from 
them to be converted into constitutional questions.
b) Proscribed Acts: The Scope of S.41
Section 41 deals with proscribed acts done under valid law but 
which are unlawful if they breach one or more of the conditions set 
out in sub-s. 1 of the section. The section is couched in the
following terms:
S.41. Proscribed Acts.
(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other 
provision of any law, any act that is done under a valid law 
but in the particular case -
(a) is harsh or oppressive; or
(b) is not warranted by, or is disproportionate to, the 
requirements of the particular circumstances or of the 
particular case; or
(c) is otherwise not, in the particular circumstances, 
reasonably justifiable in a democratic society having a 
proper regard for the rights and dignity of mankind,
is an unlawful act.
(2) The burden of showing that Subsection (1)(a) , (b) of (c) 
applies in respect of an act is on the party alleging it, and 
may be discharged on the balance of probabilities.
(3) Nothing in this section affects the operation of any 
other law under which an act may be held to be unlawful or 
invalid.
The scope of this provision was considered by the Supreme Court 
for the first time in Premdas * Case, the facts of which have been 
stated above. One of the questions referred to the Supreme Court in 
that case was whether both the Minister's order to deport the 
applicant, and the decision by the Review Committee in supporting the 
Minister's action, were harsh and unwarranted within the meaning of 
5.41(a) and (b). The Court was unanimous in holding that the section 
did not apply because, as Prentice C.J. noted, the applicant "must 
have known he was possibly exposing himself to the executive
103. [1979] P.N.G.L.R. 329.
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action",^4 by retaining his position on the ministerial staff.
It is difficult to indicate the precise scope of the provision
not only because the generality of the language used in the section
allows a number of possible interpretations^'* regarding its scope,
but also because the Supreme Court in Premdas' Case took the view that
the provision is of a general application, and is not restricted only
to the Basic Rights. This is contrary to a restricted purpose for
which the CPC recommended the provision. It wanted to control
excessive force used in cases of arrest, search, detention and so on,
1 06where the exercise of such power is done under valid law. The view
that S.41 has a general application leads to the consequence that most 
challenges to Executive action could be easily taken as S.41 
challenges. The section itself contemplates this inasmuch as the 
grounds on which action could be brought under it are similar to those 
on which the administrative discretion are controlled in Common 
Law.^^ The danger in viewing S.41 as a provision of general 
application is that it would deny these administrative law remedies to 
lower courts by converting issues arising from the remedies as 
constitutional issues with which only the Supreme Court can deal.
The scope of S.41 was again considered in the recent Supreme 
Court Reference No, 1A of 1983^ ^  (the Minimum Penalty Case). That 
case involved a challenge to the constitutionality of the Criminal 
Code (Minimum Penalties) (Amendment) Act 1982; the Summary Offences 
(Amendment) Act 1982 and the Criminal Code (Amendment) Act 1982. 
These amendments denied discretion to the courts and required them to 
apply the prescribed minimum penalties to certain specified offences 
once the offences are proved. The challenge on constitutionality of 
these amendments was mounted on a number of grounds which included 
S.41.
104. Ibid- at 332-
105. See Bayne, 1980:121 at 138-142 where he adequately discussed 
these.
106. See CPC, 1974:5/1/33. The Court did not make any reference to 
the CPC's Final Report.
107. See Bayne, 1980:142; and 1981:37.
108. Unreported judgment of the Supreme Court dated 2 November 1984.
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The question involving S.41 was whether the section applied to a 
judicial decision involving no discretion; that is, whether a judicial 
decision to impose a minimum penalty under these amendments could be 
said to be harsh or oppressive within the meaning of S.41. Except for 
Kapi Dep.C.J., the rest of the Court saw S.41 inapplicable on the 
basis that in minimum penalty cases courts lack discretion, which is 
an essential characteristic of the types of cases which S.41 is 
intended to apply. Kapi Dep.C.J. saw S.41 as applicable but he did 
not show how this could be done.
The judges went further to consider the scope of S.41 in terms of 
the decision in Premdas' Case, and came up with differing views. 
McDermott and Kaputin JJ. regarded the provision as applicable to all 
acts arising out of the context of both the Fundamental as well as the 
Qualified Rights and McDermott J. saw this as the limit to which S.41 
could be applied. Bredmeyer J. saw S.41 as applying only to the 
Qualified Rights, and thus took a very restricted view of the 
application of the provision. Only Kidu C.J. and Kapi Dep.C.J. 
supported the expansive view of S.41 inasmuch as they see the section 
as applying to all acts and not only to those emerging from the 
context of the Basic Rights. The Court was generally agreed that 
'act' within the meaning of S.41 includes executive, legislative (but 
excluding statutes) and judicial acts. The full scope of S.41 is 
therefore still left fairly open, although it could be said that its 
application to acts arising from the Basic Rights cases is confirmed 
in the Minimum Penalty Case.
7.4 JUSTICE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIVE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
The power of judicial review of the Executive action is, of 
course, an instance of the exercise of judicial power of the People. 
Any account of its scope would be incomplete if it did not consider 
the objective which the Constitution prescribes for the exercise of 
judicial power.
109. This is contrary to the decision Bredmeyer J. himself gave 
earlier in July 1984, in the case of Re: Jivetuo (unreported judgment 
of National Court of July 1984). In that case he held the decison by 
the State to evict the applicant who was an illegal settler on state 
land under the Land Act 1963 as in breach of S.41. There was no issue
relating to any of the Basic Rights involved.
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In its Final Report the CPC defined the primary function of the
courts as one of peacefully resolving conflict in accordance with
justice."*"^ This may be regarded as a reflection on the traditional
function of the courts, at least in the Western democracies. However,
there is a difference which reflects the PNG colonial experience and
that difference lies in the emphasis that the CPC placed on resolving
conflict in accordance with justice rather than exclusively with law.
This emphasis on justice was deliberate, in that many of the colonial
laws were laws in the positive sense but they did not afford justice,
at least not to Papua New Guineans. Thus the point that was
intended to be stressed was that what is at stake here is not law but
justice. Hence, an unjust law that does not provide justice cannot be
said to be truly law in the sense intended by the constitution-makers.
But the CPC did realise that law can provide justice, and this is
reflected in its statement that conflict may be determined in
accordance with 'law and justice'. However, the CPC did not assume
that in every case could there be a guarantee that law would ensure
1 13justice, and accordingly chose to stress justice rather than law.
There is another respect in which the CPC chose to extend the 
traditional role of the courts in resolving conflict, and that relates 
to the prevention of conflict before it arises. It seems that the CPC 
was aware of the shortcomings of the traditional judicial role, which 
was very much a curative one; they recognised that it was equally 
important also to emphasise the preventive role that courts could play 
in resolving conflict in society. This would save time, cost and 
energy that should be channelled towards the more urgent tasks of the 
new nation. The CPC saw that function in the following terms:
They [i.e. the courts] may also have an important advisory 
function, through which they can assist in the avoidance of 
potential disputes. In countries which have a written 
Constitution the highest courts often have the important task 
of deciding matters relating to the interpretation and 
enforcement of the Constitution. In this unique role courts
110. CPC, 1974:8/2, para. 3.
111. See generally Goldring, 1973:5.
112. In order to stress justice the CPC had 'The Administration of 
Justice' as the heading for its chapter on the courts, viz., Chapter
8.
113. CPC, 1974:8/1, para. 2.
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should be key instruments through which peaceful development 
in a society can take place."*"
The nature of any human society is such that disputes are
inevitable, and when these do arise in the PNG context the
constitutional directive to the courts is to settle these in
accordance with justice . But there is also implicit in the
Constitution the concern that the long-term interests of the PNG
society are best served by preventing as many of these disputes as 
possible from arising, and the courts could assist in this respect by 
providing timely advice.
There is no commonly-agreed definition of justice. Much 
discussion has taken place on the notion of justice, and, as Goldring 
points out, all this has probably led to two general conclusions as to 
what justice is, namely,
... that justice is part of a person's general view of morals 
and politics, ... [and] that it is, if not an ideal or model, 
a scale against which the social, moral, or political worth of 
positive law can be measured.
As the discussion of the Criminal Code Case above shows, these 
are two judicial views on the meaning of justice, at least as it is 
used in S. 155(4) of the Constitution. On the one hand, there are 
judges who take a narrow view of justice, viz., to mean justice 
according to law as defined by S.9 of the Constitution. There are, on 
the other hand, other judges who prefer a broad view of justice. In 
Keating v. The Independent State of Papua New Guinea "^ the Supreme 
Court expressed by way of a dictum its support for the broad view. 
Although the Court was not directly required in that case to interpret 
the phrase, "the interests of justice", occurring in S.42(6) of the 
Constitution, it nevertheless expressed the view that the phrase 
should be given a wide meaning. Under that section bail is not 
available in cases of wilful murder or treason. But in other cases 
the section provides that bail is to be granted unless "the interests 
of justice" require otherwise. Section 9(1) of the Bail Act 1977 sets 
out the circumstances in which bail is to be refused. Referring to
114. Ibid.
115. Goldring, 1978:124.
116. Unreported Judgment of 24 May, 1983 (S.C. No. 10 of 1983).
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these circumstances in order to demonstrate the wide meaning of 
justice he preferred, Kidu C.J. stated that,
Justice is a two-edged sword and cannot possibly be confined 
to mean those considerations enumerated in S- 9(1) of the Bail 
Act 1977. For instance, in my opinion, it would be in the 
interests of justice to refuse bail to a person known to be a 
habitual criminal, although S.9(1) does not say so.
It is naturally very difficult for statutes to define justice, 
and presumably for this reason the Constitution has also avoided 
defining it. But the Constitution does provide some assistance to the 
courts in their task of administering justice, chiefly through the 
provisions of S.109(4) and Schedule 1.5(2). These sections require 
the courts to give a liberal interpretation to the constitutional 
provisions. However, this does not prevent the possibility that 
judges may apply their personal views of morality and politics in 
their interpretation of the law.^^
In ensuring that justice is done, the CPC saw it as a special 
responsibility of the courts to protect the rights of the minority 
groups. This was a reflection of the concerns of leaders such as Fr. 
Momis and John Kaputin who had direct experiences as leaders of 
minority groups in the Bougainville and the Gazelle Peninsula 
respectively, where demands for land reforms and greater powers for 
local communities often led to clashes with the colonial executive, 
particularly the police. The new constitutional order must give 
justice to all people, justice which they had been denied by the 
colonial constitutional system.
117. Perhaps one way towards the solution of this problem lies in 
the hope that judges do refrain from asserting their personal views of 
justice, but when they do not, that they take the trouble of ensuring 




THE LEADERSHIP CODE AND ^ C0NTR0L~0F^HE) EXECUTIVE CONDUCT
The constitution-makers were aware that the State institutions 
which would exercise the power of the people would be run by 
individual human beings, especially those occupying key positions - 
the leaders of the ‘Independent State of PNG. It was therefore natural 
for them to supplement the structural and institutional controls 
already discussed, by a control of the actual official and private 
conduct of these individual leaders. The provision of the Leadership 
Code (the Code) in the Constitution^ reflects this concern.
In order to appreciate the scope and purpose of this Code it is 
essential to understand that the main aim of the CPC in this respect 
was to define a positive leadership ideal; and to assure that the 
People of PNG would be led by persons who conformed to this ideal. 
Hence, it linked the Code closely with the National Goals which the
Pleaders were expected to implement. But there was a pratical problem 
(although it is not clear to what extent the CPC was conscious of it) 
that the legal technology available to it did not seem to include 
mechanisms designed to achieve such a positive aim. The closest the 
CPC could get in this regard was to make the implementation of the 
National Goals justiciable under the Code and to give the Ombudsman 
Commission a corresponding responsibility, as will be discussed in the 
next chapter. However, even this approach was largely negative 
because it made any failure to implement the National Goals a breach 
of the Code, which the Ombudsman had to redress.
It appears that the CPC was reluctant to adopt such a negative 
perspective; and settled instead for what could be called a "neutral'*
1. See the Constitution, Division 2 of Part III.
2. Goal No. 3, Directive Principle No. 1, requires leaders to be 
committed to the Goals to ensure that their freedom to make decisions 
is not restricted by their obligations to others.
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compromise. It reasoned that the most serious danger leaders 
typically face is a conflict between their private interests and their 
public duties. Thus it became the central objective of the Code to 
prevent as far as possible such situations of conflict from arising. 
But again the CPC was forced to take negative direction, since the 
stipulation of duties of disclosure, and the prohibition of certain 
types of behaviour appear to be the only practical, legal ways of 
realising this objective. Moreover, the CPC saw ultimately no choice 
but to rely on negative sanctions in cases in which the Code was 
breached. The Code, in effect, has become the tool for punishing the 
negative conduct of leaders. This tendency was further strengthened 
by the desire of the CPC to control bribery and corruption within the 
governmental system, which it regarded as a serious danger.
As a result, this chapter will be mostly concerned with the 
punitive aspect of the Code. But it is important to emphasise at this 
point that there are other aspects of the Code, which are at least 
equally important. In this chapter I will therefore begin by firstly, 
reviewing briefly the CPC's attitude to the Code. Secondly, I will 
analyse the respective scope of the three types of jurisidictions it 
provides which I call the regulatory jurisdiction, the disciplinary 
jurisdiction and the criminal jurisdiction, and indicate some 
interpretive problems. Thirdly, I will propose, by way of conclusion, 
how the operation of the Code can be made more effective by 
recognising and emphasising the role the general criminal law can and 
should play in this context.
8.1 THE CPC'S CONCEPT OF THE CODE
The official Terms of Reference for the CPC did not include any 
reference to the subject matter of the leadership code. But by early 
1973, it had become evident that there was a growing concern in 
political circles, in the public service and among the tertiary 
students at the increasing evidence of corruption within the 
Government, especially among some Ministers and senior public 
servants. The Chief Minister, Mr Somare, admitted himself in March,
3. Goldring, 1978:189; and Ley, 1978.
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1974 in the House of Assembly that corruption was regarded by his 
Government as a 'disease'. There had been some official attempt 
earlier on to control this 'disease', as reflected in the passage of 
the Parliamentary Integrity Ordinance 1971, and by an unofficial 
Ministerial Code of Conduct which came into existence in mid-1973.^
Those who were concerned with increasing corruption in PNG were 
aware of similar experiences in other Third World countries, 
particularly in relation to multi-national corporations which were 
offering substantial bribes in order to secure political and 
bureaucratic patronage.^
In formulating the Code, the CPC derived some guidance from the 
Parliamentary Integrity Ordinance 1971. But on the whole it found the 
Ordinance to be inadequate, in that it was limited to governing the 
conduct of the politicians; it contained no provision for other public 
officials whose conduct also needed some kind of legal control. The 
Committee looked especially at the example of Tanzania and Zambia. 
Both countries had incorporated a leadership code into their 
Constitutions.^* It also studied the leadership codes of Jamaica, 
Trinidad and Tobago.^
a) The Aim of the Code
It is relevant to quote here in full the CPC's view of the 
objective of the Code:
Experience in many countries has shown that constitutional 
provisions and declarations have little effect by themselves.
We believe that perhaps the single most important factor in 
determining the direction of national development is the 
quality of leadership. If Papua New Guinea is to have any
chance of implementing its national goals and directive 
principles, it must ensure that its leadership has a genuine 
commitment to these goals.
We believe also, as do our people, that it is necessary to 
take positive steps to ensure that our leaders do not use 
their position in ways that threaten these goals; for example,
4. See Goldring, ibid.
5. Ley, 1978.
6. Fitzpatrick, 1980:211; Goldring, 1978:189; CPC, 1974:3/2.
7. CPC, 1974:3/4.
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by accumulating personal wealth, by collaborating with foreign 
or national businessmen, or by accepting bribes.
We recognise that we leaders, like all other people, have 
our strengths and weaknesses. And it is with full awareness 
of our human frailties that we have concluded that clear rules 
strictly enforced, are required to try to ensure the integrity 
of politicians at all levels, and of other leaders ....
Our proposals are designed to meet this need for positive 
action to be taken so that leaders will not be in a position 
where their private interests conflict with their public 
responsibilties. The personal interests of our leaders must 
not become identified with elements outside or within Papua 
New Guinea whose interests are an obstacle to the development 
of a genuinely* just, honest and egalitarian society in this 
country.
Thus, the CPC saw the long-term and fundamental objective of the Code 
was to bring about the good leadership which it regarded as crucial if 
PNG was going to achieve the five National Goals spelt out in the
Constitution.
b) Conduct Subject to the Code
I have already indicated that the CPC found it difficult to 
provide appropriate legal mechanisms for achieving this positive 
objective and that it therefore focused on an attempt to prevent 
conflicts between leaders’ private interests and their public duties 
as well as to control corruption. Its emphasis on a high standard of 
conduct for the purpose, however, caused some critics to react against 
the proposal. They argued that either the Committee was creating a 
paper tiger, or a code that would turn away the true leaders that the
Qpeople may want and need. The Committee stood by its position 
nonetheless, as its Final Report showed:
We appreciate these anxieties but are convinced that it is not 
too early to make a start in establishing that high standards 
of personal conduct and integrity are required of our leaders.
Our country needs men and women who have the courage of their 
convictions to take stands when vital principles are at stake.
We need leaders who will not compromise the long term 
interests of our people for short term advantages to




In its recommendations the Committee spelt out specific 
prohibitions on the conduct of the leaders. Most of these 
prohibitions were related to business interests. For instance, 
leaders were prohibited from owning shares in foreign companies or 
seeking loans from foreign finance companies, nor could they tender 
for government contracts. Other kinds of prohibitions related to such 
matters as accepting bribes; not declaring interests before voting in 
meetings of a body of which a leader is a member; misuse of official 
information for the leader's own personal benefit; and misuse of 
public funds.
The CPC also recommended that any assets being held in breach of 
the Code were to be sold within six months after the Code came into 
force. Where this was not possible, the Ombudsman Commission was to 
be given discretion to extend the time for compliance by up to three 
months. The Ombudsman Commission was also to be given the power to 
demand annual returns from each leader who was required to declare 
therein his business assets, income and liabilities obtained and 
accrued during the year.
Ministers were regarded by the CPC as holding very important 
positions, and were therefore prohibited from holding directorships in 
a company without the Ombudsman Commission's approval.
The Constitution reflects the CPC's concern for a high standard
of conduct. It defines conduct by relating a leader's conduct to the
types of activities he may engage in. Conduct defined this way falls
into two general categories. The first of these may be regarded as
personal conduct and this is dealt with by the Constitution.^ The
second type of conduct is official conduct, and this is regulated by
1 2the Organic Law on Duties and Responsibilities of Leadership.
10. Ibid.
11. The Constitution, S.27.




Personal conduct of leaders is categorised further into two 
types. The first is defined in a moral sense, whilst the second is 
defined in terms of the material interests of the leader.
After the Constitution came into force there was much confusion
over the meaning of some of the provisions of the Code. The Ombudsman
Commission which is responsible for the general administration of the
13Code therefore issued a Leadership Manual on 29 August, 1980, which 
attempted to explain what the Constitution means by conduct in 
different contexts in real life. For instance, the Manual defines 
open excessive sexual habits as amounting to immoral conduct which 
demeans the office or position the leader holds within the meaning of 
the Code; failing to pay just debts would reduce the integrity of the 
leader; getting drunk in a public place would reduce the respect the 
general public has for the Government of PNG; and receiving gifts or 
favours from companies which do business with the Government would 
place the leader in a position where he could have or appear to have a 
conflict of interests, or to be in a compromising position.^
The Constitution therefore requires each leader to conduct 
himself, both in public and in private,^ in such a way as to prevent 
a conflict of interests with his official duties or to demean his 
office. He is further prohibited from conducting himself in such a 
way as to either cause his personal or official integrity to be 
questioned or to cause respect for and confidence in the integrity of 
the Government of PNG to be diminished.^
ii) Official Conduct
Whereas the personal conduct of a leader is couched in terms of 
prohibitions, his official conduct is expressed in the form of duty or 
responsibility. Here the leader carries two specific
responsibilities. One is to declare to the Ombudsman Commission his
13. Ombudsman, 1980.
14. Ibid., 7-9.
15. This seems to include even private sex and drunkenness!
16. The Constitution, S.27(l).
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income and assets every year, and the other is to declare his interest 
(if any) when he is acting in his official capacity, such as when he 
is attending a meeting in which the matter that he has an interest in 
is being voted on.
■However, the line between what is an official and what is 
personal conduct is very thin indeed, as the Ombudsman Commission 
indicates in its Leadership Manual:
A leader becomes a public person, elected or appointed to 
serve, represent and lead the people of the Independent State 
of Papua New Guinea. Therefore a leader in Papua New Guinea 
can not say that after 4:06 pm he or she is private so and so. 
Having accepted this position of public trust our leaders must 
conform to their conduct to the highest standard in all 
respects of their life. For they are the standard bearers of 
this Nation. The examples they set will determine whether we 
live in a society which is governed by fairness, honesty and 
justice, or whether, like so many developing countries, we too 
will become a land of corruption and injustice.^
In addition to his own conduct, the leader is also required to
ensure that the conduct of any member of his immediate family, or of
any relative under his control, does not put him in a position where
he may act contrary to the Code. This responsibility in fact extends
beyond the family circle and encompasses any person who is required
1 8legally to act for the leader, such as his agent or trustee. The
Constitution requires prompt attention to this specific duty by
stipulating that as soon as the leader becomes aware that any such
conduct by others may compromise him in his official capacity, he
should dissociate himself publicly from such conduct. His failure to
19do so will constitute a breach of the Code.
All these rules constituting the Code are spread out through the 
provisions of both the Constitution and the Organic Law on Duties and 
Responsibilities of Leadership.
c) Leaders Subject to the Code 
In its Final Report the CPC recommended eighteen groups of
17. Ombudsman, 1980:5-6.
18. The Constitution, S.27(3)
19. Ibid. S.27(3)(b).
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official positions as being of such importance as to be subject to the 
proposed Code. Anyone who held a position within any of these
categories was to be treated as a 'leader' for the purpose of the 
Code. These were:
- the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister and other 
ministers;
- The Leader and Deputy Leader of the Opposition;
- The Speaker, Deputy Speaker and other members of the 
National Parliament;
- senior public servants above a specified level or holding 
specified positions;
- senior members of the Parliamentary Service holding 
specified positions;
- members of statutory corporations on boards, and officers of 
those corporations and boards above a specified level or 
holding a specified position;
- government nominated chairmen, managing directors, 
directors, and general managers of corporations in which the 
Government has an equity holding;
- members of provincial assemblies, and senior officers above 
a specified level or holding a specified position employed 
directly by provincial governments;
- constitutional and statutory office-holders, and senior 
public officers subject to their direction and control who 
hold specified positions;
- office-holders at national level of registered political 
parties;
- academic and specified senior administrative staff at 
tertiary institutions;
- specified office-holders of registered industrial 
organizations;
- specified senior staff of ministers and of the Leader and 
Deputy Leader of the Opposition;
- ambassadors, high commissioners, and senior officers of 
Papua New Guinean missions abroad holding specified 
positions;
- presidents, chairmen and mayors of recognized local bodies 
exercising governmental functions;
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- senior Police and Defence Force officers above a specified 
level or holding specified positions;
- members of the Advisory Committee on Citizenship matters; 
and
20- other specified office-holders.
Besides these eighteen categories, the Committee also recommended 
that the Divisional Heads within each Department of the Public Service 
be included as leaders but that this be effected by an Act of
Parliament. In addition, the Ombudsman Commission was to be given a
general power to declare, through the National Gazette, an office in 
the Public Service -as the one to which the Code applied.
It seems that experience elsewhere persuaded the CPC to include
the relatives of the leaders under the proposed Code, especially in
relation to business assets. Thus the recommendation by the Committee 
that a leader should divest himself of business assets included the 
assets held by any of his relatives. By "relative", the Committee 
appeared to have contemplated only the members of the leader's
immediate family. A child of eighteen years or more, however, was to 
21be included. The inclusion of relatives avoided the possibility of 
a leader using a family member to defeat the Code.
The Draft Constitution reduced the CPC's list of eighteen offices 
to be included under the Code to twelve, but added the office of
O OPublic Trustee. The following were the offices or positions left 
out from the original CPC's list:
- government nominated chairmen, managing directors, 
directors, and general managers of corporations in which the 
Government has an equity holding;
- academic and specified senior administrative staff at 
tertiary institution;
- specified office-holders of registered industrial 
organizations;
- presidents, chairmen and mayors of recognized local bodies 
exercising governmental functions; and
20. Ibid., 3/13. That is, those that Parliament may include under 




- senior members of the Parliamentary Service holding
o 'ispecified positions.
The list was later incorporated into the present S.26 of the
Constitution. Parliament, in addition, is given the power to extend 
this-list at any time either through the normal legislation or through
r\ /
Organic Laws. 4
8.2 ENFORCING THE CODE THROUGH THREE TYPES OF JURISDICTIONS
The Constitution confers the general power of administering the
2 5Code on the Ombudsman Commission. For this purpose one of the
Commissioners administers the Code on behalf of the Commission. 
Because much of the Code involves investigation into financial 
dealings by leaders, the responsibility over a administration of the 
Code within the internal organisation of the Commission has always 
been left with the Commissioner with an accountancy background. In 
fact, this need was foreseen by the CPC, which recommended in its
Final Report that one of the three Ombudsman Commissioners should have 
qualifications in accountancy. °
The administration of the Code involves receiving and 
scrutinising the annual returns sent in by leaders, and monitoring the 
various interests that have been declared by these leaders to ensure 
that these interests do not conflict with the leaders' official 
duties. Both the Constitution and the Organic Law on Duties and
Responsibilities of Leadership confer a wide discretion on the
Commission in relation to what types or what degrees of such interests 
would constitute conflict of interests within the meaning of the Code.
Other bodies which are involved in the actual enforcement of the 
Code include the Public Prosecutor and, when the occasion arises, a 
Leadership Code Tribunal. The Supreme Court is also involved to the 
extent that it has jurisdiction to hear any constitutional reference 
arising from any aspect of the exercise of the Tribunal's 
jurisdiction.
23. Ibid.




As stated above, the CPC was concerned with the need to reduce
conflict of personal interests of a leader with the responsibilities
of his public office. In this respect it is interesting to note the
three different approaches taken in Africa. Both the Ghanian
Leadership Code and the Tanzanian have the same objective, namely, to
prevent conflict of interests among leaders. However, the Tanzanian
Code is orientated towards preventing class interests since the
27constitution-makers viewed conflict of interests as a class problem.
The Zambian Leadership Code differs from the other two in innovative
ways. For instance, both the Tanzanian and the Zambian Codes
28emphasise the need for compliance with the Code, but only the
Zambian Code spells out that non-compliance amounts to misconduct and
29therefore a breach of the Code.
An examination of the types of responsibilities together with 
their accompanying powers conferred on the Ombudsman Commission under 
the Code shows that three general categories of jurisdictions are 
vested in the Commission. These may be labelled as the regulatory 
jurisdiction, the disciplinary jurisdiction and the criminal
j urisdiction.
8.2.1 The Regulatory Jurisdiction
The Regulatory Jurisdiction seeks to achieve two objectives in 
regard to the commercial and financial interests of a leader. It 
enables the Ombudsman Commission first to ensure that the conduct of a 
leader does conform to the restrictions prescribed by the Code, and 
secondly, to determine exemptions from these restrictions when 
applications for exemptions are made.
a) Control Over Financial Interests
The first aspect of the Regulatory Jurisdiction is the power 
given to the Ombudsman Commission to receive and scrutinise annual
27. Seidman, 1978:414.
28. The Constitution of Tanzania 1962, S.37; and The Constitution of 
Zambia Act 1973, S.34.
29. Ibid., S.34(2).
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30Leadership Returns, and to give whatever directions the Commission
31considers proper under the circumstances. The Code also imposes a 
duty on each leader to disclose his assets and liabilities annually by 
declaring them in Leadership Returns. The Code spells out eight 
matters over which a leader must make declaration not only for himself 
but also for his spouse, and any of his children under the voting age, 
which is eighteen. These matters are:
- the total assets including money, personal property and real 
property either in the possession or under the control of 
each of them;
- the total -income each received and the source of the income;
- the business connections;
- the directorships or other offices in profit-making 
organizations;
- the business transactions entered into by each of them 
during the period;
- the gifts received (except those received from close 
relatives) ;
- the assets each has acquired during the period of the 
statement;
- and the liabilities incurred or discharged during the period
32and the amount of each liability.
By the end of December 1975 there were 400-odd leaders who had
become subject to the Code. Most submitted their Returns by March
331976, but there were 43 Returns outstanding. These overdue Returns 
consisted of three categories. The first comprised those that were 
required from leaders who by mid-1976 had already left their 
leadership positions. The Commission felt that it was not worth the 
expense to prosecute these leaders since the only penalty available 
under the law, as it then stood, was dismissal from office.
The second group were those leaders who, for extenuating 
circumstances, were unable to submit them for the 1975-76 period.
30. The Organic Law, S.4.
31. The Constitution, S.27(4).
32. The Organic Law, S.4(1).
33. See Ombudsman, 1976:32
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Because of this extenuating factor, the Commission decided not to 
refer these leaders for prosecution.
The third group were due from leaders who were still in office, 
but who, for no legitimate reason, failed to submit them. The 
Commission's decision was to be firm on this group. The first test 
case from this group, involving the Minister for Culture, Sports and 
Recreation, Mr Moses Sasakila, was therefore referred to the Public
Q /Prosecutor early in the second half of 1976. 4
35The Commission's firmness has improved the rate of Returns. 
But in 1979 the Commission noted again what it called "the disease of
O £delay"JD among leaders in not submitting their Returns on time. In 
1981 the Commission found it necessary to summon 15 leaders to explain 
why they had failed to submit their Returns. Of these seven were 
members of Parliament, three Departmental Heads, four officers of 
statutory bodies and one a Ministerial staff member.
Another frequent problem is the dishonest disclosure by leaders. 
This consists of leaders either not disclosing a matter at all, or of 
deliberately providing misleading information. hhen further
investigations are carried out by the Commission, it is usually found 
that any one of the following three cases exists. A leader in 
question has debts which are disproportionate to his personal capacity 
to repay, and these debts usually arise through commercial 
enterprises. In the second situation a leader does not declare some 
of his business interests, which together with those declared, put him 
in either a compromising position in relation to his public duties, or 
demonstrate that his priorities lie in his personal interests rather 
than in his public duties. The third situation is where the leader in 
question fails to disclose gifts given to him in his official
capacity. This applies particularly to those leaders who travel
37overseas and often return with all kinds of gifts.
34. This case is discussed later on in this section under The





In order to rectify these problems the Ombudsman Commission has
Q O
issued, under its general power of issuing directions, a number of 
guidelines to assist leaders. In relation to gifts, for instance, the 
Commission has adopted the policy that gifts made to leaders are gifts 
made to the nation. The Commission has adopted two guiding principles 
in the disposal of gifts. First, gifts of cultural, historical and 
educational value are to be displayed in national institutions for the 
benefit of all the people of PNG. Secondly, gifts of a personal
nature may be kept by the leader provided he pays half of the price.
39This money is then paid into consolidated revenue, so that citizens 
have a share in the gifts that their leaders receive while in office. 
Some leaders are allowed to keep certain gifts in their offices for 
official purposes and those gifts that the leaders do not want to keep 
are auctioned by the Commission.
In 1981, the total amount of money paid into the General Revenue 
by leaders for keeping gifts was K601.00, but the Commission reported 
that the number of leaders who were declaring gifts was increasing.^  
This appears to have been the result of a general Direction on 
Disposal of Gifts the Commission had issued early in 1978, following a 
number of complaints about the amount of gifts leaders had been 
receiving in their official capacities during the 1975-77 period. 
There was a provision earlier under the Parliamentary Integrity 
Ordinance 1971 covering gifts, but it was restricted to gifts made to 
members of the House of Assembly for election purposes, which they had 
to disclose.^
Bad debts and dishonoured cheques are two other problem areas. 
The Commission noted in its 1981 Report that the volume of bad debts 
and dishonoured cheques by leaders had been increasing up to 1981, by 
which time the total amount owed by leaders reached a record level of 
K. 141,366.16 . This amount was reduced substantially, however, through 
repayment by leaders, to K.42,593.88 as at June, 1981.^^ But in the
38. The Constitution, S.27(4).





1982 Annual Report the Commission noted that the volume of bad debts 
and dishonoured cheques continued to grow, and most of these debts 
were owed by members of Parliament. J In its Seventeenth Report on 
Departmental Expenditure for the Year Ended 31 December 1980 presented 
to the Parliament on 12 February, 1982, the Permanent Parliamentary 
Committee on Public Accounts was concerned with this problem of misuse 
of funds by members of Parliament, and warned that such conduct must 
be punished according to the process of law.^
Although the Commission had initially collected bad debts owed by 
leaders, it has now abandoned that practice as a result of strong 
accusations from the leaders themselves as well as others that the 
Commission had become a debt collecting agency for private individuals 
and companies. The Commission therefore has now adopted a policy of 
urging debtors to use the normal legal process, viz., court action, to 
recover these debts. The Commission is prepared to act only as a last 
resort "where the legal system of redress breaks down, and the nature 
of the leader's conduct is serious enough to call his integrity into 
question".^ Lenders usually give two reasons for having been unable 
to use the legal process: either they could not find the leader in 
question to serve the summons, or the leader had intimidated the 
person who was trying to serve the summons. The Commission regarded 
these reasons as being mere excuses.4 5^
The Commission has suggested two reasons for these bad debts. 
The main cause appears to be the disparity between income and the high 
standard of living to which leaders are exposed and in which they 
indulge. The other is the unrealistic expectation of the leaders' 
supporters who expect a share of the leaders' real or imagined wealth.
The Code does not seek to prevent a leader from engaging in any 
business activities. In the Commission's own words:
What the law does prevent is the holding of business interests 
which place the leader in a position in which he could have a 






and his official duties 47
The question, therefore, is the meaning of the phrase 'conflict 
of interest'. Here the Commission has adopted the definition used by 
the Victorian Public Service Ethical Conduct Committee on Conflict of 
Interest. In its 1976 Report, the Victorian Committee defined 
conflict of interests as "the circumstances of a public office holder 
whose private financial interests might benefit from his official 
actions or political influence".^
The intention here is to avoid placing a leader in a position of 
temptation. As another study noted:
A conflict of interest does not necessarily presuppose that 
action by an official favouring one of those interests would 
be prejudicial to the other, nor that the official will, in 
fact, resolve the conflict to his own personal advantage 
rather than the Government's. If a man is in a position of 
conflicting interests, he is in a position of temptation, 
however he resolves the issue. Regulation of conflict of 
interest seeks to prevent situations of temptation from 
arising. y
This is what the Code in effect attempts to achieve by 
prohibiting leaders from holding shares in any company local or 
foreign which "could reasonably be expected to place him in a position 
in which he would have a conflict of interests or might be compromised 
when discharging his public or official duties".^ For instance, the 
Minister for Forests would have a potential conflict of interest if he 
had shares in a timber company, since his department would be involved 
in regulating the activities of that company.
i) Granting of Exemptions
The second aspect of the Regulatory Jurisdiction involves the 
exercise of power by the Commission to grant exemptions to leaders. 
Leaders are permitted to seek exemptions from the restrictions imposed 
on them by the Code. Exemptions may be sought by any leader who is
47. Ombudsman, 1981:79.
48. Quoted by the Commission in its 1981 Report at 80.
49. Cited by the Commission, ibid.
50. The Organic Law, S.8(1).
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either still in the prescribed office, or who has left it. In the 
latter situation exemptions are necessary, if an ex-leader wishes to 
hold either a directorship or a consultancy with a foreign enterprise, 
if he has not been out for more than three y e a r s . T h e  meaning of 
'foreign enterprise' is to be the same as is used under the National 
Investment and Development Act 1974 which defines it as an enterprise 
where either 26 per cent voting power is held by people who are not 
Papua New Guineans, or only 26 per cent of shares therein are 
beneficially owned by Papua New Guineans.
It appears that the Commission has adopted two separate criteria 
for granting applications by leaders for exemptions from the 
restrictions relating to holding shares in companies, depending on 
whether a company is local or foreign.
For a local company the criterion used is the one laid down under
S.8(1) of the Organic Law. The crucial test under S.8(1) is whether
there is a reasonable likelihood that the leader will put himself in a
position where the performance of his official duties would give rise
52to a conflict of interests.
In the case of a shareholding in a foreign company, the test is 
whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the leader's duties 
would involve some association with the activities of the foreign
company in question. In its 1981 Report the Commission stated that
58where there is no such likelihood, exemption would be granted.
The Commission appears to be applying this criterion also to
applications that seek exemptions from the prohibition over the
holding of either a directorship or a consultancy in a foreign
enterprise. The Code prohibits any former leader from holding either
of these positions during the three years following the date on which
54he officially left the office or position. The Commission applied 
this criterion in the recent case involving Mekere Mourata, the former 
Departmental Head for the Department of Finance.
51. The Organic Law, S.35.
52. Ombudsman, 1981:80.
53. Ibid., 82.
54. The Organic Law, S.35
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With an economics degree from the University of PNG, Mourata was 
the first Papua New Guinean to hold the position of Secretary for 
Finance, and held it for nine years before resigning from that 
position at the end of 1982. The Secretary for Finance is also the 
Price Controller for PNG, and holds ex officio membership in a number 
of financial bodies in PNG, including the membership of the National 
Investment and Development Authority.
After his resignation Mourata was offered the position of 
Managing Director with Burns Philp, one of the two major Australian 
retailing companies in PNG, which has a large operation throughout the 
Pacific. Mourata accepted the offer, and at the same time applied to 
the Ombudsman Commission for exemption from the three-year prohibition 
rule. Mourata, in fact, accepted the offer from Burns Philp before 
lodging his application with the Ombudsman Commission on the 
assumption that his application for exemption would be approved by the 
Commission.
The Commission refused to grant the application, and Mourata was 
thereupon forced to resign. Writing to the editor of the Post Courier 
on 3 March 1983, the Ombudsman Commission gave a number of reasons for 
refusing Mourata's application. Among these was the fact that while 
Mourata was a member of NIDA, Burns Philp was permitted by NIDA to 
expand its operations on nine separate occasions. These operations 
included a wide range of economic activities, such as inland water 
vessels, car rental agencies, travel agencies, licensed hotels and 
manufacturing.
In the same letter the Commission quoted the rationale the CPC 
gave in its Final Report in adopting the three-year prohibition rule 
thus :
We are concerned to avoid the situation where a person who 
holds a senior position in a government department or in a 
statutory authority abuses that position to assist foreign 
controlled corporations with which he may form an unofficial 
relationship with a view to being appointed a member of the 
board of directors of such a corporation or as a paid 
consultant to it.
Whilst no impropriety is necessarily involved in such an 
appointment, the possibility of it being a reward for past 
favours is always present.
53. Post Courier, 15 March, 1983
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The Commission therefore concluded that:
While this Commission has been empowered to grant an exemption 
from this prohibition, we have, in light of the rationale 
underlying the prohibition, consistently refused to grant an 
exemption where the leader’s duties, while in office, involved 
him in regulating or controlling the operations of the foreign 
enterprise in question.
ii) A Lack of Specific Criteria for Assessing the Returns
Neither the Constitution nor the Organic Law tells the Ombudsman 
Commission how it should assess the Returns submitted by leaders. The 
Commission itself has also not worked out a strict formula for this 
purpose. Instead, it has adopted the practice of maintaining a 
general surveillance over a leader’s account of his business assets. 
If, for instance, leader A ’s Return in a given year shows a sudden 
increase in his net assets, he immediately becomes a case for 
investigation.^
But there are no guidelines indicating, for instance, how much a 
leader can own in real estate or how many shares he may have in a 
locally-owned and operated company. Any assessment seems to depend on 
what the Commission feels is reasonable in the circumstances of a 
particular case.
It can be argued that this lack of precise criteria substantially 
reduces the effective implementation of the Regulatory Jurisdiction. 
For that effectiveness depends not so much on the prompt submission of
C O
Returns from leaders, but on the prevention of disproportionate 
accumulation of wealth according to some generally accepted criteria 
based on preventing conflict of interests. This deficiency, together 
with an increasing amount of dishonest disclosure by leaders makes it 
difficult for the Commission to prevent conflict of interests arising 
from the accumulation of wealth by leaders.
56. Ibid.
57. Chief Ombudsman:personal communication.
58. And the submission of Returns on the whole has been fairly 
successful.
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8.2.2 The Disciplinary Jurisdiction
This jurisdiction is exercised when the Ombudsman Commission 
begins formal investigation into any allegation that the Code has been 
breached.
8.2.2.1 The Procedure
When the Commission receives an allegation that there has been a 
breach of the Code, it takes two steps. First, it finds out whether 
the allegation is serious. Once this has been established, it has a 
discretion as to whether or not to take the second step, namely to 
investigate further. If it decides to proceed further it institutes a 
formal investigation to ascertain whether there is evidence to 
substantiate the allegation. If it finds that there is insufficient 
evidence, it discontinues its investigation. If, however, it finds 
that on the strength of the evidence there is a provable case, it 
formally refers it to the Public Prosecutor for prosecution before a 
Leadership Code Tribunal. On the date of this formal referral the 
leader under investigation is automatically suspended from his office 
by the operation of the law.^ But the referral of a case does not 
oblige the Public Prosecutor to prosecute the case, as he still has
C' 1discretion in this respect.01 The Public Prosecutor used this 
discretion recently to refuse to prosecute what has become known as 
the ’Diary Case’,^ involving the former Prime Minister, Sir Julius 
Chan, and a number of senior public servants. The refusal was based 
on what the Public Prosecutor judged to be inadequate evidence 
submitted by the Ombudsman Commission in support of the case.
If the Public Prosecutor considers that the case should be 
prosecuted, he advises the Chief Justice who has the power to appoint 
a Leadership Code Tribunal, consisting of a Judge of the National 
Court as the Chairman and two senior magistrates as other members of 
the Tribunal, except in those cases where the power to appoint a
59. The Constitution, S.29.
60. The Organic Law, S.28.
61. The Constitution, S.27(2).
62. The case is discussed below: see post.
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Tribunal is provided differently by the Organic Law.OJ The Public 
Prosecutor then refers the case formally to the Tribunal for 
prosecution. If the Public Prosecutor fails to prosecute within a 
reasonable period, then the Commission itself may prosecute, 
although it has so far not exercised this power. The Code provides 
for five different compositions of the Tribunal depending on who is
L' C
being prosecuted.DJ It is not required to observe strict legal rules 
of procedure and evidence, but it must observe the principles of 
natural justice. ° If the appropriate Tribunal finds that the offence 
of misconduct in office is proved, it is then required to determine 
the appropriate penalty and to make recommendations accordingly to the 
authority under which the leader in question serves.^ This authority 
has no discretion to vary the Tribunal’s recommendation but must act 
on it.
Previously, the Code provided for dismissal as the only penalty 
irrespective of the nature of a particular case of misconduct in 
office. In Sasakila's Case,69 the Tribunal found that the misconduct 
in office was of such a nature as not to warrant dismissal, but 
because it had no choice, it recommended dismissal. As a consequence 
of this case, the Code was amended by the Leadership Code (Alternative 
Penalties) Act 1976 which now confers power on an appropriate Tribunal 
to recommend a penalty that suits the nature of misconduct in office 
in each case. Possible penalties range from a mere reprimand to 
dismissal from office.
The consequence of a dismissal from office is that under S.31 of 
the Constitution, the dismissed leader becomes ineligible for three 
years to hold any elective public office or to become a Nominated 
Member of the National Parliament or to be appointed to any position 
in either a provincial or a local government body. The effect of the 
section is that such a leader can still be appointed to any position
63. The Organic Law, S.27(7)(e).
64. The Constitution, S.29(2).
65. The Organic Law, S.27(7).
66. Ibid., S.27(4).
67. The Constitution, S.28(2) and (3).
68. Ibid.
69. [1976] P.N.G.L.R. 491.
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within the National Government, which can be held by appointment, 
including the position of a Departmental Head. This is due to the 
fact that the offices which can be held only on appointment that S.31 
prohibits are only those within either a provincial or local 
government body. This is clearly a ridiculous situation, and reflects 
the fact that the provisions governing the various aspects of the Code 
were not thought through thoroughly.
Misconduct in office depends upon adverse findings by the 
Tribunal of provable facts. In order to sustain a charge of 
misconduct in office, the Supreme Court said in Mopio's Case^ that a 
Tribunal "must be reasonably satisfied by clear and convincing 
evidence of the occurrence or existence of those facts''.^ The Court
went on to state that the Tribunal has the duty to act judicially as
7 ?well as to take into account the principles of natural justice.
b) Enforcement of the Code by Tribunals
To June, 1983, eight cases have been referred to the Public 
Prosecutor by the Ombudsman Commission. They involved three 
Ministers, two Heads of Statutory Authorities, one Departmental Head, 
one Member of the National Parliament and one member of the governing 
board of a Statutory Authority. Two of the cases concerned a failure 
to submit the Leadership Returns within three months as required by 
the Organic Law. Two related to misuse of funds. Of the remaining 
four cases, one was a case of misuse of facilities; two of misuse of 
position for personal gain; and a fourth involved conduct unbecoming 
of a leader.
In six of these cases the Tribunal recorded a verdict of guilty. 
Only in one case was this verdict overruled on technical grounds by 
the Supreme Court on appeal. In two cases the hearings were not 
brought to finality because of intervening constitutional issues which 
had to be referred to the Supreme Court.
70. 11981] P.N.G.L.R. 416.
71. Ibid., at 420 .
72. Ibid., at 418.
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a) The Non-Disclosure Cases
Under the Code each leader is required to submit his Leadership
Returns within three months after Independence Day for those who
7 3became leaders on that day, or for those who became leaders after 
that-day, within three months following the day on which they became 
leaders.^ Thereafter each leader is required to submit his Return 
annually as long as he remains a leader.'7-*
The Code does envisage situations where there may be legitimate 
reasons for not complying with these strict time requirements, and for 
that purpose provision is made which allows non-compliance as long as 
the reason or reasons contributing to the non-compliance constitute, 
in the opinion of the Tribunal, a ’reasonable excuse’ within the
meaning of the Code.'7^
The non-disclosure cases were: Sasakila’s Case^ and Grey’s
Case.^
Despite various letters from the Ombudsman Commission to both 
Sasakila and Grey, reminding them of their duty to submit their 
respective Returns, Sasakila took eleven months to submit his, whilst 
Grey took nine. Each leader tried to convince the Tribunal that the 
delay was caused by heavy demands on their time and energy and 
therefore constituted a reasonable excuse within the meaning of the 
Code. Sasakila argued that being a Minister of Government he was very 
busy during the period through his commitments to the cabinet, the
Department, his electorate and his family. Grey laid particular 
emphasis on the fact that Air Niugini was expanding its operations as 
well as its fleet of aircraft during this period, which placed very
high demands on him as its General Manager and as a member of the
79National Airlines Commission.




77. [1976] P.N.G.L.R. 491.
78. Reference No. 1 of 1978.
79. Grey was charged finally in his capacity as a member of the 
National Airlines Commission rather than as a General Manager.
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In each case, the Tribunal found these arguments unconvincing and
found both leaders guilty of the offence of misconduct in office. In
both cases the Tribunals found, however, that non-compliance were of
such a nature as not to warrant dismissal from office. But the
Tribunal in Sasakila's case found itself in a quandary in that as the
law stood then the Tribunal had no alternative but to recommend his
dismissal. Moreover, the legal provisions on the question of
dismissal were technically in conflict: Section 28(l)(g)(ii) of the
Constitution required the Tribunal to recommend dismissal whilst
S.27(5) of the Organic Law provided for the Tribunal to dismiss the
leader. Sasakila appealed to the Supreme Court, which held that
S.27(5) of the Organic Law was unconstitutional since it was
80inconsistent with the Constitution. Thus Sasakila was able to avoid 
the Code on a technicality.
As a consequence of Sasakila's Case the National Parliament
O 1passed the Leadership Code (Alternative Penalties) Act 1976 
(Alternative Penalties Act) which now provides for a number of
penalties. The Constitution was also amended accordingly, to
82authorise the new provisions of the Act.
Grey was prosecuted after the Alternative Penalties Act, and so 
was recommended by the Tribunal to the Head of State for a reprimand, 
which was given. The Tribunal in fact appended to its decision the 
form of reprimand which required that Grey was to abide by the Code 
requirements in future.
The Constitutional Amendment No. 4 defines the criteria which a 
Tribunal must take into account in deciding whether to apply a lesser 
penalty instead of dismissal. There must be "no serious culpability"
on the part of the leader in question; and "public policy and public
84good" must not require dismissal. The Organic Law adds four
additional elements, namely, that:
80. The State v. Independent Tribunal; Ex-Parte Sasakila [1976] 
P.N.G.L.R. 491.
81. No. 79 of 1976 - which came into operation on 31 December 1976.




- the misconduct was unintentional or the result of ignorance; 
or
- the misconduct was trivial; or
- the misconduct was accompanied by extenuating circumstances; 
or
- the matter was capable of being put, and has been put, to 
rights.85
In both of the cases under discussion, the Tribunal conceded that 
matters had been put to rights since the Returns were submitted, 
though outside the required period. In Sasakila's case, however, they 
considered the proven indifferent attitude of the Minister towards 
submitting his Returns over a long period as constituting a serious 
culpability on his part, whereas the Tribunal was not prepared to so 
view Grey's non-compliance because of a number of extenuating 
circumstances. The main extenuating circumstance in Grey's case was a 
confusion caused to Grey by two charges against him: one in his
capacity as the General Manager, and the other in his capacity as a 
member of the National Airlines Commission. The former charge was 
later dropped when it was found the Code did not cover him in his 
capacity as the General Manager.
In both cases, however, the Tribunals did not define clearly what 
constitutes "public policy and public good" within the meaning of the 
Code. In Sasakila's Case the Tribunal said that it was not satisfied 
that Sasakila should not be dismissed from office on the grounds of 
public policy and public good, without adding anything more. In 
Grey's case, the Tribunal did point to both the facts constituting the 
breach and the unchallenged evidence of Grey himself in relation to 
those facts, as the factors which influenced it in holding that public 
policy and public good did not require Grey to be dismissed. Much of 
Grey's case was based on the fact that he was an extremely busy man in 
his capacity as the General Manager of the nation's only national 
airline, during the period in question. The Tribunal seemed to have 
been concerned implicitly that dismissing Grey from that position 
would cause some loss of the airline service to the public. Thus, 
emerging from this is a vague criterion that dismissal of a leader is
85. The Organic Law, S.27(5).
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not warranted where no loss to the public in any tangible way is 
foreseen by the Tribunal. There was no evidence that dismissal of
Grey would cause substantial loss in the economic and other senses, to
either Air Nuigini or to the travelling public. The Tribunal's view 
therefore rested on a questionable assumption.
b) Other Types of Prohibited Conduct
Apart from the failure to disclose, S.27 of the Constitution
prohibits other types of conduct. Conduct under this section is
expressed in terms of responsibilities of office. A leader is 
prohibited under the section from engaging in any conduct which tends 
to have any of the following four consequences:
- if it either causes conflict of interests or puts him in a 
position of compromise;
- if it demeans his office or position;
- if it allows both his official and personal integrity to be 
questioned; or
- if it either endangers or diminishes respect for and 
confidence in the integrity of the government of Papua New 
Guinea.
The ambit of the section is thus very wide and covers virtually 
any type of conduct. So far cases have revealed four types of conduct 
as falling within the meaning of the section: misuse of public funds;
misuse of official position for personal gain; misuse of official 
facilities for personal use, and engaging in conduct which is 
unbecoming of a leader.
i) Misuse of Public Funds
O (L O *7
In two cases, Kunangel's Case and Pondros' Case, the charge
was a breach of S.27 through misuse of public funds. Both leaders 
were Members of Parliament and also Ministers. Kunangel was alleged 
to have converted K.20,000 given him under the Rural Transport Sector 
Programme for his own use instead of the use by the local business
86. Reference No. 2 of 1982.
87. Reference No. 1 of 1982.
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group in his electorate for which the funds were sought. Kunangel, on 
legal advice, resigned from Parliament before the Tribunal was about 
to hear his case. As he was no longer a leader the Tribunal did not
have jurisdiction to prosecute him and this was confirmed by the
88Supreme Court on appeal. But if Kunangel had not resigned there was 
overwhelming evidence to establish his guilt. The Supreme Court's 
decision is analysed fully below.
In Pondros' Case, the amount involved was K.60,000, consisting of 
K.50,000 from the Village Economic Development Fund, and K.10,000 from 
the Prime Minister's Department. Again the money was granted to a 
local business group in Manus, but Pondros used the money in joint
business operations with his wife in Port Moresby. The Tribunal found 
Pondros ”a dishonest man”, guilty of the offence of misconduct in 
office. Consequently it recommended to the Head of State that Pondros 
be dismissed from Parliament.
ii) Misuse of Position
In two other cases the charges were based on misuse of official
89position for personal gain. In the Auna's Case, the charge was that 
Joseph Auna received certain bribes from foreign businessmen when he 
held the position of the Director of the National Investment and
Development Authority. On legal advice, Auna resigned from his
position before his case was referred to the Tribunal for prosecution. 
The legal opinion was that the Code covered only those leaders still 
in office, and thus did not cover a leader who was no longer a leader. 
This legal opinion was confirmed by the Supreme Court on a 
Constitutional Reference from the Tribunal. Because of the importance
of this case in demonstrating the Supreme Court's attitude to the
90Code, the decision is analysed fully below.
91In Morgan's Case, the Tribunal found Morgan guilty of 
misconduct on a number of counts which alleged that whilst Morgan was 
Acting Secretary for the Department of Works and Supply, he authorised
88. Unreported judgment, S.C.R. No. 2 of 1982.
89. In Re Joseph Auna [1980] P.N.G.L.R. 500.
90. See pp.282-287.
91. Constitutional Reference No, 1 of 1978 [1978] P.N.G.L.R. 460.
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a wire fence to be put around his house, and to be paid for out of 
departmental funds. Other counts involved similar instances of misuse 
of position. Morgan attempted to avoid liability by arguing that the 
Code covered permanent Departmental Heads only, and not the Acting 
Departmental Head position that he was occupying. The Supreme Court 
held against him. He was consequently dismissed from office by the 
Governor-General as recommended by the Tribunal.
iii) Misuse of Facilities
92There has been one case, viz., Toua's Case, where the conduct 
alleged to have breached S.27(1) was misuse of facilities for personal 
benefit. Toua was the Commissioner for the Electricity Commission at 
the time. He was alleged to have allowed his official car to be used 
by his family when he was overseas, failed to pay his electricity 
bills, and used his official entertainment fund to employ a domestic 
servant.
The Tribunal found him guilty of misconduct in office and 
recommended that he be suspended without pay for one month. The 
Tribunal was reluctant to recommend a heavier penalty since Toua had 
already been on suspension without pay. It found that there was no 
serious culpability nor did public policy and public interest 
requiring Toua's dismissal. Moreover, Toua's term as Commissioner was 
to expire very soon after the case, anyway. He was of course never 
reappointed to the Commission, although he was appointed later to 
another public position as was also the case with Morgan.
iv) Conduct Unbecoming of a Leader
The one case that falls into this category was that of James 
Mopio, who was a Member of Parliament. Mopio was charged with having 
breached S.27(1) of the Constitution on a number of counts which 
involved writing dishonoured cheques, receiving K.4,000 without 
declaring it to the Ombudsman Commission as required by the Code, 
selling beer on the black market, receiving rents from a house 
belonging to someone else, failing to pay the costs of car hire and 
taking an unauthorised trip to Hong Kong and Manila at public expense.
92. Reference No. 2 of 1978.
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These counts were proved and the Tribunal accordingly found Mopio 
guilty of misconduct in office. Mopio was consequently dismissed by 
the Head of State on a recommendation from the Tribunal.
Some of the counts could also have led to criminal charges under 
the Criminal Code. For this reason the Tribunal referred to the 
Supreme Court the question of what standard of proof a Leadership Code 
Tribunal ought to apply. The Court held that there is no standard of 
proof required. All that the Tribunal needs to ensure is to be
Q  Oreasonably satisfied of the truth of the allegations. Only Miles
J. envisaged a case where the Tribunal needs to be satisfied beyond 
94reasonable doubt. •
Out of the eight cases prosecuted before Tribunals, five reached
95the Supreme Court: one by way of appeal and the rest through
96Constitutional References. It is useful to assess briefly the
attitude of the Supreme Court toward the Code as reflected in these 
cases.
8.2.2.2 The Supreme Court's Attitude Towards the Code
In Sasakila's Case and Mopio's Case, the Supreme Court was 
content to concentrate on the technical questions of law involved, and 
did not explore the wider issues, such as the purpose of the Code. 
Their attitude towards the Code becomes more apparent in relation to 
the other two categories of cases.
Two cases come under the second category where the Supreme Court 
refused to give effect to the Code, on the grounds of a legislative 
omission of the type that the Court felt it proper for Parliament 
rather than the Court to remedy. In chronological order they are 
Auna's Case and Kunangel's Case; and because they demonstrate best the 
Court's attitude, they will be considered in some detail here.
In Auna's Case, two questions were referred to the Supreme Court.
93. In Re James Eki Mopio [1981] P.N.G.L.R. 416.
94. Ibid., at 422.
95. Sasakila's Case [1976] P.N.G.L.R. 491.
96. The Morgan, Auna, Mopio and Kunangel's Cases.
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The first was whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear the
charges arising from a previous position held by a leader who, by the
time the Tribunal assumes jurisdiction, was holding a new office which
97also came under the Code. Auna was the Director of NIDA at the time
the charges under the Code were laid against him. But he resigned
from that position afterwards; and by the time the Tribunal assumed
jurisdiction to hear his case he had already been appointed as the
98Ambassador Designate to Belgium and the EEC.
In a short joint judgment, the Court held, by way of answer to 
the first question stated above, that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction 
even if the leader decides to resign in the course of the hearing. 
The decisive stage is the date of judgment: the leader in question
must be in office at the date the judgment is handed down by the 
Tribunal if the Code is to catch him.
In relation to the second question, the Court held that the 
Tribunal could have jurisdiction only to the extent that the leader 
still remains in the second position at the date of the judgment by 
the Tribunal. Otherwise the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction over charges 
brought against the leader in the position he occupied previously 
under the Code.
The Court appeared to have accepted the argument by Auna’s 
counsel that the object of the Code was to punish leaders actually in 
office. The essence of that argument was that since the Code 
contemplates that if the nature of a given charge is serious enough in 
the judgment of the Tribunal to warrant a recommendation for dismissal 
from office, then it would be pointless if the Tribunal was to 
recommend dismissal of someone who is not holding any position from 
which he could be dismissed. Thus, according to Auna’s counsel, the 
whole intention was to catch those who are still holding offices but 
not those who have left. In coming to its decision the Court also 
adopted the statement by the Tribunal that the entire thrust of the 
Leadership Code is to remove people who are found, after due enquiry, 
to be unfit to continue in office. Thus Auna was able to avoid the 
Code.
97. National Investment and Development Authority, which is a 
Statutory Authority.
98. The European Economic Community.
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The effect of Auna's Case is that a leader charged under the Code 
can avoid liability by simply tendering his resignation at any stage 
of the proceedings to his appropriate superior authority. The 
position seems to be quite open to manipulation in that there is no 
provision under the Code requiring him either to submit his 
resignation within a certain time or to spell out some type of 
conditions under which such resignation could be accepted by the 
appropriate authority.
Auna's Case was used as a precedent by Kunangel to avoid 
liability under the Code. In Kunangel's Case, Kunangel resigned as a 
Member of Parliament after his case (which involved misappropriation 
of Government funds under the Rural Sectoral Programme) was referred 
to a Leadership Code Tribunal for prosecution. When the case was 
formally opened for hearing before the Tribunal, Kunangel's counsel 
objected to the Tribunal's jurisdiction on the grounds that it did not 
have such jurisdiction, as Kunangel was no longer a leader. Thereupon 
the Tribunal referred two questions involving constitutional issues to 
the Supreme Court for that Court's advisory opinion under its original
QQjurisdiction relating to constitutional questions. The first 
question was whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction after a leader has 
resigned his seat as a Member of Parliament and a Minister of State 
while he was still on a suspension. The second question was whether a 
Member of Parliament ceases to be a leader after he tenders his 
resignation in writing to the Speaker, independently of the Speaker's 
acceptance of that resignation.
A strong Supreme Court comprising five judges held by majority of 
four to one that the answer to the first question was that the 
suspension of a Member of Parliament under S.28 of the Organic Law did 
not affect the member's right to resign under S. 104(2)(c) of the 
Constitution. Thus, he could resign his seat in Parliament at any 
time, and once he did so, this would deprive the Tribunal of any 
jurisdiction over such leader. Kaputin J. in a minority judgment 
disagreed. In reaching its decision, the majority relied on the 
principle laid down in Auna's Case and expressly stated that it was 
good law.
99. The Constitution, S.18.
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The answer the Court gave to the second question was that a 
resignation of a Member of Parliament becomes effective once it is 
tendered to the Speaker of the Parliament. Thus the Speaker does not 
have any discretion to refuse to accept it. This makes good sense 
politically, since the people should not be denied their right to 
choose their new representative if their sitting member no longer 
wishes to serve them.
There are a number of bases on which the two decisions are 
unsatisfactory, in terms of both the law and the judicial approach to 
constitutional interpretation. To begin with, there appears to be 
some judicial doubt about the objective of the Code. Whereas in 
Auna's Case the Supreme Court regarded the object of getting rid of 
unworthy people from public office as "the entire thrust of the 
legislation”,^^ in Kunangel's Case the Court viewed that objective as 
the main thrust. But in both cases the Court failed to consider 
all the relevant provisions of the Code. Nor did it state which 
provisions, in particular, indicate unequivocally that the main aim of 
the legislation is to dismiss unworthy people from office. Instead, 
it seemed to have been easily influenced by the interpretation of the 
law as presented to it by both the Tribunal, especially in Kunangel1 s 
Case, and by the defence counsel. That interpretation was that one 
could only discipline a person if he was still holding office.
The essence of the disciplinary jurisdiction under the Code is 
that though it does not include criminal sanctions, it postulates a 
more serious legal sanctions than does the law relating to the 
ordinary discipline. This is indicated by the nature of penalties, 
including those spelt out by the Leadership Code (Alternative 
Penalties) Act 1976 as well as by the potential criminal prosecution. 
This is further supported by the sliding scale of the onus of proof 
depending on the gravity of the offence of misconduct, that the 
Supreme Court adopted in Mopio's Case. That is, the more serious the 
facts are in alleging a misconduct in office the higher is the 
standard of proof the Tribunal needs to adopt in satisfying itself as 
to the evidence which establishes the existence of those facts. This
100. [ 1980] P.N.G.L.R. at 504.
101. Unreported Supreme Court Judgment No. 2 of 1982
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leads to the question of the true purpose of the Code as envisaged by 
the CPC, which the Supreme Court did not consider in either case.
The CPC appreciate that abuse of power, corruption and other 
forms of official misconduct could not be totally eradicated. It 
therefore chose to reduce opportunities whereby such misconduct could 
be committed. For this purpose, three ways of denying such 
opportunities are provided for under the Code. Firstly, when the 
alleged misconduct is referred to the Public Prosecutor by the 
Ombudsman Commission for prosecution, the incumbent is suspended on 
full pay. The suspension denies him access to the public office he 
holds and to its facilities and resources. Secondly, if he is found 
guilty of the offence of misconduct in office he is dismissed from 
office, if he is still in office, and is deprived of any access to any 
elective public office thereafter for a period of three years. 
Thirdly, if he is found guilty, but he is no longer in office, he is 
still denied access to an elective office for a period of three years. 
In this situation dismissal is not available for consideration as he 
is no longer in office.
These three methods of denying an incumbent in office 
opportunities to indulge in situations of conflict of interest, of 
course, could be also regarded simultaneously as constituting 
penalties. But viewing them that way in an emphatic fashion as the 
Supreme Court did in both the Auna and Kunangel's Cases is to put an 
unnecessary stress on an aspect of the Code that is only secondary to 
its basic purpose.
If that basic purpose of the Code is to be served, then it 
becomes necessary to deny a leader in office opportunities to put 
himself in a position of conflict of interests. And one can only do 
that by establishing his guilt according to law on any charge of 
misconduct in office. Thus, the question becomes one of proving the 
alleged liability the person in question has incurred through 
misconduct committed while he occupied a position or office which 
comes under the Code. It is a continuing liability analogous to 
criminal liability which the State through the Public Prosecutor has 
to prove before the Tribunal.
When the Code is seen in this perspective, the question of
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resignation by the leader should not affect his alleged liability 
which is continuous until disproved. That is, people who have 
accepted public offices covered by the Code should remain responsible 
for past misconduct committed whilst in office. Nor is this liability 
related in any sense to questions of contract of employment, status of 
the office, or even the law governing the normal discipline. It is a 
liability arising out of harm such a person might have done to the 
public office and thereby to the people of PNG. Thus, both Auna and 
Kunangel could have been still subject to the Code until they had been 
cleared according to law, and their respective resignations should not 
have affected their liability under the Code. The Supreme Court was 
not prepared to adopt that view.
One disappointing aspect of the Auna and Kunangel's Cases, which 
does not augur well for the future, is the legalistic mode of 
constitutional interpretation adopted by the Supreme Court. This 
policy was clearly stated in Kunangel's Case where Gazewics J. came 
out strongly to assert in his judgment that there must be consistency 
and certainty in the law, and the only path to achieving that 
objective is through strict construction. Only Kaputin J. took a 
teleological approach in his interpretation of the Constitution, by 
arguing that the whole of the Constitution as well as the CPC’s Final 
Report had to be examined in order to establish the aim of the Code. 
When this was done, Kaputin J. argued, it was clear that the Code 
affected all leaders in the whole governmental system, and the 
intention was to punish the wrong-doing. Thus, once the Tribunal 
assumed jurisdiction, the leader's right to resign should be suspended 
until the legal process is brought to its finality. But this 
reasoning led Kaputin J. into problems of reconciling the provisions 
of the Organic Law on the Tribunal's jurisdiction with those of the 
Constitution governing the right of resignation of a Member of 
Parliament. This led to a conclusion which was incorrect in law as 
Kapi Dep.C.J. pointed out where the provisions of the Constitution 
were made subject to those of the Organic Law. Kaputin J. could still 
arrive at the same conclusion of continued liability of a leader by 
basing that liability on the grounds stated above, and by maintaining 
that the provisions of both the Constitution and the Organic Law 
comprising the Code are both self-executing and unaffected by the 
provisions elsewhere either in the Constitution or in other laws
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governing the right of a leader to resign. Kaputin J. was also 
incorrect in regarding the aim of the Code as one of punishing 
wrong-doing. That is the aim of the criminal law which the Code is 
not intended to replace. This is discussed below.
‘One effect of this strict mode of constitutional interpretation 
is a tendency among the judges to see loopholes in legislation far too 
readily. This can have disastrous consequences. As Andrew J. pointed 
out in Kunangel's Case the technical loophole under the Code creates a 
ridiculous situation in which the law allows leaders to flout the 
Constitution almost at will.
This raises the question of the extent to which courts are 
empowered by the Constitution to legislate, for instance, in order to 
fill a loophole in legislation. The Supreme Court has been reluctant 
to do so, largely on the basis that it would be otherwise breaching 
the separation of powers doctrine. It is generally accepted that 
judges do make law and that it is necessary in modern times that they 
do so. The only question that still remains a point of debate is the 
degree to which courts should be allowed to engage in judicial 
legislation.
The CPC saw the role of the courts as a creative one where they 
are permitted to perform some law-making functions. Thus, the 
degree of judicial legislation permitted by the Constitution is fairly 
high.^^ But courts have been reluctant "to make even a modest 
start" in performing this function. In relation to filling any 
omissions in legislations, the Supreme Court at the outset adopted a 
deliberate policy of regarding that function as belonging to the 
Parliament. In the first case of this type which came before the 
Court in mid-1976, viz., Constitutional Reference No. 2 of 1976,^^ 
the question referred to the Court was whether the constitutional 
provisions of S.145 governing no-confidence motions were also
102. See Agenda, 1972-75:154; and the discussion of the role of the 
Courts in Chapter 7, supra.
103. See CPC Final Report, 8/1, and Chapter 7, supra.
104. The Constitution, SS.21, 22 and Schedule 2.
105. See Sakora, 1982:269. )
106. [1976] P.N.G.L.R. 228.
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applicable to the First Parliament which was, in effect, the balance 
of the Third House of Assembly elected during the 1972 General 
Elections. The Supreme Court held that the provisions did not apply. 
In the process of reaching its decision the Court noted that there was 
an omission in the Constitution, but that it was not its role to 
remedy this defect.^'7 However, the Supreme Court has not been 
consistent in the application of its policy of refusing to fill 
legislative omissions. Morgan's Case is a neat illustration of this 
inconsistency. For in that case the Court virtually filled in a 
legislative omission under S.26 of the Constitution which had failed, 
as it stood then, to include expressly the position of Acting 
Departmental Heads under the Code. Morgan's Case was the only case in 
which the Supreme Court supported the Code by taking unanimously the 
teleological approach in interpreting the Code.
8.2.3 The Criminal Jurisdiction
The CPC did not want the Code to replace the criminal law. It, 
in fact, intended the criminal law to complement the Code:
A breach of the Code may also involve an offence under the 
Criminal Code or another law. For example, bribery is already 
an offence under the Criminal Code, and the Chief Minister is 
proposing to introduce legislation to make the acceptance of 
any gift from a company or investor valued at more than a 
certain amount, a criminal offence. We have made it clear 
that the provisions of the Leadership Code do not of 
themselves affect any offences under existing law ....
This view is reflected in S.2 of the Organic Law on Duties and
Responsibilities of Leadership, which provides that:
Except where the contrary intention appears no action taken 
under this Law prejudices any other action that be may be 
taken under any other Law.
Thus S.2 of the Organic Law envisages two types of cases: those 
of purely disciplinary nature, and those which have implications of 
criminal liability. Furthermore, it indicates an inter-relationship 
between the disciplinary jurisdiction and the criminal jurisdiction. 
What, then, is the scheme of this inter-relationship? The Code does
107. See particularly Raine J., ibid., at 238.
108. CPC, 1974:, 3/5 and 3.18.
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not provide the details of this scheme. However, a close study of the 
Code shows that both types of jurisdictions were intended to be 
autonomous but to some extent complementary.
The intention in the scheme is to allow each jurisdiction certain 
autonomy. For instance, if the evidence in the particular case is not 
adequate to sustain a criminal charge, then the matter should be dealt 
with under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Code. But in a case 
where there is sufficient evidence to warrant a charge for an offence 
defined in the Criminal Code or in some other penal legislation such 
as the Customs Act 1947 (as amended) or the Migration Act 1963, the 
intention is to lay a criminal charge against the leader involved. 
That is, the proceedings under the Disciplinary Jurisdiction provide 
no bar to proceedings that may be mounted in the criminal 
jurisdiction. The rationale here appears be to first to discipline 
the leader who is in breach of the Code, and if the state of the 
evidence is open, to penalise him as required by some other law, then 
to hold him liable on those counts as well.
So far no attempt has been made to implement the criminal 
jurisdiction as part of the total scheme under the Code. This failure 
appears to be due to a lack of full understanding of the total scheme 
which includes the criminal jurisdiction. This in turn has led to a 
failure to devise a proper mechanism with which the criminal 
jurisdiction may be implemented.
As stated above, the leaders in a number of cases could have been 
charged with criminal offences. Bribery, for instance, is covered by 
the Criminal Code^^ and so is misusing of public funds. There was 
a strong feeling within the community that the Code was inadequate 
when Kunangel went free after winning his case in the Supreme Court on 
a technical ground. The police were urged to charge Kunangel with a 
criminal offence, which they did. In March 1983 Kunangel was 
committed by the National Capital District Court for trial in the 
National Court on a charge of misappropriating K.20,000 in government 
funds.  ^^
109. The Criminal Code Act 1974, S.59.
110. Ibid., S.87.
111. Post Courier, 16 March 1983.
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A number of Leadership Code cases where the main element of
offence was essentially criminal, were treated as criminal matters:
for instance, Barnabas Kombi1, the former Premier of Manus, was
charged, convicted and jailed for one year for misappropriating
112K.3,500 in government funds. John Jaminan, a Member of Parliament,
was charged, convicted and sentenced to four years imprisonment for
11 3raping a sixteen-year old girl. In both cases, no attempt was made
to take action under the Code as well, even though that this is 
possible under the present law.
These cases indicate that, perhaps, some ad hoc method of
enforcing the criminal jurisdiction will be worked out in practice. 
But there is no certainty that this will happen. Pondros, for
instance, should have been charged with a criminal offence, but was 
not. If Kunangel's Case is any indication for the future trend, it is 
likely that criminal prosecution would follow the Code proceedings, if 
the state of evidence were to warrant it.
8.3 CONCLUSION: THE NEED TO ENFORCE THE CRIMINAL LAW
By the end of 1977 , it was realised that the Code had not been 
effective in curbing corruption and bribery.^ ^  Some remedial 
measures had to be taken. Since then there have been three attempts 
at reforming the code. The first of these was an unsuccessful attempt 
by the Prime Minister, Michael Somare, in 1978 to introduce a new 
Leadership Code.^“* The other two were attempts by the Law Reform 
Commission to study the present law relating to corruption with the 
view to strengthening it,^^ and the recommendations of the General 
Constitutional Review Commission for the Code to be amended in some
112. Post Courier, 17 March 1983.
113. Post Courier, 24 April 1983.
114. In this respect Professor Seidman shows that the implementation
of leadership codes in Africa has not been effective. By 1978 there 
had been only two cases of Parliamentarians forced to resign under the 
Tanzanian Code. There is very little study done, however, on the 
African Codes: see Seidman, 1978:418-419.
115. Post Courier, 25 May, 1978.
116. See Law Reform Commission Working paper No. 19, October 1982.
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important respects.^^ No conclusions can be drawn on these proposals 
for reform as they have not been finalised.
The present scheme of the Code is sound, but the Code itself has 
not been enforced as intended by the Constitution-makers, largely due 
to a failure by various law-enforcing agencies. One consequence of 
this has been that more efforts have been made to enforce the 
Disciplinary Jurisdiction of the Code at the expense of the criminal 
law, again contrary to what was intended by the constitution-makers.
The scheme as envisaged by the CPC was to place equal emphasis on 
both the Disciplinary Jurisdiction as well as the Criminal
Jurisdiction in such a way that both jurisdictions complement each 
other. In practice such a scheme should work thus:
(a) Once the Ombudsman Commission collects the facts after
investigating into any misconduct, it must then examine the tacts 
to see whether they could sustain a criminal charge. If they do, 
then the Commission is required to refer the case to the police 
with a recommendation for a criminal charge to be laid against the 
leader in question. At the same time the proceedings under the 
Disciplinary Jurisdiction should be suspended. Two possible 
situations could emerge after this. First, if the leader in
question is found guilty by a court of an offence on the tacts of 
the misconduct, then as well as being punished according to the 
criminal law for such offence, he is also liable to the penalties 
available under the Leadership Code. What should happen is that 
after the court hands down its sentence the Ombudsman Commission 
should then apply to a Leadership Tribunal formally to declare 
such a person unfit to hold any public office for the period of 
time stipulated under the Code, after he serves his sentence or 
pays a fine. Secondly, if the criminal prosecution is 
unsuccessful, it is still open to the Ombudsman Commission to 
initiate the proceedings under the Disciplinary Jurisdiction by 
referring the case to the Public Prosecutor for prosecution in the 
usual way.
(.b) Alternatively, if the investigation by the Ombudsman Commission
117. See General Constitutional Commission, 1983:22-29
291
reveals facts which appears to sustain only a disciplinary charge 
under the Disciplinary Jurisdiction, the Commission should 
initiate proceedings under that Jurisdiction accordingly. It at 
the end of these proceedings, facts emerge which are adequate to 
sustain a criminal charge, the Ombudsman Commission should then 
recommend to the police that a criminal charge or charges be laid 
against the leader in question once he has been punished as 
prescribed under the Code, provided of course that he has been 
found guilty for misconduct in office.
It is important that once the proceedings in either the Criminal 
Jurisdiction or the Disciplinary Jurisdiction are initiated, they 
should be allowed to proceed to finality before proceedings in the 
other jurisdiction are initiated. This will assist the process in 
which the complementary function can be smoothly carried out through 
both jurisdictions.
There are good reasons for giving equal emphasis to both 
jurisdictions. Under the criminal law the leader in question has his 
rights protected through the usual strict requirements of the criminal 
procedure. For public office-holders are entitled to the same full 
protection of the law as guaranteed to anybody else by S.37 of the
1 1 OConstitution. There should just be one law tor all, irrespective
of status. If leaders are allowed to break the law without
punishment, the risk of disrespect for the law among the ordinary
1 1 9people is indeed great. The Leadership Code was never meant to
replace the Criminal Code.
If, on the other hand, a case of alleged misconduct cannot 
sustain a criminal charge, the purpose of the Leadership Code is 
easily served by denying the leader in question access to public
office once a conviction is recorded against him. Such conviction
seems to be easy to reach because of the provision in the Organic Law 
which allows Tribunals to be free from strict rules of procedure and
118. See Miles J. in Acting Public Prosecutor v. Barry B. Holloway 
(Unreported Judgment of National Court, N.298 of June 1981).
119. See Kapi J. in The Public Prosecutor v. Barry Holloway 11981] 
P.N.G.L.R. 482 at 485.
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1 20evidence. w This does not mean, ot course, that the leader in 
question is not protected, since a Leadership Tribunal must act 
judicially and has to take the principles of natural justice into 
account in its proceedings.^^
The net effect of all this is to restrict the disciplinary
jurisdiction of the Code to deal with only non-criminal cases. In
this way, the Code can be more effectively enforced in terms of the
limited resources available to the Ombudsman Commission. The criminal
matters should be left to the police, since the Ombudsman Commission
has very onerous responsibilities to discharge not only under the Code
but also under the general maladministration jurisdiction. There are
practical problems of delay by the police in prosecuting cases
122referred to them by the Commission, but this should not serve as 
justification for transferring to the Commission the responsibility 
for prosecuting criminal cases arising under the Coae, particularly 
when the Commission lacks the resources to discharge its current 
responsibilities adequately. Furthermore, with a strong opposition to 
the Code from the Executive, it is more than likely that the 
Commission's request for allocation of further resources for its use 
would not be favourably considered by the Executive.
120. S.27(4); and see Goldring, 1978:191.
121. See the Organic Law, S.27(4), and Mopio's Case [1981] 
P.N.G.L.R. 416.
122. The Chief Ombudsman:personal communication.
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CHAPTER 9
NATIONAL GOALS AND CONTROL OF EXECUTIVE POLICY
The CPC wanted the National Goals and the Directive Principles to 
provide one form of substantive control of the Executive action. It 
made this explicit in its Final Report:
[Ojur recommendation that all activities of the State and its 
institutions should be based on the Directive Principles and 
directed towards achieving the National Goals is designed to 
help to reorient the thinking and attitudes of everyone who is 
a member of an elected body or who works in a government 
department, institution or authority; and to redirect the 
policies of those bodies towards the Goals.
The CPC's recommendation had two aspects. First, it saw the Goals as
a set of positive aims which State institutions were required to
achieve. Secondly, it also wanted the Goals to serve as a form of
restraint on the Executive.
A hypothetical example may serve to illustrate the point. The 
Goals do not prescribe the Executive to initiate a particular policy 
on forestry. What they require is that in both formulating and 
implementing its forestry policy, the Executive must take into account 
the requirements of the relevant National Goals, such as the Fourth 
Goal which calls for preservation of natural resources and 
environment. This is a substantive control, inasmuch as it controls 
the Executive discretion in relation to the content of a particular 
policy. Thus, substantive control of the Executive policy is 
important if the Goals are to be implemented.
The long-term significance of the Goals can only be understood in 
the context of the vision constitution-makers had at the time of 
Independence. They took Independence as providing them with an 
opportunity to define the kind of society that they wanted to see 
emerge in PNG. Thus the Goals of such a society had to be defined.
1. CPC, 1974:1/15, para. 122.
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However, the CPC saw the proposed home-grown constitution also as 
playing a fundamental role in helping to achieve these Goals. In its 
Final Report it stated that double role thus:
We believe that the significance of Papua New Guinea's 
attainment of Self Government and Independence is that, by 
transferring power into the hands of the people of this 
country, it gives us a chance to define for ourselves the 
philosophy of life by which we want to live and the social and 
economic Goals we want to achieve. If the Constitution is to 
be truly the fundamental charter of our society and the basis 
of legitimate authority, it should be an instrument which 
helps to achieve these Goals and not one which obstructs. Our 
Constitution should look towards the future and act as an 
accelerator in the process of development, not as a brake. It 
should be related to the National Goals that we leaders of 
this country are enunciating. We have therefore framed our 
recommendations for the proposed Constitution with these Goals 
in mind.
With that aim in mind the CPC adopted five such Goals which it 
called 'National Goals', and a total of thirty three Directive 
Principles. It intended that the National Goals were to be achieved 
through the implementation of the Directive Principles.
This chapter will attempt to show that the Goals and the 
Directive Principles are constitutionally binding on the Executive, 
although their effective implementation faces a number of crucial 
interpretive problems, which arise chiefly out of the non-justiciable 
provisions of the Constitution. To do this I will, first, discuss the 
constitutional basis and background of the Goals and the Directive 
Principles; secondly, I will discuss the Goals as the basis of 
government, focusing particularly on the relationship between the 
Goals and the Executive constitutional responsibilities, and finally, 
I will analyse the provisions governing the enforcement of the Goals.
9.1 THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS AND BACKGROUND
9.1.1 The Constitutional Framework
The five Goals in the order in which they are incorporated in the 
Preamble of the Constitution are:
2. CPC, 1974:2/1, para. 2; and Narokobi, 1983:98
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1. Integral human development.
We declare our first goal to be for every person to be 
dynamically involved in the process of freeing himself or 
herself from every form of domination or oppression so that 
each man or woman wll have the opportunity to develop as a 
whole person in relation with others.
2. Equality and participation.
We declare our second goal to be for all citizens to have 
an equal opportunity to participate in, and benefit from, 
the development of our country.
3. National sovereignty and self-reliance.
We declare our third goal to be for Papua New Guinea to be 
politically and economically independent, and our economy 
basically self-reliant.
4. Natural resources and environment.
We declare our fourth goal to be for Papua New Guinea's
natural resources and environment to be conserved and used 
for the collective benefit of us all, and be replenished
for the benefit of future generations.
5. Papua New Guinean ways.
We declare our fifth goal to be to achieve development
primarily through the use of Papua New Guinean forms of 
social, political and economic organization.
The Preamble states that the Goals underlie the Constitution. The
importance of the Goals is reflected in the sequence in which they are
enumerated.
The CPC wanted the Goals to focus on achieving social justice.
This was a reaction against the "Eight Point Plan" (usually referred
3to as the "Eight Aims"). These were essentially eight guidelines for 
policy adopted by the Coalition Government in December 1972, and
confirmed by the House of Assembly in March 1973. These "Eight Aims" 
were orientated towards economic development. The CPC did not accept 
this orientation. It stated its position thus:
In evolving the National Goals and Directive Principles of 
Policy which we propose should be incorporated in the 
Constitution, we have taken full account of the Eight Aims.
The Goals and Directive Principles we recommend are broader 
and more comprehensive than the Aims in that they provide for 
the full development of our people, whereas the Aims emphasize 
the economic aspects of our society. The Goals and Principles 
are generally consistent with the Aims but are more
3. These are discussed below.
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specifically aimed at achieving a free and just society in 
Papua New Guinea.
Social justice therefore became the overall guiding philosophy for the 
Committee. Central to its concept of social justice was the need for 
integral human development. Implicit in this was the philosophy that 
all aspects (not just economic needs) required to be emphasised and 
emphasised equally.
We do not take development to be synonymous with material 
progress. For us the only authentic development is integral 
human development. This means that we use the term
development to mean nothing less than the unending process of 
improvement of every man and woman as a whole person. We take 
our stand on the dignity and worth of each Papua New Guinean 
man, woman and child. In effect, this means that integral
human development must reach out to and enrich Papua New 
Guineans in every part of the country."*
It followed naturally from this therefore that the Committee's first
National Goal was Integral Human Development.
Fr. John Momis, the Deputy Chairman of the CPC, explained the 
CPC's thoughts behind each of the Goals during the debate in the House 
of Assembly on the Goals on 30 September, 1974, as follows:
The first concerns integral human development - liberation 
and fulfillment. The emphasis is not so much on education and 
international solidarity, but on integral human development.
The second is equality and participation. Here it says 
that everyone should have an equal share of the benefits, 
equal opportunities, equal status and equal representation in 
whatever development that may take place.
The third deals with national sovereignty and self 
reliance. Here it points out that the Papua New Guinean 
Government should not be under a foreigner's thumb. When we 
gain political independence, we must stand on our own two feet 
and, whether we be poor or rich, we must not be manipulated by 
another country. We must remember that our primary duty is to 
represent our people and their beliefs.
The fourth concerns national resources and the 
environment. This is one of the major problems that has been 
faced by Papua New Guinea. Many of the foreign companies 
engaged in mining, logging and fishing have caused a lot of 
harm to the environment. Here we want to stop this sort of 
thing from going on any further.
4. CPC, 1974:2/2, para. 9.
5. Ibid., 2/3, para. 14.
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The fifth deals with Papua New Guinea ways. Here it 
stresses that social, poitical and economic developments 
should be looked at from a Papua New Guinea point of view.
Mr Deputy Chairman, I would like to thank the Government
and the United Party for supporting the National Goals and
Directive Principles recommended by the CPC.^
As Fr. John Momis indicated in the above speech, both the National
Coalition Government and the Opposition United Party supported the
CPC's recommendations on the Goals. There was therefore no ensuing
debate in both the House of Assembly and the National Constituent
Assembly on the Goals as such.^
The main emphasis is on integral human development because the 
CPC felt that all needs of a person deserve equal support. Thus, in 
order to ensure that this first Goal, which is the most important one, 
is achieved, the other four Goals must make a contribution.
Integral human development is only possible if every human being 
is given equal opportunity to develop himself and to take part in the 
process of building the new society. This leads to a specific focus 
on equality and participation, the second National Goal.
Moreover, equality and participation cannot not be easily 
achieved if there is dependence on outside powers and resources. 
Thus, the need for national sovereignty and self-reliance is 
acknowledged as the third Goal.
Both national sovereignty and self-reliance will be mere passing 
phases in the process of nation-building, if a wise use is not made of 
natural resources, in particular, if they are not conserved for the 
needs of future generations. This led to the adoption of the fourth 
Goal (natural resources and environment).
6. See House of Assembly Debates. Third House, Vol. Ill, No. 36 at 
4569, and the Central Planning Office, 1974:16.
7. The debate that did take place on the chapter on the National 
Goals focused on the question whether the investment code should be 
scheduled to the Constitution as the CPC recommended, or, be left to 
ordinary legislation as the Government preferred. The Government 
succeeded in the end, supported by the United Party. But there were 
others such as Sinaga Giregire, the leader of the National Party, who 
supported the CPC and wanted the investment code to be included in the 
Constitution in order to protect land: ibid. , at 4563-4563. The 
concern that led to the adoption by the CPC of an investment code 
arose out of the bitter experience landowners had with the 
Bougainville copper business: Goldring, 1978:31-32.
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Finally, even if all these four Goals were achieved, they would 
lack their full meaning for Papua New Guineans, unless a conscious 
effort was made to utilise the Papua New Guinean ways and institutions 
in the task of building the new society. Here the concern, that in 
the process of development Papua New Guineans may end up without their 
culture and their identity, was shared by members of the CPC. The 
final goal, the PNG Ways, was born out of this concern.
The Goals themselves are intended to be achieved through the 
implementation of the Directive Principles, which designate particular 
areas for action. The form in which the Goals and the Directive 
Principles are presented - Goals first, followed by the Principles - 
was adopted deliberately to assist the people to understand them
Obetter. For instance, in order to achieve the first National Goal, 
it is necessary that action is taken in six important areas: personal 
contribution to the common good; education based on mutual respect and 
dialogue; the encouragement of beneficial activities; attention to 
public health and nutrition; and emphasis on the family and the PNG 
traditional ways as the basis of the PNG society.
9.1.2 The Origin of the National Goals 
and the Directive Principles
The origin of the Goals and the Directive Principles lies in both 
local as well as foreign sources. The latter source needs to be 
discussed first to provide the comparative background to the analysis 
of the PNG provisions.
The practice of incorporating into written constitutions either
social and economic goals of the state or some reference to them in
fact dates back to the French revolution. (Markandan gives a succinct
qaccount of this history.) In the context of the Commonwealth, the 
attempt during recent years to incorporate social and economic rights 
into constitutions owes its impetus to the Constitution of Ireland of 
1937 which included "Directive Principles of Social Policy". Although 
the Irish Free State Act 1922 contained statements of social, economic
8. CPC, 1974:2/2.
9. See Markandan, 1966:esp. 6-27
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and cultural reforms, these were merely declarations. The 1937 
Constitution had three distinctive features. First, it drew a 
distinction between "Fundamental Rights" relating to personal rights, 
and other rights relating to the family, education, private property, 
religion and social and economic matters which were covered by 
"Directive Principles of Social Policy". Secondly, it was made 
explicit in the Constitution that the State was expected to implement 
social policy. Thirdly, the 1937 Constitution drew a distinction 
between the Fundamental Rights as justiciable provisions, and the 
Directive Principles as non-justiciable ones.
After World War II the ideology of nation-building generated by 
the post-war decolonisation process began to draw the attention of 
national constitution-makers to the Irish model. Burma, for instance, 
adopted the "Directive Principles of Social Policy" in its 1947 
Constitution. Both India and Pakistan followed suit under their 1950 
and 1956 Constitutions respectively.
The Irish provisions had a particular influence on the 
formulation of the "Directive Principles of Social Policy" under the 
Indian Constitution. The constitutional advisor to the Constituent 
Assembly visited Dublin in 1949 and had discussions with President De 
Valera.^ In a pamphlet he prepared for the use of the members of the 
Constituent Assembly, B.N. Rao, the Constitutional Advisor, stated, 
after referring to the Irish provisions and to Lauterpacht's 
International Bill of Rights that:
There are certain rights which require positive action by the 
state and which can be guaranteed only so far as such action 
is practicable, while others merely require that the state 
shall abstain from prejudicial action. Typical of the former 
is the right to work, which cannot be guaranteed further than 
by requiring the State, in the language of the Irish 
Constitution, "to direct policy towards securing that the 
citizens may, through their occupations, find the means of 
making reasonable provisions for their domestic needs": 
typical of the latter is the right which requires, in the 
language of the American Constitution, that "the State shall 
not deprive any citizen of his liberty without due process of 
law". It is obvious that rights of the first type are 
normally either capable of, or suitable for, enforcement by 




In 1929 there had been an All Parties Conference which adopted a 
number of fundamental rights, including a provision which entitled 
every citizen to free elementary education. There was a further 
provision which required enactment of suitable laws for the 
maintenance of health and fitness for work of all citizens, a living 
wage for every worker, the protection of motherhood, and the welfare 
of children. The Declaration of Fundamental Rights by the Indian 
National Congress in 1931 contained similar provisions. In particular 
the Declaration contained an assertion that "in order to end the 
exploitation of the masses, political freedom must include real
economic freedom of the starving millions" and that the organisation
1 2of the economic system must conform to the principles of justice.
The Drafting Committee finally recommended sixteen directive 
principles of State policy, which were incorporated under Articles 36 
to 31 of the 1950 Constitution.
There was no history of such goals having been incorporated into 
constitutional documents during the colonial period in PNG. The 
practice in the Commonwealth generally had been to leave ideologies to 
politicians and the political platforms of their respective parties. 
In the PNG context there were a number of ideological forces which 
influenced directly and indirectly the final formulation of the Goals.
First, there was the Hasluck policy of 'uniform development* 
adopted in the early 1950s after Paul Hasluck became the Minister for 
Territories. The policy sought to develop all parts of PNG in order 
to avoid disparities between different areas, and thus avoid political 
instability in future. Secondly, after his policy was dropped in 
1968, a new one which emphasised 'maximum economic development' was 
adopted by the Administration, following the recommendation of a
11. Rao, 1968a:320-321. Besides these international influences,
there was also some historical experience within India itself, which 
was relevant to the question of social and economic goals of the 
State. In the ancient writings of 4 B.C. there was, for instance, 
some reference to an injunction which required the King, as a matter 
of duty, to attend to the needs of the poor and the sick.
12. Ibid., 320.
13. See Allan and Hinchliffe, 1983:13.
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committee from the World Bank. The new policy aimed to maximise 
development by concentrating on those those areas which had economic 
resources.^ Thirdly, there was another influential report by the 
World Bank (the Faber Report) which advocated an equitable 
distribution of economic wealth.^ Fourthly, there were certain 
schools of thought on alternative development such as the Tanzanian 
experience, Maoism and the popular theory of alternative technology,
I £which were current themes on development on the international scene.0 
Fifthly, the formulation of the Goals was greatly influenced by the 
Eight Aims adopted by the Coalition Government in December 1972.  ^^ 
Finally, and most importantly, there was the contribution the members 
of the CPC themselves made to that formulation.
The CPC studied the Indian provisions as well as the similar 
provisions of other constitutions. However, the ideas about the final 
form and content of the National Goals and the Directive Principles 
were those of the CPC itself, and here much of the thinking was 
influenced by Fr. John Momis' radical ideas on development. Momis' 
ideas were influenced by the theory of liberation in the Catholic 
Church in the Third World countries, especially those in South 
America. Writing in a church pastoral magazine, Catalyst, in the year 
of Independence, Fr. Momis recalled his thinking on the Goals at that 
time thus:
About the definition of national goals: the great emphasis we 
have put on the need for defining the Goals is in line with 
our belief that we must have a vision ... Leaders must have a 
vision. This is so crucial, especially in a young country 
without any traditional experience in the Western 
technological field. We must have ideology and we must have 
vision, commitment to ideology, in order to come up with 
something different.^
14. Ibid., 17.
15. The report was named after the leader of the Group, Max Faber. 
The Group, from the University of East Anglia, was sponsored by the 
World Bank at the request of the Australian Government.
16. Fitzpatrick, 1982.
17. These were, control of the economy by Papua New Guineans; equal
distribution of economic wealth; decentralisation; small-scale 
business activites; self-reliance; relying on locally-raised revenue 
to meet government expenses; promotion of women; and government 
control of the economy: see the Central Planning Office, 1975:(vii).
18. Momis, 1975:8-9.
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9.2 THE GOALS AS THE BASIS OF GOVERNMENT
The "something different" which Momis referred to in the 
quotation above was a new society based on social justice. This was 
the ultimate aim of the CPC’s recommendations. But it realised that 
in order to achieve that objective the Goals had to perform a number 
of functions. First, the Goals have to provide a sense of purpose and 
direction to the country as a whole. Otherwise the country would be 
like a rudderless ship merely floating on the sea. Hence, the CPC 
emphasised that thq responsibility to implement the Goals should bind 
all persons rather than only state institutions. This is
incorporated into the Constitution which requires "all persons and 
bodies, corporate and unincorporate to implement the Goals.
Secondly, the Goals have to play the role of unifying the
21country. PNG comprises over 700 language groups. These reflect
very diverse systems of culture, social and political organisations.
This diversity creates the problems of fragmentation of these 
organisations. Thus, there is a need for some unifying force to mould 
these diverse groups into an integrated modern state. Thirdly, the
CPC saw this diversity as richness which gives Papua New Guineans
their identity. Thus, the Committee wanted the Goals to preserve,
„ 2 2protect and promote what it called ' the Papua New Guinean ways . 
This refers to that traditional diversity of culture, social and 
political organisations. Fourthly, the Goals need to serve as targets 
for development in order to ensure that the right kind of development 
takes place: that is, the development of the people measured "not by
the Gross National Product ... [but] by [tjhe degree to which people 
throughout the country have the opportunity to achieve personal 
fulfilment.
19. CPC, 1974:2/15, para. 121.
20. The Constitution, the Preamble.
21. CPC, 1974:2/5, para. 36.
22. Ibid. , 2/12; and also see Goal 5 in the Preamble to the
Constitution.
23. CPC, 1974:2/11, para. 89.
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Finally, if the Goals are to perform these functions at all, they 
must, at least, form the basis of government of the country. As the 
CPC saw it:
This should help to ensure that these objectives [i.e. the 
Goals] will become known throughout the country and provide a 
yardstick against which government performance can be 
judged.24
For this purpose, the Preamble provides that the Goals underlie the 
Constitution. There are a number of grounds on which the Goals can be 
explained as forming the basis of government. First, they constitute 
one of the Basic Principles of Government in Part III of the 
Constitution. Section 25 (which is quoted in full below) makes the 
implementation of the Goals the constitutional responsibility of all 
State institutions. This means the State through its institutions, 
owes definite duties towards its subjects. Secondly, each member of 
the State institutions is required by the Social Obligations in the 
Preamble to respect and act in the spirit of the Constitution; and to 
make particular effort to have his children understand the Goals. 
Thus, each member of any State institution has not only an 
institutional duty to implement the Goals, but also a personal one.
The constitutional responsibility to implement the Goals affects
the Executive in particular, because it has the overall responsibility
2 5for the executive government of PNG. This means the Executive is 
largely in charge of the general policies, particularly the 
legislative programmes, for the country. Thus, in practice, the 
implementation of the Goals is mainly the Executive's responsibility. 
The CPC realised this, and thus recommended that:
Government (including institutions of Government) should make 
specific reference to the National Goals and Directive 
Principles indicating their relevance to national policies and 
programmes such as the Development Plan and the Budget.2^
If the Executive fails to carry out its constitutional duty to 
implement the Goals, how can such a breach be enforced?
24. Ibid., 2/1, para. 6.
25. The Constitution, S.149(3)(a).
26. CPC, 1974:2/25, para. 3.
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9.3 IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT
The CPC was aware of the problem of finding effective means of 
implementing the Goals:
We are well aware that it is one thing to establish 
inspiring Goals for the nation, and sound principles to guide 
the Government and our people in seeking to achieving those 
Goals, yet quite another for effective steps to be taken which 
are directed towards achieving those Goals. Clearly the 
Government of the day, as well as the people themselves, must 
be committed to taking the necessary action, much of which 
will be difficult, since it means confronting powerful vested 
interests and reducing their dominant position.
There were two types of problem involved in this. First, there was
the need to find some way of requiring the State to implement the
Goals. The CPC was aware of the difficulty experienced in
O Qimplementing the Eight Aims, as Somare himself had admitted. This
difficulty may have been due to opposing interests. But it has also
been claimed that the basic problem with the Eight Aims was the fact
that they were "capable of pointing in different directions . The
result was, as Mortimer noted later, that very little was done to
30implement the Eight Aims. Secondly, there was the question of
whether or not to enforce any breach of the Goals. The CPC was aware 
that the comparative experience with similar goals elsewhere was not 
to make such a breach justiciable.
The CPC chose to solve the first type of problem by requiring the 
implementation of the Goals to be the constitutional responsibility of 
all State institutions as discussed above; and the second type of 
problem by making the Goals non-justiciable except in two situations. 
This scheme is incorporated into S.25 which needs to be quoted in full 
because it raises a number of difficult interpretive problems.
Section 23. Implementation of the National Goals
(1) Except to the extent provided in Subsections (3) and 
(4), the National Goals and Directive Principles are 
non-j usticiable.
(2) Nevertheless, it is the duty of all governmental bodies
27. CPC, 1974:2/15, para. 121.
28. Somare, 1975:110.
29. Allan and Hinchliffe, 1982:20.
30. Mortimer, 1979:211.
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to apply and give effect to them as far as lies within their 
respective powers.
(3) Where any law, or any power conferred by any law 
(whether the power be of a legislative, judicial, executive, 
administrative or other kind), can reasonably be understood, 
applied, exercised or enforced, without failing to give effect 
to the intention of Parliament or to this Constitution, in 
such a way as to give effect to the National Goals and 
Directive Principles, or at least not to derogate them, it is 
to be understood, applied or exercised, and shall be enforced, 
in that way.
(4) Subsection (1) does not apply to the jurisdiction of the 
Ombudsman Commission or any other body prescribed for the 
purposes of Division III.2 (leadership code), which shall take 
the National Goals and Directive Principles fully into account 
in all cases as appropriate.
9.3.1 Implementation, Enforcement and 
Non-Justiciability of the Goals
Since the Goals are positive constitutional mandates, positive 
action is required to implement them. They are not mere guides. 
Section 25(2) makes it clear that the implementation of the Goals is a 
duty that binds all governmental bodies. As defined by Sch.1.2(1) of 
the Constitution the term 'governmental body' is quite exhaustive in 
that it covers not only all bodies proper of both the National and 
Provincial Governments, but also any body "set up by statute or 
administrative act for governmental or official purposes". Although 
the opening words of the Goals in the Preamble state that the Goals 
are general guides for "all persons and bodies, corporate and 
unincorporate [sic]", S.25(2) puts it beyond doubt that the 
implementation of the Goals is a binding duty in so far as the 
official bodies of the State are concerned. The reason for not 
calling the Goals principles of State policy as the Indian and other 
constitutions do, seems to be the realisation by the CPC in particular 
that the task of creating and moulding a new society requires effort
31. This avoids the problems of interpretation that arose, for 
instance, under the Indian Constitution, where the Directive 
Principles of the State Policy were stated to be "fundamental in the 
governance of the country". Some took the phrase to mean nothing more 
than mere guides for legislative and executive acts, whilst others 
took it to imply a binding duty on the State to implement the 
Directive Principles: Markandan, 1966:239-240.
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from all persons, and not only from the State institutions. But the 
CPC realised that, in the end, there must be some body to ensure as a 
matter of duty that the Goals are implemented. The State must be 
given that duty because it has the resources to perform it.
The implementation of the Goals and the Directive Principles is 
further encouraged and facilitated by S.25(3) which directs that every 
power should be exercised as far as reasonably possible in a way that 
gives effect to the Goals. This, however, depends very much on the 
terms of a particular law which confers the power.
Enforcement becomes relevant for consideration when there is a 
breach of duty. If there is a deliberate failure to implement a Goal 
through its Directive Principles, there occurs a breach of duty within 
the meaning of S.25(2). But not every such breach can be enforced in 
the courts, although it is conceivable that it can be enforced in some 
other way, for instance, through political pressure. In order to
indicate specifically the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the courts,
32the draftsman adopted the concept of non-justiciability. Thus, with 
the exceptions stipulated under SS.25(3) and (4), all questions 
arising out of alleged breaches of duty relating to the Goals are made 
non-justiciable by S.25(l).
The distinction between implementation and enforcement becomes 
very important when the role of the courts is considered. For they 
are required, just as other State bodies are also required, to 
implement the Goals, not in the sense of having jurisdiction to 
entertain legal suits, but in the sense of their being bound by a 
constitutional duty to take full account of the Goals and the 
Directive Principles when they apply the law. The CPC spelt out the 
role of the courts in this respect thus:
By this we mean that the court and other tribunals should, in 
interpreting the law, in the procedures they adopt for the 
hearing of cases, and in other aspects of their work, try to 
give effect to the Goals and principles. In some cases this
32. On this point, the Irish Constitution of 1937 used the word, 
'cognizable', and the Drafting Committee of the Indian Constitution 
replaced it with the word 'enforceable' to emphasise the lack of 
jurisdiction of the courts as the Committee envisaged that conflict 
between the Directive Principles and Fundamental Rights were likely to 
occur: ibid. , 240.
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will not be possible. If, for example, an Act of Parliament 
has been passed which clearly cuts across a particular goal or 
principle, a court may be unable conscientiously to give any 
other reasonable interpretation of the provisions of the Act 
than that it conflicts with the goal or principle, but is 
nevertheless a valid law. However, where the meaning of a 
particular law or rule of law is unclear or ambiguous, the 
courts should give an interpretation which is consistent with 
the Goals and principles, not contrary to them.^
Courts, on the other hand, cannot enforce the Goals, in that they 
have no power to entertain directly any legal suit which alleges 
breaches of the Goals. This is the constitutional meaning of 
non-justiciability as it is defined by Sch.1.7 of the Constitution.
The CPC did not state expressly in the Final Report the bases on 
which it wanted the Goals made non-justiciable. But three reasons are 
usually advanced in support of such provision, and it could be argued 
that these apply equally to justify the PNG provisions. First, by 
their nature the provisions of the Goals related to policy objectives 
or directions rather than to the existence, or the extent of, legal 
rights vested in any individual or group normally subject to the 
jurisdiction of the courts. Secondly, this is the field in which 
professional lawyers who preside over the courts are not necessarily 
the most competent judges; and finally, the provisions themselves are 
new and no one could be too confident of the most appropriate method
o /of ensuring their observance. q
There are however, two exceptions to non-justiciability, which 
have implications for the Executive.
9.3.2 Exceptions to Non-Justiciabity
The first exception relates to the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman 
Commission. Section, 25(4) states by necessary implication that any 
questions pertaining to the Goals that arise in relation to either the 
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman or the jurisdiction of any other body 
prescribed for the purposes of the Leadership Code, are justiciable 
questions. Schedule 1.7 makes the same provision. It is not clear
33. CPC, 1974:2/16, para. 126.
34. See Joye and Igweike, 1982:63
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however, whether one can take both S.25(4) and Schedule 1.7 to mean 
that a breach of a National Goal by the Executive could constitute the 
ground for a legal suit under the Leadership Code.
The Ombudsman Commission has to take the Goals into full account 
under its Leadership Code jurisdiction. The difficult question is 
whether it thereby has the power to refer a leader for prosecution 
when it considers the evidence is sufficient to establish such conduct 
as having breached the duty imposed by S.25(2), even if such breach 
does not amount to a breach of some other legal duty. Although a 
joint reading of S.25(4) together with the provisions of SS.27 and 28 
and the provisio-ns of the Organic Law on the Duties and 
Responsibilities of Leaders indicates that the Commission is competent 
to recommend prosecution where a National Goal is breached, the 
Commission has taken the view that a breach of a goal alone is not 
sufficient for prosecution. That view seems to be based on the
Commission's perception that the very broad language of the Goals 
would make it very difficult to collect adequate evidence to sustain a 
specific charge against a leader. Thus there has to be evidence of 
breach of a specific conduct prohibited under the Leadership Code 
before any claim on the basis of the Goals could be then adjoined to
O L'the specific breach for purposes of prosecution. This view is
rather unconvincing.
The second exception arises from a joint reading of S.25(1) and
(3). S.25(1) states that, except to the extent provided by S.25(3),
the Goals are non-j usticiable. The implication is that any
non-compliance with S.25(3) would be justiciable. However, S.25(3)
only says that any law or any power conferred by law should be
interpreted in such a way as to give effect to the Goals. This is a
broad provision, but it does have ramifications for the Executive as
37well as other State institutions. Gorio v. Natonal Parks Board was 
a case in which the National Court could have considered the scope of 
the provision by relating its decision to the Goals. The defendant, a
35. S. Kaipu, Ombudsman Commission's Legal Officer: personal
communication.
36. Ibid.
37. [1982] P.N.G.L.R. 364.
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Statutory Authority, executed a contract of sale under which it agreed 
to sell one of its houses to the plaintiff, who was at the time of the 
contract its employee living in the house. The agreed purchase price 
was K13,000, but a subsequent valuation of the property put the total 
value of the property at K53,100.00. The plaintiff, who subsequently 
terminated his employment with the defendant, sought to enforce the 
contract. The question before the Court was whether the defendant had 
power under S.3(2) of the National Parks Act 1971 (as amended) to sell 
its property at such an artificial price. The Court held that the 
defendant did not have such power because such sale was not necessary 
or incidental to the performance of its functions as set out in S.ll 
of the Act. The Court could have gone further and related the 
provisions of the Act to S.25(3). It could have done this by 
demonstrating that S.25(3) requires the power given to the defendant 
under S.3(2) of the Act to be confined in its scope so as not to 
authorise action which is in conflict with the value of equality and 
participation enshrined in Goal 2 and Directive Principle 6. The 
justiciable issue in the case was whether the power vested by statute 
had been properly exercised. For the purposes of S.25(3) the question 
was not whether the Goals were directly justiciable, but whether they 
were relevant to the determination of the outcome of the justiciable 
issue. Thus, justiciability which S.25(l) and (3) contemplate could 
have been achieved indirectly in the case.
9.3.3 The Judicial Attitude
Courts with the power of judicial review under constitutions, 
such as the PNG Constitution, which have broadly-worded social goals, 
are likely to be caught up in political controversies. The CPC 
appreciated this and sought to assist the courts to avoid these as 
much as possible by requiring them to take into account the relevance
T Oof the Goals when they exercise their power of judicial review.
In Public Curator of Papua New Guinea v . Public Trustee of New 
39Zealand, a case involving the interpretation of a will and decided a
38. Bayne, 1982:219.
39. [1986] P.N.G.L.R. 427.
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year after Independence, Prentice Dep.C.J. (as he then was) urged the 
courts to ensure that their rulings were consistent with the National 
Goals and the Directive Principles.^  But other judges have taken a 
casual attitude towards the Goals. Some have merely drawn the court’s 
attention to the constitutional requirement to take the Goals into 
account but have done nothing more.^ Others have tried to draw the 
attention of other state institutions to the same constitutional
/ r\
requirements, but again without indicating how this could be done.
On two occasions, two judges of the Supreme Court even expressly 
ruled out the relevance of the National Goals and the Directive 
Principles. In Iambakey Okuk v. Fallscheer, J Miles J. did no see any 
relevance of the Goals to the question of the dismissal of the airline 
manager of the nation's airline without giving him the opportunity to 
be heard.^ In an earlier case, Premdas v. Independent State of Papua 
New Guinea^“* where the applicant sought to challenge the 
constitutionality of an executive decision to deport him, Wilson 
J. stated categorically that:
it is not part of this Court's duty [i.e. the Supreme Court] 
to have particular regard to the national goals and the 
directive principles and basic social obligations ....
This view contrasted sharply with that shared by Prentice C.J., Andrew
J. and Saldanha J. All three judges stated explicitly that the
Constitution required the Goals, and the Preamble generally, to be
taken into account by the courts as an aid in interpreting the
Constitution.“^  Wilson J. manifested the same attitude towards the
40. Ibid. , at 431.
41. e.g. Kidu C.J. in S.C.R. NO. 4 OF 1980 (The Vanuatu Case) [1981] 
P.N.G.L.R. 265 at 272; and Kapi J. at 292.
42. E.g. Pritchard J. who referred to the Ombudsman Commission's
responsibility to take the Goals and the Basic Social Obligations into 
account when performing its duties: see Constitutional Reference No.
of 1978, [1978] P.N.G.L.R. 345 at 374.
43. [1980] P.N.G.L.R. 274.
44. Ibid. , at 292.
45. [1979] P.N.G.L.R. 324.
46. Ibid., at 375.
47. Ibid. , see Prentice C.J. at 340-341; Andrew J. at 394-395 and 
Saldanha J. at 370. Saldanha J. however, would use the Preamble only 
if there is a doubt involved in interpreting the Constitution, sic.
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Goals in a later case of Re Rooney No. 2^  which involved a charge for
contempt of court against the then Minister for Justice, Mrs. Rooney.
In that case counsel for the Principal Legal Adviser to the NEC
submitted that, in writing the letter of 11 July to the Chief Justice,
in which she alleged judicial interference with the Executive's
decision, the Minister had perhaps been guided by the fifth National
Goal which requires PNG ways to be used in conducting State 
49activities. Wilson J. dismissed this submission without any
explanation except to say that the Minister's letter was 'couched in 
language more typical of "foreign laws" and foreign influence than of 
Papua New Guinea forms of participation, consultation, [and]
c o n s e n s u s ' S a l d a n h a  J., however, noted that if National Goals were 
to be achieved, the Constitution needed to be protected, and the 
Supreme Court was doing nothing more than protecting the Constitution 
as it was directed to do by the Basic Social Obligations embodied in 
the Constitution.-^
Sir William Prentice was perhaps the only judge who tried
consciously to take the Goals into acount in his decisions. In
52Rakatani Peter v. South Pacific Brewery Ltd. the question before the
Supreme Court was whether the court should read-down S.131 of the
District Courts Act 1963 in order to render it in conformity with the
53requirements of S.37(5) of the Constitution. In order to support
his argument that the constitution-makers did not want courts to take 
a legalistic approach in their interpretation of the Constitution 
Prentice Dep.C.J. (as he was then) referred to the rule of 
construction under S.25(3) which requires the relevance of the Goals 
to be taken into account, S.32 which relates Basic Rights to the 
Goals, and Goal 2(4) which calls for equalisation to services, in all 
parts of the country. He concluded:
48. [1979] P.N.G.L.R. 448.
49. Ibid., 504.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid., at 483.
52. [1976] P.N.G.L.R. 537.
53. S.37(5) prohibits a hearing of any charge of an offence which 
carries a penalty of imprisonment (other than imprisonment in default 
of payment of a fine) without the presence of the defendant; whereas 
S.131 permits this.
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It seems to me manifestly clear that it is desirable not only 
in order to achieve the National Goals and the Directives, but 
also to secure the basic rights of individuals, that certain 
classes of charges involving possible imprisonment, should be 
capable of being heard summarily in the absence of the 
defendant if he consents - thus avoiding his arrest and 
compulsory attendences in court - even though potentially 
imprisonment could result.
In the Supreme Court Reference No, 2 of 1982^^ (the Election Fee 
Case) the Supreme Court made an effort to take the Goals into account 
in the way the constitution-makers had intended. In that case the 
Ombudsman Commission challenged the constitutionality of the Organic 
Law on National Elections (Amendment) Act 1981 which increased the 
nomination fee for a candidate at a General Election from K100.00 to 
K1,000.00. One of the Commission's arguments was that the imposition 
of K.1,000 discriminated against citizens on the basis of wealth and 
thereby denied all citizens the same equal right to stand for election 
to Parliament contary to S.55 (Equality of Citizens) of the 
Constitution. The Court accepted this argument unanimously, and went 
on to emphasise that it was contrary to the Goals, particularly Goal 2 
(Equality and participation) to impose such a fee. Kearney Dep.C.J. 
elaborated on the decision:
I accept the Commission's submission that the Constitution 
is permeated by an underlying principle of free and equal 
participation by its citizens. See, for example, the first 
National Goal of "integral human development" especially par. 
(1); and the second National Goal of "equality and 
participation", especially pars. (1), (2), (5), (8) and (9). 
These National Goals are a directive guide to all including 
this Court; see also the elaboration of this by the C.P.C., 
C.P.C. Report, p/2/4, pars. 21 and 23; p.1/3, par. 16; and
p.2/6.56
Apart from the Election Fee Case, it can be said that the judges 
have not generally taken the Goals into account in a systematic 
fashion in interpreting the law despite the constitutional directive 
that they do so.^ In fact, some judges adopted a negative attitude 
towards the Goals, and on two occasions two of these judges did not
54. [1975] P.N.G.L.R. 537 at 557; and see Bayne, 1982:227.
55. 11982] P.N.G.L.R. 364.
56. Ibid., 230; and also see Kapi J. (as he was then) at 239.
57. The Constitution, S.25(3)
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S 8see the relevance of the Goals and said so. °
So far there has not been a case where a court has had to deal
with a direct conflict between a statute purporting to implement a
Goal and some other constitutional provisions, particularly those
dealing with the Basic Rights. The likelihood of this conflict would
increase if Parliament accepts a recommendation of the General
59Constitutional Commission that the Goals should be made justiciable.
In Ex parte Moses Sasakila, the Supreme Court indicated that it was
8 1prepared to limit the range of matters which are non-justiciable.
Although the case dealt with a different kind of problem, it shows
that the Supreme Court is prepared to enforce the limits of power
prescribed by the Constitution. The Goals could assist the courts
greatly in the judicial task of finding a proper balance between the
rights of an individual and the collective interest of the community
when there is a conflict between the two types of interests. To
prepare themselves for the task the superior courts should adopt a
systematic approach of giving the Goals the importance the
Constitution attaches to them. They cannot simply refuse to recognise
8 9the law that causes the conflict as one Indian author has suggested.
It is useful, then, to consider briefly the relationship between the 
Goals and the Basic Rights.
9.3.4 The National Goals and the Basic Rights
There are seventeen Basic Rights incorporated into the 
8 8Constitution. ° Three of these are termed 'Fundamental Rights' whilst 
others are categorised as 'Qualified Rights'. The Fundamental Rights 
are: the right to life; freedom from inhuman treatment, and
protection of the law. The Qualified Rights are: the liberty of the
58. See Miles J. in Fallscheer's Case, [1980] P.N.G.L.R. 274 at 292; 
and Wilson J. in Premdas' Case, [ 1979] P.N.G.L.R. 324 at 275..
59. See General Constitutional Commission 1983:17-21.
60. [1976] P.N.G.L.R. 491.
61. Goldring, 1978:37.
62. India has the most extensive account of the experience on this
conflict among all the States that have constitutional provisions on 
Directive Principles of State policy: See generally, Rao, 1975.
63. See Part III, Division 3.
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person; freedom from forced labour; freedom from arbitrary search and 
entry; freedom of conscience, thought and religion; freedom of 
expression; freedom of assembly and association; freedom of 
employment; right to privacy; right to vote and stand for public 
office; right to freedom of information; right to freedom of movement; 
protection from unjust deprivation of property; and equality of 
citizens.
Whilst the Goals are generally non-justiciable, the Basic Rights 
are, under S.57, justiciable.
It seems that the general relationship between the Goals and the 
Rights is something akin to what the first Indian Prime Minister saw 
as the relationship between the Directive Principles of State Policy 
and the Fundamental Rights under the Indian Constitution.
The Directive Principles of State Policy represents a dynamic 
move towards a certain objective. The Fundamental Rights 
represent something static, to preserve certain rights which 
exist. Both again are right. But somehow and sometimes it 
might so happen that that dynamic movement and that static 
standstill do not quite fit into each other.^
At some points the PNG constitutional provisions are framed in a 
way that tries to avoid conflict between the Goals and the Basic 
Rights. For instance, if Parliament by an Act restricts membership of 
a political party to only women citizens in order to implement the 
Directive No. 5 of the second National Goal (Equality and 
Participation), it has the power do do so even though such a law would 
discriminate against the male citizens within the meaning of S.55(1) 
(Equality of Citizens). The Equality of Citizens is a Qualified Right 
which Parliament can qualify both under its general power relating to 
Qualified Rights under S.38, and under its specific power granted by 
the exception contained in S.55(2).
Under the constitutional scheme Parliament can legislate to 
implement any of the Directive Principles under any of the five 
National Goals; and if there is a risk of such statute breaching any 
of the Qualified Rights it has to ensure that the wording of the 
legislation conforms to the requirements of S.38. If it does not,
64. Parliamentary Debates 16 May 1951, cited by Markandan, 1966:238.
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then, within the meaning of S.38, such statute would be in breach of 
the Basic Rights. Under S.38 Parliament is granted the power to 
intervene in the area of Qualified Rights in three specific 
situations, and when it does intervene, it has to satisfy four 
procedural requirements before any law it enacts in this area can be 
taken as valid. First, it may enact a law regulating or restricting 
any of the Qualified Rights to the extent that it is necessary in 
order to give effect to the public interest in a number of matters. 
These include defence, public safety, public order, public welfare, 
public health, the protection of children and disabled persons and the 
development of under-privileged and less advanced groups or areas. 
Secondly, Parliament may regulate or restrict a Qualified Right to the 
extent that it is necessary to protect the exercise of the rights and 
freedoms of others. This is a protective step Parliament may take in 
the event when someone else’s action has already encroached upon the 
exercise of the others' rights. The third is a situation which 
involves the prevention of an anticipatory breach of a right. In that 
instance Parliament may make reasonable provision for cases where the 
exercise of one such right may conflict with the exercise of another.
If Parliament so makes such law it must ensure that it satisfies 
the procedural requirements spelt out in SS.38 and 39. First, such 
law must relate to any of the purposes falling into any of the three 
situations stated above and it must express that purpose. Secondly, 
it must specify the right or freedom which it is regulating or 
restricting. Thirdly, such regulation, restriction or provision must 
be "reasonably justifiable in a democratic society having a proper
(L Crespect for rights and dignity of mankind" as specifically required 
by S.39. Finally, such law must be certified by the Speaker as having 
been passed by an absolute majority.
These provisions thus afford the Parliament the necessary power 
to prevent conflict situations not only in relation to any conflict
65. It is difficult to define this phrase precisely. Nevertheless, 
it does require a balancing of two sets of interests: those of the 
society against those of the individual. Chalmers suggests that in 
determining that balance, courts need to take into account all the 
circumstances, and their task would be made easier if they take the 
National Goals into consideration: See Chalmers, 1975:102.
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between the Goals and the Basic Rights, but also in relation to any 
conflict between the Basic Rights themselves. Much of course depends 
on the actual legislation purporting to regulate or restrict a 
particular right or freedom.
The CPC realised, however, that when conflict is unavoidable, the 
courts in particular would be in a difficult situation. In that case 
the Committee recommended that the courts should use public policy to 
evaluate and balance competing interests. It saw the problem thus:
The Committee appreciates that cases will almost certainly 
arise in which there will appear to be conflict between, for 
example, a human rights provision in the Constitution and a 
directive principle. In such a case, giving a proper 
interpretation of the provision in question will not be an 
easy matter, but we do not see the duty of the court in such a 
case as being significantly different from that where a 
provision in an Act of Parliament appears to be contrary to a 
common law principle of "public policy".
The provisions of S.38 in some way reflect this principle of 
public policy by emphasising the public interest. But the principle 
of public policy as it has been developed by the Common Law courts is, 
as McCardie J. stated in Naylor, Benzon & Co. Ltd v. Krainische 
Industrie Gesellschaft, "a variable thing. It must fluctuate with the 
circumstances of the time."^ Earlier Burrough J. warned in 
Richardson v. Mellish that public policy "... is a very unruly horse, 
and when once you get astride of it you never know where it will carry
The apparent emphasis on public interest under S.38 together with 
the general power granted to Parliament to qualify Qualified Rights 
indicates the intention of the constitution-makers to give primacy to 
the collective interest rather than individual interests, where 
conflict between the two is irreconcilable. Since the Goals and the 
Directive Principles reflect a concern for collective welfare, they, 
rather than the right of an individual are likely to be given primacy 
by the courts. But courts would have to do this indirectly under 
S.25(3) as discussed above.
66. CPC, 1974:1/16, para. 127.
67. [1918] 1 K.B. 331, 342.
68. 2 Bing. 252. This statement was adopted and approved by Esher, 
M.R., in Cleaver v. Mutual Reserve Association [1892] 1 W.B. 147.
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The relationship between the Goals and the Fundamental Rights is
difficult to determine with any precision. There is no general power
given to Parliament to qualify these Rights, as there is in the case
of Qualified Rights. The powers that are given to Parliament to
qualify the Fundamental Rights are very specific: their limits are
defined under each of the Rights. Thus, outside the scope of each
69specific restriction permitted under two of the Fundamental Rights, 
it seems likely that courts would give primacy to Fundamental Rights 
where these are in conflict with the National Goals.
The Indian courts gave primacy to the Fundamental Rights. In
Madras v. Champakam- Dorairajan,^  the plaintiff, a non-backward Hindu, 
challenged the constitutionality of a Madras Government Communal Order 
which apportioned seats in the Medical Colleges on communal and 
religious bases which, however, did not include non-backward Hindus. 
The plaintiff argued that the Order breached her Fundamental Right 
under S.29(3) which prohibited any denial of admission of a citizen 
"into any educational institution maintained by the State ... on 
grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them." The 
Madras Government attempted to justify the Order on the ground it
implemented the Directive Principle in Article 46 which imposes a duty 
on the State to promote the educational and economic interests of the 
weaker sections of the people, and in particular, of the Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The Full Bench of the Madras High Court 
held that Article 46 could not override the provisions of the 
Fundamental Rights under Article 29(2). The Court stated that the
Government was at liberty to implement the Directive Principles so 
long as it did not contravene any of the Fundamental Rights.
Since Dorairajan's Case in 1951, the Indian courts have softened 
their emphasis on the primacy of the Fundamental Rights over the
Directive Principles by adopting a rule of harmonious interpretation 
with the view to reconciling the conflicting provisions.^ * Where the 
conflict is irreconcilable, the courts apply the primacy of the
69. The third one, viz., Freedom from inhuman treatment does not
admit of any restriction: see the Constitution, S.36.
70. S.C.R. (1951) 526 (India).
71. Markandan, 1966:237.
318
7 2Fundamental Rights. There have also been other judges who have 
argued that the reverse position, viz., the primacy of the Directive 
Principles over the Fundamental Rights, was the intention of the 
constitution-makers. There is evidence that following his 
discussions in Dublin, Shri B.N. Rao, the Constitutional Advisor to 
the Constituent Assembly, proposed an amendment to the draft 
Constitution, which subjected the Fundamental Rights to the Directive 
Principles. But, by then, the work of the Drafting Committee had 
advanced too far, and it was too late to consider the proposal.^
The Indian courts have therefore given the Directive Principles a 
subordinate position in relation to the Fundamental Rights in cases of 
irreconcilable conflict.^ The non-justiciability of the Goals has 
influenced the courts in that they have given less emphasis to the 
Directive Principles than they would otherwise have done. This raises 
the question whether the fact that PNG constitutional provisions on
72. Servai, 1976:1026-1044.
73. Hedge, 1971-72:129.
74. Ibid., 1032; and also Rao, 1968b:237-239.
75. It seems, however, that the Indian courts, would try to avoid 
interpreting any apparent conflict as a conflict in actuality as the 
following observation of the Indian Supreme Court in The State of 
Mysore's Case shows:
"Freedom of trade does not mean freedom to exploit. The
provisions of the Constitution are not erected as barriers to 
progress. They provide a plan for orderly progress towards 
the social order contemplated by the preamble to the
Constitution. They do not permit any kind of slavery, social, 
economic or political. It is a fallacy to think that under 
our Constitution there are only rights and no duties. While 
rights conferred under Part III are fundamental, the
directives given under Part IV are fundamental in the 
governance of the country. We see no conflict on the whole 
between the provisions contained in Part III and Part IV.
They are complementary and supplementary to each other. The 
provisions of Part IV enable the legislature and the 
government to impose various duties on the citizens. The 
provisions therein are deliberately made elastic because the 
duties to be imposed on the citizens depend on the extent to 
which the directive principles are implemented. The mandate 
of the Constitution is to build a welfare society in which 
justice, social, economic, and political, shall inform all 
institutions of our national life. The hopes and aspirations 
aroused by the Constitution will be denied if the minimum 
needs of the lowest of our citizens are not met" (1970: (2) 
S.C.R. 600).
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the Goals are also made non-justiciable gives these Goals a 
constitutional status which is lower than the other constitutional 
provisions.
9.3.5 Non-Justiciability and the
Constitutional Status of the Goals
Fitzpatrick claims that the Goals were included in the Preamble 
to the Constitution in order to give them a lower status than the rest 
of the provisions. ° This view suggests that not only are the Goals 
less important than the rest of the constitutional provisions, but so 
is the Preamble. ‘Two factors appear to have influenced this view. 
First, courts at Common Law generally do not use preambles as an aid 
in interpreting statutes, even though a preamble is a part of a 
statute.^ This tends to suggest that preambles have a lower status 
or are less important than the rest of the provisions in a statute. 
Secondly, the Goals under the PNG Constitution are generally 
non-justiciable (see above). Thus, those who subscribe to the 
positivist theory of law, which characterises law as comprising 
enforceable legal rules, are likely to deny the Goals the status of 
law on the basis that they lack this basic characteristic.
The view which relegates the Goals to a low constitutional status 
raises two immediate questions. First, whether the Constitution 
itself distinguishes the Preamble from the rest of its provisions in a 
way which suggests that the Preamble is not an integral part of the 
Constitution; and secondly, whether the Constitution contains
provisions that are in the technical sense not law, even though the
7 8Constitution itself states that it is the supreme law.
As to the first question Sch.1.3(1) puts it beyond doubt that the
Preamble forms part of the Constitution and may be used as an aid to 
79interpretation. Even the fact that the Goals and the Directive
76. Peter Fitzpatrick, "The Eight Aims and Development in Papua New 
Guinea", a seminar at A.N.U. on 5 October, 1982:personal notes.
77. see Dworkin, 1967:307; and Pearce, 1981:11.
78. Ibid., SS.10 and 11.
79. See Prentice C.J. in Premdas v. Independent State of P.N.G. 
[1979J P.N.G.L.R. 324 at 340.
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Principles are generally non-justiciable does not derogate from their
constitutional status. Their status is the same as that of the other
80constitutional provisions. In fact, as stated above, the Goals are 
justiciable in two important respects, although the full implications 
of this still remain to be seen. But their non-j us ticiabity does not 
prevent their implementation by other governmental bodies, including 
courts which have to take the Goals fully into account in interpreting 
the law. This point was brought out clearly by Hedge J. of the Indian 
Supreme Gourt:
Whether or not a particular mandate of the Constitution is 
enforceable by the courts, has no bearing on the importance of 
that mandate. • The Constitution contains many important 
mandates which may not be enforceable by courts of law ...
[T]he state is directed to take certain positive steps for 
the advancement of the society. For taking those steps 
necessary conditions must be first created. In the very 
nature of things those mandates cannot be enforced through 
courts. It would be wrong to say those positive mandates 
(i.e. Directive Principles) are of lesser significance than 
the mandates under Part III (Fundamental Rights).^
This then leads to the second question posed above: do the Goals
82constitute law? This question is not so easy to answer. In my view 
the Goals and the Directive Principles are law, whether one means law 
as defined by the Constitution or by some general theoretical concept 
of law.
Under S.9 the Constitution and the Organic Laws are two of six 
types of laws declared by that section to be the laws of PNG. 
Further, Sch.1.2 of the Constitution includes both of these types of 
laws in its definition of 'Constitutional Laws'. In other words, it 
is difficult to argue successfully that the Goals could not constitute 
law in terms of the constitutional context where the Goals form an 
integral part of the Constitution itself.
With regard to the general theory, there are, of course, a number 
of legal theories which seek to explain what law is or what it should 





theories about law did not play a major part in the minds of the 
constitution-makers during the framing of the Constitution.^ Rather, 
my concern here is limited to suggesting the legal theory which I 
consider best explains the PNG constitutional arrangement.
The Constitution contains diverse provisions which have, in each 
case, different effects. Some, for instance, are justiciable,^
O Cwhilst others are not. Still others are provisions which are both 
Rf) q 7introductory and definitional, conferring no rights or duties that
could be enforced. This state of the constitutional provisions
therefore calls for a legal theory which recognises the diverse nature
of these provisions. Dworkin's theory that law consists not only of
ftft’legal rules' but also of 'legal principles'00 and 'policies', best 
explains, in my view, the PNG constitutional arrangement.
Dworkin has sought to refute the positivist theory of law by 
arguing that law involves more than merely the legal rules enforced by 
courts. He contends that the variety of legal requirements that are 
in existence cannot be simply pigeon-holed into only one type of legal 
rule, as the positivist definition of law attempts to do. Dworkin 
formulates his theory by first regarding the various legal 
requirements such as rules and principles as 'standards'. He then 
divides these into 'legal rules' and 'legal principles'. He defines 
the 'legal rules' as those standards which require compliance in an 
'all-or-nothing' manner. That is, one either observes the rules or 
ignores them, and Dworkin gives the traffic rules as examples in this 
respect. But there are other legal 'standards', Dworkin argues, which 
do not fit into this 'all-or-nothing' situation. He prefers to call 
these 'legal principles', and distinguishes them from the 'legal 
rules' in two ways. First, he sees 'legal principles' as relating to
83. In these situations political rather than legal considerations
receive greatest attention from constitution-makers: Ghai (forth­
coming) .
84. See the Constitution Part III - Basic Principles of Government.
85. Ibid., SS.86(4); and 25(1).
86. Part I - Introductory.




some requirement of justice, fairness or morality for the purpose of 
protecting either a group's or an individual's rights. Secondly, he 
conceives of each principle as carrying with it a certain relative 
weight or importance which influences the final choice of a principle 
in a case of conflict.^
Dworkin also identifies a third group of legal 'standards' which 
91he calls 'policies'. He defines a policy as a goal which generally 
requires 'an improvement in some economic, political or social feature 
of the community'. This definition covers the Goals perfectly, for 
the aim of the Goals, as shown above, is to achieve social justice for 
all in the PNG community.
Dworkin's definition of law as involving rules, principles and 
policies is therefore quite comprehensive. This is useful, in that 
such definition neatly accommodates the diverse forms of the legal 
provisions one finds under the PNG Constitution.
9.4 CONCLUSION
The National Goals and the Directive Principles provide a form of 
substantive control over Executive action inasmuch as they attempt to 
prescribe the content of Executive policies and programmes. To apply 
this control effectively on the Executive in order to enable it to 
achieve these Goals is not easy, largely because of two basic problems 
the Constitution itself has created.
First, S.25 of the Constitution addresses two concepts, one of 
implementation and the other of enforcement, without distinguishing 
them clearly. Implementation means positive action required to 
achieve the Goals. For this purpose it is clear from the Preamble 
that bodies both corporate and unincorporate, as well as individual 
persons, are required to implement the Goals. Section 25(2) makes 
this implementation a constitutional duty for all governmental bodies 





the law in a way which gives effect to these Goals, although they have
93done this only occasionally.
Secondly, S.23 raises the question of the enforcement of the 
Goals. This becomes relevant when there is a breach of the Goals. It 
involves a legal liability on the part of the person responsible for 
such breach. The difficulty in enforcing a breach of the Goals
against the Executive or, indeed, against anyone, is that the
94Constitution makes such a breach non-justiciable.
There are a few instances where the Constitution makes a breach 
of the Goals justiciable. But whether the Goals can be enforced in 
these circumstances is uncertain, largely because the law on the point 
still remains to be developed by the courts.
The difficulties of implementating the Goals are further 
reinforced by the generally negative attitude ot both the judiciary 
and the Executive towards the relevance of the Goals. It was with the 
view of changing this situation that the General Constitutional Review 
Commission has recommended to the National Parliament that Goals be 
made justiciable. At the time ot writing Parliament has not debated 
this recommendation.
93. See Bayne, 1982:227.





As I have shown in the first chapter of this thesis the CPC 
distrusted the Executive in both Canberra and PNC. The distrust of 
the former was a reaction against the Australian colonial rule, which 
concentrated power outside the country and allowed little 
participation by Papua New Guineans in the determination of their own 
affairs. The local Executive was distrusted because the CPC suspected 
it of being closely associated with foreign interests, particularly 
those of the Executive in Canberra. This led to a bitter conflict 
between the CPC and the National Coalition Government during the 
constitution-making period. As a result the CPC was determined to 
ensure that the proposed Independence Constitution should adequately 
control the Executive.
The analysis of the constitutional scheme devised tor this 
purpose, has demonstrated that it uses three supplementary techniques. 
First , control is built into the way in which the exercise of the 
total State power is structured. As Chapter 2 has shown, State power 
is divided and controlled as well as shared. This reflects the two 
objectives the CPC wanted the Constitution to achieve, namely, 
effective government ana controlled government. So far the Supreme 
Court has tended to explain the exercise of State power under the 
Constitution in terms of a strict separation of powers, although the 
CPC expressly rejected this approach. In my view the constitutional 
scheme can best be explained by a theory that sees the total State 
power as having been divided into governmental and non-governmental 
powers. The former are concerned with the effective government of the 
country; the latter (although not exclusively) with the control of 
government.
Secondly, the control of those powers vested in the Executive is 
primarily achieved through the National Parliament, the Courts, the 
Ombudsman Commission and the Constitutional Office-Holders. The 
principal means by which Parliament was intended to control the
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Executive were Parliamentary committees, the principle ot ministerial 
responsibility, and the power to dismiss the Executive through 
constructive motions of no confidence. As noted in the Introduction, 
the CPC's recommendations for a comprehensive system of permanent 
Parliamentary committees was rejected by the National Constituent 
Assembly where the National Coalition Government had control. The 
main reason for the Government's opposition was its fear that such a 
comprehensive system of permanent parliamentary committees would 
stifle the work of the Executive, particularly the Ministries. 
Nevertheless, its rejection has often been criticised ana the recent 
General Constitutional Commission found a "strong call for more 
parliamentary committees to be set up".^
The relatively weak position of the Ministry in public service
matters has been redressed to some extent by the Supreme Court in
bouraga's Case. The Court affirmed that the power to discipline the
most important public servant, namely, the Departmental Head, is
vested in the NEC. However, this is not seen as sufficient by the
current Somare Government. Thus, at the time of writing, there were
four major legislative amendments (.two of which were Constitutional
amendments) before the National Parliament, which seen, to transfer all
the powers in management and personnel matters presently vested in the 
oPSC, to the NEC. Undoubtedly, this woula politicise the public 
service to an extent unprecedented in PNG, and is in my view 
unnecessary as well as undesirable. The solution to the problem, 1 
suggest, is to go back to the scheme the CPC recommenaed. This would 
ensure an adequate political control ot the public service, but would 
at the same time, guarantee the indepenaence of the Public Services 
Commission in determining personnel matters.
The power to dismiss the Executive through motions of no 
confidence has so far been effective, inasmuch as it enabled the 
dismissal of one Prime Minister from office. but there are basic 
problems in the practical application or this proceaure. The most
important of these is the uncertainty and aelay in governmental 
activities that follow, once notice ot such a motion of no confidence
1. General Constitutional Commission, 1983:121.
2. See Saffu, 1984:439-440.
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in the Ministry has been given. To overcome these problems, I have 
suggested that two steps be taken. One is to prescribe, in general 
terms, the types of reasons for which motions of no confidence may be 
moved. The other is to provide tor an automatic resort to a General 
Election if Parliament fails to remove the Executive through the vote 
of no confidence on a number of occasions in a given year.^
The scope of judicial review of Executive action has been widened 
not only by the provisions ot S. 155(4) of the Constitution but also by 
the modern doctrine of judicial review which has been adopted by the 
new National Court Rules of 1963. Section 155(4) has received some 
consideration from the courts. They are generally agreed that 
S. 155(4) is a grant of power which has increased the scope of these 
remedies beyond what the Common Law permits inasmuch as it allows 
orders in the nature of the prerogative writs. But the Supreme Court 
is divided on the question whether these orders can only be made in 
the circumstances similar to those in which the writs are available at 
Common Law. Some judges support this strict application of S.155(4) 
whilst the others advocate a more flexible approach.^
Thirdly, the constitution-makers attempted to provide substantive 
controls of the Executive through the provisions on Basic Rights, the 
Principles of Natural Justice, the Leadership Code and the National 
Goals. The Basic Rights ana tne Principles of Natural Justice are 
substantive limitations courts can apply to control Executive action. 
As I have shown, courts have applied these limitations to restrain the 
Executive in a number of important cases, although the full potential 
of the constitutional provisions in this respect still remains to be 
developed.
On the other hand, there has been little judicial support for the 
other two forms of substantive control, namely, the Leadership Code 
and the National Goals. The Leadership Code has only been partly 
successful in practice. I have suggested that this is largely due to 
the fact that the authorities responsible for the enforcement of the
3
3. Chan, 19b2:2.
4. See Chapter 6, supra.
5. See Chapter 7, supra.
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Code have failed to appreciate the interaction between the three types 
of jurisdictions (regulatory, disciplinary and criminal) incorporated 
under the Code. 1 have argued that in order to make the Code more 
effective, more emphasis should be given to the criminal law 
jurisdiction by treating cases in which criminal charges can be 
sustained in accordance with general criminal law.
1 have argued that the National Goals are the major 
constitutional yardstick by which the Executive policy (and indeed the 
policy of any other State institution) is to be measured. Yet this 
study has demonstrated that public authorities, including the courts, 
have made little effort to give effect to these Goals, even though 
they are all bound by them under S.25 of the Constitution. I have 
suggested two factors which, in my view, have contributed to the 
difficulty the courts face in this respect. First, the judges who are 
trained in the Common Law system lack the experience in applying the 
legal concepts of the kind embodied in the Goals. This renders them 
somewhat reluctant to taxe initiatives. Secondly, this disincentive 
is reinforced by the Constitution itself in making the Goals, in 
principle, non-justiciable, even though it requires them to be 
implemented.
The fact that public authorities have tailed to implement the 
Goals, particularly the failure by the courts to play an active role 
in this regard, has not gone unnoticed. It has been brought to the 
attention of the recent General Constitutional Commission that if the 
Goals are to be the charter for a new society as the 
constitution-makers had intended it, then the continued failure of 
public authorities should not be tolerated any longer. Therefore the 
Gommission has recommended that the Goals be made fully justiciable. 
If this recommendation is accepted, the courts will have no choice but 
to develop the new kind of jurisprudence the Constitution requires, if 
it is to achieve its objectives fully.
This, in a way, sums up the general position. The Constitution 
has worked during the last ten years in the sense that it has survived 
some minor tests and experienced no major crisis which it could not
6. See Chapter 8, supra.
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control. However, it is difficult to say that it has proved itself as 
the charter of a new kind of society. Indeed, there are signs of 
serious trials ahead which may either break or strengthen the 
Constitution. Undoubtedly the Constitution will have a chance of 
surviving and of being strengthened, if courts in particular, and 
lawyers in general, begin to view it not only as a technical piece of 
legislation, but as something more fundamental in legal terms, 
affecting the basic foundations of the PNG society. Only then will 
they be in a position to play a more constructive and meaningful part 
in meeting the challenge of shaping an emerging constitutional system 
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THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF THE HEAD OF STATE AND HER POWERS
1) The Institution of the Head of State
The English Monarch as the Head of State for PNG is not of course
new to PNG since the Queen of England was indirectly the Head of State
during much the colonial period. This follows from the fact that the
English monarch is the Head of State for the Australian Commonwealth
under the Federal Constitution. Under that Constitution the English
Monarch is both the Head of State as well as a constituent part of the
federal Parliament.^ Besides this, the tederal executive power is
ovested in the English Monarch. The colonial administration in PNG 
was carried on in the name of the English Monarch. In fact, even 
after the house of Assembly began functioning as an almost 
fully-fledged legislature up to the eve of Independence, the 
Governor-General of Australia, who represented the English Monarch, 
still remained a constituent part of the PNG legislature, although in 
a less significant position, under the Papua New Guinea Act 1949.
The constitutional provisions on the Head of State are 
interesting in that the draftsman has built in one subtle distinction 
which was perhaps not thought of by all the constitutional fathers. 
This is demonstrated by S.82(l) which reads:
Her Majesty the Queen -
(a) having been requested by the people ot PNG, through 
their Constituent Assembly, to become the Queen and 
Head of State of Papua New Guinea; and
(b) having graciously consented so to become, is the Queen 
and Head of State of Papua New Guinea.
1. Section 1 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900 
(63 and 64 Vic; Chapter 14).
2. Ibid., S . 61.
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It is clear irom the section that the English Monarch was
requested by the people of PNG to do two things: first, to become the
Queen of PNG; and secondly, to become the Head of State. She
consented to both requests. The distinction can be properly explained
in the context of the Monarch's two roles in the United Kingdom.
There the Monarch is a social and cultural institution, symbolising
the ideals of the English society. As Morrah has noted, ”[t]he
conception of monarchy as a way of life is not easy to explain to
those who are unaccustomed to it. It can only be fully comprehended 
3from within." Besides this, the Monarch is also a constitutional 
institution since she is part of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, 
and also has powers vested in her by law.
The GPG saw the distinction and used it to reject the concept of 
head of state by arguing that there had never been a monarchy in the 
traditional communities in PNG; and that the functions of the head of 
state could be performed by other public officers.^ But its 
recommendations were rejected by the Gonstituent Assembly. However, 
from the PNG constitutional perspective one would have thought that 
adopting the English Monarch as a social and cultural institution in 
the PNG context was an artiticial and irrelevant exercise. Perhaps, 
what the Constituent Assembly really wanted was simply to adopt the 
English Monarch as the head of state only. Thus S.82(l) could have 
been drafted to provide that the people of PNG had asked the Queen of 
the United Kingdom to become the head or state ot PNG and she 
consented.
The adoption of the Queen as a constitutional institution can be 
explained on two grounds. First, the Queen of England has 
constitutional significance behond her position as Head ot State ol 
the United Kingdom. In particular, she is the head of the 
Commonwealth, though this position is a nominal one. In the light of 
a strong feeling in PNG that the connection with the Commonwealth 
should be retained, there was no other constitutional device through 
which this connection could be retained than through the institution 
of the Queen. This interpretation is supported by S.83 which confers
3. See Morrah, 1938:37; and also de Smith, 1981:119.
4. See Chapter 1, supra for the discussion of these points.
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on the Queen a Papua New Guinean title as "Elizabeth II, Queen ot 
Papua New Guinea and Her Other Realms and Territories, Head ot the 
Commonwealth". Secondly, the distinction made above between the Queen 
as a social institution, and the Queen as Head ot State was as a 
matter of practical politics not acceptable to Buckingham Palace."1
Hence, there are two general constitutional roles of the Queen of 
England as Head of State for PNG. First, the Queen of England is the 
Head of State for PNG for the purpose of the internal constitutional 
order within PNG. Her position as Head of State in this respect 
derives essentially and intrinsically from the terms of the 
Constitution. She’is not the Head of State because she is the Queen 
but because she consented to become the Head of State on request. 
Secondly, the person of the Queen of England performs the external 
constitutional role for PNG as Head ot the Gommonwealth under her 
constitutional position as Elizabeth II, Queen ot Papua New Guinea. 
In this respect she does not act as Head ot State for PNG, but as a 
nominal head of a body of which PNG is a member. This accords with a 
long-recognised international convention that exists among the member 
nations of the Gommonwealth, some of whom, such as India, are 
republics. The Head of the Commonwealth does not therefore, hold any 
constitutional position in the substantive sense within the internal 
constitutional system of a member country. Thus the fact that the 
same person serves in a nominal capacity as Head of the Commonwealth 
for two or more member countries by itself cannot provide a legal 
connection between the members for purposes of maintaining legal 
action within the internal constitutional system of a member country. 
To that extent, the reasoning of Prentice Dep.C.J. (as he then was) 
for instance, in Bradford v. bradford^ that the Royal Prerogative ot 
parens patriae could be taken as applicable in PNG on 30 September 
1975 on the basis of the Queen of Papua New Guinea being also the 
Queen of Australia, cannot be supported. After all the Commonwealth 
of Nations is a fairly loose international organisation held together 
more by political consensus and trust than by a common constitutional 
arrangement between the members.
5. C.J. Lynch:personal communication.
6. [1975J P.N.G.L.R. 305, at 308-309. The relevant issue here was 
whether a non-resident child plaintiff could claim damages at the date 
of the trial for injuries she sustained in an accident whilst resident 
in PNG, by relying on the Royal Prerogative of parens patriae.
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Hence, for purposes of the internal constitutional system of PNG, 
the significance of the Queen of England is her position as the Head 
of State and not as a Queen. There are two clear constitutional 
principles forming the basis on which the Queen of England becomes the 
Head of State. First, she was requested to become the Head of State 
by the people of PNG and she consented.'7 8910 If one reads this principle 
liberally, it means that the Queen of England accepted the position of 
the head of State on the terms the people have spelt out in their 
Gonstitution; secondly, that one of these terms is that her powers and 
functions are to be exercised and performed by her representative, the
C
Governor-General. The Office of Governor-General has since
Independence been held by Papua New Guineans. Sir John Guise was the
first Governor-General until his resignation in February 1977. He was
replaced by Sir Tore Lokoloko, who was then succeeded on 2 March,
1983, by the current incumbent, Sir Kingsford Dibela. In fact, the
provisions governing the qualification tor the office ensure thisqresult by requiring Papua New Guinean citizenship as a qualification.
In terms of rank, the Head of State precedes everybody else in 
PNG. Otherwise, the constitutional position of the head or State is 
essentially a formal one. The two functions she personally periorms 
that are of some constitutional importance are the signing of 
documents appointing a Governor-General, and the documents conferring 
the Queen's honours on Papua New Guineans.^ The signiticance of the 
position of the Head ot State in the modern comparative constitutional 
law of the Gommonwealth however, depends really on the position of her 
representative, viz., the Governor-General.
2) The Governor-General Holding a Personal Office
Nowhere in the Constitution nor in any other legislation is the 
office of the Governor-General expressly created, although a number of 
constitutional provisions do refer to the Governor-General as holding
7. See the Constitution, S.82(l).
8. Ibid., S.82(2).
9. Ibid. , S.87(1) .
10. R. Robertson, Secretary to the Governor-General, Sir Tore 
Lokoloko:personal communication.
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an of f ice. By contrast, the office of the Prime Minister, for
instance, is expressly created by the Constitution. The distinction 
between the two positions is of constitutional importance in two 
respects. First, the Governor-General is the personal representative 
of the Head of State in PNG. His constitutional position is derived 
from the position of the Head of State as such and not from an office 
of Governor-General created by the Constitution. Thus the relevant 
key section of the Constitution, S.82(2), is expressed in terms of the 
appointment of the Governor-General rather than in terms of creating 
the office of the Governor-General. The Governor-General, therefore, 
holds a personal office on behalf of the Head of State. Because it is 
a personal office, the Head of State is obliged to dismiss, remove or
suspend the Governor-General if she receives advice to that effect
12from either the Parliament or the National Executive Council. 
Secondly, the Functions and powers the Governor-General is required to 
perform and exercise are those of the Head of State and not of any 
independent constitutional oftice. This is made obvious by the fact 
that there is no conferment of any independent function or power on 
the Governor-General either by the Constitution or by any other 
legislation.
Three constitutional institutions are involved in the process of
appointing a Governor-General: the Head of State, the National
13Executive Council, and the National Parliament. But the real choice
lies with the Executive. At least so far the three incumbents of the
position have had the support of the Executive of the day. Sir John
Guise was the first Somare Government’s nominee, and was opposed by
two other candidates, Mr Sinaga Giregire and Mr Tei Abal (as he was
then). Sir John Guise won the nomination and was appointed the first
14Governor-General in 1975. On the second occasion, in 1977, when the 
appointment of Sir Tore Lokoloko was made, he had the Government's 
support, even though he was a member of the United Party which was 
then in the Opposition. There were no other nominees. ^  Sir
11. See the Constitution, SS.87-96.
12. Ibid., SS.93-94.
13. Ibid., S.88(l).
14. See Griffin, Nelson and Firth 1979:224-225.
15. Ibid., 244.
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Kingsford Dibeia, who became the third Governor-General in March 1983, 
was a member of the PAlNiGU Pati and was the Speaker of the 1977-1982 
Parliament.
The procedure for nominating a person as a candidate for the 
Governor-Generalship is provided under the Organic Law on the
Nomination of the Governor-General. Section 4 of the Organic Law 
requires the nomination to be signed by the person proposing the 
nomination as well as by the nominee himself with signatures of not 
fewer than fifteen other members of the Parliament. The nomination 
must be in accordance with a prescribed form set out in Schedule I of 
the Organic Law. * It is obvious from the provisions of the
Constitution and the Organic Law that the procedure for the nomination 
is restricted to and involves only members of Parliament, in that the
1 hiproposer must be a member of Parliament as well as the seconders. °
However, the person being nominated need not be a Member of
17Parliament. But he must be qualified to be a member of Parliament. 
The first two Governors-General, viz., Sir John Guise and Sir Tore 
Lokoloko were members of Parliament at the time of their respective 
appointments. But Sir Kingsford Dibeia was at the time of his
appointment an ordinary citizen, having lost his seat in the 1982
General Elections. But he was qualified to be a member of Parliament 
within the meaning of S.103 of the Constitution.
A Governor-General holds the position for six years from the date 
on which he assumes the position. He may elect to serve for a second 
term, but he is not eligible for the position after the second term.^ 
Two considerations appear to underlie this arrangement: in normal
circumstances, the nominee for the position of the Governor-General 
would be an elderly man of experience who would be approximately 
reaching his retiring age at the end of his second term, if not at the 
end of his first term. He would then retire in peace. However, 
should he appear to be interested in taking advantage of his position
16. See Schedule I to the Organic Law on the Nomination of the 
Governor-General.
17. The Constitution, S.87(l); and see also S.103 for the 
qualifications of a Member of Parliament.
18. Ibid., S . 91.
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for political purposes, and this could easily happen with a relatively
young incumbent , then he should not be allowed to continue to misuse
for longer than twelve years the position which should be seen as 
19above politics. These considerations naturally would not determine 
the choice of a particular person. For there could be a host of 
reasons for which the Executive of the day may support one nominee and 
not the others. It may be argued that Somare has used the position of 
Governor-General as a backwater in which he pushes his potential 
rivals. But, whilst this may be true for the first Governor-General 
who resigned and eventually challenged Somare on the floor of the 
Parliament for the position of Prime Minister, it would be difficult 
to maintain that the same argument applies to the others.
The terms and conditions under which the Governor-General is 
appointed are provided for by the Organic Law on the Terms and 
Gonditions of Employment of the Governor-General. These include inter
alia, his salary to be paid on the same level as the Speaker of the
20National Parliament. Besides this, he is entitled to an annual
pension calculated at seventy per cent of a Governor-General's salary 
21after he retires.
The powers the Governor-General exercises are those of the Head 
of State, \vhat then are these powers?
3) The Head of State, the Royal Prerogatives 
and the Subordinate Legislative Power
Section 138 of the Constitution puts it beyond doubt that the 
legal basis of the executive power of the Head of State is statutory. 
In practical terms, the exercise of this power does not pose any real 
danger because of the constitutional requirement that it must be 
exercised in accordance with advice. Two matters need to be 
explained: first, the question of the extent to which Royal
Prerogatives apply under the Constitution; and secondly, the nature of 
the power to enact subordinate legislation.
19. See Wolfers, 1977:81-82.




3.1) The Royal Prerogatives: The Dead-Letter Laws
The Constitution adopts the principles and rules of Common Law as 
part of the Underlying Law, and provides in Schedule 2.2(2) that they 
include those "relating to the Royal Prerogative". The Schedule also 
provides that the rules of Common Law apply unless they are 
inconsistent with a Constitutional Law or a statute; or are 
inapplicable or inappropriate to the circumstances of the country from 
time to time; or are in their application to any particular matter 
inconsistent with custom as adopted under Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the 
Constitution.
The prerogatives expressly included in the Constitution are those 
relating to the power to declare martial law; the power to grant a
letter of denization, or power to do any act, provision for which is
o nalready made by statute, including the Constitution itself.
The recommendation to include the Royal Prerogative came from the 
Crown Solicitor's Office. In a brief to Somare, dated 14th Hay, Hr 
1. Tarua, the then Acting First Assistant Secretary in the Chiet 
Minister's Department, advised Somare that Hr P. Clay of the Crown 
Solicitor's Office haa investigated the question of prerogative powers
and had recommended that except for those specific ones stated in the
23preceding paragraph they be adopted as part of the Common Law. It
appears therefore that the present provisions of Schedule 2.2(2) are 
in fact based on Peter Clay's recommendation.
Goldring takes the view that Prerogative Powers apply where there
0  /is no provision made by statute." This view is based on the literal 
interpretation of Schedule 2.2(2) and also appears to reflect what 
Peter Clay recommended. The basic question that arises is whether the 
Royal Prerogatives have been incorporated into the Constitution and 
whether, and to what extent they do actually apply.
22. See the Constitution, Sch.2.2(2).
23. "Brief to the Chief Minister (on) Head of State". I.F. Tarua, 
A/First Assistant Secretary (Political Development), 14 May, 1975.
24. Goldring, 1978:49.
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The fact that the Royal Prerogatives are part of the Underlying 
Law cannot be disputed. But the recommendation to incorporate the 
Royal Prerogatives was ill-conceived, although it is explainable under 
the circumstances at the time. It was clear to the Crown Solicitor’s 
Office that with the comprehensive recommendations of the CPC covering 
both emergency powers and citizenship, it was difficult to see how any 
prerogatives pertaining to either of these areas could be applicable. 
This resulted in the recommendation which the Office finally made to 
exclude the incorporation into the Constitution of any prerogative 
powers relating to both of these areas.
For other prerogative powers, the Crown Solicitor's Office was 
not sure, presumably because there was inadequate time to carry out 
the necessary research. Accordingly, a policy of expediency seems to 
have been adopted in recommending a general provision to the effect 
that unless statute law made provision, prerogative powers do exist, 
and are applicable. This tactic is reflected in the provisions of 
Schedule 2.2(2)(c) of the Constitution. The reasoning seems to have 
been to adopt the whole parcel of the Royal Prerogatives (apart from 
the two exceptions stated above) since it was difficult at the time to 
establish whether there was a statutory provision in every relevant 
area; and, therefore, it was best to let the details of their 
application be regulated by statute. This reasoning was also 
accompanied by the concern that there should not be any hiatus in the 
law.
Dicey defined prerogative powers as the residue of arbitrary 
authority which at any given time is legally left in the hands of the
') c:Crown. Although various authorities on constitutional law have
emphasised that the exercise of Prerogative Power is circumscribed 
very much by constitutional conventions,^ they have failed to 
emphasise that it still retains an inherent element of arbitrariness. 
The dismissal of the Australian Prime Minister by the Governor- 
General, Sir John Kerr, on 11th November, 1975, illustrates this 
inherent danger.
25. Dicey, 1965:424.
26. See Heuston, 1964:64-66.
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I n  t h e  PNG c o n t e x t  t h e  Supreme C o u r t  made i t  p e r t e c t l y  c l e a r  i n  
27Wonom's Case  t h a t  power  b e l o n g e d  t o  t h e  P e o p l e .  I n  t h e  w ord s  of
F r o s t  C . J . ,
The C o n s t i t u t i o n  i t s e l f  i s  a t r u l y  a u t o c h t h o n o u s  c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  
e s t a b l i s h e d ,  a s  t h e  p r e a m b l e  r e c i t e s ,  by t h e  w i l l  o f  t h e  
p e o p l e ,  t o  whom ' a l l  Power b e l o n g s ' .  I t s  a u t h o r i t y  i s  t h u s  
o r i g i n a l  and i n  no way d e r i v a t i v e  f rom  an y  o t h e r  s o u r c e .  
U n l i k e  t h e  c a s e  o f  A u s t r a l i a ,  w h e re  t h e  f i r s t  s e t t l e r s  b r o u g h t  
w i t h  them t h e  common l a w ,  t h e r e  i s ,  t o  u s e  t h e  w ord s  o f  S i r  
Owen D ix o n ,  s p e a k i n g  o f  t h e  A m e r ic a n  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  ' n o  
a n t e r i o r  l a w  p r o v i d i n g  f o r  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  now 
e s t a b l i s h e d ' .
Wonom's Case  was d e c i d e d  i n  S e p t e m b e r  1975 ,  o n l y  one week a f t e r
• 29I n d e p e n d e n c e .  I n  O c t o b e r  1975 F r o s t  C . J .  i n  Yamba v .  G e r u ,
r e j e c t e d  t h e  a r g u m e n t  t h a t  t h e  r o y a l  p r e r o g a t i v e  o f  t h e  Queen as
p a r e n s  p a t r i a e  was d e l e g a t e d  t o  t h e  j u d g e s  by t h e  Queen and he
e x p l a i n e d  h i s  r e a s o n i n g  t h u s ,
I n  my o p i n i o n  i t  f o l l o w s  f r o m  j u d g m e n t s  i n  The S t a t e  v .
J o h n  Mogo Wonom . . .  t h a t  i t  i s  no l o n g e r  t h e  l aw  t h a t  t h a t  
p a r t  of  t h e  p r e r o g a t i v e  i s  d e l e g a t e d  by Her M a j e s t y  t o  t h e  
J u d g e s .  I t  h a s  b e e n  d i s p l a c e d  by r e a s o n  o f  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
p r o v i s i o n  t h a t ,  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  t h e  j u d i c i a l  
power o f  t h e  p e o p l e  i s  v e s t e d  i n  t h e  N a t i o n a l  J u d i c i a l  S y s te m .  
(Co n s t i t u t i o n  s . 5 8 ( l ) . )  But  t h e r e  ca n  be no d o u b t  t h a t  t h e  
j u d i c i a l  power  o f  t h e  p o e p l e  i s  a s  p l e n a r y  a s  t h e  Royal  
P r e r o g a t i v e  w h i c h  a t t a c h e d  t o  t h e  Queen a s  t h e  d i s p e n s e r  of  
j u s t i c e  . . .  o r  a s  p a r e n s  p a t r i a e ,  and i s  amply s u f f i c i e n t  to  
s u p p o r t  „ t h e  w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d  r u l e s  f o r  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  
i n f a n t s . ^
F r o s t  C . J .  e x p r e s s l y  r e j e c t e d  t h e  d e c i s i o n  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  C o u r t
31( P r e n t i c e  D e p . C . J . )  i n  B r a d f o r d  v .  B r a d f o r d  w h ich  was d e c i d e d  on t h e  
same day a s  Vvonom's C a s e .  G e r u s '  C a s e , l i k e  B r a d f o r d ' s  C a s e , i n v o l v e d  
t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  b a s i s  f o r  t h e  j u d i c i a l  power  o f  t h e  
N a t i o n a l  C o u r t  t o  a p p r o v e  s e t t l e m e n t s  r e l a t i n g  t o  w e l f a r e  o f  i n f a n t s .  
I n  G e r u s ' Case  t h e  s e t t l e m e n t  was a co m pro m ise  r e a c h e d  b e tw e e n  t h e  
p a r t i e s  f o r  t h e  w e l f a r e  o f  t h r e e  c h i l d r e n  and  t h e i r  m o t h e r  a s  a r e s u l t  
of  t h e i r  f a t h e r ' s  d e a t h  c a u s e d  by t h e  d e f e n d a n t ' s  n e g l i g e n c e .  T h es e  
c a s e s  i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  o p p o s i t i o n  by t h e  j u d g e s  t o  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f
2 7 .  11975] P . N . G . L . R .  3 1 1 .
2 8 .  I b i d . , 3 1 5 - 3 1 6 .
2 9 .  [1 975]  P . N . G . L . R .  3 2 2 .
3 ° .  I b i d . , 323 .
3 1 .  [ 1975 ] P . N . G . L . R .  3 0 5 .  See C h a p t e r  2 ,  s u p r a ,  f o r  a more
d e t a i l e d  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h i s  c a s e .
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the Royal Prerogative despite the tact that Schedule 2.2 of the 
Constitution appears to have adopted them.
For purposes of PNG public law, the formal existence of the Royal
Prerogatives may be acknowledged. It is difficult however, to
envisage cases where they could apply because there are exhaustive
statutory provisions. The law on this point was laid down by the
House of Lords in the leading case of Attorney-General v. De Keyser’s 
32Royal Hotel Ltd, where it held that if both the Prerogative and
statute make provisions governing the same area, then statute
supersedes the prerogative. In that case the lessees of a hotel
possessed by the Crown for wartime administrative purposes sought
compensation on the grounds that the statute under which the Crown
took possession gave them the right to compensation. The Crown
attempted to avoid lability by arguing that it took possession under
the Royal Prerogative which does not allow such compensation. The
House of Lords ruled that the Crown had to comply with its statutory 
33obligations.
Although the formal existence of the Royal Prerogatives may be 
acknowledged, it is difficult to ascertain the situations in which 
there are no statutory provisions, thereby enabling them to be 
applied. It is worth looking briefly at the areas where the Royal 
Prerogatives apply in the United Kingdom to see whether they similarly 
apply in PNG. From the perspective of public law, there are 
essentially eight Royal Prerogatives of any significance. They are:
- The power to call, prorogue and dissolve Parliament;
- the power to preside over the opening of a new Parliament;
- the power to appoint the ministry and to dismiss them;
- the power to make treaties and to send and receive ambassadors;
- the power to own ownerless land;
- the right to priority as a creditor in cases of bankruptcy;
- the power to grant a pardon;
- the power to maintain the office of the Governor-General. 4
32. [1920] A.C. 508.
33. See generally, Goldring, 1974; and Hogg, 1971:172-175.
34. See Stevens, 1982:83-85.
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All these powers outlined above are provided and defined by 
statutes of various forms ranging from the Constitution itself to 
subordinate legislation such as the Standing Orders of the Parliament. 
There is no possible basis on which the Royal Prerogative could apply. 
A brief survey of each of these areas in the order as set out above, 
is warranted at this point to support the argument that in every case 
there is a statutory provision.
The Calling and Prorogation of the Parliament
The power of the Head of State to call Parliament after a General
Election is conferred on her by S.l of the Organic Law on the Calling
35of Meetings of the Parliament. In tact, the Governor-General acts 
in this respect on the advice of the outgoing Prime Minister and the 
outgoing Speaker of the Parliament, both of whom she is required to 
consult under this S.l. Even the power of issuing the writ for a 
General Election is statutory, in that it is conferred on the Head of 
State under S.74 of the Organic Law on National Elections.
The prerogative of proroguing and dissolving Parliament is 
replaced by a very elaborate and systematic provision for no 
confidence motions under SS.145 and 107 of the Constitution. If there 
is no General Election before the five-year term of a Parliament 
expires, the Parliament stands prorogued until new members are 
returned after a General Election. All this is determined by statute 
and not by prerogative.
b) Presiding Over the Parliament
The Governor-General does not preside over the proceedings of the
O £Parliament. This is the role of the Speaker. ° At the meeting of a
new Parliament, the Governor-General addresses the Parliament and this
17is authorised by the Standing Orders of the national Parliament, 
just as there are Standing Orders authorising his presence in the
35. As authorised by S.124(2) of the Constitution.
36. The Constitution, S.108.
37. Standing Orders 8(2) and 9. Standing Orders are made by the 
Parliament by power given to it for the purpose under S.133 of the 
Constitution.
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o oParliament on other occasions.0
c) Appointment and Dismissal of Ministers
The power to appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister and his
ministry is provided by the Constitution, and therefore is statutory.
The Prime Minister is appointed by the Head of State, but on the
nomination of the Parliament, leaving no discretion to the Head of 
39State. The appointment of other Ministers is also made by the Head 
of State, but again on the nomination of the Prime Minis ter. ^  In 
both cases the effective decision is that of the authority that 
nominates, and the role of the Head of State is a mere formality.
d) Treaties
The power of the Head of State to sign treaties and other 
international agreements between PNG and other states is also a
A 1constitutional power rather than a prerogative power. Once again, 
the Head of State acts on the advice of the NEC in this area, and the 
Parliament has the power of disallowing the proposed treaty, z unless 
the giving of consent is dispensed with through the combined action of 
the Prime Minister and the Speaker, or it the Parliament waives the 
requirement.^
e) Crown Land
It is untenable to argue that under the present land legislation 
there is still room for the application of the Crown prerogative to 
ownership of ownerless land. In fact, the only pieces of land that 
were ownerless were called "waste and vacant land", but there were 
provisions under the British New Guinea Crown Lands Ordinance 1890
38. For instance, when presenting a new Speaker: Standing Order
6(2); and administering oaths: Standing Order 5(2).
39. The Constitution, S.141.
40. Ibid., S.144.
41. The Constitution, S.117(2).
42. Ibid., sub-s.(3).
43. The Constitution, S.117(5).
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which provided proper registration of these as Crown Land.^ This is 
the position under the present legislation covering the whole country. 
Although the power of declaring land as "waste and vacant" appears to 
have been exercised arbitrarily at times, there has been no argument 
that the source of this power has been other than statutory.
Even if the original source of power were prerogative, this is 
now clearly replaced by statute in that the Constitution provides for 
State title to lancis that have been claimed to be Crown land during 
the pre-independent period. ^  This title includes those pieces of 
land that were declared to be "waste and vacant". The legal ownership 
of those types of land has always been questioned by Papua New 
Guineans and their resentment over the years has necessitated the 
return to traditional owners of 220,000 hectares of this type of land 
by the Government.
Ownership of land in PNG has two legal bases: one statutory and
the other customary. Neither has a semblance or connection with the 
Prerogative in any sense.
f) The Priority in Bankruptcy
The situation of bankruptcy in PNG is governed by statute. The
47chief statute in this area is the Insolvency Act 1951. The winding 
up of corporate entities such as companies is specitically provided 
for under their respective legislation.
In none of these statutes is there a provision that gives the
Head of State a priority among creditors. lor instance, S.292 of the
48Companies Act 1962 (as amended) dealing with priorities in a 
winding-up of a company does not even mention the Head of State.
Generally the Prerogative of the Crown in this area of the law 
has been effectively abrogated in the Commonwealth by statute, apart
44. See Lalor, 1969:137-140.
45. See the Constitution, S.54.
46. See Fingleton, 1981:229.
47. No. 64 of 1951.
48. No. 1 of 1964.
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49from a few constitutional limitations which, however, do not exist 
in PNG.
g) Power of Mercy
The Power of Mercy is provided for by the Constitution,^ leaving 
no possibility for the Prerogative power to apply. Under the
Constitution, the Head of State exercises the power of mercy on a 
convicted person on the advice of the NEC after the NEC has received a 
recommendation from the Committee on the Power of Mercy. These 
provisions not only state the statutory basis for the power, but also 
define the restrictions which do not exist under the Prerogative. The 
Organic Law on the Power of Mercy does not confer any additional power 
on either the Head of State or anybody else than the power the 
Constitution confers. Thus, the area is completely occupied by 
statute, as Coldring also recognises."’'*'
The Office of Governor-General
There is a view held by some writers that the Queen has
prerogative power to create and control the office of the Governor- 
52General. Whilst this may be so in those Commonwealth countries
which do not have constitutional provisions covering the office, it is 
not the case in PNC where the Constitution makes very elaborate
provisions. To an extent the appropriation of moneys for the
Governor-General is guaranteed under the Organic Law on the Conditions 
of Appointment of the Governor-General, but the details of annual 
appropriations are provided for by the annual Appropriation Act. The 
Head of State appoints ana dismisses the Governor-General on the
advice of the NEC following a recommendation of the Parliament. She 
has no independent discretion in each case. She does not pay the 
expenses of the Office either directly or indirectly. The Papua New 
Guinean taxpayer does.
49. See McPherson, 1968:443-444.
50. See the Constitution, S.151.
51. Goldring, 1978:49 ; and see a more detailed analysis of this 
power in Chapter 3, supra.
52. Monet, 1979:48-49
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The general trend on the question of the Royal Prerogative has 
been a gradual restriction of these by statutes over the years, until 
they are either non-existent or they are insignificant. As Hogg 
observes:
The history (of proceedings against the Crown) is uniformly in 
the direction of subjecting the crown to the same legal 
processes as the subject. The many royal immunities which 
originated in medieval concepts of Kingship have now all but 
disappeared. They have disappeared, of course, because they 
did not serve any modern purpose, and they frustrated the 
administration of justice between Crown and subject. J
The CPC was quite emphatic that:
In the great majority of the societies that make up our 
nation, it was from the people rather than from kings or 
chiefs that power was taken by the colonial rulers. It is 
therefore appropriate that it be the people to whom that power 
should now be returned. The principle that power derives from 
the people provides the basis of the Constitution. 4
From the foregoing analysis it is clear that even though the 
Constitution recognises the existence of the Royal Prerogative, the 
application of the Prerogatives is rendered insignificant by the fact 
that the major part of the field is now occupied by statute. This 
means, in relation to their application in the area of public law, the 
Royal Prerogatives are dead-letter law in PNG.
4) The Head of State and the Subordinate Legislative Power
In practice, the Head of State often exercises a power to enact 
subordinate legislation. A constitutional question in relation to 
this power is whether it is executive or legislative. For present 
purposes it is important not only to answer this question but also to 
explain the constitutional basis of that answer.
It is difficult to see how this power could be regarded as part 
of the executive power since prima tacie it is a law-making power. It 
is the power to lay down legal rules that bind individuals as well as 
other legal entities. This is clear from S. 116(3) of the Constitution 
which vests in the Parliament the power to disallow any subordinate
53. Hogg, 1971:233.
54. CPC, 1974:7/1, para. 1.
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legislation. Even the tact that the Governor-General acts on advice 
when he enacts a subordinate legislative enactment does not give that 
power an executive characteristic since the ambit of S.86 of the 
Constitution requiring him to act on advice is not restricted to the 
exercise of executive power alone. The section refers to the exercise 
of powers and the performance of functions of the Head of State with 
no specifications.
The history of the power of the Monarch to make subordinate 
legislation in England confirms that the power is a law-making power 
delegated to the Crown since Parliament cannot, for practical 
purposes, perform' all the detailed functions of government. 
However, Parliament retains the power to oversee the actual enactments 
to ensure that they do not breach the ambits of their respective 
enabling statutes. This parliamentary scrutiny is further
supplemented by the doctrine of ultra vires that courts apply to
subordinate legislation.-^
In brief, the constitutional basis of the power of the Head of 
State to enact subordinate legislative enactments may be explained as 
follows. The power is a law-making power and is a part of the 
legislative power of the People. Although S.109 of the Constitution 
does not by itself appear to authorise any delegation, the fact that 
it vests in Parliament the law-making power but subject to the 
Constitution means that delegation, if any, must depend on other 
provisions of the Constitution. Since the law-making power is part of 
the legislative power which is vested in the Parliament under S.100 of 
the Constitution, and since S.100(2) authorises delegation of 
legislative power, the power to make subordinate legislative 
enactments must be deemed to have been delegated by the Constitution 
under that subsection, and subsequently by particular Acts of 
Parliament.
One further question is whether the law-making power of the Head 
of State delegated under S.100(2) of the Constitution extends beyond 
the power to make subordinate legislative enactments. It is obvious
55. See Eddy, 1957:56.
56. See hartley and Griffith, 1975:350.
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that it does not. The proposition derives support from a strong 
constitutional convention that the Head of State's legislative power 
in this respect extends no further than the enactment of subordinate 
legislation. The power is not independent in terms of its source, but 
rather, dependent on the enabling legislation of Parliament (as the 
very word 'substitute' implies). Certainly in the constitutional 
history of PNG, there has not been any case either before or after 
Independence, when the Head of State attempted to enact Acts or other 
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